intent
In legal and free-will contexts, whether a person meant to do an act, knew its consequences, and knew alternatives existed—the proximal mental state used to assign culpability.
As defined in Robert Sapolsky on Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility
Where it comes up · 2
- A Quick Lesson Of AI Languages4 claims
- Robert Sapolsky on Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility1 claim
Most important claims · 5 of 5Search all claims for “intent” →
- The real problem in AI context management is not harnessing the technology correctly—it is not solved by reducing tokens, making models smarter, or expanding context windows, but rather requires reconceptualizing how we interact with, point to, and communicate with AI systems.A Quick Lesson Of AI Languages
- The @ symbol is fundamentally underused in AI harnesses and prompting, despite its established role in Slack and file references as a tool for pointing to and creating relations between intents and objects within context.A Quick Lesson Of AI Languages
- Legal and scientific debates about free will focus too narrowly on proximal intent (did the person intend the act, know consequences, know alternatives); the only interesting question is where that intent came from, and answering it opens a causal chain stretching from one second to a million years before the behavior.Robert Sapolsky on Determinism, Free Will, and Responsibility
- Humans are a liability for LLM performance because people are bad at prompting—both machines are bad at prompting themselves and for others, and performance improves when humans are better at clarifying their intent.A Quick Lesson Of AI Languages
- Problems with how humans interact with AI systems and communicate intent have historical precedent in pre-AI era challenges and represent a recurring structural issue that transcends technological change.A Quick Lesson Of AI Languages