What this covers

This is a one-hour Talks at Google session with John Mihaljevic, publisher of The Manual of Ideas, who sets out to demystify stock investing for people who don't do it for a living. He treats a stock as a legal claim on part of a corporation, so the working question is whether you'd want to buy the whole company at the market's price. He frames the market with the Beauty Contest idea associated with John Maynard Keynes: a short-term voting machine driven by guesses about other people's guesses, and a long-term weighing machine that tracks business results. The BP collapse during the Gulf oil spill serves as his example of the voting machine at work.

The middle of the talk lays out a spectrum of valuation lenses. At one end sit companies trading below liquidation value, which he says are rare, with shipping stocks priced under the scrap value of their vessels as an example. Next comes Benjamin Graham-style deep value investing, based on tangible assets, and the replacement cost test, which holds that a company priced above what it would cost to rebuild invites competition. Most companies fall between these extremes, where he says to compare earnings yield with your required return. He also covers sum-of-the-parts activism in the style of Carl Icahn, and Joel Greenblatt's Magic Formula Screening Framework. He reports that people who cherry-pick from the screen's output underperform the mechanical list.

The talk turns contentious around psychology and practice. Mihaljevic claims that deeply discounted, hated stocks outperform but that most investors can't tolerate holding them. He says to buy only what you'd be excited, not terrified, to see fall 50%. He also argues that idea generation is the easy part, that an edge lies in assessing opportunities, and that a small portfolio doesn't make an investor irrelevant to market efficiency. He draws on Warren Buffett for the Circle of Competence and for buying when others are fearful. He closes with practical advice for investors outside the U.S. who lack cheap screening databases and must read primary filings company by company.

Sharpest takeaway

Mihaljevic argues that successful investing requires viewing stocks as ownership stakes in real businesses rather than trading vehicles, and systematically comparing intrinsic business value to market price while staying within your circle of competence.

  • Stock market functions as both a beauty contest in short term and a weighing machine in long term; long-term success requires focusing on business fundamentals, not sentiment
  • Multiple value investing frameworks (deep value, magic formula, sum-of-parts) all converge on the principle that buying assets below replacement cost or earnings below required return creates margin of safety
  • Discomfort with owning unpopular stocks is the primary obstacle preventing most investors from capturing the outperformance available in deeply discounted securities

The claims · ranked41 claims · weighted by value

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0.80

Stock legally represents partial ownership of a corporation, and investors should analyze stocks by asking whether they would want to buy the entire company at the market price, not by technical chart analysis or price momentum patterns.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“The legal definition tells you that it's just a partial ownership of a corporation. That's really what you're buying when you invest in a stock. And it may not seem that way because it's so easy to transact online...it's easy to forget that what you're really buying is ownership of a real life business.”

0.76

Stock investors don't need to outsmart market price predictions; they can simply decide what yield they're comfortable with and buy companies meeting that threshold, receiving that return regardless of market expectations.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“you don't need to outsmart the market on the prediction necessarily, because you can just decide what you're comfortable with. So if the company's earning $1 billion in free cash flow, or net income per year, and it's selling for $10 billion, that's a 10% yield. And you can say, well, I'm comfortable with that.”

0.76

Investors often overprice liquidity; a stock that doesn't trade frequently is preferred at a discount compared to an identical or superior security (preferred stock ranking ahead in bankruptcy) because of perceived inability to exit quickly.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“Sometimes people will care about liquidity a lot in a stock. Oh, can I buy $10 million of this in one day, or does it trade very little? When actually, how much it trades has nothing to do with how much it's worth. I mean, if you own a house it trades zero, and it's still worth whatever it's worth.”

0.74

A company trading above its replacement cost signals that competitors have an incentive to enter the market and recreate the business more cheaply, making it uncompetitive as an investment opportunity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“Because what that's saying is there's an incentive for a competitor to come in, because they can recreate that same company for less money than the stock price implies. So if the company in the stock market is worth $2 billion, and you could recreate that business for $1 billion, there's an incentive for someone with a lot of money to come in, create that company for $1 billion, take it public immediately, and then basically sell the stock for $2 billion in the market.”

0.74

CNBC's daily financial commentary (discussing quarterly or daily movements) is pure noise with no signal value; long-term investors should ignore short-term media commentary as it reflects only the voting machine, not the weighing machine.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And when you turn on CNBC, they're always talking about this quarter, or today even, or tomorrow, what's going to happen. That's just noise. There's no signal there.”

0.74

Warren Buffett advises knowing your circle of competence and staying within it; most investors should admit they don't understand most companies, particularly biotech without revenue, and it's more valuable to decline investing than to venture outside expertise.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“Warren Buffett once said, you need to know your circle of competence. But what's even more important is to stay within it. So it can be small, but if you stay within that, you'll do well. And if you venture outside of it, like would be my case with a biotech company, or many other companies-- and it's OK to say, I don't know enough.”

0.74

The stock market is fundamentally a beauty contest where investors choose companies based on what they think other people will think of those companies rather than intrinsic quality, creating a self-referential guessing game.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“The stock market is a beauty contest, that's really a criticism that economist John Maynard Keynes levied on the stock market, or on Wall Street. And it's really this idea that a lot of investors, and even professional investors, will choose companies based on what they think other people will think of those companies.”

0.74

Value investing focuses on buying securities trading below intrinsic value, contrasting with growth investing which focuses on growth rate; growth stocks with no margin of safety can collapse 20% on a single quarter miss.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“So growth investing, usually it's kind of the other mindset, or just the mindset of which company is going to grow the fastest and that's where I want to invest. But you're not really thinking, well, what if everyone else thinks it's going to grow the fastest as you're super expensive. You may not make any money. If they have any kind of disappointment, like they missed a quarter by a penny, the stock can be down 20% in a day, because there was just no value there.”

0.72

Investors should only buy stocks where a 50% price decline would be exciting rather than terrifying, because this mindset ensures you know what the business is worth and aren't vulnerable to panic-selling.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And generally, I want to only buy a stock where I am excited if it goes down 50%, because then I can buy even more. And if you have that mindset, you're going to be a lot pickier. Because usually when a stock goes down 50%, you're really scared. You're thinking this is going to zero.”

0.72

Deep value (asset-focused) stocks are universally hated; investors historically overreact negatively to deep value companies, creating outperformance, but psychological discomfort from holding despised positions causes most investors to abandon the approach.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“So these deeper value companies where you're buying maybe some factory-type business for less than it would cost to create the factory, these are generally hated stocks. And if you look at it historically, people have overreacted on the negative, generally...it's kind of contradictory that you buy what no one else wants, and then you outperform. And it just takes a certain mindset to be comfortable doing that, because everyone around you will say, oh, you are not very smart.”

0.71

When given lists of magic formula stocks (high earnings yield + high return on capital), people who use their own judgment to cherry-pick companies actually underperform the mechanical screen, showing that human selectivity among already-screened companies creates negative alpha.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“Alon Bochman is an investor who focuses on that. And an interesting finding is that if you gave people the lists of those companies that rank highly on those two factors and told them, well, now that you have these companies, choose the best ones-- or now, use your own judgments to choose which ones you want to invest in. What they found is actually, when people choose their own, they do worse than the mechanical screen does.”

0.70

Successful investors identify their edge by assessing investment opportunities better than others, not by generating more ideas; idea generation is the easy part given 10,000+ publicly traded companies available.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“So where successful investors really generate their success-- or as they call it in the industry, their alpha or edge-- is really in assessing the investment opportunities. So I could give everyone the same potential company to invest in, and someone will say, wow, that's great, I want to buy. Someone will say, no way.”

0.70

Most companies fall between replacement cost and liquidation value extremes; evaluation should focus on earnings yield (earnings divided by market price) compared to investor's required return, taking into account whether those earnings will grow or decline.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And this is where most companies end up, unless we're in a 2008 financial crisis-type scenario...And what you would look at here is how much is this company actually earning, and how much do I have to pay in the stock market to acquire the whole business? And there's no right or wrong answer...what kind of return is good enough for my savings?”

0.69

Companies selling below liquidation value (the cash value if shut down and assets liquidated today) are rare but represent extreme opportunities; shipping industry stocks sometimes sell below scrap metal value of ships.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“When the shipping industry-- these big ocean tankers that transport crude oil around the world, and so forth. When that industry is doing badly, it's doing generally so badly that no one wants to own these stocks, and they will sell, on occasion, for less than the scrap value of the metal used to build the ships.”

0.69

Joel Greenblatt's 'magic formula' screens for companies with both high earnings yield (cheap) and high return on capital (good quality); historically this mechanical screen outperformed the S&P 500 by several percentage points annually.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“Joel Greenblatt is a very successful investor...where he talks about this magic formula. It's essentially a way to screen for companies...And it looks at two factors. One is the high earnings yield, how cheap is a business. And the other is the high return on capital, how good is a business. And historically, just a mechanical screen of those companies that rank highly on those two metrics has outperformed the S&P 500 by several percentage points a year.”

0.69

Carl Icahn-style sum-of-the-parts investing involves buying companies where individual business units or assets are worth more in aggregate than the market values the whole company, allowing activists to unlock value.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“Carl Icahn-style, sum-of-the-parts investing. You may have heard of Carl Icahn, or these activist investors, who will buy a big chunk of a company-- maybe 10%-- and then try to tell the company what to do so that the stock would be worth more, or go up. And usually what they look for is where you have a company that has different parts to it, and if you add up the value of all the parts, it's materially above what the whole company is trading for in the stock markets today.”

0.69

BP's stock collapse during the Gulf of Mexico oil spill was a voting machine reaction; sober analysis showed BP would survive the cleanup costs and be undervalued even in worst-case scenarios, and the stock eventually recovered as the weighing machine reasserted itself.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“When there was the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, BP's stock got killed, because they were operating that well that had the spill. And that was the voting machine, right? People were saying BP is going bankrupt. And then as people start to think, well, what are the scenarios? How much could they have to pay? And even in the worst case scenario, if they had to pay $20 billion to clean up this oil spill, they'd still be undervalued because the stock has gone down so much. And over time, the stock went back up, because people realized what BP was actually worth.”

0.69

For European and Asian investors without access to cheap screening databases, the practical solution is manual research of primary documents (10-Ks, annual reports) company-by-company, eliminating the ability to screen across many companies simultaneously.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“You may just end up relying a lot more on the primary documents, and doing the work yourself. Which of course makes it hard to screen across many companies.”

0.69

Warren Buffett's principle 'be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful' works because when collective pessimism drives odds dramatically in favor of a company's survival, even a mediocre company can become a great investment if its survival is not in genuine doubt.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“And this quote from Warren Buffett kind of fits that paradigm. He says, we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful. And that really speaks to those odds. Because if you have everybody in the world believing that a company will go bankrupt, the odds on it may be so great that if it just doesn't go bankrupt-- it may still be a mediocre company-- you could actually do very well.”

0.68

Benjamin Graham's 'deep value' approach focuses on buying assets below their value, particularly tangible assets like property and equipment, using metrics like purchasing companies below tangible book value as a screening tool.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And I start with that because Benjamin Graham wrote the book on value investing. It's called 'The Intelligent Investor.' And the style is today called deep value because you focus mostly on the assets-- like I mentioned a shipping company with their ships and the scrap value. That would be deep value, if you can buy something for less than the assets.”

0.68

The stock market is merely a conduit for trading ownership stakes in companies; the market itself does not create value—a great company like Google would be valuable whether publicly traded or not, and the stock market just provides the mechanism to buy and sell that ownership.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And then finally we really get to the essence of the stock market, and it's just a conduit to ownership. So Google would be a great company whether it's publicly traded or not. It would still have the cash flow it has, it would still have the customers that it has. And so you don't need the stock market to make a Google valuable, or any other company. And so it's basically just a place to buy and sell stock in companies.”

0.68

Performing detailed financial analysis of companies requires examining line items like 'property, plant, and equipment' on balance sheets and supporting footnotes in annual reports to understand asset composition and market values.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“So every company will have a line item on their balance sheet called property, plant, and equipment. And for a shipping company, that's where their ships might be. For a hotel company that owns hotels, that's where their hotels would be. And then they may have a footnote in their annual report that actually lists out the ships. It won't necessarily tell you the market value of those ships, but it might tell you what they're carried on on the books, and how much they've depreciated so far, and some detail.”

0.68

There is no secret or magic to successful investing; long-term investing success requires finding businesses where you're comfortable with the risk, buying at prices cheap enough that the underlying business return justifies the investment, regardless of market sentiment.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“And I'll end it there... the point that I just want to kind of leave with all of you is, there's no secret, there's no magic to this. And the only way to do well in the long term is to find businesses where you feel like you're comfortable with it, and it's cheap enough in the stock market that you feel like the return you're getting from the business itself is going to make it worthwhile.”

0.68

An individual investor's portfolio size is irrelevant to their impact on market efficiency; market efficiency depends on investors at all scales thinking carefully about company quality and valuation, so the 'small fish' mindset is incorrect.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“And the reason it's the wrong mindset to adopt is because just because your portfolio may be small, your role in the market is not insignificant. Because the market is supposed to function efficiently because even small investors think about how well is company A going to do, how much do I have to pay to buy it, et cetera, et cetera.”

0.66

A company's quality is measured by how much earnings or cash flow it generates relative to the capital invested in it; capital-intensive businesses generating 1% returns are poor investments regardless of brand reputation.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“Because we're dealing with money here, we want the company to make as much money as possible in earnings or cash flow relative to the capital it takes to build that company. So if I need to have a factory that costs me $1 billion, and that factory is then going to throw off $10 million a year in profit, that's probably not good enough. Because that's a 1% return, and a factory is no CD, it's not a safe investment.”

0.66

Expensive stocks create more forecasting risk because their low yields mean you must be right about something great happening; cheap stocks with high yields reduce forecasting risk because moderate business success is sufficient for target returns.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“It does get dangerous when you're buying very expensive stocks, because there your yield from the business is so low that you really are betting on something great happening. And that's where outsmarting the market becomes much more important. But if you're just sticking with things that you're totally comfortable with, you don't need to worry very much about what the market is predicting.”

0.66

Before investing, you must have an explicit estimate of intrinsic business value; without this anchoring estimate, there is no basis for making investment decisions, and recommendations to buy a stock without reference to valuation are vacuous.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· John Mihaljevic

“You really need to know-- or basically have an estimate that you believe in-- that a company's worth before you can even think about investing in it. Because if you don't know what you think a business is worth, then there's no basis to make an investment decision. And I think that's often forgotten. Sometimes you'll just hear someone say, oh, you should buy Apple stock, because they're going to come up with a new iPhone. And there's no reference in that sentence to how much you have to pay for Apple.”

0.65

Google's business is so high-quality that it generates more cash than it can effectively reinvest, causing tens of billions to accumulate as cash on the balance sheet rather than being deployed at the company's historical return rates.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“And if it's a great business, like Google, the problem actually becomes that it's very hard to reinvest that cash, because the business doesn't require a lot of capital. So take one year's worth of free cash flow for Google...that would be phenomenal. But because it's not a capital-intensive business, that free cash flow just kind of builds up on the balance sheet, and over time there's tens and tens of billions of cash on the balance sheet.”

0.64

'Jockey stocks' are stocks of companies with great CEOs who excel not only at running the business but at capital allocation; these are especially valuable when companies have large cash balances, as bad allocation can destroy or good allocation can create enormous value.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“What I call jockey stocks, which is really companies that are run by a great jockey. It's again the horse racing kind of analogy, where you have a CEO who is not just great at running the business, but also great at what he does with the cash that the business generates. Because once the cash is there, there are a lot of options. And you can destroy a lot of value is a company, or create a lot of value, based on what you do with the cash.”

0.64

A Korean tire manufacturer had common and preferred shares trading at vastly different valuations; the preferred traded at 50% discount to common while conferring identical economic benefits but lacking voting rights, creating a pure value opportunity.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“this is a tire manufacturer in Korea that has a few different types of stock, so it gets a little complicated. But basically, you can invest in this company in a few different ways, and the basic way-- the common stock-- is cheap. But then there's another way, through the preferred stock, where you're getting this exact same thing 50% cheaper than other people are paying for the other thing.”

0.64

A small Indian exhibition and IT parks company had $50 million cash and valuable real estate near Mumbai airport worth more in aggregate than the company's total market value, giving investors free ownership of the operating business.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“Where you have this little company in India where they got $50 million cash, they have a big plot of land near Mumbai airport, and both of those things together are already worth more than what the whole company's trading for in the stock market. So you're actually getting the business, whatever it is that they do-- which is an exhibition and IT parks business-- you're getting that for free.”

0.64

The data infrastructure for US stock screening is abundant and cheap (~$300/year for American Association of Individual Investors data), while European and Asian screening data is extremely expensive ($20,000-30,000/year) or simply unavailable.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“The data that exists for the US stock market is a lot more robust than what's available out there for Europe or other markets...The subscription you mentioned is about $300 a year, and then the databases that will do a good job on Europe and the rest of the world may cost $20,000 or $30,000 a year.”

0.63

Using baseball terminology, investing is a 'no-strike-called game' where investors never swing at pitches (investment ideas) unless the terms are attractive; selective discipline is more important than hitting rate, because investors only need to be right on the companies they actually buy.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“To use a baseball analogy again from Buffett, it's a no-strike called game. So you don't need to swing at every idea that comes your way. The only thing that matters is the companies that you do buy, you're right on. And even there, you're not going to be right on every one.”

0.63

Book value metrics are useful for initial screening but have limitations: the accounting book value does not necessarily reflect economic or liquidation value, requiring follow-up research to validate whether book values are realistic.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“And tangible book value is once you satisfy all the liabilities-- like the debt-- what's left over for the shareholders, using this accounting language-- which is standardized, but it's not really correct in an economic sense. But you can use it for screening, and then you have to do your own research to decide, well, the book value may be high, but that's not actually if I wanted to sell the ships, so you take it down and do that kind of analysis.”

0.62

Wall Street has a financial incentive to make investing seem complicated to convince people they need professional money managers, when in reality the fundamentals of successful investing are straightforward.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“And it's actually in the interest of the financial community and Wall Street to make it seem very complicated, so that you will just give your money to them and think that they're doing such a great job for you that they deserve to get paid a lot of money. When in reality, it isn't that complicated.”

0.60

Vodafone owned a large publicly-traded stake in Verizon Wireless; Verizon's value alone was so high that the rest of Vodafone was valued extremely cheaply, but investors didn't recognize the sum-of-the-parts gap for several years until it eventually worked out.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“So there was a couple years ago, Vodafone, which is a big mobile phone carrier based in the UK, owned a large stake in Verizon Wireless in the US. And Verizon Wireless publicly traded so just that the value of that stake was so great that the rest of Vodafone was being valued extremely cheaply. But investors didn't see care to see it for a while, and it's hard to predict these things, but usually it works out, and then after a couple of years, all of a sudden it worked out, and you actually make a great return.”

0.51

Microsoft at half Google's P/E suggests a more extreme opportunity than the Microsoft/Google decision, which is marginal; investors should look for situations like Research In Motion trading at 1% of Google's valuation, where extreme gaps offer more opportunity.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“Generally, that's not an extreme situation. Usually you'll find much more extreme situations than that, where Research In Motion is trading at 1% of the valuation of Google. And something that extreme can be also more rewarding, if you are a little bit right in some aspect.”

0.48

If you can acquire a company for a 50% earnings yield (earnings are half the purchase price), you recover your entire investment within two to three years from retained earnings even if those earnings decline, and any earnings after that period represent pure profit, making the investment worthwhile despite poor long-term growth prospects.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· John Mihaljevic

“So maybe even if the earnings are going to decline, well, if you can acquire it for two times current earnings, that means you're making 50% return just based on-- and we have the mindset of a capital allocator and owner here, no longer just pieces of paper and stocks. If you can buy the whole company and in one year get half your money back in earnings, you're probably going to be fine, even if those earnings are going down slowly over time. Because within two to three years, you've got all your money back, and then whatever comes after that is just gravy.”

0.17

Manual of Ideas (Mihaljevic's newsletter) doesn't function as a screening database; instead it selectively presents curated ideas monthly, so it's not a replacement for mechanical screening for investors seeking breadth.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“If you're looking to screen mechanically, the 'Manual of Ideas' really won't be the right tool, because we don't allow you to screen on our whole database. We actually select ideas and present them each month.”

0.17

Seth Klarman's investor letters are highly valuable but sometimes difficult to obtain, suggesting that access to quality management communication is limited for many investors despite its analytical value.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· John Mihaljevic

“Seth Klarman's letter is great, it's sometimes hard to get.”

0.13

Warren Buffett and his investor peer Phil Ordway are among the few managers Mihaljevic actively follows and respects; Ordway, though less famous, is identified as an up-and-coming fund manager expected to perform very well.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· John Mihaljevic

“Phil Ordway is somebody I have a little bit later. He manages a fund and does just extremely good work. He's kind of an up-and-coming fund manager, but I think will do very well.”