factual

No Epistemology For Moral Truth Objection

A sharper objection to non-naturalist realism is that if it is true there must be a plausible epistemology explaining how we access objective moral truths, yet there appears to be no such epistemology—since on non-naturalism scientific means are insufficient and there is no moral object that impinges on our senses to correct us, unlike walking into a table to refute external-world skepticism.

factualpending

Speaker

Russ Shafer-Landau

Evidence Quote

“If you're a skeptic about the external world, all you gotta do is walk into a table and say, 'Oh, well, maybe I shouldn't be so skeptical anymore'... There's nothing out there, like that, if I'm right, if my picture of morality is right.”

Source

107 | Russ Shafer-Landau on the Reality of Morality— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:20:09 AM

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