probability calculus
The mathematical rules governing probabilities (e.g., values between 0 and 1, summing to 1, plus relative-probability rules) that Bayesians require credences to obey.
As defined in 253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
Where it comes up · 2
- 253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation4 claims
- Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability2 claims
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- The constraints obeyed by a measure of a theory's logical content are exactly the same as the probability calculus, so a probability assignment can always be consistently reinterpreted as a statement of a theory's degree of logical weakness—saying one theory is more probable than another can mean it says less.Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability
- The conjunction fallacy—shown in Kahneman's Linda experiment where people judge 'banker and feminist' more likely than 'banker' alone—demonstrates that people seek explanatory theories that fit the given information rather than the most probable option.Matjaž Leonardis - Science, Identity and Probability
- Deutsch rejects Bayesian epistemology specifically—the theory that knowledge consists of propositions each accompanied by a credence number obeying the probability calculus, and that improving a theory means increasing credence in true theories and decreasing it in false ones. He argues these credences either do not exist or, if they do, cannot obey the probability calculus.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
- Deutsch holds high credence in both quantum theory and general relativity even though he believes both are definitely false and that they contradict each other—proving his beliefs about theories cannot obey the probability calculus, since otherwise credence in one would equal one minus credence in the other.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
- The Popper-Miller theorem shows that evidence can increase the credence of a general theory while decreasing the credences of its consequences; the only consequences whose credence is increased substantially are those that merely restate or nearly restate the evidence, so interesting consequences are not supported—and this result is independent of the prior credence distribution.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation
- Bayes' theorem is legitimately useful for particular (not general) questions—like a doctor estimating dengue fever from travel history—but this is really reasoning about finite frequencies approximated as probabilities, used because of an absence of explanation rather than a genuine credence; such methods cannot decide between general theories because the relevant set of individuals would be infinite.253 | David Deutsch on Science, Complexity, and Explanation