Tiebout Hypothesis
The idea, from Charles Tiebout's 1956 work, that competition among many local governments lets people 'vote with their feet,' choosing the mix of taxes and public goods they want and keeping governments efficient.
As defined in Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government
Where it comes up · 1
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- California's Local Agency Formation Commissions (LAFCOs), created in the 1960s, function like cartels of existing municipalities that can block the formation of new cities, acting like a Certificate of Need regime that prevents the Tiebout competition through which new municipalities would pressure existing ones toward efficiency and lower prices.Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government
- Zoning, combined with property taxes commensurate with allowed development, solves the free-rider problem in the Tiebout model by making a local government function like a business: homogeneous owners with equity invested control entry and have incentive to fund good public goods, preventing redistribution away from the median voter that would otherwise cause everyone to underfund public goods.Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government
- Local zoning and control resemble Nozick's meta-utopia, where people choose to join communities that constrain them in agreed ways; as long as an exit option exists and new governments can be formed, allowing diverse local communities to set their own rules preserves an admirable diversity of lifestyles rather than collapsing choices into a single national rule.Judge Glock on Zoning and Local Government