public goods game
An experimental game, essentially a multi-person prisoner's dilemma, in which it is in each individual's selfish interest not to contribute but everyone is better off if all contribute.
As defined in 247 | Samuel Bowles on Economics, Cooperation, and Inequality
Where it comes up · 4
- 176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems2 claims
- How We Tamed Ourselves and Invented Good and Evil (with Hanno Sauer)1 claim
- Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism1 claim
- 247 | Samuel Bowles on Economics, Cooperation, and Inequality1 claim
Most important claims · 5 of 5Search all claims for “public goods game” →
- In repeated public-goods experiments, contributions collapse toward zero, but when players can pay a cost to reduce free riders' payoffs, they punish heavily, contributions rise to around 80%, and punishment becomes unnecessary by the end — and people will pay to punish free riders even when the target won't learn of it until after the game, showing a deep predisposition to punish unfairness.247 | Samuel Bowles on Economics, Cooperation, and Inequality
- The way a society cooperates—more collectivist versus more individualist—is shaped by its material conditions and subsistence ecology: whale-hunting peoples (Lamalera) who need collective hunting parties are exceptionally cooperative in economic games, individual hunters (Machiguenga) cooperate mainly within family, and rice-cultivating cultures (requiring intense coordination) trend collectivist while herding/wheat cultures trend individualist.Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism
- Experimental economics public-goods games show that cooperation begins in the first rounds but then unravels, yet when a punishment option is introduced, cooperation can be stabilized—demonstrating that social sanctions are a necessary mechanism for straightening out 'the crooked timber of humanity.'How We Tamed Ourselves and Invented Good and Evil (with Hanno Sauer)
- In Benedikt Herrmann's 2008 cross-city public goods study, cosmopolitan cities like Copenhagen, Switzerland, and Boston showed immediate cooperation sustained by punishment of free-riders, but in smaller-world societies like Athens, Muscat, or Riyadh, non-cooperators punished the cooperators—'antisocial punishment'—reflecting resentment of coercion and a learned distrust of strangers.176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems
- In a public goods game studied with Dave Rand and Martin Nowak, putting people under time pressure made them more likely to do the cooperative 'us-ish' thing and contribute, while time to deliberate made them more selfish—though follow-up research shows the effect depends heavily on cultural experience of whether cooperating with strangers is normally rewarded.176 | Joshua Greene on Morality, Psychology, and Trolley Problems