philosophical zombie
A hypothetical being physically and behaviorally identical to a conscious person but lacking any subjective experience; used to probe whether consciousness is something over and above physical facts.
As defined in 71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
Where it comes up · 15
- 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation4 claims
- 96 - The Nature Of Consciousness3 claims
- 113 - Consciousness And The Self2 claims
- 34 - The Light Of The Mind2 claims
- 284 | Doris Tsao on How the Brain Turns Vision Into the World2 claims
- 71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere2 claims
- 178 - The Reality Illusion1 claim
- 475 - The Hard Problem Of Consciousness1 claim
and 7 more
Most important claims · 10 of 24Search all claims for “philosophical zombie” →
- Philosophical zombies are not even conceivable unless you already believe consciousness is non-physical; since Carroll holds that inner conscious experience is nothing more than a way of talking about the physical processes in our bodies and brains, he concludes there are no zombies, rather than concluding consciousness is an illusion.AMA | February 2021
- Evolutionary explanations of consciousness fail because the causal cash value of any conscious function is just the brain's physics—neurons, electrical potentials, synaptic weights, neuromodulators falling billiard-ball style—and it is at that physical level that anything evolves and becomes efficacious; so to say the lights had to be on for us to be social either jumps past the hard problem or covertly talks like dualism, since most adaptive mental work (parsing grammar, reading emotion) demonstrably happens unconsciously, in the dark.475 - The Hard Problem Of Consciousness
- We can conceive of a 'philosophical zombie'—a being physically identical to a normal human but lacking any subjective consciousness—and the very conceivability of such a being raises the question of why we aren't zombies, since for any behavioral function (perception, learning, memory, language) it appears a zombie could perform it unconsciously, throwing the question of what consciousness does into harsh relief.34 - The Light Of The Mind
- Philosophical zombie arguments are weak because the more you know about how a system works (the easy problem), the harder it becomes to genuinely conceive of a functionally identical system with no experience, just as learning aerodynamics makes it harder to conceive of a 747 flying backwards; if zombies cannot truly be imagined, the hard problem loses force.264 - Consciousness And Self Rebroadcast
- Conceivability arguments like Chalmers's zombie thought experiments are very weak because an ill-defined folk-psychological umbrella term like 'consciousness' lets you generate any scenario; the hard problem clarified issues in the mid-90s but serious researchers have moved on.96 - The Nature Of Consciousness
- Against the dominant 20th-century view (Fodor, Davidson, Dennett) that thought can be fully accounted for in functional/behavioral terms with nothing to say about consciousness, a growing minority holds that thought is itself a kind of consciousness; on that view a zombie would have no thoughts at all, and the speaker's knowledge of his own consciousness is grounded not in self-observation but in immediate awareness of his own experiences.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- Reaching general AI — the full functional capabilities of a human being — does not require that the system be conscious, and the zombie argument is not relevant here because general AI need not be completely functionally indistinguishable from a human; the scariest possibility is building superhuman, non-conscious AI that destroys us, since what remains would be more intelligent but no more ethically important.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- The questioner proposes that one is largely a nonsentient zombie and only conscious during the brief moments of actually thinking about consciousness, raising the question of whether you are conscious when not introspecting and whether that question is even meaningful.AMA | March 2023
- If a physical zombie acts exactly like a conscious person, then when asked whether it is conscious it sincerely answers yes and denies lying, so it honestly believes it is conscious just as we do; therefore none of us could know we are not zombies, which Carroll wields as the best argument against views that treat consciousness as something over and above behavior.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- Clark is an illusionist who denies the hard problem: experience does not float free of behavioral profiles, and once you fully specify a system's actual and counterfactual behavior—how it groups, sorts, classifies, and reports—you have fixed the nature of its experience; there is no further hidden, in-principle-undetectable fact, so the philosophical zombie is not a zombie at all but simply a conscious being.322 - Predicting Reality