deflationism
The view that calling something 'true' adds nothing beyond asserting it; truth is just a linguistic device with no deep metaphysical nature.
As defined in 95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
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- Deflationism holds that to say something is true is almost just to repeat it—truth is a linguistic device captured by the schema 'X is true if and only if X' (e.g., 'snow is white' is true just in case snow is white). There is no deep metaphysics; truth merely streamlines conversations, enables blind ascriptions ('whatever Sean said was true'), and can speed up mathematical proofs, but the property of being true never does substantive work.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- A key objection to deflationism (associated with Michael Dummett) is that it misses why truth matters in our mental lives—namely that the point of inquiry is to get true rather than false beliefs. Like explaining chess's rules and pieces while omitting that the goal is checkmate, deflationism explains truth's communicative and technical roles but leaves out the central role, which seems to require something more substantial about what truth is.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- Each theory of truth picks up on something real (goal-fulfillment for pragmatism, self-consistency for coherentism), and rival theories can recover those virtues within their own framework—e.g., a correspondence theorist holds that the facts can't be mutually inconsistent, so an incoherent (inconsistent) theory must be false. Because any theory can recover the nice things you want to say, this suggests truth itself isn't doing much work, which tempts people toward deflationism.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- Deflationism is not a theory of objective reality and does not deny realism; you can still assert that the universe would be expanding even if no one discussed it, but that assertion gets its content from substantive additional claims (e.g., that there are no causal dependencies between our words and the rate of expansion), not from the predicate 'true'—saying it's true doesn't do the work of affirming those things.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- Bright predicts that over time there will be a unification of the advanced technical/mathematical work on truth (building on Tarski) with the traditional high-level philosophical theories of what truth amounts to, giving a better understanding of what truth is and the role it plays for us; some logicians already claim the technical work vindicates deflationism via minimal rules.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science