Goldman's pre-2008 gains were rent-seeking: investing in the political process to enlist the government as a cosigner on all loans ('if I win I keep it, if I lose somebody else pays'). The solution is not to claw profits back after the fact but to never make such promises. Once authorities have the power to make such deals, it is rational for firms to 'invest' in politics. From the investor's perspective rent-seeking and profits are indistinguishable, but from society's perspective they differ greatly. These perverse incentives increased misallocation rather than correcting it.

causalpending

Speaker

Michael Munger

Evidence Quote

“so far from correcting miss allocations these perverse incentives increase the miss allocations”

Source

Mike Munger on Profits, Entrepreneurship, and Storytelling 12/12/2011— EconTalk
Created: 10/30/2026, 2:14:08 PM

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