population ethics
The branch of ethics concerned with how to evaluate outcomes involving different numbers and identities of people, including whether bringing new people into existence is good.
As defined in 207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future
Where it comes up · 11
- 321 - Reckoning With Parfit3 claims
- 207 | William MacAskill on Maximizing Good in the Present and Future3 claims
- 44 - Being Good And Doing Good2 claims
- Animal Minds & Moral Truths: A Conversation with Peter Singer (Episode #342)1 claim
- William MacAskill1 claim
- Erik Hoel on Effective Altruism, Utilitarianism, and the Repugnant Conclusion1 claim
- 208 - Existential Risk1 claim
- 48 - What Is Moral Progress1 claim
and 3 more
Most important claims · 10 of 16Search all claims for “population ethics” →
- The non-identity problem shows that an action can be morally wrong even though it harms no particular person: a 14-year-old having a child does not harm that child (whose life is still better than nothing), and a different child would exist if she waited, so we cannot ground the wrongness in harm to an individual—yet we still judge it a mistake, overturning the assumption that morality must be about harming particular individuals.321 - Reckoning With Parfit
- The repugnant conclusion is that for any population of very happy people, there must exist a much larger population—possibly trillions—whose lives are barely worth living that is a better outcome, a conclusion Parfit found counterintuitive yet could not escape through any robust argument.321 - Reckoning With Parfit
- Every moral view, not just consequentialism, faces extremely unintuitive implications in population ethics—this has been formally proven—because every view must decide under what conditions bringing a new flourishing life into existence is good; so paradoxes like the repugnant conclusion don't single out consequentialism, and abandoning consequentialism over them would require something more radical like abandoning moral consistency itself.William MacAskill
- Parfit's repugnant conclusion follows from variable-population ethics: starting from world A with billions of very happy people, one can move stepwise through worlds of slightly lower happiness for ever-larger populations until reaching world Z with an enormous population whose lives are barely worth living—yet which, by summing total happiness, comes out as 'better,' a conclusion most find repugnant.446 - How To Do The Most Good
- It would be a bad thing if everyone died painlessly tonight and future generations were never created, because high-quality human life has objective value; the loss would be the loss of all future generations' happiness and the fulfillment of their lives, making the universe a worse place to that extent.48 - What Is Moral Progress
- The average view of population ethics is incoherent because it implies a world with one perfectly happy person is better than one adding billions of extraordinarily but not perfectly happy lives (since they lower the average), and conversely that adding a tortured-but-slightly-better-than-average life to a world of misery improves it—both of which are obviously wrong.321 - Reckoning With Parfit
- EA leaders' academic papers openly admit that the repugnant conclusion and related problems remain unresolved—described as paradoxes with no good answer—but their popular books de-emphasize this ambiguity; since the movement gives away billions justified by this moral philosophy, the standard for firm answers should be higher than the messy academic reality provides.Erik Hoel on Effective Altruism, Utilitarianism, and the Repugnant Conclusion
- The standard utilitarian view is that happiness aggregates linearly, so the same level of happiness for four people is twice as good as for two; while some have toyed with a declining marginal utility of utility to address Parfit's population-ethics puzzles, there is no clear basis or discount rate for such a discount, so it is better to accept linear aggregation.351 | Peter Singer on Maximizing Good for All Sentient Creatures
- The paradoxes Derek Parfit constructed in population ethics, such as the repugnant conclusion, are similar to Zeno's paradoxes of motion: clever puzzles that enthralled philosophers but that no one should take seriously enough to doubt the underlying reality; just as summing an infinite series dissolved Zeno's puzzle, the limit cases of well-being are undeniable regardless of whether Parfit's paradoxes are ever fully resolved.364 - Facts Values
- Derek Parfit's philosophy of population ethics addresses the difficult question of whether bringing more beings into existence if they will lead good lives is actually a good thing, and whether this compensates for depriving an existing being of their life.Animal Minds & Moral Truths: A Conversation with Peter Singer (Episode #342)