causal

External threat as commitment device to end internal fighting

An external existential threat can serve as a commitment device that ends internal factional fighting: when an outside enemy can take more from both factions than they would take from each other, the cost of internal fighting rises and former enemies become fast friends—as in post-1870 France, where defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and German unification forced the republican and monarchist factions to stop fighting and produced France's longest-lived constitution, the Third Republic (1871-1940).

causalpending

Speaker

Barry Weingast

Evidence Quote

“the external threat serves as a commitment device... the amount I want to take from you is small relative to the amount that the outsider is going to take from both of us. And so as a consequence we start to cooperate.”

Source

Barry Weingast on the Violence Trap— EconTalk
Created: 6/13/2026, 12:10:26 AM

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