FDICIA
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, intended to address bank failures via prompt corrective action but not invoked in the 2008 crisis.
As defined in et_323
Where it comes up · 5
- Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation2 claims
- Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail 10/05/20092 claims
- Yanis Varoufakis on Valve, Spontaneous Order, and the European Crisis1 claim
- Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty1 claim
- Anat Admati on the Financial Crisis of 20081 claim
Most important claims · 7 of 7Search all claims for “FDICIA” →
- The 1991 FDICIA legislation required least-cost resolution to impose losses on creditors, but contained a systemic-risk exception that allowed regulators to avoid it—an exception requiring agreement of the FDIC, Federal Reserve board, President, and Treasury Secretary, the very same parties who had bailed out Continental Illinois—so the law merely formalized the existing too-big-to-fail practice rather than ending it.Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail 10/05/2009
- A government policy with strings attached already existed—FDICIA (1991)—which provided that when a bank blew up, management got replaced; TARP was an extra-legal, ad hoc, cobbled-together way to avoid that consequence and protect existing management.Chris Arnade on the Mexican Crisis, TARP, and American Poverty
- The main obstacle to bank-resolution reform in both Europe and the US is the political power of the financial sector: the US had FDICIA, a law meant to do similar things to troubled banks, but it was not invoked in 2008; instead banks were made whole and those who erred kept their jobs, an outcome that is both immoral and destructive.Yanis Varoufakis on Valve, Spontaneous Order, and the European Crisis
- Alan Meltzer told Hank Paulson to use the FDICIA systemic-risk exception in the current crisis, but Paulson asked the banks, who were against it because invoking it would remove their management.Gary Stern on Too Big to Fail 10/05/2009
- Given the unavoidable current reality of deposit insurance and implicit bailout promises (which persist even when legislated against, as FDICIA's prompt corrective action was short-circuited), the only reasonable way to deal with the resulting incentives is to require very low leverage and very high equity, and the cost of doing so is small compared to the cost of ongoing financial-system failures.Anat Admati on the Financial Crisis of 2008
- The United States violated the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), which was supposed to limit the insurance of uninsured debt, by extending blanket guarantees and generous Fed lending during the crisis and effectively pretending the act did not exist.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation
- Although Bernanke's argument that a resolution authority was needed (so the government would not be held over a barrel by creditors) was reasonable, Dodd-Frank crafted the resolution authority in such a way that it is completely non-credible, leaving the country in the same position as before—analogous to FDICIA, which was a good law that was simply not used.Charles Calomiris on Capital Requirements, Leverage, and Financial Regulation