knowledge argument
An anti-materialist argument, based on the Mary thought experiment, that one can know all the physical facts about color experience yet still learn something new upon first seeing color, implying physical facts are incomplete.
As defined in 71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
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- The ability hypothesis (Nemirow/Lewis) says Mary gains only new know-how—abilities to imagine, categorize, and remember red—not new information, which would rescue materialism; but 'what it's like' sentences can be placed into valid truth-preserving deductive syllogisms, showing they are genuine truth claims, and the ability hypothesis, dealing only in abilities, has no account of this.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- Mary, a genius color scientist who knows everything neuroscience can teach about color experience but has lived in a black-and-white room, learns something new when she first sees color; if materialism were true neuroscience would give a complete account leaving nothing to learn, but since she gains new information about the qualitative character of color experience that could not be obtained from neuroscience, the neuroscientific account must be incomplete.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere
- Mary's case is no problem for materialism: just as knowing all the neuroscience of color is obviously different from experiencing red, in principle Mary could use her complete neuroscientific knowledge to manipulate her own neurons into firing exactly as they would when seeing red, thereby having the experience—so nothing in the thought experiment obstructs materialism.71 | Philip Goff on Consciousness Everywhere