
How the Markets Lost their Predictive Power — ft. Aswath Damodaran | Prof G Markets
What this covers
Aswath Damodaran (NYU Stern)), a finance professor at NYU's Stern School of Business, sits down to argue that the US market has undergone a structural shift in character and function over the past two decades. He contends that American institutions have weakened gradually—not suddenly in 2025—such that the country has slid from occupying a uniquely safe position into a continuum of global country risk. Markets, he argues, have already priced this transition in, which is why there has been no dramatic selloff; the confusion belongs to experts and media, who are only now catching up to what equity valuations absorbed years ago. This shift has a larger consequence: markets have transitioned from prediction machines into reactive instruments, because economist forecasts have lost predictive power in an interconnected, chaotic global economy where tiny inputs produce outsized and unpredictable outcomes.
The conversation sprawls across AI valuations, cryptocurrency, and the mechanics of the IPO market. Damodaran distinguishes between investing—which assesses fundamentals and intrinsic value—and pricing or trading, which follows demand, supply, mood, and momentum; he estimates that 95-99% of money in AI is currently pricing and trading rather than investing. He frames the "big market delusion" as a recurring pattern where buzzwords attract overconfident founders and venture capitalists, inflating aggregate valuations far beyond what markets can absorb, yet he treats this overreach-and-correction cycle as healthy and necessary to human progress. On Bitcoin and companies using it as treasury assets, he argues that Bitcoin cannot serve as corporate cash because it is too volatile for that stabilizing purpose, and that pricing power depends entirely on pulling forward new buyers in a fixed-supply game vulnerable to sudden demand collapse. For tech earnings and valuations, he finds Nvidia unlikely to be the ultimate AI winner despite its current dominance, Google undervalued given market skepticism toward its bets, and the best AI companies—OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe—creating governance risks precisely by staying private.
Damodaran argues that US institutional weakness and loss of exceptionalism have been gradually priced into equity markets for years, so 2025's headline risks (credit downgrades, political pressure on the Fed) represent confirmation of an existing trend rather than a shock, making the market's resilience rational rather than complacent.
- US has lost its triple-A rating and 'safe haven' status over 15 years due to deteriorating institutions and politics, not just recent events
- Equity markets have already adjusted to this risk while experts and rating agencies are catching up discontinuously
- Market will only reprice if economic damage appears in earnings, not from political headlines or institutional erosion alone
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Gold's enduring demand stems from properties that made it work as a store of value across cultures and millennia—compact, transportable, hard to destroy, malleable—and its pricing is partly emotional (people will hold gold even down 50% because they like its feel); whether Bitcoin has this cross-cultural, cross-time emotional connection is unproven, since its demand currently comes almost entirely from having done well over one decade.
“gold has endured... It was compact enough that you could transport it. It was very difficult to destroy. You could make it into different things.”
The 'big market delusion' is a recurring pattern where a buzzword-driven big market (PCs in the 1980s, internet in the 1990s, online advertising and social media in the 2010s, now AI) attracts overconfident entrepreneurs funded by overconfident VCs, each overestimating their own success, so the summed value of all players vastly exceeds what the market can deliver—leading inevitably to a correction, yet this overreach-and-correction cycle is how change happens and is ultimately healthy.
“It's part of what I call the big market delusion. I've written about it... It's because I've seen this movie before.”
Portfolio managers and investors have fundamentally different missions: a portfolio manager judged year-to-year on returns would be irresponsible not to hold Nvidia/AI because omitting it creates relative disadvantage, whereas a long-term investor's only responsibility is to preserve and grow their own wealth, which may mean staying out of overpriced spaces—neither approach is better, just different.
“if you're going to be judged on an endowment fund or a pension fund on the returns you make each year, not having Nvidia will put you at a disadvantage”
The search for 'multi-baggers' (stocks that go up tenfold) is one of the most dangerous things in investing because making the big hit your entire focus skews your whole investment process toward big bets; it is healthier to let multi-baggers happen 'accidentally'—Damodaran's Nvidia and 1999 Apple wins came from buying undervalued companies expecting only ~5% over-market returns, not from hunting the next Microsoft or Amazon.
“the search for multi-baggers, which is the stock which will go up tenfold, is one of the most dangerous things in investing”
Bubbles are healthy and necessary because overreach is how human beings advance—people overreach, correct, feel pain, and clean up, but the world changes as a consequence (the dot-com bust still transformed how we live), so Damodaran is 'an optimist in bubbles' rather than wishing for a world run by risk-averse actuaries.
“Would you want to live in a world run by actuaries? I'm okay with bubbles. I'm okay with overreaching.”
Investing and trading are fundamentally different: investing assesses TAMs, revenues, and cash flows to ask if a price is reasonable for the business; pricing/trading is about demand and supply, mood, and momentum—and roughly 95-99% of money currently in AI is pricing and trading, where investors don't care about the TAM because they treat it as a 'pass the cushion' game where flipping to the next buyer earns money even if wrong.
“Investing is about assessing TAMs and estimating revenues and cash flows... Pricing is about demand and supply, more than momentum.”
AI is changing the scam game and 'upping the ante': scams now use deepfaked likenesses (Damodaran's own video promoting Palantir and Nvidia to recruit a fake investment club promising 60-80% returns), and scams function 'like a tango' requiring both scammer and scammed—so scams won't disappear until the scammed recognize their own role; the target audience is people who don't do homework and want to invest in a name.
“AI is changing the scam game. It's upping the ante.”
Markets are driven by the economy and earnings, not talk; what would actually shake markets is real evidence of economic slowdown (turning negative/recessionary) translating into earnings damage—likely showing first in third-quarter earnings—because the link between economic data and earnings has weakened, making the adjustment gradual rather than sudden.
“Ultimately, markets are not driven by talk. They're driven by the economy and earnings.”
Big tech companies are 'money machines' that gain a relative advantage as uncertainty rises, because their large cash reserves let them act quickly and spend tens of billions without needing external capital, outcompeting rivals precisely when conditions worsen.
“as you up the uncertainty, you actually give these companies an advantage over the competition”
Meme stocks have broken the normal link between price and value—where value usually acts as a gravitational force pulling price back—and instead become 'unmoored,' driven purely by demand, supply, mood, and momentum; once a stock goes there, its underlying business no longer matters.
“they've broken away from the gravitational push of pull of value. Usually we have price and value value operates as some kind of force pushing price back. With meme stock that link is broken.”
Markets have shifted from being a proactive 'prediction machine' to a reactive 'wait-and-see' stance because economist and market-guru predictions have lost their accuracy in an interconnected, chaotic global economy where tiny inputs produce large, unpredictable outcomes—so the market rationally declines to predict until data confirms.
“have you seen the quality of predictions from economists and market gurus for the last decade?”
The independence of the Fed is partly an illusion that has been 'leaking out' for 20-30 years; Jerome Powell could not do what Paul Volcker did in 1981, when no senator or House member publicly demanded he stop—reflecting that US political consensus and institutional robustness have eroded since the late 1970s.
“The notion that the Fed was independent to 2025 is an illusion... Jerome Powell could not have done what Paul Volcker did in 1981”
A CEO's real job is to be the company's storyteller who frames and sells a compelling narrative—not to fix supply chains—which is why Jeff Bezos drove Amazon's narrative for decades and why Google suffers from lacking a storyteller (Sundar Pichai being a good operator but not a narrative-setter), and why $30B of compensation may be justified to keep Elon Musk as full-time Tesla storyteller.
“That's a CEO's real job. It's not to fix supply chains. It's to be the storyteller for the company.”
A good collectible needs three things—scarcity (Bitcoin has its 21M cap), enduring demand (gold has lasted thousands of years), and acting as a hedge that holds value when financial assets collapse—but Bitcoin fails the hedge test: in Q1 2020 the S&P fell 33% while gold held and Bitcoin fell 56%; over the following six months stocks rose ~50% while Bitcoin doubled, showing Bitcoin behaves like a very risky stock, not a collectible.
“good collectibles operate as hedges against financial assets... when stocks and bonds go into collapse, a good collectible holds its value”
Nvidia is the 'lazy investor's answer' to AI exposure because it is one of the few companies actually making money on AI (mostly architecture); but like Cisco in the dot-com era—which was not the biggest winner (Amazon was)—the architecture companies will recede into the background while product and service companies move to the foreground, so Nvidia is unlikely to be the ultimate AI winner.
“When all was said and done, Cisco was not the biggest winner from the dot-com era. It was amazon.com. I'm waiting to see who the amazon.com of the AI boom will be. But I don't think it's going to be Nvidia.”
Equity markets have already been pricing in US institutional weakening for 7-15 years, which is why there is no massive market reaction in 2025; it is the experts who are stuck in a pre-2008 worldview and being dragged 'discontinuously' to recognize what markets already absorbed gradually.
“equity markets have been treating the US more like the rest of the world for the last 7, 8, 10, even 15 years. And that's why you're not seeing the massive reaction in markets”
The US historically received a 'buffer' allowing it to run trade and budget deficits other countries couldn't, because it was the largest economy with the largest financial market—but 2025 has removed the illusion of that slack, and the US will increasingly be treated in markets like the rest of the world.
“if any other country had run the trade and budget deficits that the US had, they'd be treated as a basket case... We've been doing it for 40 years”
Strong corporate governance should not be seen merely as a check on founders but as a mechanism that brings founders back to reality when they get distracted; OpenAI would be a better company if Sam Altman were more open to people who disagree, which is what a board with different viewpoints provides.
“people often think of strong corporate governance is putting a check on founders. I don't think of it as that way. I think it brings founders to reality when they get distracted”
The best AI companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, SpaceX, Stripe, Databricks) are staying private and have no trouble raising capital, but many are 'corporate governance nightmares'—which may be a reason they stay private since it lets them do things public companies couldn't—and this lack of accountability, even to investors, risks them not growing in healthy ways and eventually biting them.
“Many of them are corporate governance nightmares. Which might be one reason they're staying private”
Cash is held by companies as a shock absorber for safety and stabilization to get through bad times—never to earn high returns—so moving corporate cash from liquid, near-riskless treasuries into Bitcoin is a category error, because Bitcoin is too volatile to serve cash's stabilizing purpose even given its strong historical returns.
“cash was never supposed to have that purpose of delivering high returns. It provides safety. It's a shock absorber.”
Bitcoin can only be priced and traded, not valued or invested in, because its price depends on getting ahead of the demand-supply game; getting companies, mutual funds, and endowments to buy Bitcoin (especially post-2024 election expectations of more buyers) is 'insidious' because with fixed supply, increased demand mechanically pushes price up—but this trading thesis can fall apart fast since a 30% drop dissipates the demand.
“There's an insidious effect of getting companies to invest in Bitcoin... If they invest in Bitcoin... Increase the demand side of Bitcoin, and since the supply is fixed, the price goes up.”
Big technology companies (Google, Meta, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon) are 'money machines' that gain competitive advantages during periods of uncertainty because they have massive cash reserves, don't need capital, and can spend tens of billions quickly while competitors face constraints.
“These companies are money machines. They figure out a way to make money in good times, in bad times, in certain times, in uncertain times. And actually, they're getting an advantage over the rest of their competition when uncertainty goes up. They have the cash reserves to go, they don't need capital. They can do things quickly, spend tens of billions of dollars if need be. So, in a strange way, as you up the uncertainty, you actually give these companies an advantage over the competition.”
The difference between Damodaran's approach (long-term investor seeking 5% outperformance on undervalued stocks) and portfolio managers' approach (annual benchmark-beating) reflects different missions; both are rationally justified within their respective constraints
“I'm not going to point fingers and say you shouldn't be doing it. What they're doing makes complete sense given their mission. But what I'm doing makes complete sense given my mission, which is I am investing to preserve and grow my wealth for the long term. And that effectively might mean staying out of spaces where I think I'm paying too much for the cash flows and earnings I'm going to get on it. It's a different mindset. It's not better, it's not worse, it's just different.”
Google/Alphabet trades below the S&P 500 average PE multiple despite strong AI, YouTube, and Waymo growth because a decade of its 'bets' (Nest, Google Glass, the six other businesses) being cash drains with little bottom-line return has made markets skeptical and lowered expectations; if Alphabet delivers on those bets it could beat lowered expectations, making it Damodaran's preferred Mag 7 entry point.
“if I were an investor and I've never held any of the Mag 7 stocks and I want to enter, Alphabet would be my choice”
For Nvidia to justify a $4.4 trillion valuation, AI architecture spending would need to reach $2-3 trillion, which in turn requires AI products and services to be worth $12-15 trillion to make the money back—a market size Damodaran does not believe exists, making Nvidia's valuation hard to justify on economics.
“if you spend $3 trillion on AI architecture, AI products and services have to be $12 trillion, $15 trillion in value to make your money back. I think AI is great, but I don't see the market as that big”
Since 2008, country risk has shifted from a binary (safe developed markets vs. risky emerging markets) to a continuum because globalization means every country's risk spills over into others, and the US has moved along this spectrum—no longer truly safe but not as risky as Brazil—evidenced by losing its triple-A rating across S&P (2011), Fitch (2023), and Moody's (May 2025).
“the US has lost its triple A rating. First with S&P in 2011, then with Fitch in 2023, and finally with Moody's in May of 2025”
A catastrophic economic event would not crash markets in a single day but unfold over weeks in alternating good and bad news, because markets are highly adaptable and can switch from reactive to predictive 'overnight'—unlike experts, markets have no egos and don't cling to methods that stopped working.
“I don't think it'll happen in a day. It'll happen over a series of weeks”
Big VC investors in large private companies are passive and do not demand accountability—they put money in and hope to profit from exits in 2-5 years—so they are not asking the questions needed to make these companies truly great.
“VC investors, especially in these big companies, are passive investors. They take their money, they put it in, and they hope to make their money from exits.”
Bitcoin fails as a currency because it is inefficiently designed (requiring thousands of miners to guess a nine-digit number just to buy a coffee), and despite 15 years of effort, actual transactional use to buy and sell things remains minuscule—so advocates have shifted to calling it 'the new collectible' / digital gold.
“if it takes a thousand Ukrainian miners guessing a nine-digit number for me to buy my Starbucks cappuccino, it doesn't work for me”
CFOs are terrible traders who lack a sense of market tops and bottoms and tend to trade at the wrong times, so letting them move corporate cash from T-bills into Bitcoin (or equivalently Beanie Babies or Picassos) is a bad idea; even a Bitcoin believer should prefer the company return cash so they can buy Bitcoin themselves rather than have the CFO do it.
“CFOs are terrible traders. They don't have a sense of what the bottom is, what the top is. They often trade at the wrong times.”
The US has lost its triple-A credit rating across all three major rating agencies: S&P downgraded it in 2011, Fitch in 2023, and Moody's in May 2025, marking a shift from being viewed as a safe developed market to somewhere on a continuum of risk alongside other countries.
“the US has lost its triple A rating. First with S&P in 2011, then with Fitch in 2023, and finally with Moody's in May of 2025”
The distinction between investing and trading is that investing requires assessing TAMs (total addressable markets), estimating revenues and cash flows under uncertainty, and asking whether a price is reasonable for the business. Trading is purely about demand and supply momentum, with no fundamental value analysis.
“You cut to the heart of what separates investing from trading. And I'm not passing any value judgment. Investing is about assessing TAMs and estimating revenues and cash flows even in the face of uncertainty and trying to ask, 'Is this a reasonable price to pay for this company given the business it's entering?' Pricing is about demand and supply, more than momentum.”
Very few companies actually generate profits from AI currently; the money flowing into AI is concentrated in architecture companies (Nvidia, Palantir, Constellation Energy, data centers) with almost none flowing to AI product or service companies that ultimately create value.
“AI is a big buzzword, but there are relatively few companies that actually make money on AI. Nvidia does. Maybe Palantir does on its commercial software. But then it's mostly architecture company. like Constellation Energy, data center companies. It's almost entirely in the architecture space.”
Bitcoin is not a viable currency because it is inefficiently designed (requiring thousands of miners to guess nine-digit numbers for simple transactions) and has never achieved meaningful adoption for transactions despite 15 years of promotion.
“The question I often get for Bitcoin advocates is is it a currency or is it a collectible? You have two choices here. Initially, their point was it's a currency. Well, if it's a currency, it's not a very good one. It's very inefficiently designed. And if it takes a thousand Ukrainian miners guessing a nine-digit number for me to buy my Starbucks cappuccino, it doesn't work for me. And it's not work. In spite of all of the the the thrust that Bitcoin has got over the last 15 years, if you look at the actual transactions where Bitcoin is used, it can buy and sell things. It's minuscule. It's never taken off because it's an inefficient currency.”
Collectibles require three characteristics to be good stores of value: (1) scarcity, (2) enduring demand, and (3) ability to function as a hedge against financial asset collapse
“Collectibles need to be scarce. And Bitcoin comes with this impulse scarcity of 21 million if you think of Bitcoin as its own investment. The there are two other things you need for a collectible. One is the demand has to endure. Gold is a great collectible because people have been okay with it being a collectible now for what? Thousands of years. And the second is good collectibles operate as hedges against financial assets. Put differently, when stocks and bonds go into collapse, a good collectible holds its value.”
The irony of alchemy is that if it had succeeded in turning base metals into gold, gold's price would have collapsed to zero—so the analogous risk for Bitcoin traders is that some new crypto coin will eventually replicate Bitcoin's 'paranoid requirements' (scarcity, decentralization), at which point Bitcoin's value as a collectible would dissipate quickly.
“If alchemy actually worked... the price of gold would have collapsed to a zero.”
Strong Q2 earnings, especially Apple's iPhone sales, are ambiguous evidence: an optimist reads them as proof tariffs aren't hurting, while a pessimist reads them as customers pre-buying ('pre-dating') ahead of expected tariffs—so the same data supports both the catastrophe and the healthy-economy narratives, prolonging the debate into Q3.
“if you're a pessimist, you're looking at that same data saying, 'Maybe people are pre-dating. They're buying up phones to fight off the tariffs'”
The historical dream with gold has always been alchemy—transmuting base metals into gold. If alchemy worked, gold's price would collapse to zero because its scarcity (the thing that makes it valuable) would be destroyed. This irony points to a fundamental question: what version of 'alchemy' are Bitcoin advocates unconsciously pursuing?
“You know, for thousands of years what the dream has been with gold, right? Alchemy. Yes. If alchemy And this is the irony of alchemy. If alchemy actually worked, It's over. the price of gold would have collapsed to a zero. So, very act of being successful. So, my question with Bitcoin is what is the version of alchemy that people are trying on Bitcoin?”
Gold has endured as a collectible across thousands of years and cultures for reasons beyond simple economic utility: it is compact, difficult to destroy, and has deep cultural significance in inheritance customs (e.g., gold passed to daughters in Indian culture). This gives gold a collectibility that may never apply to Bitcoin.
“There's a reason people pick gold. It was compact enough that you could transport it. It was very difficult to destroy. You could make it into different things. So, whatever the reason, gold has endured...I was grew up in India. You know what You know, gold used to be the way in which inheritances were passed down to daughters. The sons could not inherit property. This is There's something about gold that I can't explain that has this this connect to people that cuts across cultures and cuts across time.”
Scams require both scammers and scammed people to work—it's a tango. Until the scammed recognize their role in the scam (failing to do homework, wanting easy answers), scams will persist. The victim side bears some responsibility for the scam's existence.
“Note the scam is like a tango. You need both sides for it to work. You need the scammer and you need the scammed. And I think we're too easy to put one in the victim side and the villain side, but I think until the scammed recognize how much they're part of the scam, scams are not going to go away.”
There are three carve-out exceptions where holding Bitcoin in a treasury can make sense: (1) companies run by a 'Bitcoin savant' who trades Bitcoin better than you can (like MicroStrategy, functioning as a Bitcoin-trading SPAC); (2) companies where Bitcoin is part of the business model (PayPal, Coinbase needing it for transactions); and (3)—the most dangerous—broken-business-model meme stocks (AMC, GameStop) that have unmoored from value and might as well buy Bitcoin to give traders something to trade.
“a Bitcoin savant is somebody who senses the right time to buy Bitcoin and they therefore they trade Bitcoin for you, but at much better prices than you can have”
For 40 years preceding 2025, the US was allowed to run trade and budget deficits that would have been treated as a sign of economic crisis in any other country, because it benefited from exceptionalism as the largest economy and financial market. In 2025, this illusion of exception has been removed and the US will be treated in markets more like the rest of the world.
“For a long time, especially starting with the Second World War, the US got a buffer where it was allowed to do things that the rest of the world could not do and get away with it. As an example, if any other country had run the trade and budget deficits that the US had, they'd be treated as a basket case, right? We've been doing it for 40 years... What 2025 has done is essentially removed even the illusion of that slack. The US is going to get treated in markets more like the rest of the world.”
Institutional weakness in the US, including erosion of legal protections and the separation between the two political parties, has been declining over the past 20 years. Trump might have accelerated this or made it explicit, but the underlying institutional deterioration predates 2025 by decades.
“Our institutions have been becoming less robust over the last two decades. Trump might have pushed it over the edge, but I think in a sense the institutional weakness, the legal protections, all of the things you talked about that set the US apart, they've been slipping for a while.”
Equity markets have been treating the US risk profile similarly to other developed nations for the last 7-15 years, while rating agencies and policy experts have only recently (2025) formally acknowledged this shift, creating an illusion of sudden change when the adjustment has been continuous.
“Equity markets have probably been doing it already. The rating agencies might have taken a while to get there. But equity markets have been treating the US more like the rest of the world for the last 7, 8, 10, even 15 years.”
The Big Market Delusion occurs when a large market opportunity attracts overconfident entrepreneurs with VC capital, each overestimating their success chances; collectively their valuations exceed what the market can deliver, but this process is healthy because it drives innovation.
“It's because I've seen this movie before. I saw it with online advertising 10 years ago with dot com in the 1990s, the PC business in the 1980s. The big market delusion happens anytime there's this buzzword big market...Each thinks they can conquer the big market. So, each in a sense overestimates their chance of success, overestimates their value. But we add up all of the pods of these overconfident groups, collectively, that value is going to be much greater than the value that can be delivered by the market.”
Investing in frontier technologies like AI requires accepting uncertainty about TAM (total addressable market) and business models; the investment thesis is not 'calculate the math precisely' but 'participate in the transformation even though nobody knows the size'
“With a frontier technology like AI, part of the the investment thesis is, 'Look, don't worry about the TAM. If this is what people think it might be, you just got to get it. You just got to get on the train. You got to get in Nvidia, or you got to get in in in OpenAI, and you know, be my guest, do the math, but your loss, because none of us really know what the TAM is. None of us know what this is going to become. You have to just sign up if you want a piece of this.'”
Bitcoin cannot be valued (assigned a fundamental fair value) only priced (assigned a current market price). Therefore, asking whether Bitcoin is undervalued or overvalued is a category error—Bitcoin can only be assessed through trading/momentum lenses, not investment/value lenses.
“But, don't ask me whether Bitcoin is undervalued or overvalued, because it cannot be valued. I'd like to just double click on gold.”
Damodaran plans to publish an analysis of the scam in his blog, grading it on look/language (A-), content (C-), and message consistency (F). This is part of a broader effort to create templates for recognizing AI-enabled scams before they become more sophisticated.
“my initial reaction was anger and outrage and frustration, but then my teacher in me kicked in. I said, 'I'm going to grade the scam.' So, I took the scam and I graded it on look and and language, a minus. I graded on content, C minus. And graded on message consistency, an F.”
Markets are much more adaptable and respect-worthy than experts because they have no egos and don't hold onto strategies that used to work; markets can switch from reactive to predictive overnight if they perceive their power
“I respect markets. Markets might be reactive today, but doesn't mean they're stuck in a reactive mode. If it turns out that they can find their predictive power again. It won't come from the experts. It'll come from within the market. I mean, I don't put it past markets to switch in a moment. I've seen markets go from being reactive to predictive overnight when they feel their power. Markets are much more adaptable than experts are. They have no egos. They don't hold on to hey, that used to work, I'm going to keep using it.”
CFOs are generally poor traders and lack skill in timing Bitcoin purchases; even if investors believe in Bitcoin, they should prefer to hold Bitcoin personally rather than trusting CFOs to trade it on their behalf.
“CFOs are terrible traders. They don't have a sense of what the bottom is, what the top is. They often trade at the wrong times. I don't want the CFO of a company I invest in putting my money in Bitcoin, even if I'm a Bitcoin believer. I'd much rather they give me the cash and I'll go buy my own Bitcoin.”
The concept of a 'truly safe' investment has become increasingly difficult to find globally, as political uncertainty, institutional decay, and interconnectedness mean all countries carry some level of country risk.
“There are no truly safe countries left anymore. And that's something I would say about all investing. The notion of a safe place is becoming more and more difficult to find in the world we live in.”
VC investors in mega-cap private companies are mostly passive investors who take money in, hope for a good exit in 2-5 years, and do not ask the hard accountability questions that would help the companies become truly great. This passive VC behavior allows corporate governance failures to persist.
“You think big VC investors would demand accountability? I don't think they do. VC investors, especially in these big companies, are passive investors. They take their money, they put it in, and they hope to make their money from exits. Two years, five years down the road. And they're not asking the questions that need to be asked to make these companies truly great companies.”
Tesla is following a similar narrative trajectory to Google's Alphabet rebrand: claiming to be more than just a car company (now an AI and robotics company, robot taxi company), but markets will eventually demand that these narratives translate into measurable earnings and revenue, not just story potential.
“I wonder if, you know, 10 years from now it's a similar story to Google where the markets go, we don't we don't believe you anymore. And even if you do prove your business, we're we're not as interested. It'll happen. Every company reaches stage of life cycle where the story is not going to be enough. With Tesla, they've been able to put off this bar mitzvah moment.”
A CEO's real job is to be the company's storyteller and frame the narrative, not to fix supply chains or handle operational details. Companies like Amazon succeeded because Jeff Bezos was an exceptional storyteller who sold the market on the company's vision, while CEOs like Sundar Pichai at Google do not fill this narrative leadership role effectively.
“Who's Google's narrative setup? Who's Google's storyteller? Sundar Pichai is not the storyteller for Google. He's the basically, you know, he's he's he's a good good CEO. I mean, the other company I think of that drove a narrative for decades was Amazon. And you got to give Jeff Bezos credit. He's a He's He set the narrative and he sold the market on the narrative. That's a CEO's real job. It's not to fix supply chains. It's to be the storyteller for the company.”
During the dot-com boom, Cisco was the architecture company (similar to Nvidia in AI), but Amazon (a product/service company) was the real winner from the era. Damodaran expects the AI boom will similarly create a product/service winner, not an architecture winner, but finding that company is much harder than buying Nvidia.
“I'll take you back to the dot-com era. When all was said and done, Cisco was not the biggest winner from the dot-com era. It was amazon.com. I'm waiting to see who the amazon.com of the AI boom will be. But I don't think it's going to be Nvidia. That's why the big win from AI investing will be to find that company that you think will emerge in the product and service business. And that's a much, much tougher call to make and that's why portfolio managers are not even trying.”
Strong corporate governance and board oversight, far from constraining founder value creation, actually makes companies better by bringing founders to reality when they become distracted. OpenAI would be a better company if Sam Altman were more open to people who disagree with him, as occurs with proper board governance.
“I mean, I think that um you know, OpenAI would be a much better company if Sam Altman were open to people who disagree with that, which is what markets do. This is what having a board of directors with different points of view. It makes the company better. So, people often think of, you know, strong corporate governance is putting a check on founders. I don't think of it as that way. I think it brings founders to reality when they get distracted, when they start doing things.”
Damodaran would carve out exceptions for Bitcoin holdings by: (1) Bitcoin savants (skilled traders who time Bitcoin buys better than the company could) like MicroStrategy's Michael Saylor, (2) companies where Bitcoin is part of their business model (Coinbase, PayPal), and (3) companies with broken business models that have become meme stocks (AMC, GameStop).
“I carved out an exception for some companies where you think where you allow people to get away with holding Bitcoin. And I said I would not be one of the investors, but if If one of those investors, I understand what you do. The first was for companies where you felt the company was run by what I call a Bitcoin savant...The second is companies where Bitcoin is part of their business model. PayPal, Coinbase where some of their transactions happen in Bitcoin...The third and this is I think the most dangerous group of companies is companies whose business model is broken...AMC GameStop right?”
Many of the best private companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, SpaceX, etc.) are staying private because they are 'corporate governance nightmares' and would not pass public company governance standards. Their founders operate with minimal accountability to investors or boards, which is tolerable in private companies but would face institutional resistance in public companies.
“Many of them are staying private. They have no trouble raising capital as private companies. Many of them are corporate governance nightmares. Which might be one reason they're staying private, right? It allows them to do things that would never have passed muster in a public company.”
The search for 'multi-baggers' (stocks that go up 10x) is one of the most dangerous investing approaches because it skews decision-making toward chasing big hits rather than prudent valuation. Letting big hits happen accidentally in a diversified portfolio is healthier than making them the entire focus of an investing strategy.
“I think the search for multi-baggers, which is the stock which will go up tenfold, is one of the most dangerous things in investing, right? Because we all wanted it...if you say look that's what I'm going to make my investing is about is finding the next Microsoft circa 1986, the next Amazon circa it skews the way we invest because we go for the big hit and everything we do is about the big hit. You know what? If a big hit happens, I want it to happen almost accidentally in my portfolio.”
Damodaran's personal investing philosophy is to stay out of spaces where he believes he's paying too much for future cash flows and earnings, even if that means missing out on short-term gains. His mission is long-term wealth preservation, not year-to-year returns optimization.
“What they're doing makes complete sense given their mission. But what I'm doing makes complete sense given my mission, which is I am investing to preserve and grow my wealth for the long term. And that effectively might mean staying out of spaces where I think I'm paying too much for the cash flows and earnings I'm going to get on it. It's a different mindset. It's not better, it's not worse, it's just different.”
AI has become a massive scam vector where bad actors use deepfaked videos of prominent people (Damodaran himself) to promote fake investment clubs claiming 60-80% returns. AI's ability to convincingly generate synthetic media has increased scam sophistication dramatically.
“There's a scam going around me. An Instagram scam that uses my likeness, my video. And in this scam, I'm talking about Palantir and Nvidia. And it's inviting people to join an investment club that I'm supposedly part of that I will tell them how to make 60 to 80% returns. And it's a scam that's collecting people's money.”
Meme stock behavior (AMC, GameStop) represents a breakdown where stock price and fundamental value become completely unmoored. In meme stocks, the link between price and value is broken—markets are driven purely by demand, supply, mood, and momentum rather than any tether to financial reality.
“The companies have become meme stocks. Why? Because you know, if you're 25 or 30, you have some nostalgia for that GameStop you stopped at. And you feel you're saving the company from the bad times. The bad guy of course are the hedge funds and these guy companies have become meme stocks which is just a fancy way of saying they've broken away from the gravitational push of pull of value. Usually we have price and value value operates as some kind of force pushing price back. With meme stock that link is broken. You're just unmoored. It's demand and supply, mood and momentum.”
The target audience of AI scams is people who don't do homework and don't read what people actually write, but want to invest based on someone's name/reputation alone. This audience likely cannot be protected through individual warnings, but understanding this may help design system-level protections.
“The target audience of people who don't do their homework, don't read what people are doing, but want to invest in somebody's name. And I'm not sure I'm reaching that target audience. And I'm not sure that target audience can ever be protected, but I have a feeling that this this this entire space that's going to get scammed going forward.”
Markets are no longer functioning as prediction machines trying to anticipate future economic outcomes. Instead, they have become reactive, waiting for actual economic data (earnings, growth figures) to confirm or deny policy impacts before repricing.
“the markets used to have this job of being a prediction machine, and the job was to be proactive and to predict what was going to happen in the future. And what you're kind of describing as a market that has decided, 'Actually, we don't really want to do that. We would rather be reactive. We would rather wait and see until the actual economic data comes out, until the earnings show...'”
Bitcoin advocates have shifted their narrative from 'Bitcoin is a currency' to 'Bitcoin is a collectible like gold,' but Bitcoin has not behaved like a good collectible because it lacks the properties of durability and crisis-protection that define collectibles like gold.
“Over the last few years, this there's been a shift among Bitcoin advocates saying it's not a currency, it's the new collectible...Collectibles need to be scarce. And Bitcoin comes with this impulse scarcity of 21 million if you think of Bitcoin as its own investment. The there are two other things you need for a collectible. One is the demand has to endure. Gold is a great collectible because people have been okay with it being a collectible now for what? Thousands of years. And the second is good collectibles operate as hedges against financial assets.”
Corporations and institutional investors buying Bitcoin for treasury purposes increases Bitcoin demand while supply remains fixed, which mechanically pushes up price. This creates a perverse incentive for financial institutions to buy Bitcoin to front-run the price appreciation driven by their own buying.
“There's an insidious effect of getting companies to invest in Bitcoin, right? Or mutual funds and endowment funds. If they invest in Bitcoin, what are you doing? Increase the demand side of Bitcoin, and since the supply is fixed, the price goes up. So, it's almost like you can you're gauging what would I how many people can I get to buy Bitcoin, and if I can get more people to buy Bitcoin, it'll push up the price, so I'll get ahead of that price run.”
Corporate treasury decisions to move cash from T-bills into Bitcoin are generally unwise for most companies because cash is meant to stabilize the company and absorb shocks, not deliver high returns. Bitcoin's volatility makes it unsuitable for this treasury function.
“I was started by listing out all the reasons companies hold cash, and none of them is to earn 30% returns. You hold cash to stabilize the company, to get you through the bad times. And I said Bitcoin doesn't meet any of those requirements, even if you took its great history. Cuz it's too volatile. It swings around too much.”
Google (Alphabet) has spent a decade delivering headlines and research about innovative bets (Nest, Glass, research labs) but very little actual revenue or earnings from these projects, causing investors to remain skeptical of new growth narratives and price Google based on its proven ad business dominance rather than potential future businesses.
“Now, I'm going to take you back about a decade when Google renamed itself Alphabet. When it did so, it said because it didn't want to be just a search engine, but all these other businesses, if you remember the six other businesses, the bets. And the problem is for much of the decade, the bets were just cash drains and nothing came back in the form of revenues and earnings...there's so little to show for it in the bottom line. You know, the question that investors keep asking is if all of this is working, how come you're so dependent on the ad business for so much of your value?”
The real AI winners like OpenAI ($300 billion valuation), Anthropic, SpaceX, Stripe, and Databricks are all staying private, which means retail investors cannot invest in them. This lack of public investment access in the best companies is a reason Nvidia receives so much capital inflow.
“the only amazon.com in the AI world, which I in my view is OpenAI, you can't invest in because it's private. And this has been a theme that we've discussed on this podcast, which I'd love to get your reactions to, which is all of the good companies in AI at least, OpenAI, Anthropic, even beyond AI. You look at SpaceX, you look at Stripe, you look at Databricks. All of the really great companies that might become the next amazon.com, they're all staying private.”
Nvidia's valuation is being driven by portfolio managers and mutual fund managers who need to show clients they have AI exposure, making Nvidia a 'lazy investor's answer' to the question 'do you own AI stocks?' This is trading, not investing, and reflects FOMO rather than value analysis.
“There are I mean AI is a big buzzword, but there are relatively few companies that actually make money on AI. Nvidia does...So, you're a portfolio manager and your client says, 'What do you know? Have you invested in AI?' Guess what the easy answer is. Yeah, we own Nvidia. It's become the lazy investor's answer to how much money do you have in AI? Well, I have Nvidia stock. And I said it's a lazy investors because I do think that ultimately the AI business is also going to shake out.”
Bitcoin's trading argument can fall apart very quickly if Bitcoin price drops 30%, because the demand from traders and momentum investors will suddenly dissipate, accelerating the decline. This fragility is inherent to trading-based valuations.
“The trading arguments can fall apart very quickly, because all you need for that to change is a 30% drop in the Bitcoin price, because all of a sudden, all that demand will start to dissipate. So, trade it, it's a pure trading instrument, and as long as you accept it as such, and you realize that if you're good at detecting mood and momentum, you'll be okay, then I'm okay with you betting on Bitcoin.”
If a severe market downturn occurs, it will unfold gradually over weeks with back-and-forth moves between good news and bad news, rather than as a single catastrophic day. Markets are adaptable and can switch from reactive to predictive mode rapidly if they perceive an opportunity to do so.
“Ed, that's a good point, but I don't think it'll happen in a day. It'll happen over a series of weeks, and it'll take the form very similar to the employment report that came out on Friday. And we saw the markets react saying, 'This is bad news. We've got to price it in.'”
Second quarter earnings data is ambiguous and can be interpreted to support either an optimistic view (tariffs not affecting sales, economy is healthy) or a pessimistic view (consumers are buying in advance to avoid expected tariff impacts). This ambiguity means the debate about whether we're heading toward economic catastrophe will continue through Q3.
“If you take Apple, great quarter in terms of iPhone. So, we're an optimist looking at this and say, 'Look, you know, the tariffs are not affecting Apple. They're they're selling a lot of phones.' But, if you're a pessimist, you're looking at that same data saying, 'Maybe people are pre-dating. They're buying up phones to to fight off the tariffs that they think are coming later in the year.' So, the second quarter earnings, the question you're asking is are these numbers really good because customers are spending more up front to avoid what they think is pain down the pike, or are they reflective of a much healthier economy than we think?”
Nvidia is an AI architecture company, and for Nvidia's current $4.4 trillion valuation to be justified, the AI architecture buildout would need to cost $2-3 trillion, requiring AI products and services to deliver $12-15 trillion in value. Damodaran does not see a market that large.
“Nvidia's an AI AI architecture company. And if I frame out how much the architecture has to cost for Nvidia to be worth $4.4 trillion, I don't see economics in them. I mean if the architecture costs $2 trillion or $3 trillion, you can justify Nvidia's valuation. But if you spend $3 trillion on AI architecture, AI products and services have to be $12 trillion, $15 trillion in value to make your money back. I think AI is great, but I don't see the market as that big.”
Bitcoin has performed well since the November 2024 election because of expectations that regulatory environments will become more favorable to Bitcoin, increasing demand and pushing up price. This is a trading argument based on sentiment and policy expectations, not investment analysis.
“There's a reason I think Bitcoin has done so well since the election last year, which is there's this feeling that more people are now going to be allowed to enter the Bitcoin buy side of the market. And that's going to increase demand, that increased demand will push up the price. This is trading arguments for Bitcoin that I understand.”
Prof G Markets takes a summer break from August 11-22, returning August 25 with Josh Brown; the episode is the last before the vacation break
“Prof G Markets will be taking a summer break from August 11th to August 22nd. We won't have any new episodes during that time... we will be back on Monday, August 25th with the one and only Josh Brown.”
Microsoft recently hit a $4 trillion market cap and Nvidia is now worth $4.4 trillion, more than the entire UK stock market.
“company recently hit $4 trillion in market cap. It's now worth $4.4 trillion. It is more valuable than the entire UK stock market.”
The average human sheds roughly 35 kilograms of skin in their lifetime.
“That's how many kilograms of skin the average human sheds in their lifetime.”
The average human sheds 35 kilograms of skin in their lifetime, which is roughly half the amount shed by a Burmese python or by Mark Zuckerberg
“Today's number? 35. That's how many kilograms of skin the average human sheds in their lifetime. It's also roughly half the amount of lifetime skin that is shed by the Burmese python and also by Mark Zuckerberg.”