Union Pacific: Long Train Runnin’
What this covers
This Business Breakdowns episode, with Matt Reustle, Dom, and Matt, who supplies most of the analysis, treats Union Pacific as a case study in how the US rail industry works. It begins with history: transcontinental builders were paid per mile and granted land that later proved valuable for oil and gas. Railroads once made up over 60 percent of the first Dow index, and the 1980 Staggers Act reversed decades of decline after Penn Central's bankruptcy. It then covers structure. Each region is served by essentially two Class One railroad operators. Because most land is privately held, new track needs easements and trackage rights that are hard to get, so the network is effectively fixed.
The middle of the conversation is economics. Much volume is captive heavy freight, and rates are challenged through Surface Transportation Board rate cases rather than set by a regulator, which the episode treats as contested. Intermodal is covered as the growth engine, sold wholesale to intermediaries such as JB Hunt. The geography is also compared: Union Pacific's long western hauls against the dense eastern networks, plus Chicago's role as an interchange hub and the weight of western ports.
The sharpest turn is Precision Scheduled Railroading, traced to Hunter Harrison and later backed by Bill Ackman. Management pay tied to the operating ratio pushed margins past 40 percent. The argument is contested: Burlington Northern declined to follow, and Union Pacific lost share to it. Demurrage fees, modest returns on capital, and doubts about future capacity round it out.
Union Pacific's unusually high margins and low cyclicality come from a quasi-oligopoly protected by regulatory friction and an operating-ratio-driven efficiency push, and the cost is weaker customer flexibility and possibly underinvested networks.
- Consolidation to a few Class One operators and captive bulk volumes give rails pricing power that regulators only weakly constrain through the rate-case process
- Precision scheduled railroading cut labor and fuel costs per revenue dollar, lifting operating margins from roughly 10 to 15 percent in the early 2000s to 40 percent plus
- Rising margins and shrinking capex raise questions about whether the network can handle future volume growth without another large capital investment
Operating efficiency and PSR margin focus, not regulation, explains railroad margins and Union Pacific's outperformance.
- Railroads prefer to originate most of their volume, because picking up freight directly lets them control timing and avoid waiting in yards for handed-off cars; Union Pacific originates more than 80 percent of its volume versus under 50 percent for Kansas City Southern.
“You typically want to be originating your volumes. That way you're not waiting at the yard in order for something to come in”
- Operating ratio is simply one minus operating margin, so a lower operating ratio means higher profitability, and it became the key metric investors and management pay focuses on.
“It's simply one minus the operating margin.”
- Railroads avoid running locomotives with few cars, and instead collect large batches on fixed schedules, such as taking 100 cars once rather than 25 cars four times a week, which saves fuel per unit moved.
“we are going to come by once, and we're going to take a hundred, and we're going to tell you exactly when that time is.”
- Operating margins for the rail industry rose from about 10 to 15 percent in the early 2000s to north of 40 percent today, meaning railroads now keep roughly 40 cents of each revenue dollar instead of 10.
“Taking a dollar and keeping 10 cents versus taking a dollar and keeping 40 cents, when you're talking about a 90 billion industry.”
- Intermodal now makes up about 50 percent of rail volume, up from about 25 percent in the early 1990s, but only about 25 percent of revenue, so it is likely the lowest-margin business at roughly 35 to 40 percent margin.
“today about 50% of rail volumes are coming from intermodal containers. And that's up from about 25% in the early nineties. Now the interesting thing to contrast that is only 25% of our rails revenue comes from intermodal volumes.”
- Union Pacific earns about 35 percent of revenue from the industrial economy, 33 percent from bulk materials, and about 30 percent from premium intermodal and automotive freight.
“you have 35% of revenue coming from the industrial economy, 33% of revenue coming from bulk materials, and the balance to about 30%.”
- Precision scheduled railroading improved margins by running longer trains with fewer stops and fewer people, cutting labor from about 30 cents to about 20 cents of each revenue dollar and improving fuel efficiency.
“to frame it simply, it was longer trains, fewer stops, less people.”
- The operating ratio is a simple efficiency metric but does not tie down to the bottom line or cash flow, especially given the gap between depreciation and capex, yet it drives share outperformance.
“Felt like a very specific number that didn't necessarily tie all the way down to the bottom line. Didn't tie, even, to something as simple as cash flow”
- Hunter Harrison was the godfather of precision scheduled railroading, implementing it at Canadian National in the early 2000s, then at Canadian Pacific with Bill Ackman's support and at CSX, delivering thousands of basis points of margin improvement.
“Hunter Harrison, who was the godfather of precision scheduled railroading, which he implemented at Canadian National in the early 2000s”
- Railroad earnings historically converted to free cash flow at only about 80 percent because depreciation runs well below capex, given assets held at old book values, but conversion is now near 100 percent as capex has been reduced.
“So earnings conversion was closer to 80% range. Whereas today, as they began, focused on some of that efficiency, pulled back on some of that capital spending”
- Union Pacific's aim of a 50 percent operating ratio is proving hard, and taking out about 30 percent of labor leaves little room to rehire if volumes grow, so cost efficiency may become a constraint on growth.
“When you take out 30% of your labor force relating to the business and volumes are flat or down slightly, if you want to grow volumes, you probably need to bring labor back on.”
- When CSX adopted PSR, service disruption led to strong financial numbers but frustrated shippers so much that the Surface Transportation Board held weekly calls with CSX, showing that aggressive efficiency can attract regulators.
“the STB had a weekly call with CSX. So it was attracting a lot of focus.”
- Berkshire's Burlington Northern never implemented precision scheduled railroading, and over roughly a decade Union Pacific lost 400 to 500 basis points of market share to Burlington Northern as Union Pacific focused harder on margins.
“over the past 10 years, you've basically seen a 400 to 500 basis point market share movement away from Union Pacific to Burlington Northern.”
- Union Pacific outperformed the market by a wide margin from 2005 onward and beat the index every year except one through about 2020, a pattern that came from shifting focus from customers toward shareholders.
“Union Pacific, from 2005 to today, has massively outperformed the index. And there was a stretch of time from 2005 to, I want to say 2020, where they outperformed the market every year, except for one.”
- Railroads' high margins are not simply regulatory luck; Matt argues it would be selling them short to attribute their performance only to regulation, because management has deliberately protected the industry through lobbying, regulation, and operations.
“I think the rails, while they benefit from all those regulatory dynamics, that would be selling short what the management teams have done to protect their industry”
- Shareholder pressure pushed Class One railroads toward PSR, and management teams repeatedly dismissed PSR as inapplicable before adopting it and finding it workable.
“in those interim periods of time, you always have management teams dismiss the benefits of PSR and say, it doesn't apply here”
- Investors who want to outperform in a sector should identify the sector's key operating metric, because in transportation the operating ratio drives stock outperformance more than any single executive's skill.
“if you want to outperform in a certain sector, in this case, in transportation, there are usually key metrics which are the drivers and the single driving force of what results in outperformance.”
- Burlington Northern rejects PSR because it prioritizes customers over shareholders, and Matt argues taking volume at a 35 percent margin can be reasonable rather than insisting on 45 percent margins.
“I think there's a case to be made that taking volume at 35% margin is reasonable and you don't have to take every piece of volume at 45% margin”
- Standard intrinsic-value models such as discounted cash flow are useful, but an outsider who ignores how a sector's investors price its key metric will misread outperformance drivers.
“we all like to have our own models for intrinsic value, discounted cash flow, the rate of return earned on assets”
- Most railroad management teams are paid on operating ratio combined with longer-term performance metrics, so the metric shapes management incentives.
“what the majority of management teams get paid on, is the operating ratio paired with some other longer term performance metrics.”
- Rail management shifted focus from customers to shareholders, generating job cuts and shipper frustration while delivering strong shareholder outcomes, a tradeoff with both positive and negative consequences.
“the frustration of some of the shippers, but the satisfaction of shareholders”
Consolidation into few Class One operators and captive shipper contracts give railroads oligopoly-like pricing power.
- Each region of North America is served by essentially two Class One operators, and these few firms account for about 95 percent of rail revenue and about 75 percent of rail volume moving through the US.
“you basically have two operators in the various regions of the continent.”
- A Class One railroad is a network with more than 900 million dollars in annual revenue, and the industry has consolidated so that a few such operators dominate.
“What defines a class one rail is a railroad network that owns over 900 million US dollars in revenue.”
- TTX is a shared railcar entity owned by railroads that sits off balance sheet, borrows cheaply on the perception of implicit rail guarantees, and saves railroads roughly 200 basis points of margin, which Matt sees as evidence of cooperative behavior.
“It's off balance sheet. So it doesn't generate profit. It borrows non guaranteed debt, but it's able to borrow very cheaply”
- The consolidated rail industry is widely described as an oligopoly, and some observers call it a lightly regulated monopoly, which Matt considers fair characterizations.
“which many will call a oligopoly, some will refer to them as lightly regulated monopolies. And I think those are fair characterizations.”
- Freight railroads actively resist passenger service on their tracks, and Amtrak's attempt to restore Gulf Coast service faces opposition from Norfolk Southern and CSX because delays would hurt freight operations.
“the freight rails want absolutely nothing to do with the passenger rails”
- Railroads typically push a three to four percent price increase each year on industrial and bulk contracts, which are generally renewed annually, enforcing pricing power.
“what you'll see, typically, in any given year, is a three to 4% pricing hike. So they are enforcing pricing power.”
- Rail pricing uses dimensional pricing that accounts for both the size and weight of a carload, because heavier loads, especially over mountains, consume more fuel.
“It's a mix of carload, also by weight, so dimensional pricing is a concept that's frequently used in transportation.”
- Railroads pass fuel price increases to customers, but the arithmetic of passing through fuel inflation still lowers their margin percentage, and fuel's share of revenue has fallen from the mid-teens to around 10 percent.
“It has a funny way of working its way into margins, where just the arithmetic of passing through fuel inflation actually does diminish your margin profile.”
- Railroads offset supply chain delays by charging demurrage fees whenever cars are not unloaded or picked up on time, and shippers have asked regulators to clarify those fees.
“The way that these companies have been able to offset some of that pain has been through enforcing demurrage fees.”
- Rates are not set by a regulator; instead shippers must bring a rate case to the Surface Transportation Board to protest rates, and this friction helps railroads protect their networks and pricing power.
“So it's not as though rates are actually being set by a regulator. It is that rates could be protested and brought to a regulator.”
Heavy regulation caused decades of rail underinvestment until the Staggers Act reversed it.
- Railroads building the transcontinental line were paid per mile of track and granted land rights on both sides of the track, and that land later became highly valuable in oil and gas.
“to not only pay them for the amount of track they built, but also to grant them the land rights on the track that they built.”
- The Staggers Act of 1980 loosened regulation, allowed railroads to set lower prices and reinvest, and reversed a century of network deterioration that had culminated in Penn Central's early 1970s bankruptcy.
“The Staggers Act came in the form of, really, loosening the regulatory nature around the rail industry, actually allowing for them to charge lower prices.”
- Heavy regulation under the Interstate Commerce Act restrained railroad pricing, and this contributed to nearly a century of underinvestment and deterioration in rail networks.
“you had the Interstate Commerce Act come into play and start to heavily regulate railroads in terms of what prices looked like”
- In the 1890s railroads made up over 60 percent of the first Dow Jones index, which drew regulatory attention to their pricing power.
“The first Dow Jones index, that came out in the 1890s, over 60% of it was represented by railroad companies.”
- The transcontinental railroad, finished in 1869, reduced coast-to-coast travel from about three weeks by ship or multiple months by other means to just over three days.
“You could now get from the east coast of the US to the west coast of the US in just over three days.”
Revenue quality and revenue adequacy, not volume, should guide railroad pricing and strategy.
- Revenue adequacy, which compares return on assets with cost of capital, was originally designed to support higher rail rates as a floor, but shippers now push regulators for a more balanced rate-protest system.
“Now the origins of revenue adequacy were created actually to support higher rates for the rails.”
- The key lesson from rails is to focus on revenue quality rather than volume, because railroads sacrificed revenue volume to protect margins, and this approach saved an industry for shareholders.
“one of the biggest items or lessons today is just the idea of revenue and the quality of that revenue.”
- Railroads collaborate through lobbying groups to argue that highways are publicly funded while rail infrastructure is maintained by railroads themselves, a framing Matt presents as evidence of cooperative industry behavior.
“they work the lobbying efforts fairly hard. They have a lot of organizations that they collaborate with together to point out that the highway system is paid for by the government.”
- Railroad consolidation from around 40 Class I networks to a few regional duopolies, enabled by the 1980 Staggers Act, produced an oligopoly that some call a lightly regulated monopoly and that allows monopolistic pricing behavior.
“many will call a oligopoly, some will refer to them as lightly regulated monopolies. And I think those are fair characterizations.”
- The revenue adequacy standard was originally created to support higher rates for railroads and was meant as a floor rather than a rate cap, and only recently have railroads begun meeting it after historically failing to cover cost of capital.
“the origins of revenue adequacy were created actually to support higher rates for the rails.”
Rail's fixed network limits trucking competition, while rail is far more fuel-efficient with a improved cost structure.
- Shippers generally treat roughly 400 to 500 miles as the breakeven distance where rail begins to make sense over truck, with rail saving about 10 to 15 percent in cost while arriving about a day later.
“We're looking about 400 or 500 miles as threshold, the break even threshold, where it starts to make sense to move something via rail.”
- Building rail track costs about 75,000 dollars per mile, while new locomotives cost two to three million dollars each and have roughly 40-year lives.
“it's about 75,000 per mile of track.”
- Because most US land is now privately owned, building additional rail track requires easements and trackage rights that are difficult to obtain, so the existing network is effectively fixed.
“most of the land now around the US is owned and you would have to go through all types of hoops and hurdles to get easements done”
- North American transportation is about 900 billion dollars, with rail about 10 percent, trucking about 600 billion, and air freight about 90 billion.
“in North America it's about $900 billion in terms of market size. Rails make up about 10% of that.”
- Rail is often not chosen over other modes; many railroad volumes are captive because heavy grains, commodities, and steel need substantial capacity that trucks or planes cannot economically provide.
“Many of these businesses, and many of the things that move on rails are just captive volumes that can't economically move via truck or via plane.”
- A single gallon of diesel can move one ton of freight almost 500 miles by rail, which Matt estimates is about four times more fuel-efficient than trucking.
“you can move one ton to almost 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel. So it's, I think, four times as fuel efficient as what you have in the trucking market.”
- Full electrification of rail is unlikely because of the physics of moving heavy loads, whereas trucks face different economics and may electrify or automate to compete for 500 to 700 mile hauls.
“I don't think you are going to see a full electrification push because it's a physics problem, in terms of moving weight”
- Labor now runs about 20 percent of revenue versus 30 percent previously, fuel has fallen from the mid teens to around 10 percent (sometimes high single digits), and purchased transportation has dropped from about 25 percent to about 20 percent of revenue.
“fuel being another 10%”
Intermodal is the weakest-pricing rail business, and container limits and coal decline reshape volume mix.
- Intermodal is the rail business with the least pricing power, because it competes on price and depends on intermediaries, unlike captive bulk and industrial volumes.
“I would say, intermodal is the one category where you'd have the least amount of pricing power.”
- Intermodal customers are served through intermediaries such as JB Hunt, Schneider, and Knight Swift, so railroads set a wholesale rate card with those operators rather than negotiating with each end shipper.
“So it's a wholesale pricing model if you think about it relative to a retail pricing model.”
- Most freight cannot move in intermodal containers, such as grain or crude oil, so intermodal's share of rail volume likely has a limit even though standardized containers are efficient.
“When you start dealing with certain things like grain or something as extreme as crude by rail, you can never put crude oil into an intermodal container.”
- Standardized shipping containers let freight move seamlessly between ship, rail, and truck, cutting shipping costs, and intermodal has become a key growth driver that offset stagnation in other rail volume.
“If you go back over the past 30 years, intermodal volumes have been a key driver of volume growth for the rails, and basically been offsetting, what has been, stagnation in the other volume base.”
- Coal once made up 25 to 30 percent of Union Pacific revenue at high margins but is now in the high single digits, as US coal-fired electricity fell from about 50 percent in the early 2000s to about 20 percent.
“at one point coal volumes were a massive source of revenue and high margin for the rails, and Union Pacific was a major beneficiary of this, talking about 25 to 30% of revenues. Whereas today that's high single digits.”
- Double-stacking containers on trains improves efficiency and partly compensates for intermodal's low revenue per unit of volume.
“They can do things like double stack containers on the locomotives. So that's another very efficient way to move it. And that makes up for some of that revenue.”
Union Pacific's leverage increase and shareholder payouts are reasonable, though capex metrics mislead for railroads.
- If onshoring brings volume back to rail, existing networks may not handle it without another massive capital investment, which would dent the thesis of high cash returns to shareholders.
“can their networks handle it, or does it require another massive capital investment?”
- Union Pacific has moved from about one turn of leverage five years ago to a little over two turns, which Matt considers reasonable given revenue visibility and steady earnings.
“So five years ago, UNP operated with a turn of leverage. Now that's closer to two turns, little north of two turns.”
- Measuring capex as a percentage of revenue is flawed for railroads because track and equipment maintenance is reactive and driven by what breaks, not by yearly revenue, so underinvestment may surface later as network deterioration.
“It's something that Burlington Northern scoffs at, in terms of the idea of thinking about CapEx as a percentage of revenue.”
- Union Pacific returns about 45 percent of net income through dividends and the balance through buybacks, so roughly 5 to 6 percent of the investment comes back to shareholders each year, and it bought back about 3 percent of market cap last year.
“So what you have is 45% of net comes out via dividends.”
- Even after margin gains, railroads' return on invested capital has risen only from high single digits historically to low teens, so they remain very capital-intensive businesses.
“historically they've had high single digit returns on invested capital. And even after all of this margin improvement, you're looking at low teens returns on invested capital.”
- Union Pacific, along with other PSR-focused railroads, has shifted capital allocation toward more leverage and returns of capital, while Burlington Northern prioritizes long-term network needs.
“There's a willingness to operate with more leverage versus someone like Burlington Northern, which has a little bit more focus on the long term needs of the network.”
Rails are less cyclical than other freight, so future downturns will demand harder cost takeout.
- Railroads have been much less cyclical than expected, tracking US GDP closely until 2015 and 2016 when an industrial recession hit them while the services economy stayed strong.
“I think, going back over time, they actually have been much less cyclical than you would've expected.”
- During the 2007 to 2010 downturn railroads offset volume declines by cutting costs from abundant slack, but since most low-hanging fruit has been picked, future downturns will require more pricing and harder cost takeout.
“a lot of the low hanging fruit has been picked. Now you're starting to get into more challenges.”
- Air freight and trucking are more cyclical than rail because they have low barriers to entry, intense competition, and irrational pricing, whereas rails are insulated by consolidation and regulation.
“The easiest way to answer that is, the light monopolistic nature or the lightly regulated monopolies that rails are.”
- If manufacturing moves to plants in the US or Mexico through nearshoring, rail volumes could rise, which would be a net positive, though rails will never fully escape cyclicality.
“there is a case that you could see more nearshoring, more manufacturing plants, or facilities built in the US or in Mexico, which is more likely.”
- The downside case for rail is continued secular decline in the industrial economy, which would shrink captive volumes, reduce pricing power, and force more competition over price in intermodal.
“you have a continuation of what you've seen in the industrial economy, which is secular decline. That means less captive volumes for rails, less pricing power”
Western geography and port flows concentrate Union Pacific's freight and create hub dependence.
- Union Pacific owns about 60 percent of its railcars and leases the rest, spanning hoppers, reefers, and intermodal cars.
“So they own about 60%, lease the balance.”
- Freight is often handed between railroads through interchange, and about 25 percent of US freight touches Chicago, making it a major hub that gets intense during peak season.
“One of the main interchanges for the rail system is in Chicago where 25% of the freight, in the US, touches.”
- Union Pacific's western network covers about two-thirds of the US geographically, with long hauls, while eastern railroads cover about one-third of the land but serve two-thirds of the population in a dense spaghetti-like network.
“Union Pacific, as a western rail, actually covers two thirds of the US.”
- Over 40 percent of US import volume comes through western ports such as Los Angeles and Long Beach, where Union Pacific has a stronghold, while eastern ports handle more exports such as coal.
“I think over 40% of import volumes come through the western ports, port of LA, port of Long Beach, where Union Pacific has a stronghold there.”
Cyclical disruptions and insider networks among railroad managers and investors shape results and stock trading.
- Large rail networks are constantly slowed by disruptions such as the pandemic, supply chain backups, and hurricanes, which investors must look through and adjust for year by year.
“whether it's something like the coronavirus, whether it's something like the supply chain backup or things like hurricanes”
- A group of long-tenured transportation investors, referred to as the transportation mafia, strongly influences how transport stocks trade through close communication and shared views.
“the transportation mafia, which is a group of investors who've been around for decades”
- Rail management works like legendary coaching trees, with former Hunter Harrison disciples running other railroads, including Keith Creel at Canadian Pacific, a large team at CSX, and Jim Vena at Union Pacific.
“legendary management trees, similar to coaching trees, the Belichicks and the Bill Walsh's, who have all these former assistants”
- Union Pacific has issued two recent updates cutting volume guidance because of current economic conditions, with the hit felt most directly in its intermodal business.
“Union Pacific, who has had to give two recent updates and cut guidance from a volume perspective”