approbation
Approval or praise from others; a Smithian motivation (with its opposite, disapprobation) that Becker incorporated into his richer view of preferences.
As defined in Edward Lazear on Becker
Where it comes up · 4
- Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V6 claims
- Russ Roberts1 claim
- Edward Lazear on Becker1 claim
- Michael McCullough on the Kindness of Strangers1 claim
Most important claims · 9 of 9Search all claims for “approbation” →
- Part IV concerns the effect of utility (social usefulness, beneficial outcomes) on moral approbation; Smith disagrees that moral approval is based directly on utility, holding instead that approbation is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety based on spectatorial sympathy, so the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, while propriety nonetheless tends to conform to utility by providential design.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- In part four Smith argues that moral approbation is never based directly on utility (beneficial social outcomes) but is always 'enshrouded' in a spectatorial sympathy and an almost aesthetic sense of the beauty/propriety of conduct; the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stopover at propriety, and propriety tends to conform to utility only because God set up the sentiments so that our notions of propriety serve utility—though imperfectly.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Part four argues that moral approval (approbation) is never based directly on utility (useful social outcomes); rather, the journey from utility to approbation necessarily makes a stop at propriety—approval is always enshrouded in a sense of propriety arising from spectatorial sympathy, an almost aesthetic reaction to the beauty of conduct—while God-given sentiments tend (imperfectly) to make propriety conform to utility.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Part IV argues that moral approbation is not based directly on utility (beneficial social outcomes) but is always enshrouded in spectatorial sympathy and a sense of propriety—an aesthetic reaction to the beauty of conduct—so the path from utility to approval necessarily makes a stop at propriety, with propriety tending (by providential design) to conform to utility but imperfectly.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Adam Smith located the governor of moral behavior in conscience and our sensitivity to praise and disapproval (approbation and opprobrium), combined with an evolved natural endowment for compassion that lets us simulate others' suffering via the impartial spectator, deeming compassion a weak reed and grounding consistent moral self-government in social regard.Michael McCullough on the Kindness of Strangers
- Smith's conception of law is anti-legal-positivist because he counts as 'laws' the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms (approbation and disapprobation), not merely what government or the police enforce—making moral order a much broader, bottom-up phenomenon.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Smith's conception of law is anti-legal-positivist: he counts as laws the duties enforced through internal sentiment and social norms—approbation and disapprobation—not merely what the state or government enforces, giving a much broader sense of duty than codified law.Dan Klein on The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Episode 5--A Discussion of Parts III (cont.), IV, and V
- Becker held that the economic approach is a method of analysis rather than an assumption that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or gain; behavior is driven by a much richer set of values and preferences, including Smithian considerations like approbation and reputation.Edward Lazear on Becker
- Although humans are prone to manipulation through praise and naturally desire others' approbation, treating that praise as one's motivator suggests a lack of integrity and is consequentialist; the better stance—even if Smith doesn't fully resolve the tension—is to discount praise and do the right thing for its own sake.Russ Roberts