public choice theory
The economic study of how self-interested behavior by political actors and interest groups shapes government decisions, often producing capture and rent-seeking.
As defined in Cass Sunstein on #Republic
Other definitions
The economic study of political decision-making, which assumes politicians and officials pursue their own interests (such as re-election) rather than acting purely for the public good.
Dick Carpenter on BottleneckersThe economic analysis of political behavior holding that public-sector actors pursue their own interests (especially power) just as private actors pursue wealth.
George Will on the Conservative SensibilityThe application of economics to political decision-making, treating politicians, bureaucrats, and agencies as self-interested actors pursuing their own gain rather than a unified national interest.
Pradyu Prasad - Imperial Japan, the God Emperor, and Militarization in the Modern World
Where it comes up · 6
- Richard Hanania - Foreign Policy, Fertility, and Wokeness3 claims
- Ricardo Reis on Keynes, Macroeconomics, and Monetary Policy 04/27/20092 claims
- Cass Sunstein on #Republic2 claims
- Pradyu Prasad - Imperial Japan, the God Emperor, and Militarization in the Modern World2 claims
- Dick Carpenter on Bottleneckers1 claim
- George Will on the Conservative Sensibility1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 11Search all claims for “public choice theory” →
- Macroeconomists have models of why government spending matters and models of how spending should be set optimally, but almost none model how government spending is actually set through the political process, so the variable G is treated as exogenous.Ricardo Reis on Keynes, Macroeconomics, and Monetary Policy 04/27/2009
- Public choice theory explains most Japanese war crimes and aggression: the army and navy, angry that the Depression cut their budgets, manufactured crises in East Asia (and in the army's case actively created them) to justify budget increases, and a weak civilian government kept funding them, dragging Japan into WWII.Pradyu Prasad - Imperial Japan, the God Emperor, and Militarization in the Modern World
- Per Public Choice theory, elected officials have their own interest—re-election—rather than the public's interest, producing an implicit quid pro quo where officials grant a license to a special interest group and that group then supports the official at the next election, while diffuse consumers remain unrepresented because they don't even know the decision is happening.Dick Carpenter on Bottleneckers
- Self-interest distorts foreign policy more than domestic policy because foreign policy lacks the tight feedback loops and accountability mechanisms that discipline domestic outcomes, allowing special interests (generals, weapons manufacturers, foreign governments) to shape decisions without correction.Richard Hanania - Foreign Policy, Fertility, and Wokeness
- The notion that the United States pursues a coherent grand strategy is largely an illusion; observed foreign policy behavior is better explained as the aggregate output of competing self-interested actors than as the execution of a rational national plan.Richard Hanania - Foreign Policy, Fertility, and Wokeness
- Under the tutorship of Public Choice Theory (Buchanan and Tullock), Will shed his romantic view of government and concluded that just as private-sector actors maximize wealth, public-sector actors maximize power, so the national pastime is no longer baseball but rent-seeking—bending public power for private advantage to confer benefits on a faction or disadvantage its competitors.George Will on the Conservative Sensibility
- The unitary actor model does not apply to nation-states because they are heavily driven by internal factions, individuals, and special interest groups (e.g., the imperial way faction in Japan), as argued in Hanania's 'Public Choice Theory and the Illusion of Grand Strategy.'Pradyu Prasad - Imperial Japan, the God Emperor, and Militarization in the Modern World
- Macro education has a three-stage structure: models of why government spending matters, then models of how it should optimally be set, and then the missing third stage of how it is actually set; the omission is partly a matter of running out of time and partly because the third stage is too hard to model.Ricardo Reis on Keynes, Macroeconomics, and Monetary Policy 04/27/2009
- The relevant question about government intervention is not whether it could in principle achieve good while guarding against special interests, but whether it actually does so in practice, since agreeing on the ideal does not settle what happens when government uses its collective power.Cass Sunstein on #Republic
- Based on his government experience, Sunstein judges that public choice problems (special interest capture) are a comparatively tiny source of problems in Executive Branch decision making though larger in Congress, that academics focus on them too much, but that a cost-benefit filter is still needed to reduce the chance of disastrous capture.Cass Sunstein on #Republic