precision scheduled railroading
An operating model that runs fixed schedules with longer trains, fewer stops, and fewer employees to prioritize efficiency and margin over volume.
As defined in Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
Other definitions
A railroad operations method that optimizes efficiency by having customers adapt to fixed railroad schedules rather than the railroad adapting to customer schedules, improving margins but sometimes straining customer relationships
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Where it comes up · 2
- Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’13 claims
- Watch CNBC's full interview with Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett1 claim
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- Precision scheduled railroading improved margins by running longer trains with fewer stops and fewer people, cutting labor from about 30 cents to about 20 cents of each revenue dollar and improving fuel efficiency.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Hunter Harrison was the godfather of precision scheduled railroading, implementing it at Canadian National in the early 2000s, then at Canadian Pacific with Bill Ackman's support and at CSX, delivering thousands of basis points of margin improvement.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Railroads avoid running locomotives with few cars, and instead collect large batches on fixed schedules, such as taking 100 cars once rather than 25 cars four times a week, which saves fuel per unit moved.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Berkshire's Burlington Northern never implemented precision scheduled railroading, and over roughly a decade Union Pacific lost 400 to 500 basis points of market share to Burlington Northern as Union Pacific focused harder on margins.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Burlington Northern rejects PSR because it prioritizes customers over shareholders, and Matt argues taking volume at a 35 percent margin can be reasonable rather than insisting on 45 percent margins.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Shareholder pressure pushed Class One railroads toward PSR, and management teams repeatedly dismissed PSR as inapplicable before adopting it and finding it workable.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Taking volume at a 35 percent margin can be reasonable for a railroad, and it is not necessary to take every shipment at a 45 percent margin or reject lower-margin volume entirely, since an overly narrow stakeholder focus can attract unwanted regulatory attention.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Rail management works like legendary coaching trees, with former Hunter Harrison disciples running other railroads, including Keith Creel at Canadian Pacific, a large team at CSX, and Jim Vena at Union Pacific.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- When CSX adopted PSR, service disruption led to strong financial numbers but frustrated shippers so much that the Surface Transportation Board held weekly calls with CSX, showing that aggressive efficiency can attract regulators.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
- Rail management shifted focus from customers to shareholders, generating job cuts and shipper frustration while delivering strong shareholder outcomes, a tradeoff with both positive and negative consequences.Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’