integrated information theory
Giulio Tononi's theory that consciousness corresponds to integrated information in a system, one of the best empirically supported scientific theories of consciousness.
As defined in ms_71
Other definitions
A theory proposed by Giulio Tononi claiming consciousness is identical to a certain kind of physically integrated information, measurable by a quantity called phi.
AMA | April 2022A theory of consciousness proposing that consciousness corresponds to integrated information (phi) in a system; Hoffman cites it as an example of theories that cannot explain why specific neural activity produces specific conscious experiences.
Conscious Agents vs Cognitive Agents with Donald Hoffman and Michael Levin
Where it comes up · 14
- 374 - Consciousness And The Physical World11 claims
- 113 - Consciousness And The Self7 claims
- Donald Hoffman Meets Stephen Wolfram For the First Time on TOE2 claims
- 34 - The Light Of The Mind2 claims
- What Is The Field Of Diverse Intelligence (DI)? All Possible Intelligent Agents | Michael Levin2 claims
- 25 | David Chalmers on Consciousness, the Hard Problem, and Living in a Simulation2 claims
- John Horgan on Mind-Body Problems1 claim
- 94 - Frontiers Of Intelligence1 claim
and 6 more
Most important claims · 10 of 34Search all claims for “integrated information theory” →
- Meditative experiences of 'pure consciousness' — consciousness stripped of its usual content where the unchanging, centerless quality of awareness becomes salient rather than the distinctness of experiences — pose a phenomenological challenge to IIT's information axiom, since they are celebrated as a height rather than a diminution of consciousness even though information and integration appear dialed down, like discovering a white raven after defining all ravens as black.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- The human cerebellum contains roughly four times more neurons than the rest of the brain yet is not thought to be a basis of consciousness, demonstrating that gross neuroanatomical features like neuron count are not the relevant variables; the cerebellum's relatively functionally independent circuits (low integration) plausibly explain its exclusion.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- Christof Koch argues simulated minds cannot be conscious because simulations lack causal power—a simulated black hole won't suck you in—but the listener challenges this by noting that a simulated brain hooked to sensors and actuators (as LLMs and self-driving cars already are) does affect the world, questioning whether causal power coupled to the environment is really the criterion that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious simulations.AMA | April 2025
- Integrated Information Theory's phi metric may provide a necessary but not a sufficient condition for consciousness, because it seems too easy to imagine systems with high phi that we would not recognize as conscious; consciousness is probably like life, a collection of separable characteristics, and phi may capture only one of them.AMA | April 2022
- Harris argues that taking consciousness as ontologically primary is unnecessary; IIT could deliver the same operational results while remaining agnostic, because consciousness being the primary datum is true only epistemologically (you must be conscious to know anything) and says nothing about ontology—it need not commit one to idealism, since it remains possible that mind reduces to neurons in ways we cannot yet understand.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World
- Integrated information theory's claim that consciousness simply IS integrated information, measured the right way, makes it empirically untestable for anything but trivial toy systems, because computing it requires knowing not only the states a system has occupied but all the states it could have occupied but hasn't — combined with a strong metaphysical claim (it-from-bit) that unrealized possible states still causally contribute to present consciousness.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- IIT must stipulate a spatiotemporal granularity over which information is integrated, but this exclusion axiom is its weakest because the choice seems post hoc — without it, integration could in principle occur over 500 years or across geological/plate-tectonic processes, implying absurd minds, which suggests the axiomatic, self-evidence-based approach is suspect.113 - Consciousness And The Self
- In IIT, abstractions like prime numbers, God, justice, or nations have no external existence per se but exist only to the extent that conscious beings believe in them, instantiated in brains; against Penrose's Platonism, IIT grants absolute existence only to consciousness, so a prime number larger than any ever conceived exists merely as potentiality, not actuality.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World
- Following Plato, what exists is what can cause—the ability to make a difference and take a difference defines existence; in IIT, consciousness is specifically a system's intrinsic causal power upon itself (its ability to determine its own future state from its past), measured by the quantity phi, distinct from external causal power that defines external existence.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World
- IIT is not a computational theory: it is not about information processing or input-output transformation (which define intelligence) but about a system's ability to make a difference upon itself—its causal power—which is why a system's unexercised potential states are part of its consciousness, analogous to a bicycle chain adopting the minimum-energy position without traversing all possible positions.374 - Consciousness And The Physical World