forcing
A method introduced by Paul Cohen for constructing new models of set theory in which chosen statements (such as the negation of CH) become true, used in thousands of independence proofs.
As defined in 282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
Other definitions
A technique in set theory for constructing models of set theory in which given statements, such as the continuum hypothesis, are independent of the axioms.
Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Grant Sanderson – AI and the future of math
Where it comes up · 4
- 282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity6 claims
- Joel David Hamkins4 claims
- Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Grant Sanderson – AI and the future of math2 claims
- 137 | Justin Clarke-Doane on Mathematics, Morality, Objectivity, and Reality1 claim
Most important claims · 10 of 13Search all claims for “forcing” →
- Although Godel hoped large cardinal axioms would settle the continuum hypothesis, Levy and Solovay proved that any standard large cardinal axiom is consistent with forcing extensions in which CH is true or false while the large cardinal retains its nature, so many set-theoretic statements including CH remain independent of all known large cardinals, undercutting the one-road-upward picture.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- Beyond unsolved research problems there are unsolved expository problems: results proven as true but not understood, such as the independence of the continuum hypothesis via forcing, and the gap between proof and explanation is the key distinction.Dwarkesh Patel Podcast - Grant Sanderson – AI and the future of math
- The developments of set theory over the past half-century are evidence that there is no unique set-theoretic reality; rather there are multiple alternative set-theoretic universes in which fundamental truths differ, so set-theoretic truth has a fundamentally plural character with no singular meaning to fundamental terms.Joel David Hamkins
- Contrary to those who treat the continuum hypothesis as still open, Hamkins argues CH is already settled: even though it is independent of ZFC, it is settled by our deep understanding of how it behaves across the multiverse — we can force it to be true or false, realize it in inner models, and understand all of that, and that understanding is the answer to CH rather than some single truth value.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- A powerful proof method is to prove something true in the ground model by first constructing a forcing extension, using its features to realize what must already be true, then discarding the extension—analogous to early mathematicians solving real algebraic equations by passing through imaginary square roots of negative numbers that cancel out to give correct real answers.Joel David Hamkins
- Essentially every fundamental open question about infinite combinatorics in set theory turns out to be either completely trivial (provable or refutable immediately) or independent of the ZFC axioms, a pervasive and ubiquitous independence phenomenon demonstrated through thousands of forcing proofs since Cohen's 1963 work.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- Paul Cohen's method of forcing (1963) provides a powerful tool for building alternative mathematical realities: from any model of set theory one can construct a forcing extension in which the continuum hypothesis is false, complementing Gödel's 1938 constructible universe where CH is true, together establishing CH's independence.Joel David Hamkins
- The 'dream solution' of settling CH by finding a missing axiom that is self-evidently true for sets and decides CH is impossible: because we already understand that worlds where CH is true and worlds where CH is false are both perfectly acceptable set-theoretically, any proposed axiom that settles CH must fail in one of those acceptable universes, and the very fact that an axiom settles CH undermines its claim to be self-evidently true.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- Whereas a monist treats the independence of a question as showing the theory is too weak (pushing toward stronger axioms), the pluralist treats the independence phenomenon itself as evidence for pluralism, because we can already see how, by choosing the right conception of set, we obtain a set-theoretic universe in which the truth value goes one way or the other.282 | Joel David Hamkins on Puzzles of Reality and Infinity
- The choice of philosophical perspective in set theory does not change the mathematical theorems but determines which questions and research programs are pursued: a universe view drives efforts like Woodin's ultimate L to find the one true universe, while a pluralist view leads to studying interactions between universes, such as set-theoretic potentialism and geology.Joel David Hamkins