self-indication assumption (SIA)
The anthropic principle that gives a boost to possibilities containing more copies of observers like you—favoring worlds with many instantiations of your experience (absolute numbers).
As defined in 345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe
Other definitions
An anthropic principle holding you should treat your existence as more likely in worlds containing more observers who share your evidence.
Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
Where it comes up · 2
- Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics3 claims
- 345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe3 claims
Most important claims · 6 of 6Search all claims for “self-indication assumption (SIA)” →
- The Self-Indication Assumption (SIA) holds you should think it more likely you exist in worlds with more people sharing your evidence; in the God's-coin-toss case it implies the coin most likely came up the way that creates a million people (one-in-a-million on heads), which Carlsmith argues is a better conclusion than the alternative SSA.Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
- Both SIA and SSA ultimately break when confronted with infinite universes: SIA naively becomes certain you live in an infinite-population universe and then cannot compare infinite universes, and SSA also struggles, so infinities break anthropic reasoning in ways analogous to how they break ethics.Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
- Under SIA the Doomsday Argument dissolves: you start very confident you're in the populous (tails) world, but once you update on the surprising fact of being in the 21st century you return to your prior 50/50 on extinction, so SIA leaves you back at normality rather than predicting doom.Joseph Carlsmith - Utopia, AI, & Infinite Ethics
- The two main anthropic views differ in what they boost: SIA (self-indication assumption) boosts possibilities with many copies of observers like you (absolute numbers), while SSA (self-sampling assumption) boosts possibilities in which a high fraction of observers are like you (frequencies), and SSA requires fixing a free parameter about what counts as sufficiently like you.345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe
- Carroll's preferred approach (close to Radford Neal's fully non-indexical conditioning) judges theories by the probability that in that theory at least one observer exactly like you arises; this boosts large stochastic theories with many observers but does not keep giving an infinite boost as duplicates multiply, because all that matters is that at least one such observer exists.345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe
- Accepting the thirder/SIA view—that worlds with many instantiations of your state of mind get a boost—forces the conclusion that a cosmological theory positing many observers gets a large evidential boost merely because there are more copies of you, a presumptuous result that lets cosmological determinations depend on this factor from the armchair.345 | Adam Elga on Being Rational in a Very Large Universe