atomic fact
The smallest constituents of reality that atomic propositions correspond to; they are the basic building blocks of the world viewed atomistically, with no intrinsic relationships between them—relationships only being external and causal
As defined in A History of Philosophy | 74 Bertrand Russell -- Logical Atomism
Where it comes up · 2
- A History of Philosophy | 74 Bertrand Russell -- Logical Atomism3 claims
- A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein2 claims
Most important claims · 5 of 5Search all claims for “atomic fact” →
- Russell wrote an early work titled 'Mysticism and Logic' in which he argued against methodologies rooted in Hegel, Bergson, and Bradley, which claimed intuitive knowledge of the whole or immediate awareness of being in its totality, because Russell does not believe there are any internal relationships between atomic facts that would ground such mystical intuition.A History of Philosophy | 74 Bertrand Russell -- Logical Atomism
- A fact is not a thing, but the existence of a state of affairs, which can be atomic or molecular; things are constituents of states of affairs, and facts are the existence of states of affairs.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Russell argues that to avoid ambiguity and multiple reference, philosophy needs an ideal language in which every name refers to exactly one fact, creating a strictly logical language where atomic facts are described by atomic propositions.A History of Philosophy | 75 Ludwig Wittgenstein
- Russell employs a correspondence theory of truth requiring precise one-to-one correlation between atomic propositions and atomic facts, where atomic propositions correspond structurally and referentially to atomic facts through the correlation of terms with properties and the correlation of proposition structure with fact structure.A History of Philosophy | 74 Bertrand Russell -- Logical Atomism
- Russell's atomic facts are neither mental nor material but rather neutral with regard to mind-body distinctions, and Russell is a neutral monist: qualitatively there is only one kind of property, but quantitatively there are many atomic facts, making him a monist about quality and a pluralist about quantity.A History of Philosophy | 74 Bertrand Russell -- Logical Atomism