factual

Consciousness Requires Irreducible First-Personal Facts

Phenomenal consciousness cannot be properly accommodated within the purely third-personal, impersonal scientific worldview even with extra phenomenal properties added as Chalmers proposes; instead one must postulate genuine, irreducible first-personal facts over and above third-personal facts, placing List more radically outside physicalism than Chalmers because he locates the problem in the 'view from nowhere' itself.

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Speaker

Christian List

Evidence Quote

“I'm sort of much more on Nagel's side and think that actually the problem lies with the view from nowhere, with the impersonal perspective. We can't really properly accommodate consciousness in our worldview without recognizing the sort of fundamentality of the first-personal perspective. And that leads me to think that we must really postulate genuine, irreducible first-personal facts over and above the third-personal or impersonal facts.”

Source

354 | Christian List on Free Will and Levels of Reality— Sean Carroll's Mindscape
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:28:26 AM

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