borders of defeat
Territorial or strategic positions where a power suffered historical loss and now seeks to overturn; used to distinguish revisionist ambitions driven by historical resentment from purely pragmatic expansion; borders where the status quo is unacceptable because of past humiliation
As defined in Niall Ferguson, Victor Davis Hanson and Stephen Kotkin: Three Historians Debate The Era of Trump
Where it comes up · 3
- STEPHEN KOTKIN - THE WORLD IN PIECES3 claims
- Niall Ferguson, Victor Davis Hanson and Stephen Kotkin: Three Historians Debate The Era of Trump2 claims
- Stephen Kotkin: Russia’s Murky Future | Foreign Affairs Interview2 claims
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- China has announced its intention to take Taiwan and collapse American power in East Asia; this represents a 'border of defeat' for China (like Ukraine for Russia and the Israel-Arab frontier), and China's revanchism is about more than Taiwan—it includes revenge for alleged Japanese WWII atrocities, eviction of US bases from South Korea and Philippines, pushing America back from the first island chain to the second, and potentially beyond; China's appetite grows with success, so Taiwan's fall opens a cascading sequence of further territorial ambitions.Niall Ferguson, Victor Davis Hanson and Stephen Kotkin: Three Historians Debate The Era of Trump
- The American-led international order had three territorial vulnerabilities that were deliberately positioned but not protected: Crimea/Ukraine, Israel/Middle East, and Taiwan/South China Sea; these are borders of defeat for Russia, Iran, and China (territories they lost or claim), making them inherently revanchist pressure points.Stephen Kotkin: Russia’s Murky Future | Foreign Affairs Interview
- The Soviet Union could negotiate with the United States to stabilize the international order and accept the Helsinki Accords because it had achieved borders of victory; in contrast, Russia today has borders of defeat, which makes stabilizing relations fundamentally harder and reduces incentives for Russia to accept the current order.STEPHEN KOTKIN - THE WORLD IN PIECES
- Three zones of territorial vulnerability persist for the US-led international order: Crimea and Ukraine, Israel and the broader Near East, and the South China Sea with Taiwan, because these represent borders of defeat for the anti-Western powers, making stabilization of relations with adversaries extremely difficult.STEPHEN KOTKIN - THE WORLD IN PIECES
- Three borders of defeat define the modern great power system: Taiwan (China's strategic vulnerability forcing revisionism), Ukraine (Russia's vulnerability forcing revisionism), and Israel's borders (Iran and Arab neighbors' vulnerability forcing revisionism); these cannot be negotiated or subject to détente because they represent existential grievances, unlike the Soviet borders which were borders of victory and thus stabilizable.Niall Ferguson, Victor Davis Hanson and Stephen Kotkin: Three Historians Debate The Era of Trump
- The Cold War's strategic stability rested on 'borders of victory' (mutually recognized territorial settlements after World War II) rather than 'borders of defeat,' making the Cold War easier to manage than the post-Cold War era where borders of defeat create persistent instabilityStephen Kotkin: Russia’s Murky Future | Foreign Affairs Interview
- Middle Eastern countries are drawn into great power conflicts not because of inherent regional instability but because they sit in a zone of great power competition; China, Russia, and the US all have interests in the Middle East, and regional actors align accordingly.STEPHEN KOTKIN - THE WORLD IN PIECES