Dick Carpenter on Bottleneckers
What this covers
Dick Carpenter of the Institute for Justice discusses his book Bottleneckers with host Russ Roberts, examining how occupational licenses function as tools of market restriction rather than public protection. Carpenter argues that licenses are created not by consumers seeking safety but by incumbent industries lobbying legislatures to bar competitors, with regulatory boards then captured by those same industries. The conversation traces this pattern across specific cases—funeral directors inflating casket prices, cosmetologists blocking African hair braiders, wine distributors preventing direct sales—and explores how Concentrated Interests vs Diffuse Costs explains why organized industries win while scattered consumers remain unrepresented. Roberts grounds the discussion in Bruce Yandle's Bootleggers and Baptists framework, where idealistic justifications provide cover for profit-seeking restrictions, illustrated by J. D. Rockefeller's dual role in Prohibition.
The episode spans licensing's economic toll—Morris Kleiner's research on lost jobs, state-by-state variation in requirements that defies rational justification, and the disproportionate burden on low-income workers and ex-offenders—alongside constitutional terrain. Randy Barnett's contrast between a Presumption of Liberty vs Presumption of Constitutionality frames whether occupations should be free unless proven dangerous or restricted unless proven safe. Carpenter contends the choice is not binary: Market Regulation via Reputation, bonding, registration, and inspection provide consumer protection without entry barriers. Examples like Nathaniel Craigmiles's casket litigation and Juanita Swedenberg's wine-shipping case illustrate how Less Restrictive Alternative solutions address genuine harms while preserving opportunity. The discussion also addresses License Creep—growth from 5% of workers licensed in the 1950s to 25% today—and Conflict of Interest when universities lobby for training mandates that benefit their own programs.
Carpenter argues that occupational licensing is overwhelmingly a tool created by incumbent industries ('bottleneckers') to restrict competition under the guise of protecting public health and safety, imposing large economic costs while delivering little of its claimed benefit—and that less restrictive alternatives plus market-based reputation systems can serve consumers better.
- Licenses are created by industries lobbying legislatures, not by harmed consumers, and the overseeing boards get captured by those same industries
- Licensing reliably keeps people out of occupations, inflating prices/wages and reducing jobs and mobility, without evidence it improves safety or quality
- Market regulation (ratings, bonding, registration, certification) and platforms like Uber can deliver consumer protection without restricting entry
Licensing is deliberately created and controlled by incumbent industries to restrict competition and increase their economic returns.
- Licenses are overwhelmingly created not by harmed consumers or concerned citizens petitioning the legislature, but by industries themselves going state by state—often via task forces—to ask the legislature for a license, with requirements designed and controlled by the industry.
“licenses are not created by harmed consumers and concerned citizens going to the legislature and beating down the doors asking for protection. These licenses are overwhelmingly created by these industries going to the legislature and asking for the license.”
- Occupational licensing is one of the rare public policies that does exactly what it is designed to do—keep people out of an occupation; this is an intended, not unintended, consequence, and by restricting the flow of workers it lets incumbents artificially inflate prices and wages.
“occupational licensing is one of the rare public policies that does exactly what it's designed to do. It keeps people out. We talk about unintended consequences of public policy. This is an intended consequence of licensing.”
- Once a license is created, the board that oversees it is immediately captured—most seats go to members of the regulated industry (and sometimes trainers)—and because enabling legislation often delegates the setting of requirements to the board, captured boards can set rules that keep their competitors out.
“once the license is created, a Board is created to oversee that license. And that Board is immediately captured. By that, I mean, let's say there are 9 members on the Board... Eight of those seats are going to be captured by member of the industry”
- A bottlenecker is someone who advocates for the creation or perpetuation of a government regulation, particularly an occupational license, that restricts the free flow of workers so that those already in the occupation can enjoy an economic benefit.
“A bottlenecker as we define it in the book is someone who advocates for the creation or perpetuation of a government regulation, particularly an occupational license, that restricts the free flow of workers so that those who are in the occupation can enjoy an economic benefit.”
- Industries seeking licenses recruit higher-education trainers (e.g., professors of music therapy or interior design) to testify that training is essential, but these trainers have an undisclosed self-interest because their institutions benefit financially from a government mandate requiring all that training.
“the professor will be there who will also say, 'Yeah; this is very important. Training is very important.' But not saying, of course, explicitly that his institution or her institution will benefit significantly from the government requiring all of this training.”
- Licensing proponents prevail because they are a concentrated interest that mounts intensive campaigns—industry data, rallies at the capitol, personal lobbying, strategic campaign contributions, awards to legislators, and packed committee testimony—while diffuse consumers, whose individual stake is small, are not in the room.
“they are the concentrated interest, whether in the legislature or in the court. They are the power of the concentrated interest... They'll make strategic campaign contributions. They'll give special awards to legislators... bringing to bear that influence on state legislators who don't hear from the other side.”
- Through 'license creep,' a licensing board over time pushes its authority outward to sweep in operations at the fringe (like hair braiders), justified publicly as protecting health and safety but motivated by the economic threat that those fringe services draw customers away from licensed incumbents.
“a license is created--a cosmetology license is created. A Board them oversees it. And then over time, the Board will attempt to push its authority out, push its fence out, and sweep in operations that operate at the fringe.”
Licensing requirements lack rational basis and vary wildly across states despite claiming to protect public health and safety.
- While licensing purports to protect public health and safety and to increase service quality above what market regulation would provide, there is little evidence it accomplishes either goal—yet it reliably imposes significant economic costs.
“licensing purports to protect public health and safety. But, in fact, there is little evidence that it actually accomplishes that. But, there's plenty of evidence that it comes with significant costs.”
- Licensing requirements for the same job vary wildly and irrationally across states—auctioneers need a year or more in some states but only 7-9 days or nothing in others; New Jersey requires over a year for locksmiths—and cosmetologists spend roughly 12 times as much training time as EMTs, undermining the public-safety rationale.
“cosmetologists will spend about 12 times as much time in education and experience as compared to EMTs [Emergency Medical Technicians], who spend about a month in education or experience”
- Many occupations that historically never required a license—auctioneers, locksmiths, sign-language interpreters, furniture upholsterers, florists, interior designers—now require a government license, which functions as a permission slip to work.
“auctioneers and locksmiths, sign-language interpreters, furniture upholsterers; florists in Louisiana, I think interior designers--all of these are occupations that now require a license. Which is essentially a government permission-slip to work.”
- There is nothing mystical or specialized about a casket—it is a box you can order from Costco—so the funeral industry's claim that selling one requires extensive specialized knowledge and a funeral director's license is unfounded.
“There's nothing mystical or magical about a casket. In fact, right now, anyone listening could take their phone and order a casket from Costco”
Licensing disproportionately harms disadvantaged workers and those re-entering the workforce by imposing large training and fee burdens.
- Licensing schemes that bar people with criminal backgrounds from licenses create a perverse trap: research shows ex-offenders' likelihood of staying out of prison is tied to their ability to find work, yet states spend large sums training inmates as barbers, electricians, and plumbers and then deny them licenses in those very trades because of their record.
“your likelihood of staying out of prison, is tied closely to your ability find need for work. But, licensing schemes often restrict the ability to get a license based on a criminal background.”
- Across 102 low-to-moderate-income occupations IJ examined, on average earning a license requires about a year of education or experience, completing an examination, and paying about $267 in fees—burdens that fall especially hard on disadvantaged people who spend a year on training rather than earning a living.
“On average, one has to complete about a year of education or experience, complete an examination, and pay about $267 in fees to the state.”
- IJ's typical clients are not well-heeled physicians but small entrepreneurs and workers on the first rungs of the economic ladder—people entering or re-entering the economy as hair braiders or similar—rather than established high-income professionals.
“we're talking about, small business folks who are on the first rungs of the economic ladder. People who may be entering or re-entering the economy. These are the typical clients that IJ represents.”
- A Wall Street Journal-reported case of a young woman in rural Indiana illustrates the trap: she went into debt for cosmetology training but then couldn't get the license because she couldn't afford the $150 application fee—showing that even after paying for training, the licensing fee itself can block work.
“she goes into debt in order to get a cosmetology--get training as a cosmetologist. But then, when she got out of school, she couldn't get the license because she could afford the $150 license application. $150. She couldn't afford it.”
- African hair braiding involves only braiding—no coloring, chemicals, or cutting—so forcing braiders to obtain a cosmetology license (a year or more of school costing $15,000-$25,000) compels them to spend enormous time and money on training that is irrelevant to their actual work.
“Hair braiding is not cosmetology. Hair braiding is braiding... There's no coloring; there's no chemical; there's no cutting. It's just braiding hair.”
- Licensing has grown from covering about 5% of US workers in the 1950s to about 25% today, and crucially that growth is not from more doctors or lawyers but from licensing newly imposed on low-rung service occupations, so the burden falls disproportionately on people entering or re-entering the economy.
“in the 1950s about 5% of workers needed a license. Now, it's about 25%. And, the important thing to note there is that the growth in that licensing is not because we have disproportionally more doctors... It is because now we see growth of licensing in occupations that never before required a license.”
The three-tier alcohol system and funeral licensing demonstrate how licensing enables artificial markups while serving no genuine protective function.
- After Prohibition, the three-tier system separated alcohol producers, distributors, and retailers and legally required a distributor between producer and retailer, ostensibly to reduce overconsumption; in practice it injects a mandated bottleneck that lets distributors mark up product by as much as 30% while serving no real function in reducing consumption.
“the Distributor, by law, is put in between the Producer and the Retailer. And, as a result, by law, what they are doing is essentially injecting a bottleneck into that process. And so, the Distributor enjoys the ability to mark up the cost of the product as much as 30%.”
- Requiring a funeral director's license to sell caskets allowed markups of roughly 250% to 600%—funeral industry publications openly admitted 'the casket is where the money is made'—and introducing competition (e.g., Costco) drove casket prices sharply down, as illustrated by Pastor Craigmiles finding the same casket for ~$800 in unregulated New York that cost him $2,000-$3,000 elsewhere.
“in the funeral industry, the price of caskets actually was marked up anywhere from 250% to 600%... 'We all know this is where we make our money. The casket is where the money is made.'”
Market-based regulation through reputation systems and alternative tools are more effective and less restrictive than licensing.
- Reputation systems now regulate provider behavior even in healthcare—Carpenter's wife found poor online ratings for an assigned Workers' Comp doctor, and that office actively solicits visit ratings because it knows and responds to its reputation—giving consumers far better information than a licensing scheme ever could.
“That question to my wife is not an accident... That office knows what kind of ratings it is getting. They are getting paying attention to how consumers--even in the health care industry, people are rating providers. And those providers are paying attention to how they are being rated.”
- The choice is not binary between licensing and no regulation; the absence of a license means market regulation—third-party online ratings now provide more information about service providers than any licensing scheme could, and businesses respond to those ratings—plus less restrictive government tools like mandatory bonding, insurance, registration, inspection, and certification can deliver licensing's purported benefits without restricting entry.
“no licensing doesn't necessarily mean no regulation. It means market regulation... on our phones, we can get more information about a service provider through third-party websites than any licensing scheme can ever provide.”
Licensing creates a perverse trap where states train ex-offenders then deny them licenses, blocking the work that prevents recidivism.
- Georgia's music therapist license requires a Bachelor's or higher in music therapy from a program approved by the very Music Therapy Association that lobbied for the license, plus 1200 hours of clinical training, a $325 exam offered only by that Association, state fees, a minimum age of 18, and a criminal background check—for a job that had no government regulation before.
“your Music Therapy Program has to be approved by the Music Therapy Association. That is the very entity that lobbied for the license in the first place. Then, you have to successfully complete 1200 hours of clinical training. You have to pass an examination--which is offered only by the Music Therapy Association--that costs $325 to take.”
- Because distributors profit by moving high volume, they refuse to represent small boutique wineries, so producers like Juanita Swedenberg cannot reach distant consumers through the three-tier system—and direct shipping to those consumers was illegal because it bypassed the mandated distributor.
“The Distributor has an interest in representing people who are big players. Because they want to move as much product as possible. So, they don't want to represent some small winery in the middle of Virginia.”
- The claim that banning direct wine shipping protects minors fails empirically—in the Swedenberg case sting operations designed to catch underage online wine buyers backfired and found no evidence of the problem—and a simple alternative (requiring an age-verified signature on delivery) could address any genuine risk without banning shipping.
“in the case, Juanita's case that actually did come up as an empirical question, that couldn't find any evidence that that was in fact a problem. Even despite trying to. They would set these sting operations to try to... capture this in action. They were unable to do so.”
Licensing imposes a constitutional harm by unnecessarily infringing the right to earn an honest living without genuine public necessity.
- Per Randy Barnett, there are two competing visions of the Constitution: a 'presumption of liberty' under which people are free to pursue an occupation unless government shows a genuine need to intervene (dominant at the Founding through the late 1930s), versus a 'presumption of constitutionality' under which government may intervene unless the worker proves the action unconstitutional (dominant since the 1930s-1950s).
“Randy Barnett, at Georgetown, who talks about two competing visions of what the Constitution says. One is the presumption of liberty, the presumption of freedom... The other view is that, the government should have the ability to intervene, unless and until the person who wants to work freely shows that what the government is doing is unconstitutional.”
- Beyond economic costs, licensing carries a rights-based harm: when there is no genuine need for a license it unnecessarily infringes upon the right to earn an honest living.
“licensing, it infringes upon the right to earn an honest living unnecessarily. That is, there is no need for the license, and therefore it infringes upon the right to earn an honest living unnecessarily.”
Legal challenges and case-by-case precedent can incrementally reform and strike down irrational licensing requirements.
- Legal reform of licensing happens incrementally, one case and one decision at a time, building precedent—such as the Craigmiles casket decision in Tennessee—that subsequent courts can apply to strike down similar irrational licensing requirements in other occupations.
“Legal change generally is made one case at a time, one decision at a time, setting precedent that can build upon itself in future decisions.”
- Licensing imposes major economic costs: artificially inflated prices and wages passed to consumers, and according to Morris Kleiner's research more than 2 million fewer jobs annually nationwide, plus reduced interstate mobility because workers hesitate to move to states that require a new license.
“Morris Kleiner, who I would call the dean of occupational licensing research, has studied this very extensively and found that licensing actually results in more than 2 million fewer jobs on an annual basis, across the country.”
- Per Public Choice theory, elected officials have their own interest—re-election—rather than the public's interest, producing an implicit quid pro quo where officials grant a license to a special interest group and that group then supports the official at the next election, while diffuse consumers remain unrepresented because they don't even know the decision is happening.
“as Public Choice theory tells us, the elected official has his or her own interests. Which aren't necessarily the public's interests. Their interests are being re-elected. And so, there's an implicit quid-pro-quo that happens.”
- The Institute for Justice is a non-profit public-interest law firm that represents clients for free, suing the government when it infringes individuals' basic rights, and takes no government money of any kind except attorneys' fees when it wins, relying otherwise on individual donations.
“IJ is a non-profit public-interest law firm that represents individuals whose most basic rights are violated by government... We take no government money of any kind. Except one. That is, attorneys' fees when we win.”