factual
Consciousness Requires Irreducible First-Personal Facts
Phenomenal consciousness cannot be properly accommodated within the purely third-personal, impersonal scientific worldview even with extra phenomenal properties added as Chalmers proposes; instead one must postulate genuine, irreducible first-personal facts over and above third-personal facts, placing List more radically outside physicalism than Chalmers because he locates the problem in the 'view from nowhere' itself.
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Speaker
Christian ListEvidence Quote
“I'm sort of much more on Nagel's side and think that actually the problem lies with the view from nowhere, with the impersonal perspective. We can't really properly accommodate consciousness in our worldview without recognizing the sort of fundamentality of the first-personal perspective. And that leads me to think that we must really postulate genuine, irreducible first-personal facts over and above the third-personal or impersonal facts.”
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:28:26 AM
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