independence of irrelevant alternatives
A desirable property of a choice rule requiring that the relative ranking of two options not change when a third, non-winning option is added or removed.
As defined in Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
Where it comes up · 2
- Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse2 claims
- AMA | June 20261 claim
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- Building on Carroll's claim that morality is not objectively out there in the world but up to you and the moral framework you develop, the question is whether rationality itself—not rationality within some particular theory, but rationality as such—is also up to you and the rational framework you develop, and if not, why it is different.AMA | June 2026
- Borda's averaged-rank voting method avoids cycling but introduces dependence on irrelevant alternatives: removing or disqualifying a non-winning candidate can reverse the relative standing of the remaining candidates—like choosing steak over chicken but switching to chicken once fish is added to the menu—so it merely substitutes one form of manipulability for another.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse
- Kenneth Arrow proved that no collective decision system satisfying elementary non-dictatorship assumptions can avoid both cycling and dependence on irrelevant alternatives; one perversity must always be present, so the possibility of manipulation is ubiquitous in genuine collective choice.Leo Katz on Why the Law is So Perverse