coherentist theory of truth
The view that a belief is true if it fits into the maximally coherent, internally consistent total theory of the world that accommodates all observations.
As defined in 95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
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- The central objection to the coherentist theory is that there is no way to specify a unique best theory: multiple internally consistent, coherent theories admitting contradictory beliefs can be formulated (e.g., a coherent fairytale vs. an accurate description of the world), forcing one either to endorse true contradictions or to find some non-coherence criterion to decide between equally coherent worldviews.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- Each theory of truth picks up on something real (goal-fulfillment for pragmatism, self-consistency for coherentism), and rival theories can recover those virtues within their own framework—e.g., a correspondence theorist holds that the facts can't be mutually inconsistent, so an incoherent (inconsistent) theory must be false. Because any theory can recover the nice things you want to say, this suggests truth itself isn't doing much work, which tempts people toward deflationism.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science
- The coherentist theory holds that a true belief is one that fits into the maximally coherent theory of the world—the hypothetical totality of beliefs able to accommodate all observations; a belief is true just in case it would fit into that complex, internally consistent whole.95 | Liam Kofi Bright on Knowledge, Truth, and Science