non-naturalism
A version of moral realism holding that objective moral facts exist but are not part of, or reducible to, the natural/scientific world; moral knowledge is not gained by the methods of natural science.
As defined in 107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
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- A sharper objection to non-naturalist realism is that if it is true there must be a plausible epistemology explaining how we access objective moral truths, yet there appears to be no such epistemology—since on non-naturalism scientific means are insufficient and there is no moral object that impinges on our senses to correct us, unlike walking into a table to refute external-world skepticism.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
- Moral features supervene on natural/non-moral features—two situations identical in all non-moral respects must be morally identical—and a thing has a moral feature in virtue of its natural features, yet morality is an additional, irreducible layer that sits on top of the natural and cannot be reduced to it.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
- Non-naturalist moral realism is distinct from theism; one can hold that objective moral truths exist independently of human construction without grounding them in divine command or divine agency, contrary to a common assumption among non-philosophers.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality
- Within moral realism, non-naturalism holds that an objective moral reality exists but is discontinuous from scientific reality; moral truths cannot be discovered by laboratory methods or controlled experiments, even though scientific investigation can aid moral inquiry.107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality