repeated prisoner's dilemma
A game-theory setup in which players face the prisoner's dilemma repeatedly, allowing cooperation to emerge as an equilibrium because future interactions reward trustworthy behavior.
As defined in Garett Jones
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- Garett Jones2 claims
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- Drawing on Axelrod's Evolution of Cooperation, smarter people are more cooperative because they exhibit the 'three Ps' of the repeated prisoner's dilemma to a greater degree: they are more patient (focused on long-run payoffs), more pleasant (willing to start by cooperating), and more perceptive (better at tracking the game's history)—all three of which experiments show are crucial for sustaining group cooperation.Garett Jones
- Drawing on Gary Miller's Managerial Dilemmas, Arrow's impossibility theorem and Condorcet preference cycling apply inside firms just as in voting, so corporations face the same difficulties making rational decisions; the only solution is to recognize firm culture as an equilibrium to a repeated prisoner's dilemma—a long-run cooperation game—where failed firms are those that failed to coordinate on a good cooperative equilibrium, an insight that explains not just firms but societies as a whole.Garett Jones