advance market commitment
A funding mechanism where governments or donors commit in advance to purchase a specified quantity of a product (such as a vaccine) at a set price if it is developed and meets defined criteria, creating an incentive to innovate without granting a monopoly.
As defined in Michael Kremer
Where it comes up · 2
- Michael Kremer7 claims
- Carbon Removal1 claim
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- Advance market commitments work for innovations you know you need ahead of time and where you can define a passing threshold (like a malaria vaccine via FDA trials), but they cannot incentivize innovations you never knew you needed until invented (like the Post-it Note).Michael Kremer
- An advance market commitment sends a credible demand signal to entrepreneurs and investors that a market will exist for their technology, giving them confidence to build; the concept was borrowed from a mid-2000s pneumococcal vaccine commitment that pulled pharma companies into developing a vaccine for low-income countries.Carbon Removal
- A $1.5 billion advance market commitment pledged by a number of countries together with the Gates Foundation incentivized the development of three pneumococcus vaccines targeting strains common in the developing world, vaccinating hundreds of millions and saving an estimated 700,000 lives.Michael Kremer
- A key distortion of monopoly is that high monopoly pricing reduces the quantity sold, which for pharmaceuticals can be very harmful to human health; advance market commitments avoid this by committing in advance to buy the efficient quantity, simultaneously creating an incentive for vaccine development and ensuring the efficient quantity is purchased.Michael Kremer
- Because the world economy is losing $500 billion every month due to COVID, it is worth investing heavily in developing a vaccine and getting many 'shots on goal' despite high failure risk; since private returns from building large factories before a vaccine is proven fall far below social returns, governments should use a mix of push and pull incentives—up-front financing to build factories ahead of time plus rewards for success—and invest in supply-chain capacity, not just final vaccine production.Michael Kremer
- Clean cookstoves are a good candidate for an advance market commitment because indoor air pollution from household cooking fires kills millions yearly and produces potent global-warming chemicals, and an AMC could combine a technological threshold with a consumer-willingness requirement—e.g., subsidizing $20-30 if consumers will pay $10—solving the prior problem that developed stoves didn't attract consumer demand.Michael Kremer
- There is a tendency for advance market commitments to target technologically close products (like pneumococcus) rather than technologically distant ones (like malaria), because politicians and bureaucrats want quick wins and firms push products where they have a technological advantage—even though, economically, technologically distant products offer greater advantages from AMCs.Michael Kremer
- Although patent buyouts (buying patents and placing IP in the public domain to reward innovators without monopoly distortions) were academically attractive, they failed politically—likely because pharmaceutical firms feared it would delegitimize the IP system—whereas advance market commitments, which involve selling products rather than patents, proved politically acceptable.Michael Kremer