defection
When a member of an organization betrays it—by stealing, informing, or abandoning the group—which illicit firms must deter without recourse to courts.
As defined in Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence
Where it comes up · 1
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- Because illicit actors cannot use courts to enforce contracts, they substitute fictive kinship—deliberately cultivating familial-style bonds (dinners, meeting families)—to build the trust needed for trade and to deter defection, since betrayal carries the threat of violence against the defector and his family.Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence
- Violent entrepreneurs provide social services—roads, schools, hospitals—not mainly for ego but because doing so creates a club good that increases loyalty and deters defection, and the ability to engage in high-value illicit activity is a direct function of the ability to deter defection.Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence
- You do not need to know why a violent leader acts; since they must generate revenue, minimize costs, make payroll, and deter defection to stay in business, it is sufficient to understand how to make them fail as a business rather than probing their hearts or unreliable survey-based motivations.Gary Shiffman on the Economics of Violence