clarity and distinctness
In Descartes' epistemology, the criterion for true ideas; clarity refers to the unambiguous presence of an idea to the mind, and distinctness refers to the idea's separation from other ideas and its internal coherence; ideas that are clear and distinct are identified with objective reality
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 2
Where it comes up · 2
- A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 23 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 64 American Pragmatism1 claim
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- The underlying problem with Descartes' epistemology is that clarity and distinctness as a criterion for truth is not reliable; clarity and distinctness is a matter of degree rather than an absolute threshold, and one may believe an idea to be perfectly clear and distinct when further reflection reveals inadequacy.A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 2
- In Meditation Three, Descartes argues that the idea of God is not factitious (self-caused) and not simply adventitious (externally caused through normal experience), but rather distinctive because it has the fullest kind of objective reality—meaning it is characterized by maximal clarity and distinctness.A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 2
- Peirce rejects the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness (whatever I am clearly convinced of is true) because conviction is subjective and variable; clarity and distinctness are criteria of meaningfulness rather than truth.A History of Philosophy | 64 American Pragmatism
- Even in the depth of skeptical doubt, the mind is not in complete darkness because the very existence of the thinking thing is evident; the clarity and distinctness required for doubt itself presuppose a light of mind.A History of Philosophy | 33 Descartes' Meditations 2