ex-ante preferences
Your preferences at the time of decision, before undergoing the experience, as opposed to the preferences you would have afterward.
As defined in L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
Where it comes up · 1
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- Nozick's experience machine and the decision to have children share the same deep structure: in both, the ex-ante self's preferences cannot be analytically compared to the post-transformation self's preferences, so the decision is analytically undecidable, even though people intuitively reject the experience machine while accepting parenting.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation
- Transformative choices violate the act-state independence axiom because the act of undergoing the experience changes who you are, so the state (your post-choice self and its satisfaction) is dependent on the act rather than independent of it; you cannot tell whether your future satisfaction reflects a pre-existing preference being realized or your preferences simply being replaced, leaving no principled way to decide which self should take priority.L.A. Paul on Vampires, Life Choices, and Transformation