labor share
The fraction of national income that goes to workers as wages, as opposed to profits going to capital owners.
As defined in Paul Romer
Where it comes up · 6
- Daron Acemoglu on Shared Prosperity and Good Jobs4 claims
- Paul Romer2 claims
- Daron Acemoglu on Innovation and Shared Prosperity2 claims
- Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Alex Imas and Phil Trammell – What remains scarce after AGI?1 claim
- Russ Roberts on Wealth, Growth, and Economics as a Science 04/20/20091 claim
- Robin Hanson on the Technological Singularity 01/03/20111 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 11Search all claims for “labor share” →
- Post-WWII US growth involved a race between automation (which reduces labor's share and pulls labor demand below productivity growth) and reinstating technologies that create new tasks, occupations, and sectors (which push labor demand up); these forces balanced out by aggregation through the 1970s, but from 1980 onward automation accelerated while reinstating technologies slowed sharply, and that balance is not inherent but depends on institutional and technological choices.Daron Acemoglu on Shared Prosperity and Good Jobs
- Labor earns about 70 percent of US income and has stayed roughly constant; because human labor, not capital, is the main limit on growth, machines that can substitute for people could break that limit and drive a large change in growth rates.Robin Hanson on the Technological Singularity 01/03/2011
- The share of national income going to labor versus capital is a useful indicator because it is completely immune to overall CPI mismeasurement, and it shows a sharp, non-recovering drop especially in sectors like manufacturing and mining, demonstrating that some groups are being left behind regardless of what happens to measured GDP or productivity.Daron Acemoglu on Shared Prosperity and Good Jobs
- Labor share has stayed roughly constant at over 60% of the economy through the Industrial Revolution and all subsequent automation—a Kaldor fact so stable that some suspect it is an accounting artifact; Atkinson shows that holding accounting constant, labor share may not have fallen at all.Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Alex Imas and Phil Trammell – What remains scarce after AGI?
- Globalization and automation have very similar implications because they both amount to replacing tasks previously performed by labor with either foreign labor or machines, improving productivity while reducing payments to labor and failing to create jobs.Daron Acemoglu on Shared Prosperity and Good Jobs
- Male wage growth has been so flat since 1970, even within groups such as whites, that it seems to refute all theories of economic growth and to be less than either Milton Friedman or Paul Samuelson would have predicted in the 1970s.Paul Romer
- The decline of shared prosperity is multicausal rather than driven by a single factor, resting on three sets of powerful explanations: globalization (trade with low-wage countries), automation (substituting machines for labor), and institutional factors (market power in labor and product markets plus changing corporate norms that shift gains from workers to shareholders and managers).Daron Acemoglu on Shared Prosperity and Good Jobs
- Labor's share of total output, measured including benefits, has stayed at roughly 70 percent for about 60 years, so claims that workers' share has fallen ignore non-wage compensation.Russ Roberts on Wealth, Growth, and Economics as a Science 04/20/2009
- Roberts' account that automation cuts prices and reallocates displaced workers is only half the story; if automation were all that happened, labor's share of income would decline steadily, but for most of the 20th century it did not, because scientific knowledge is simultaneously applied to create many new tasks—including for unskilled labor—and it is these new tasks that reinstate employment, raise wages, and keep labor's share constant.Daron Acemoglu on Innovation and Shared Prosperity
- Questions about what is happening to the distribution of income — labor share versus profits — are very important current concerns that traditional growth models simply haven't addressed.Paul Romer