causal

Neuroscience of consciousness is inherently self-referential

The neuroscience of consciousness is an observer's attempt to explain themselves from within the system they exist in, which looks like a self-referential problem; since self-reference reliably destroys the epistemic purity of systems (as Bertrand Russell discovered with the set-theoretic paradox), the field's persistent failure to explain why particular experiences map to particular neural firings is suspicious.

causalpending

Speaker

Erik Hoel

Evidence Quote

“the part that's self-referential is our attempt to understand scientifically where consciousness comes from...we seem to just be having a huge amount of trouble in this very specific case of self-reference, so it makes me very suspicious that maybe something is going on here.”

Source

Erik Hoel on Consciousness, Free Will, and the Limits of Science— EconTalk
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:29:27 AM

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