corporate governance
The rules and structures by which corporations are directed and controlled, including how executive pay and the division of corporate revenues are determined.
As defined in Joseph Stiglitz on Inequality
Where it comes up · 4
- How the Markets Lost their Predictive Power — ft. Aswath Damodaran | Prof G Markets3 claims
- Steven Kaplan on the Inequality and the Top 1% 11/07/20112 claims
- 4% of Stocks. 100% of Wealth | Gautam Baid on the Brutal Math of Compounding1 claim
- Joseph Stiglitz on Inequality1 claim
Most important claims · 7 of 7Search all claims for “corporate governance” →
- Parallel pay growth across CEOs, bankers and lawyers suggests they are all responding to similar market forces, which makes the alternative of coordinated corrupt boards implausible.Steven Kaplan on the Inequality and the Top 1% 11/07/2011
- India has approximately 5,000 listed stocks but more than 3,500 are illiquid microcaps; of the remaining 1,500, only 150-200 qualify as quality stocks with good corporate governance, with remaining stocks being cyclical, commodity, or questionably governed.4% of Stocks. 100% of Wealth | Gautam Baid on the Brutal Math of Compounding
- A disproportionately large fraction of those at the top derive their wealth from rent-seeking—predatory lending, abusive credit-card practices, monopoly power, and CEOs exploiting deficient corporate governance to capture a larger share of corporate revenues—rather than wealth creation, which distorts the economy and fuels resentment.Joseph Stiglitz on Inequality
- Strong corporate governance and board oversight, far from constraining founder value creation, actually makes companies better by bringing founders to reality when they become distracted. OpenAI would be a better company if Sam Altman were more open to people who disagree with him, as occurs with proper board governance.How the Markets Lost their Predictive Power — ft. Aswath Damodaran | Prof G Markets
- Many of the best private companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, SpaceX, etc.) are staying private because they are 'corporate governance nightmares' and would not pass public company governance standards. Their founders operate with minimal accountability to investors or boards, which is tolerable in private companies but would face institutional resistance in public companies.How the Markets Lost their Predictive Power — ft. Aswath Damodaran | Prof G Markets
- VC investors in mega-cap private companies are mostly passive investors who take money in, hope for a good exit in 2-5 years, and do not ask the hard accountability questions that would help the companies become truly great. This passive VC behavior allows corporate governance failures to persist.How the Markets Lost their Predictive Power — ft. Aswath Damodaran | Prof G Markets
- The motivation for the Rauh-Kaplan study was the popular view, from pundits and some academics, that income inequality is driven largely by CEOs of public companies who capture pay through weak boards and broken corporate governance.Steven Kaplan on the Inequality and the Top 1% 11/07/2011