
Kenneth Rogoff | Podcast | In Good Company | Norges Bank Investment Management
What this covers
This is a conversation between Nicolai Tangen, who hosts the NBIM podcast, and economist Kenneth Rogoff, co-author with Carmen Reinhardt of This Time Is Different. Rogoff says the financial crisis aftermath tracked their historical averages for unemployment, stock declines and housing declines closely, despite early criticism. He then applies the same long-view habit to the present: tariffs, debt, the dollar's standing, and China's trajectory.
On trade, Rogoff says Americans will bear tariff costs through higher prices and lower quality, comparing it to "Mexico will pay for the wall." He concedes that tariffs are popular with voters, which makes them rational politics even though economists oppose them. A 20% tariff would act as a large tax hike and disrupt supply chains, though he says it need not be catastrophic if paired with deregulation and innovation policy. He rejects nostalgia for 1950s manufacturing, arguing it would mean lower incomes and costlier goods.
The most contentious material concerns money and debt. Rogoff calls central bank independence a roughly 40-year-old experiment that could be reversed. He says pressure on the Fed comes from both the left and Donald Trump, and he argues that low inflation is a product of independence, not a sign it is dispensable. On debt, he rules out a US default and rejects the claim that growth alone will solve the problem. He expects financial repression to be used more widely, and he points to the swing in real Treasury yields since Larry Summers's secular stagnation speech as evidence that permanently low rates were a bad assumption.
The dollar is described as "late middle-aged." Currency transitions are slow, and no credible rival exists, since the euro is regional and the yen and renminbi are barely used. China wants to widen the renminbi's footprint, partly out of fear of sanctions like those placed on Russia. The conversation also covers China's need for a private-sector-led growth model, which Xi has been reluctant to allow, how a slowdown there would affect Norway and other commodity exporters, and why Germany can now afford stimulus.
Rogoff argues that the US faces unprecedented economic turbulence from Trump's tariffs and policy randomness, combined with structural pressures on central bank independence and unsustainable debt trajectories that will likely force either inflation or politically-constrained monetary policy, while the dollar's dominance has peaked and will gradually decline as a global reserve currency.
- Central bank independence is under threat from both political sides, making inflation control difficult during future shocks
- US debt is unsustainable on current trajectory and will eventually resolve through inflation rather than fiscal adjustment
- Dollar peaked in dominance around 2015 and faces secular decline despite remaining the primary reserve currency
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Central bank independence is a new and experimental institutional innovation (~40 years old), with most countries historically having central banks under treasury control, making it vulnerable to reversal and not a permanent feature of governance.
“the mo the most fundamental point is that Fed independence is a new thing. Uh central bank independence is a new thing. I mean the Fed was not the the Federal Reserve has this grand building that you see pictures of, you've probably been to in the 20s and you know early 30s. They were in a room in the Treasury a few people. This whole they were part of the treasury. most countries the central bank was part of the treasury. The notion of central bank independence which I by the way I think I wrote the first paper on uh just 40 years ago now and back then almost no one had independent central banks. It's new. It's experimental”
Global currency transitions occur slowly (e.g., Spanish peso took ~100 years to decline), but the dollar is 'late middle-aged' and while no replacement currency exists now, dramatic currency crises are unlikely in the near term.
“the the the global currency normally changes slowly. you you know you had the Spanish peda and it's like 100 years yeah like a hundred years and there's usually you know you die a slow death over time and the newcomer comes up and you're even for a while and I I would describe the dollar as late middleaged at the moment uh you know there's no nobody's going to take over right now but for it to actually disappear you wouldn't have seen it”
The US ability to see and control all financial transactions (making the rules of the game in international finance, controlling SWIFT messaging) gives it tremendous power that China specifically wants to escape by developing renminbi usage and their own clearing mechanisms.
“it isn't just the sanctions, it's the ability of the United States to see everything... the US gets to make the rules of the game when bankers are negotiating... by getting more things into rembi getting more things into the Chinese currency and developing their own the word is rails but their own clearing mechanisms they can get around this”
Many people incorrectly believe central bank independence is no longer needed since inflation is low, but this confuses correlation with causation—inflation is low BECAUSE of independence, not independence is unnecessary because inflation is low.
“there a lot of people who are saying well it's had its benefits but now that inflation's down we don't need it anymore. it we it was useful to bring inflation down. Now we don't need it, which of course, you know, they don't they don't see that that's why inflation's down because you have central bank independence.”
Germany was able to conduct stimulus now (post-2024) because it saved during good times; it should have stimulus sooner, and running deficits is good for economies while having big debt constrains options.
“Germany is able to do stuff now because it has saved for a rainy day and it's a rainy day and they're making use of it. I I think they should have made use of it sooner, but yeah, I mean, you know, it depends on how you spend the money obviously. I mean, debt's not the be all and end all of uh macro policy.”
Debt resolution requires either raising taxes or lowering spending—some combination of fiscal adjustment; Rogoff rejects the idea that debt can be solved by growth alone, as both parties present it.
“what kind of adjustments can we see well you either lower raise taxes or lower spending. I mean, you have to do something to do with adjusting what you're spending. The US is running a I think it's a 7% of GDP deficit this year. I mean, and it'll come down a bit, but who knows how much. Uh, all the projections are the debts currently at 36 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office, I think, has it going to 65 trillion in 10 years. So there are lots of things you can I'm not tell I I'm not about what you should adjust. I'm not about the size of government. That's a separate question. But you know some kind of adjustments will need to be made.”
The U.S. will not default on Treasury bonds because it can print money; restructuring debt into longer-duration obligations is unlikely; but the U.S. can employ financial repression to reduce debt burden.
“Do you see a scenario where the US defaults on his treasury bonds? I mean, again, it would be so good for sales of my book with Carmen Reinhardt from 2009 if that happened. But, you know, and it would be total dysfunction to do that. It would be so stupid because we we can print money. We don't need to default on our Treasury bonds.”
Financial repression (forcing banks/financial firms to hold government debt at below-market returns) already exists to some degree since 2008 financial crisis; Trump administration may expand this tool to manage debt.
“What already happened after the financial crisis was we put in all these restrictions to make the bank safer that had them basically hold more Fed debt, which is basically Treasury bonds and more Treasury bonds. So, we can put in restrictions. We can put in rules.”
China's efforts to decouple from the dollar are motivated by observation of US sanctions on Russia and fear that similar sanctions could be imposed on China, particularly regarding Taiwan.
“what's really scared the daylights out of them is watching what the US has tried to do to Russia with the sanctions. And you know, we don't know, but China is certainly thinking about uh, you know, provoking the eye of the United States at some point by trying to take over Taiwan and looking at the sanctions.”
China needs to return to a growth model where the private sector leads and the state follows, but President Xi has been reluctant to relinquish centralized power because of concerns about regime stability.
“They need to go back to this growth model where the private sector leads and the states not doing everything. But President Xi's been very reluctant to let go of that power. He's worried about instability.”
The financial crisis aftermath matched Rogoff and Reinhardt's historical averages for crisis outcomes (unemployment duration/level, stock declines, housing price declines) remarkably well, validating their 'This Time Is Different' analysis, despite initial criticism.
“Well, actually, you know, uncannily so. I mean uh if you look at uh we we gave that by the way uh we were looking at private financial crisis and not government debt crisis and what we're talking about um and and I think what you're talking about but um you know if you look at uh how much unemployment went up on average in the US how long it lasted um uh how much uh uh stock markets fell fell, how much housing prices fell. It was remarkably uh on our on our averages.”
Manufacturing leaving China has benefited Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India, with many companies pursuing 'China plus one' strategy (keeping some production in China while diversifying new investments elsewhere).
“it's been great for Japan, for Korea, for Singapore, Malaysia, even Indonesia and India. So as you well know, a lot of companies have this China plus one strategy, meaning we're leaving our stuff in China. And by the way, they can't get it out right now anyway. And we're going to do our new investments uh we're going to do our new investments somewhere else.”
The euro is currently a regional currency not used as central reserve currency outside Europe, and the yen and renminbi are hardly used at all, leaving no credible competitor to the dollar despite its decline.
“the euro right now is a regional currency It's just basically not a central currency outside of Europe. And of course, the yen's hardly used at all. The renimi even less.”
Efforts by developing nations (like Brazil under Lula) to decouple from the dollar have limited power, but China is taking efforts to expand renminbi usage seriously—not to replace the dollar entirely, but to expand its footprint and reduce dollar dependence.
“Well, there's the uh PMIC stuff like when Lula says he doesn't want to use the dollar in Brazil and he he has no power. I mean, he's not able to do anything. But I think the Chinese take it very seriously of wanting it's it's not that they want to get everyone for everything to use the renimi their Chinese currency instead. It's that they want to expand its footprint.”
A Chinese economic slowdown would harm energy and commodity exporters (including Norway through reduced demand for oil) but benefit the US and other energy producers, creating complex global welfare impacts.
“it's very big on uh energy exporters and commodity exporters. I mean, if you if we were to turn around and tell you that China's growth's going to be 8% the next 2 or 3 years instead of I think it's going to be 2 or 3%. Uh probably that would be very good for inflows into the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund. I mean and for Norway in general uh and for the United States as a big uh energy producer and good for Brazil and good for Argentina.”
European high debt levels have weighed on growth (similar to Japan), visible in Italy, Japan, Greece, France underperformance over last 10 years, though high debt is not deterministic—investment, education, and cyclical stimulus matter too.
“Well, I think the high debt levels some of the responses that Europe needs to uh invest more in infrastructure to improve education uh on occasion to do uh stimulus when there's a transaction. I I you know I would say uh I mean I wouldn't want to overstate the weight. It's very hard to parse that. But if you look at uh you know how much uh particularly after the global financial crisis, look at the low debt countries and how much they were able to stimulate their economies, they did better.”
The 10-year inflation-indexed Treasury yield has swung 3% from -1% (when Summers did secular stagnation speech) to ~2%; this demonstrates that the assumption of permanently low rates was wrong and justifies worrying about debt sustainability.
“Of course, in the real the 10-year inflation index Treasury when Larry Summers did a secular stagnation speech was average zero over those 10 years. That got to minus one. Now it's around two. You know, it's a 3% swing. And US uh interest payments have gone up in a short period from 250 billion to nearly a trillion.”
Going back to 1950s manufacturing would mean lower incomes for Americans overall, as while manufacturing jobs might increase, costs on goods would be significantly higher than current prices.
“Let's go back to the 50s.' Well, we had a lot lower income back in the 50s. Like, okay, maybe we'll have more manufacturing jobs, maybe, but things will cost a lot more.”
American consumers will pay tariffs through both higher prices and lower quality of goods, similar to how 'Mexico will pay for the wall'—the political rhetoric obscures who actually bears the cost.
“this whole story, it's a little bit obviously like Mexico will pay for the wall. The American consumers will pay the tariffs both in terms of higher prices and I think lower quality.”
Central banks were slow to raise rates during the inflation surge partly because of forward guidance but mainly because they were cautious due to crisis fears that didn't materialize; the core mistake was not looking through supply-chain shocks to underlying demand.
“Well, I think they I I think I think part partly it was a case where a lot of people were thrown off in their forecasts. Uh I think the main reason everyone was slow to increase rates really was that they wanted to be the things looked like they could get really bad. They didn't get really bad and they were trying to be cautious.”
The Federal Reserve is not constitutionally protected like the Supreme Court and could be eliminated or packed with 'doves' to pressure inflation; pressure on Fed independence comes from both the left (wanting money printing for transfers) and Trump.
“A thing a lot of people don't understand is the central this the Fed is not the Supreme Court. It does not have that kind of constitutional status that the ECB does have. And it it could disappear in a week. And by the way, it isn't just Trump that wants it to disappear. The left wants it to disappear, too. They have all these plans.”
Central bank independence is a recent institutional innovation (first paper written ~40 years ago), not historically normal, and is experimental—most countries historically had central banks as part of the Treasury.
“central bank independence is a new thing. I mean the Fed was not the the Federal Reserve has this grand building... they were in a room in the Treasury a few people. This whole they were part of the treasury. most countries the central bank was part of the treasury. The notion of central bank independence which I by the way I think I wrote the first paper on uh just 40 years ago now and back then almost no one had independent central banks. It's new. It's experimental”
Tariffs are popularly supported, with most Americans favoring them despite economists' consensus against them, making it politically rational for elected officials to pursue tariff policies.
“the person said Well, you know, the candidate, uh, Trump, uh, he knows politics better than I do, and he thinks 80% of Americans love terrorists. And actually, you know, I, sadly, I find that hard to argue with.”
A 20% tariff would be a very bad outcome, functioning as a big tax hike and reducing trade and interfering with global supply chains; however, it would not be catastrophic if accompanied by offsetting sensible deregulation and innovation policies.
“if we just slapped on 20% tariffs, it would be very bad, like a big tax hike. It would reduce trade. it would interfere with the global supply chains and such. It would not be the end of the world if together with that Trump did a bunch of sensible things deregulation uh you know finding uh ways to uh improve innovation.”
Advocates for returning to 1950s economic policies ignore that incomes were much lower then, and while there might be more manufacturing jobs, costs would be significantly higher and goods quality would likely decline.
“Trump sometimes and his people sometimes say, "Let's go back to the 50s." Well, we had a lot lower income back in the 50s. Like, okay, maybe we'll have more manufacturing jobs, maybe, but things will cost a lot more.”
Whether high debt is sustainable depends primarily on interest rates, not absolute debt levels; people incorrectly debate 'is X% debt high?' without asking 'at what interest rates?'
“A lot of the this debate around debt took place when there was this, you know, zealous belief that interest rates would stay zero. And so, why ever think about it? They're not. They're they're not in your country. They're not in my country. Uh they're not in many places around the world.”
Many economists argue the Fed should focus on environment, social justice, and inequality, but this is wrong; the Fed should focus on inflation and follow Congressional policy direction on other issues, not lead on climate.
“So, actually a lot of them have really leaned into this idea the Fed should deal with the environment, social justice, inequality, and all of those things are really important. They're very valuable, but it's wrong. And actually, a survey of the American Economic Association just a couple years ago showed incredible naive Tay among academic economists about where the Fed's focus should be. It should be on inflation.”
Progressives argue that high debt is not a problem and mistake concern for debt as opposition to redistribution, while conservatives claim tax cuts pay for themselves through growth—both positions are financially fiction unsustainable.
“particularly on the left they just want to make debt really big... Anyone who thinks that big debt is a problem is in favor of austerity. They think you must not want to give people stuff... on the right they say, "Oh, we can do whatever we want because when we cut taxes, growth just soarses, doesn't cost anything." And it soarses a little, but it doesn't pay for itself. So, they've both been telling this fiction”
The period of low inflation was partly due to central bank competence (particularly Ben Bernanke's Fed) but also to favorable structural conditions: globalization, China's rise, and consensus against populist policies.
“the period where inflation was really low uh the central banks were good going back to Ben Larson but they were also lucky because globalization helped the rise of China helped. There was a general consensus away from populist policies more or less and that helped. They had the they had the wind at their backs.”
Europe should invest in becoming more independent in technology, as military spending often provides early funding for tech startups and investment, and this independence is strategically necessary.
“you need to think about um being more independent in tech. that Mario Draghi, the former head of the ECB, wrote a report where he made that point where Europe's lagged. And those two things are connected because military often provides the funding early on for uh tech uh tech startups”
The US dollar's global dominance peaked approximately 10 years ago (around 2015) in terms of its footprint and dominance measured by reserve holdings, transaction share, and pricing dominance, and has since been in decline.
“my book argues that we sort of reached the peak 10 years ago in terms of the dollar's footprint and dominance in the global economy and lots of different measures uh you know how many res reserves people hold uh number of transactions in dollars what's priced in dollars and we won't need to go into detail. they all kind of tell the same story”
The US dollar peaked in its global dominance approximately 10 years ago (around 2015) in terms of footprint and dominance, measured by reserve holdings, transaction volumes, and pricing in dollars.
“I think uh and my book argues that we sort of reached the peak 10 years ago in terms of the dollar's footprint and dominance in the global economy and lots of different measures uh you know how many res reserves people hold uh number of transactions in dollars what's priced in dollars”
China's official GDP growth of 5% is overstated; the government punishes academics and economists who publicly question the figure, indicating low statistical credibility.
“They're throwing people in in jail for questioning the figure. They're academics who said in uh too publicly that they thought the growth was overstated and they got in trouble.”
China's private sector was previously the source of innovation and strong performance in tech, but government intervention (crushing innovative companies, placing party members on boards, Jack Ma's disappearance) has destroyed this dynamic.
“where China was doing really well was their private sector. They're they were very innovative. There are areas of tech where they're just fantastic and uh they're great investments in China if you could make them now. But they they crush them. You know, famously Jack Ma who recently reappeared had sort of he's the founder of Alibaba and one of the great innovators at China just sort of disappeared and you know he was a little too vocal about his power.”
AI productivity gains creating 15-20% annual efficiency improvements in firms like Rogoff's suggest AI could provide deflationary effects as suggested earlier, but he doubts this will overcome political pressures for inflation.
“You know we are just seeing a dramatic uh increase in efficiency in our firm on the back of it. Last year probably 15% I suspect this year we'll see 20% efficiency gain. is just you know totally democratize the way people around the firm here code and um automate and uh it's just unbelievable”
Manufacturing is moving out of China to Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India as companies adopt a 'China plus one' strategy, expanding investment elsewhere while maintaining existing China operations.
“It's been great for Japan, for Korea, for Singapore, Malaysia, even Indonesia and India. So as you well know, a lot of companies have this China plus one strategy, meaning we're leaving our stuff in China. And by the way, they can't get it out right now anyway. And we're going to do our new investments uh we're going to do our new investments somewhere else.”
China is experiencing a 'Japanification' process with characteristics including deflation, slow growth, housing problems, overbuilding in infrastructure and housing, similar to Japan's multi-decade crisis.
“So we those of us who work on financial crisis look at Sweden on the one end is like the fastest recovery ever and the other end is Japan which by some measures took two decades. China's Sweden time is over... they're having a longer crisis than that. Uh it looks to me like it'll be a few more years uh to... the deflation the slow growth the housing problem the overbuilding in infrastructure and housing the similarities are are really quite remarkable.”
Rogoff's primary concern about AI is not its economic potential but rather the speed of change and human inability to adjust to rapid transformation.
“What worries me is that it's going to be so fast. Humans, mankind, will not be able to adjust to it. And that's what worries me right now. the uh you know the potentially chaotic change that could happen with AI.”
Consumer sentiment (70% of consumption) is more important than business sentiment for demand, though business sentiment matters for investment and future growth; the Fed listens to multiple signals but gives some credence to professional business forecasts.
“Not as important as consumer sentiment because consumer sentiment 70% of consumers are 70% of consumption. But it's business sentiment is certainly very important. I mean, it affects investment. Investment affects future growth.”
Tariffs will have a short-term inflationary effect and will harm consumer welfare through both higher prices and lower quality of imported goods, similar to the 2018 tariffs and the wall funding promise.
“it raises prices. is the United States is pretty closed and it raises prices there'll be a short-term effect that's I mean it won't be pleasant and I think some of it will be inflation some of it lower quality but the the problem is more uh innovation slowing growth over the longer run”
Democratic voters report dramatically worse economic sentiment than Republicans when looking at identical data, with Democratic indicators off the charts terrible while Republicans see everything as fine, a pattern more pronounced than under Biden.
“particularly consumers who didn't vote for Trump, which is about half of people, they think it's the end of the world. They think it's 20089, the global financial crisis, the pandemic. The indicators for the Democratic voters are just off the charts terrible. Oddly enough, they also think inflation's going to go through the roof. You talk to the Republicans, everything's ducky.”
A slowdown in Chinese economic growth would negatively impact energy and commodity exporters globally, including Norway, the US, Brazil, and Argentina, while potentially benefiting energy importers.
“it's very big on uh energy exporters and commodity exporters. I mean, if you if we were to turn around and tell you that China's growth's going to be 8% the next 2 or 3 years instead of I think it's going to be 2 or 3%. Uh probably that would be very good for inflows into the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund.”
Price controls and financial repression work temporarily but eventually things spin out of control, suggesting instability is inevitable.
“That stuff doesn't work indefinitely. It works for a little while and then eventually, you know, things spin out of control.”
The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis matched Rogoff and Reinhart's predictions in their book 'This Time Is Different' remarkably well, with unemployment increase, stock market falls, and housing price declines all aligning with historical averages they documented.
“uncannily so. I mean uh if you look at uh we we gave that by the way uh we were looking at private financial crisis and not government debt crisis... you know if you look at uh how much unemployment went up on average in the US how long it lasted um uh how much uh uh stock markets fell fell, how much housing prices fell. It was remarkably uh on our on our averages.”
Global currency transitions typically occur slowly over approximately 100 years, with the Spanish peso exemplifying this gradual decline, suggesting the dollar will similarly undergo a slow death rather than sudden collapse.
“the the the global currency normally changes slowly. you you know you had the Spanish peda and it's like 100 years yeah like a hundred years and there's usually you know you die a slow death over time and the newcomer comes up”
The euro has remained a regional currency and is not used as a central currency outside of Europe, and the yen is hardly used globally, despite expectations that alternatives to the dollar would emerge.
“it doesn't mean we'd have the euro instead of the dollar but it is a surprise that the euro right now is a regional currency It's just basically not a central currency outside of Europe. And of course, the yen's hardly used at all.”
Japan has successfully employed financial repression and high debt relative to GDP with a large domestic savings pool, though growth has been poor, suggesting this model is available to the US.
“I mean, look at Japan. Japan's debts very high. Their growth's been terrible, by the way, but their debts very high. They have a lot of financial repression in Japan... if if you're printing one of the big currencies that and you have a lot of cards you can play.”
Globalization has been very good for the United States, particularly benefiting it while it was at the top of the economic hierarchy, though this does not address distributional problems.
“Globalization's been great for the United States. Who are we kidding? I mean, the United States has been at the top. has benefited and yes, there are problems with globalization, but uh he he seems to just think it's really good for him.”
Next time there's a crisis in Europe with current interest rate levels, it may be harder to work out a solution compared to pandemic response (which had negative rates supporting German cooperation); positive rates raise the cost of crisis response.
“And interest payments have gone up. It's more painful. And I think, you know, [1:01:00] countries will need to make adjustments, but it's it's not something that, you know, necessarily precipitates change immediately. You know, the next time there's a big crisis in Europe with these kind of interest rates, it maybe it's going to be a little harder to work out a package when it doesn't seem like a free lunch. I I think what Europe did during the pandemic was great, but interest rates were negative, so wasn't very hard to persuade the Germans to do it. Now they're not.”
Economists are wrong to suggest the Fed should engage in environmental, social, and inequality objectives—these are important but the Fed lacks personnel, knowledge, and democratic accountability for these domains.
“a lot of them have really leaned into this idea the Fed should deal with the environment, social justice, inequality, and all of those things are really important. They're very valuable, but it's wrong... the Fed doesn't have the uh personnel. it doesn't have the knowledge and above all it doesn't have the democratic accountability to be the leader”
US debt is not sustainable on its current trajectory but could be resolved through inflation rather than fiscal adjustment, though inflation is not inevitable.
“no in the sense with on its current path, it's going to have to get resolved by inflation. Uh it's not going to get I think again going back to my colleagues in the profession, there were these people who argued interest rates would be lower forever.”
GDP is no longer an accurate measure of the economy because it misses many important economic phenomena and quality-of-life effects.
“it's been a long time since GDP was a really accurate measure of the economy. There are a lot of things it doesn't capture”
Some argue that now that inflation is down, central bank independence is no longer needed, failing to recognize that low inflation exists because of central bank independence.
“there a lot of people who are saying well it's had its benefits but now that inflation's down we don't need it anymore. it we it was useful to bring inflation down. Now we don't need it, which of course, you know, they don't they don't see that that's why inflation's down because you have central bank independence.”
Forward guidance (explicit communication of future Fed policy) has been overdone—it ties the Fed's hands without market credibility, making central banks followers of their own forecasts rather than flexible decision-makers.
“I think that's been overdone... the problem is, uh, markets don't believe it. And then you get to a year later and the Fed's a little bit tied its hands by giving this forward guidance”
The US gains tremendous power from its ability to set the rules of global financial transactions through control of SWIFT and dollar-clearing mechanisms, allowing it to see all transactions and enforce sanctions effectively.
“it isn't just the sanctions, it's the ability of the United States to see everything... the US gets to make the rules of the game when bankers are negotiating over you know what kind of uh transactions mechanism should we have how swift is something people may have heard of the uh international uh messaging system that's used by banks... the US, you know, it's not like they say it's our bomb and we're going to go home if you don't do what we want, but they can.”
Europe needs to be a geopolitical counterweight to the United States and should not suddenly rethink everything with each US presidential election, as this destabilizes international relations.
“we need Europe to be a geopolitical counterweight to the United States. You can't every time there's a presidential election and you know you think people think you know this is the worst thing that'll ever happen. I don't know what's to come. Every time there's a presidential election you can't suddenly rethink everything. you need a counterbalance”
Rogoff has long believed inflation was in remission rather than dead, and that this view was widely rejected by academic colleagues who became 'mesmerized and brainwashed' by central banks' promises of perpetual low inflation.
“I have always thought inflation was in remission and not dead. And my academic papers have made this case. My colleagues across all of academics, I think, became in somehow mesmerized, brainwashed by central banks saying there's never going to be inflation, nothing to worry about.”
China's overcentralization of power under President Xi may undermine longer-term growth by suppressing private sector innovation and investment.
“they have this over centralization of power which you know may undermine their longer term growth but it's uh you know certainly the the deflation the slow growth”
The US does not have capacity to defend Europe, Middle East, and Asia simultaneously even if Harris had won; US defense spending is 3.5% of GDP vs. 8% towards end of Cold War; experts believe US can defend 2 regions max, so Europe must build military capability.
“I mean I think the United States even if Harris had won, she was the one opposing Trump. uh is not prepared to defend Europe, the Middle East and Asia at the same time. The US defense budget which I was like 8% of GDP uh towards the end of [53:17] the cold war is 3 and a half% of GDP now. I think it will go up uh again regardless of Harris or Trump winning. But uh most of the foreign policy experts I talked to think the US does not have the capacity to project power in two regions at once, much less three.”
Interest payments on US debt have risen dramatically from $250 billion to nearly $1 trillion in a short period due to rising interest rates, which is very painful and reduces fiscal flexibility.
“Of course, in the real the 10-year inflation index Treasury when Larry Summers did a secular stagnation speech was average zero over those 10 years. That got to minus one. Now it's around two. You know, it's a 3% swing. And US uh interest payments have gone up in a short period from 250 billion to nearly a trillion.”
GDP is no longer an accurate measure of the economy due to quality improvements and unmeasured services; using GDP alone masks real living standard changes.
“Well, it's been a long time since GDP was a really accurate measure of the economy. There are a lot of things it doesn't capture, but uh you know, it's it's a there's it's a very difficult world that our children face”
Emerging markets borrowing in foreign currency (dollars) can face sudden rate increases, while Greece couldn't control the euro and faced sudden crises; the US, able to print dollars, has more runway for adjustments through inflation.
“When you go to an emerging market uh that borrows in dollars, it can happen very suddenly that Greece was an example. They were borrowing in Euro but they didn't control it can happen very suddenly.”
A debate about debt 'high' depends entirely on what interest rate is being paid—high debt at low rates is sustainable, while same debt at high rates is not.
“people often say is this debt level high? Is that debt level high? Well, tell me what interest rate you're paying and I can give you a lot better answer.”
The dollar has been 'lucky' at different historical stages because the US system proved good, but it has fallen short more than expected as the US faced challengers, suggesting luck rather than inherent superiority explains dollar dominance.
“there's this sense in which the dollar has been lucky at different stages the US has been good the US system's good but as the US has faced challenggers I think they've fallen short more than I would have guessed”
The US defense budget was ~8% of GDP toward the end of the Cold War and is now 3.5% of GDP; even if it increases, it won't return to Cold War levels, suggesting US capacity to project power is constrained.
“The US defense budget which I was like 8% of GDP uh towards the end of the cold war is 3 and a half% of GDP now.”
Trump has explicitly stated he thinks he's smarter than central bankers and wants a bigger voice in monetary policy; this represents an existential threat to Fed independence comparable to attacks coming from the left.
“Trump here and he has said he thinks he's smarter than the central bankers. He'd like a bigger voice.”
Tangen's firm is experiencing 15% efficiency gains on AI, with expectations of 20% efficiency gains this year, with potential of democratizing coding and automation.
“Last year probably 15% I suspect this year we'll see 20% efficiency gain. is just you know totally democratize the way people around the firm here code and um automate”
Young people today have higher nominal earnings than Rogoff had at their age, but face much higher interest rates and housing costs, creating welfare reduction despite higher wages.
“I talk to young people and tell them, "You're earning a lot more than I did at your age." And they say, "Yeah, but look what a house costs. Look at how high interest rates are."”
The 10-year inflation-indexed Treasury moved from zero to minus one to approximately two percent, representing a 3% swing in real rates that has driven interest payment increases from $250 billion to nearly $1 trillion.
“the 10-year inflation index Treasury when Larry Summers did a secular stagnation speech was average zero over those 10 years. That got to minus one. Now it's around two. You know, it's a 3% swing. And US uh interest payments have gone up in a short period from 250 billion to nearly a trillion.”
Global government debt according to the IMF is approximately 100 trillion dollars, representing a major policy challenge.
“if you add up all the all the government debt across the world according to IMF where you were the chief economist for some time u it's 100 trillion dollars”
Central bank independence has worked up to now in generating confidence and allowing higher debt levels, but its future depends on whether independence can survive political pressure.
“central bank independence up to this point has worked. It's given people more confidence. It allowed uh debt levels to be higher maybe than they would have otherwise. But I I think a lot of this question has to do with where do you think interest rates are going?”
The US is running a 7% of GDP deficit this year, expected to decline somewhat, with Congressional Budget Office projections showing US debt growing from 36 trillion to 65 trillion in 10 years.
“The US is running a I think it's a 7% of GDP deficit this year... The debts currently at 36 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office, I think, has it going to 65 trillion in 10 years.”
Possible inflation triggers include: cyberwarfare, pandemic, or other out-of-box shocks that both reduce growth and trigger government spending to maintain consumption.
“the most likely trigger for getting a really big shock is some out ofthebox thing happening that we haven't seen before for a long time and uh such as such as what? Well well let me throw out another pandemic because that's an easy one. But I also think the possibility of a say a cyber war is not far off.”
Financial repression (forcing banks and financial firms to hold debt at lower returns) will likely increase, similar to patterns since the financial crisis.
“Reinhardt and I label financial repression which we have to some degree now since the financial crisis where banks and financial firms are forced to hold more debt at ending up at lower returns than they'd like. So I think that you know kind of wilder stuff like that is coming to a theater near you soon.”
Central banks now lack favorable structural winds (globalization, China's rise, anti-populist consensus), and politics have shifted against central bank independence, creating conditions for inflation if shocks occur.
“Now they don't. And not only did they have the wind at their backs in terms of these techno factors, but the politics were leave the central bank alone. And that has been thrown by the wayside in in many countries.”
Markets are now signaling disbelief in both progressive and conservative fiscal fictions, as interest rates have risen despite policy claims.
“which I think now interest rates are saying the markets don't believe.”
China's official GDP growth figure of 5% is likely significantly overstated, with academics who publicly questioned the figure facing legal consequences from the government.
“They're throwing people in in jail for questioning the figure. They're academics who said in uh too publicly that they thought the growth was overstated and they got in trouble.”
Chinese savers have lost confidence in the government and regime, panicking and trying to move money out, forcing artificial stimulus to create the mirage of 5% growth while actual consumption has collapsed.
“People in China are they have no confidence in the regime. They have they have just lost confidence. So they're trying to get people to consume, but it's just collapsed. So they're forced to do a lot of artificial stuff to create the mirage of this figure of 5%.”
Political polarization in consumer sentiment can cause a recession because Republicans will not spend enough to compensate for reduced Democratic spending, creating aggregate demand shortfall.
“But it is much more pronounced and it can cause a recession because yeah you the the Republicans are not going to spend enough to make up for what the Democrats aren't spending.”
AI could produce deflationary effects similar to globalization, with downward pressure on wages and prices, but it may also create political tensions and worker displacement.
“you know it's possible that technology will produce an effect like globalization did putting downward pressure on wages and putting downward uh pressure on prices. And that's a distinct possibility. But on the other hand, I think uh AI is also going to lead to a lot of uh political tensions, uh a lot of worker displacement.”
Some people claimed debt doesn't matter at all (modern monetary theory adherents), which Rogoff considers 'nutty' and a quasi-religious belief.
“And there are all these people who said you shouldn't care. It doesn't matter a wit. And that that was that was nutty and unfortunately became almost uh a religion in some circles.”
India has faster growth rates than China and is a more positive economic story, with Modi building infrastructure that lays groundwork for future growth.
“I mean, India's been a positive story for a while, right? I mean, uh, we can still point to a lot of problems in India, but they have faster growth rates than China. Who'd have thought that? and seemed to be for a while. Uh Modi is building infrastructure finally uh in India that you know is laying the groundwork for future growth.”
Rogoff has always argued inflation was 'in remission' not dead, but academic and policy communities became mesmerized by central banks' claims of permanent low inflation, an assumption hardwired into top journal papers.
“I have always thought inflation was in remission and not dead. And my academic papers have made this case. My colleagues across all of academics, I think, became in somehow mesmerized, brainwashed by central banks saying there's never going to be inflation, nothing to worry about. That assumption of no inflation is hardwired into all the top journal papers that have been coming out.”
The post-pandemic inflation was partly a supply-side phenomenon, but supply chains recovered without prices falling back, indicating central bank error in not raising rates sooner.
“I often hear the line that well it was just the supply side. It was just supply chain problems that made prices go up. That's why we had inflation. Okay, fine. But then the supply chain problems went away. Why didn't the price of paper towels come down? Why didn't the price of everything come down? That was a central bank mistake.”
High debt levels in developed countries like Italy, Japan, France, and Greece have weighed on growth, evidenced by Europe's underperformance over the last 10 years.
“We had a paper papers after that. We just argued it weighed on growth. When you're a big rich country it's the case of Japan. So if you look at Italy, you look at Japan, obviously Greece, but you can go to France, this has weighed on growth. Uh the the Europe has wildly underperformed the last 10 years.”
Low-debt countries performed better in stimulus capacity after the financial crisis than high-debt countries, suggesting debt matters for macro flexibility.
“if you look at uh you know how much uh particularly after the global financial crisis, look at the low debt countries and how much they were able to stimulate their economies, they did better.”
The US government can print money and therefore does not need to default on Treasury bonds, making default an irrational choice despite fiscal stress.
“it would be total dysfunction to do that. It would be so stupid because we we can print money. We don't need to default on our Treasury bonds.”
Rogoff's thesis about the dollar peaking in 2015 rests on concerns about US debt, central bank independence threats, and unwillingness to confront structural problems—similar to Rome's late imperial decline.
“if we come back to my thesis that the US dollar peaked in 2015, there's the competition from China, crypto, but a lot of the big problems are inside the unwillingness to confront debt, concerns about the independence of the central bank. Uh, you know, just like that was the problem in Rome at the end of the day.”
Young people today earn more than Rogoff did at their age but face much higher housing costs and interest rates, making them resistant to rate increases despite nominally higher incomes—revealing real welfare loss from higher rates.
“I talk to young people and tell them, "You're earning a lot more than I did at your age." And they say, "Yeah, but look what a house costs. Look at how high interest rates are."”
Rogoff doesn't see a financial crisis around the corner but suggests crypto is a more likely source of crisis than AI valuations given current regulatory environment.
“I you know uh hesitate to say that I don't see a financial crisis around the corner but uh I don't right now there's an awful lot of regulation which makes it more difficult. I think if we get a financial crisis, look for it coming out of crypto rather than necessarily high valuations of AI firms.”
The biggest concern with current economic policy is undermining the institutions that form the bedrock of US exceptionalism—trust in rule of law and the US honoring its commitments—particularly by labeling global trade advocates as 'globalists' and fracturing the global economy.
“the the the biggest concern is that uh we undermine the institutions that are the bedrock of US exceptionalism. You trust the rule of law. Uh when the United States gives its word, it keeps its word. I'm not saying we always did that, but you know, uh certainly with respect to paying our debts, uh I'm concerned uh certainly about this view that people uh who believe in global trade and global integration are globalists.”
Forward guidance (dot plots showing future Fed rate expectations) has been overdone and created problems: markets don't believe it, central banks become tied to their forecasts, and they end up only listening to themselves.
“I I think that's been overdone. I think the whole thing that came under another friend of mine, Ben Bernani, uh, who is, you know, a great Fed chair, but I think this whole thing about here's the dot plot here that that tells where they think interest rates are going. Uh, you know, here's everything we think we're going to do, it got overdone. And the the problem is, uh, markets don't believe it. And then you get to a year later and the Fed's a little bit tied its hands by giving this forward guidance”
Central bank independence has worked up to this point and given people confidence, allowing higher debt levels than might otherwise be sustainable, but future debt sustainability depends critically on interest rate expectations.
“So the good news is that central bank independence up to this point has worked. It's given people more confidence. It allowed uh debt levels to be higher maybe than they would have otherwise. But I I think a lot of this question has to do with where do you think interest rates are going?”
To negotiate effectively on tariffs with Trump from a chess strategy perspective, Europe needs to combine long-term strategy with short-term tactics, thinking about becoming a geopolitical counterweight, building tech independence, and deciding whether to supplicate or confront.
“I think you have to combine, you know, long-term strategy. What is it we want to do? Some of the things Trump is forcing Europe to do, it probably should have done a long time ago.”
Europe needs to develop independent tech capacity and military capability, issues that Mario Draghi highlighted in his report, because US military capacity is insufficient to defend Europe, Middle East, and Asia simultaneously.
“you need to think about um being more independent in tech. that Mario Draghi, the former head of the ECB, wrote a report where he made that point where Europe's lagged. And those two things are connected because military often provides the funding early on for uh tech uh tech startups, tech investment”
Tariffs on capital inflows are unlikely to be a first-order effect, but Biden's Inflation Reduction Act (subsidies for US investment) and Trump's tariff approach represent similar trade-distorting mechanisms, making neither an ideal economic policy.
“When Biden put his kind of called it inflation reduction act but his environment act that had a ton of subsidies to invest in the United States and I think a lot of Europeans were really angry about that saying you know this is just basic trade war. You're incentivizing people to invest in the United States. this violates general principle. So Trump didn't invent this.”
China is experiencing a 'Japanification' crisis similar to Japan's lost decades, with the question being merely one of degree, and China's initial recovery window (like Sweden's quick bounce) is closed; the crisis will last several more years.
“Do we have a some kind of japanification in China now then? Yes, we do. The question is a matter of degree. So we those of us who work on financial crisis look at Sweden on the one end is like the fastest recovery ever and the other end is Japan which by some measures took two decades. China's Sweden time is over. That's gone. They're having a longer crisis than that. Uh it looks to me like it'll be a few more years”
Central banks no longer have the favorable wind at their backs; politics have shifted away from central bank independence, making inflation a political economy problem requiring political will to fight, not just technical monetary policy.
“Now they don't. And not only did they have the wind at their backs in terms of these techno factors, but the politics were leave the central bank alone. And that has been thrown by the wayside in in many countries. So inflation doesn't have to be high. The central banks can control inflation. But e economists, prognosticators, opinion makers had just forgotten that inflation's a political economy problem. And if you don't really have central bank independence, that's the core of it, you're going to periodically run into trouble.”
The next time there's a big crisis in Europe with current interest rates, it will be harder to work out a package compared to pandemic stimulus, because markets won't see it as a free lunch with negative rates.
“I think what Europe did during the pandemic was great, but interest rates were negative, so wasn't very hard to persuade the Germans to do it. Now they're not.”
If China exports its growth problems to the world through trade surpluses (pushing excess savings into global markets), the rest of the world won't accept this without retaliation—suggesting China cannot export its way out of its crisis.
“If they push that money out to the rest of the world in the form of trade surpluses and such, it'll have a big effect, but I don't think the rest of the world's going to accept that.”
The ECB has greater constitutional independence than the US Fed, but even pushing it to lead on climate represents a thin pretext that distracts from core central banking, and businesses already worry about their own business risks.
“the ECB is different and my friend Christine Lagarde would certainly raise her eyebrows if I were saying you shouldn't look at um you know the environment I would say the ECB is following Europe Europe European dictates it's not telling it's not making its own forecast of the environment but that said I I find it very thin pretext for having the ECB uh intervene by saying you're not worrying about the business risks coming from the environment enough. We're worrying about the business risks. I mean, I I think businesses are pretty good at worrying about their own business risks.”
China should have moved to expand renminbi usage 20 years ago given its economic size, but the US sanctions on Russia scared China into urgently pursuing currency independence as a hedge against potential US sanctions.
“They've got a couple reasons for this. F first of all, they should have done that 20 years ago. I mean, I I haven't had engagement with them for over 20 years and have been puzzled. They haven't done that.”
Tariffs would be very bad if imposed at 20% as a simple tax hike that reduces trade and disrupts supply chains, but could be acceptable if paired with sensible deregulation and innovation improvements.
“So, truth be told, if we just slapped on 20% tariffs, it would be very bad, like a big tax hike. It would reduce trade. it would interfere with the global supply chains and such. It would not be the end of the world if together with that Trump did a bunch of sensible things deregulation uh you know finding uh ways to uh improve innovation.”
The Fed lacks constitutional status like the Supreme Court has; it could disappear in a week if Congress acted, and both the right (Trump) and left want it to disappear—the left wants the Fed to print money and distribute it, while the right wants presidential control.
“The Fed is not the Supreme Court. It does not have that kind of constitutional status... It could disappear in a week. And by the way, it isn't just Trump that wants it to disappear. The left wants it to disappear, too. They have all these plans. They want to, you know, have it print money and give it away to people.”
As a chess grandmaster, Rogoff's strategy for European trade negotiation with the US would combine long-term strategic independence-building with short-term tactical flexibility, focusing on military, tech independence, and infrastructure as prerequisites to resist US pressure.
“I think you have to combine, you know, long-term [9:55] strategy. What is it we want to do? Some of the things Trump is forcing Europe to do, it probably should have done a long time ago...we need Europe to be a geopolitical counterweight to the United States...Uh on the other and you you uh you need to think about um being more independent in tech. that Mario Draghi, [10:59] the former head of the ECB, wrote a report where he made that point...And those two things are connected because military often provides the funding early on for uh tech uh tech startups...I mean, do you supplicate to Trump and kiss the ring or which your public hates, but then he's not throwing a 200% tariff on you, or do you just sort of [11:32] turn the other cheek and hope that it calms down? I mean, it's it's it it's not it's not good in a way, but on the other hand, it kind of forces Europe to g be more assertive, to be more independent in a way that I think has been a long time coming.”
The biggest concern with current economic policy is undermining the institutions that are the bedrock of US exceptionalism, including trust in rule of law and the US's reputation for keeping its word, particularly regarding paying debts.
“the the biggest concern is that uh we undermine the institutions that are the bedrock of US exceptionalism. You trust the rule of law. Uh when the United States gives its word, it keeps its word. I'm not saying we always did that, but you know, uh certainly with respect to paying our debts, uh I'm concerned”
The odds of a US recession have gone up sharply, with the likely nature being a confidence shock among consumers rather than an oil shock, pandemic, or financial crisis.
“I mean, I think the odds have gone up sharply. And it's sort of funny, but the nature of the recession we might get is a loss of confidence, not an oil shock, not a pandemic, not a global financial crisis.”
Protectionist sentiment is not unique to Trump; Bernie Sanders held very similar protectionist views and had considerable influence in the Democratic Party, suggesting broad political convergence on tariffs across the spectrum.
“Bernie Sanders, who was came very close to being the candidate in 2016, is very influential in the Democratic party. He had pretty much the same stuff. he wouldn't agree now, but there's not a lot of open water between really the left where the left was in the US and Trump.”
The odds of a US recession have increased sharply, driven by loss of consumer confidence—particularly among Democratic voters who view the situation as a crisis—while Republican voters remain optimistic, creating a partisan divide in economic perception that could itself trigger recession through differential spending.
“I mean, I think the odds have gone up sharply. And it's sort of funny, but the nature of the recession we might get is a loss of confidence, not an oil shock, not a pandemic, not a global financial crisis. But among consumers, particularly consumers who didn't vote for Trump, which is about half of people, they think it's the end of the world.”
Nixon-style price controls and other wild policy measures (financial repression) are likely coming soon (within a few years), not in Trump's fourth year, because these measures don't work indefinitely and things will spin out of control.
“I don't think we're going to wait to the fourth year of the Trump presidency for that. That stuff doesn't work indefinitely. It works for a little while and then eventually, you know, things spin out of control.”
A financial crisis could emerge from AI company valuation collapses (like past technology bubbles with railways, airplanes), but current regulation makes this less likely; crypto is a more probable source of next crisis.
“Well, a lot of financial crises have come because there's a new technology and everybody gets all excited about it. The the steam engines, uh railroads, uh airplanes, you know, you name it. often there's a new technology everybody thinks it's amazing and it's hard to evaluate I mean hard to know what what it's worth so of course there's a lot of volatility around it and uh there's the potential to have you know sudden valuation changes collapses I you know uh hesitate to say that I don't see a financial crisis around the corner but uh I don't right now there's an awful lot of regulation which makes it more difficult. I think if we get a financial crisis, look for it coming out of crypto rather than necessarily high valuations of AI firms.”
Another burst of inflation will occur, similar to post-pandemic inflation, triggered by a future shock (pandemic, cyber war, etc.) where central banks face recession vs inflation pressure and choose to worry about recession, unable to resist political pressure.
“there's going to be another big burst of inflation similar to what we saw in the uh after the pandemic what's going to cause that surge what's going to cause That will be another shock where the central banks are, you know, get put into a corner where they worry about recession, they worry about inflation, but the pressures are going to be towards worrying about having a recession and they're just not going to be able to stand up to the politics the way they might have say in 2008 and 2009.”
US debt on current path is unsustainable and will be resolved by inflation, not spending/tax adjustments, because politicians haven't prepared the public for necessary adjustments.
“Well, yes and no. I mean, uh no in the sense with on its current path, it's going to have to get resolved by inflation. Uh it's not going to get I I think again going back to my colleagues in the profession, there were these people who argued interest rates would be lower forever.”
Young people face tremendous uncertainty about future employment due to AI disruption, with many trying to make quick money rather than plan careers because they don't know what skills will be relevant in 3 years.
“There is quite a bit of manufacturing moving out of China... It's very unsettling. Um I I I try to be an optimist about it, but I I don't buy this idea that don't worry about inflation because this is going to make everything cheaper... I see so many people graduate college trying to see how to make a million dollars in a year because they don't know what they'll be doing in three years. they they don't want to plan a career that's going to go away.”
The US benefited from luck (not just merit) in its dominance—globalization, China's rise, and anti-populist consensus all provided tailwinds—and the chess player Ben Larson correctly emphasized preferring luck with good rather than good without luck.
“I actually towards the end of the book quote the Danish Grandmaster Ben Larson uh and he was asked would you rather be lucky or good and he said I'd rather be lucky and good and I think Americans forget the lucky part”
China's efforts to de-dollarize are serious and long-overdue; China should have pursued renminbi internationalization 20 years ago, and while not aiming to replace the dollar globally, China is expanding the footprint of yuan-denominated transactions and loans.
“Well, there's the uh PMIC [20:28] stuff like when Lula says he doesn't want to use the dollar in Brazil and he he has no power. I mean, he's not able to do anything. But I think the Chinese take it very seriously of wanting it's it's not that they want to get everyone for everything to use the renimi their Chinese currency instead. It's that they want to expand its footprint. more things priced in Chinese currency, more loans priced in Chinese currency. And [20:58] they've got a couple reasons for this. F first of all, they should have done that 20 years ago. I mean, I I haven't had engagement with them for over 20 years and have been puzzled. They haven't done that. If you're the euro is not pegged to the dollar. There's a good reason the euro is not pegged to the dollar. Yet forever they had their rendity, this big economy with its own business cycles, its own problems.”
Bernie Sanders held positions on tariffs and trade nearly identical to Trump's, showing that protectionism is not uniquely a Trump phenomenon but a broader populist sentiment across the political spectrum.
“Bernie Sanders, who was came very close to being the candidate in 2016, is very influential in the Democratic party. He had pretty much the same stuff. he wouldn't agree now, but there's not a lot of open water between really the left where the left was in the US and Trump.”
The global economy is currently in modestly good shape but is being thrown into chaos by Trump's restructuring of globalization and what is happening in Europe, with the situation feeling similar to the 1970s and Trump resembling Nixon.
“it was uh in modestly good shape, but obviously it's being thrown into chaos with uh the restructuring of globalization that Donald Trump comes with uh what's happening in Europe. Uh you know, it it's a pretty wild time... it feels a little like the 70s to me. Trump actually feels a little like Nixon to me”
Markets are signaling disbelief in both parties' fiscal fictions (left's 'debt doesn't matter' and right's 'tax cuts pay for themselves') through rising interest rates.
“So, they've both been telling this fiction, which I think now interest rates are saying the markets don't believe.”
Rogoff was also isolated in predicting China would experience a financial crisis rather than continuing moonshot growth.
“I would say I was also pretty isolated in saying China was not going to grow to the moon uh that it would have a financial crisis. I think to some extent you know though uh I'm I'm still fringe on saying those things believe it or not but less so.”
AI's transformation will be so fast that humans won't be able to adjust, creating chaotic change in warfare and workplace that could trigger inflation shocks through disruption.
“What worries me is that it's going to be so fast. Humans, mankind, will not be able to adjust to it. And that's what worries me right now. the uh you know the potentially chaotic change that could happen with AI. We obviously see it in warfare but we may see it in the workplace as well.”
Tariffs are deeply popular with the American public, with approximately 80% of Americans favoring them according to Trump's associates, making it politically difficult for even economists to argue against them despite evidence of economic harm.
“the candidate, uh, Trump, uh, he knows politics better than I do, and he thinks 80% of Americans love terrorists.”
Loss of consumer confidence in China has panicked savers who have lost faith in the regime, causing consumption collapse despite government stimulus efforts, while driving interest rates down and creating deflation despite claimed 5% growth.
“Another aspect is the fact that they're in trouble has uh panicked their savers. We were talking about the Democrats in the United States. People in China are they have no confidence in the regime. They have they have just lost confidence. So they're trying to get people to consume, but it's just collapsed.”
College graduates are struggling to plan careers due to AI uncertainty about future job availability, creating a cohort trying to make fast money rather than build careers, indicating profound economic uncertainty.
“I see so many people graduate college trying to see how to make a million dollars in a year because they don't know what they'll be doing in three years. they they don't want to plan a career that's going to go away. It's very unsettling.”
Trump has deep conviction about tariffs being 'beautiful' and beneficial, appearing not to be bluffing as previously expected, despite potential market pressures to reverse course.
“but it's all going to pull back at the at the at the same time. He clearly looks at the market, but this is someone who's very determined to put his place in history. He I don't know if it came from his childhood or something, but he has this deep belief that tariffs are beautiful. He says it again and again.”
Tariffs on capital inflows were strong before Trump's policy announcements and may not be a first-order effect, though the idea of incentivizing domestic investment is not new—Biden's Inflation Reduction Act did this through subsidies rather than tariffs.
“Well, they'd been very strong before. So, the idea was to bring uh more production into the United States. Uh but I I don't think this is something that's going to be like a first order effect. When Biden put his kind of called it inflation reduction act but his environment act that had a ton of subsidies to invest in the United States”
Trump's conviction about tariffs' value appears deep and ideological rather than contingent or performative, based on his consistent advocacy since at least 2016 and his demonstrated willingness to implement them despite contrary advice.
“He he seems to be a believer... when he was first running someone who was uh close to him called me... the candidate, uh, Trump, uh, he knows politics better than I do, and he thinks 80% of Americans love terrorists.”
The 'secular stagnation' narrative (Larry Summers, etc.) incorrectly assumed interest rates would stay low forever based on recent past rather than longer time horizons; Rogoff debated this 10 years ago against Summers, Krugman, Teal, and Kasparov.
“Larry Summers had this I don't know if you've ever had this line in your podcast, secular stagnation. We're never going to grow again. Uh interest rates will be low. We're not inventing anything. Everybody's getting old. And I I I debated this with him uh 10 years ago. Paul Krugman, even Peter Teal, actually Gary Kasparov uh at one time. And I've always thought, you know, that people are very short. They're looking at the recent past too much.”
Rogoff differs from other economists in multiple ways: arguing real interest rates wouldn't be low forever (contrarian to academic consensus), predicting China wouldn't sustain growth and would have crisis, and arguing dollar won't maintain dominance.
“Where I have been different uh for some uh in many places over the years, but right now where I've been different is I was sort of all alone in arguing that real interest rates weren't going to be low forever among academic economists. people write in opinion pages. Uh I was uh alone in saying when they rise debt which seems like a free lunch today uh is not going to be I would say I was also pretty isolated in saying China was not going to grow to the moon uh that it would have a financial crisis.”
Rogoff expects Trump to use economic policy tools (tariffs, price controls, etc.) that mainstream economists view as harmful, while claiming they are beneficial, demonstrating willingness to abandon orthodox economics.
“I think we're going to see him reach into the toolkit. And you know, Fed independence comes later. The Fed does not like this stuff, but you know, that's that's sort of something that comes further down the road.”
Forecasting Trump's tariff policy a year out is extremely difficult because his approach appears random and unpredictable, like spinning a wheel each morning to determine which country to target and what tariff level to impose.
“it seems like he's spinning a wheel when he when he wakes up every morning. And first he spins the wheel to see what country it points at, and then he spins the wheel to see what tariff he wants to put on, and then he changes his mind the next day.”
Despite this randomness, Rogoff expects the US to have tariffs on Europe on the order of at least 10-20%, and Europe will have retaliated with reciprocal tariffs.
“I'm guessing the US will have tariffs for example on Europe uh on on the uh on the order of uh uh I don't know at least 10 you know 15% 20%. And Europe will have retaliated and there'll have been a lot of noise back and forth.”
Returning inflation to the 2% target is achievable, but Rogoff's book predicts it will take 5-7 years (or potentially faster than 5-7 years given recent Trump election and his policies).
“Well, I mean, I uh you're asking, are they going to ever get down to 2% again? I think what I think is they will but we will see in the next my book says 5 to seven years but that was the I did the page the final day of page proof was just the day after Trump got elected I might make that a little faster now than 5 to seven years”
A survey of the American Economic Association revealed 'incredible naivety' among academic economists about the Fed's proper focus, suggesting it should emphasize inflation control above environmental and inequality concerns.
“a survey of the American Economic Association just a couple years ago showed incredible naive Tay among academic economists about where the Fed's focus should be. It should be on inflation.”
Money has been pouring into the US and it has outperformed for the last 10 years with remarkable data; it's unclear how current policies are improving this situation, suggesting the economic case for Trump's policies is weak.
“people were pouring their money into the US. The US as you well know had been outperforming the last 10 years some remarkable data about that. So exactly how you're improving things now I don't know.”
A survey of the American Economic Association showed 'incredible naiveté' among academic economists about where the Fed's focus should be, suggesting the profession had lost sight of inflation as the core mandate.
“a survey of the American Economic Association just a couple years ago showed incredible naive Tay among academic economists about where the Fed's focus should be.”
Rogoff has been puzzled that particularly the left argues debt doesn't matter and frames anyone who thinks debt is a problem as wanting austerity/being against helping people, conflating debt limits with anti-welfare politics.
“particularly on the left they just want to make debt really big. That's been the argument for a long time. Anyone who thinks that big debt is a problem is in favor of austerity. They think you must not want to give people stuff.”
A positive business environment with good regulation and work conditions is preferable to both subsidies and tariffs as the mechanism for attracting investment, rather than targeted industrial policy interventions.
“it's better to have an environment where the regulation and the general uh work environment for companies is good and makes them want to invest.”
India is a positive economic story with faster growth rates than China, with Modi building infrastructure laying groundwork for future growth, though significant monopoly and tariff problems remain.
“I mean, India's been a positive story for a while, right? I mean, uh, we can still point to a lot of problems in India, but they have faster growth rates than China. Who'd have thought that? and seemed to be for a while. Uh Modi is building infrastructure finally uh in India that you know is laying the groundwork for future growth.”
The New York Times initially mocked Rogoff and Reinhart's predictions of long recession recovery duration, stock market decline continuation, and housing price stagnation as overly pessimistic, but events proved them correct.
“There were a lot of people making fun of us when our book came out. The New York Times had almost a two-page article saying these crazy people think this recession's going to last a long time. They think the stock market's going to go down further. They think housing prices won't come back for years.”
Rogoff debated secular stagnation theorists (including Larry Summers, Paul Krugman, Peter Teal, Gary Kasparov) 10 years ago, arguing interest rates would not remain low forever and the low-rate period was temporary.
“I I debated this with him uh 10 years ago. Paul Krugman, even Peter Teal, actually Gary Kasparov uh at one time. And I've always thought, you know, that people are very short. They're looking at the recent past too much.”
Trump appears to be spinning a wheel each morning—first selecting a country for tariffs, then selecting a tariff rate, then changing his mind the next day—making tariff levels one year from now extremely difficult to forecast despite his apparent intent to proceed.
“it seems like he's spinning a wheel when he when he wakes up every morning. And first he spins the wheel to see what country it points at, and then he spins the wheel to see what tariff he wants to put on, and then he changes his mind the next day.”
Inflation will return to target, but Rogoff's book predicted this would take 5-7 years; he may revise this downward to faster pace given Trump's election and policies accelerating inflationary pressures.
“Well, I mean, I uh you're asking, are they going to ever get down to 2% again? I think what I think is they will but we will see in the next my book says 5 to seven years but that was the I did the page the final day of page proof was just the day after Trump got elected I might make that a little faster now than 5 to seven years”
The reason for slow rate increases was not primarily forward guidance but rather that people feared things could 'get really bad' and were being cautious; the main mistake was not tightening early enough, not communication strategy.
“Was it was that the reason why the why the ECB was slow to increase rates, for instance? You think? Well, I think they I I think I think part partly it was a case where a lot of people were thrown off in their forecasts. Uh I think the main reason everyone was slow to increase rates really was that they wanted to be the [46:57] things looked like they could get really bad. They didn't get really bad and they were trying to be cautious.”
Globalization has been great for the United States, with the US at the top benefiting substantially, though there are problems with globalization that Trump doesn't seem to focus on.
“it's been obviously very good. Globalization's been great for the United States. Who are we kidding? I mean, the United States has been at the top. has benefited and yes, there are problems with globalization, but uh he he seems to just think it's really good for him.”
Fiscal adjustments can be achieved through either raising taxes or cutting spending, but politicians have not made clear that this is necessary.
“you either lower raise taxes or lower spending. I mean, you have to do something to do with adjusting what you're spending.”
Consumer sentiment is the primary driver of Fed policy considerations (since 70% of consumption comes from consumers), more important than business sentiment, though Fed listens to multiple constituencies.
“consumer sentiment 70% of consumers are 70% of consumption... the Fed listens to everybody. Business sentiment's important. Financial market sentiment, political sentiment, consumer sentiment.”
Germany is using its accumulated savings (low debt) during a crisis period, though Rogoff thinks they should have stimulated earlier.
“Germany is able to do stuff now because it has saved for a rainy day and it's a rainy day and they're making use of it. I I think they should have made use of it sooner”
Global government debt (~$100 trillion per IMF data where Rogoff was chief economist) combined with tariffs, central bank independence concerns, and geopolitical issues will lead to debt that pans out poorly, conditioned on interest rate expectations.
“I think if you add up all the all the government debt across the world according to IMF where you were the chief economist for some time u it's 100 trillion dollars right what so what's going to happen here given what you are seeing now uh deglobalization tariffs um central bank independence”
The New York Times initially mocked Rogoff and Reinhardt's book, claiming they wrongly thought the recession would last long and housing wouldn't recover for years; the debate has now changed around financial crisis understanding.
“There were a lot of people making fun of us when our book came out. The New York Times had almost a two-page article saying these crazy people think this recession's going to last a long time. They think the stock market's going to go down further.”
The ECB differs from the Fed because it follows European policy mandates rather than setting its own agenda, and the ECB's emphasis on climate risk is not inappropriate given European direction.
“the ECB is different and my friend Christine Lagarde would certainly raise her eyebrows if I were saying you shouldn't look at um you know the environment I would say the ECB is following Europe Europe European dictates it's not telling it's not making its own forecast of the environment”
Those who believe in global trade and integration are labeled globalists, and Rogoff considers himself an unapologetic globalist, expressing concern about the fracturing of the global economy.
“I'm concerned uh certainly about this view that people uh who believe in global trade and global integration are globalists. I'm an unapologetic globalist myself. uh and uh this fracturing of the global economy.”
The global economy was in modestly good shape before Trump's restructuring of globalization and European disruptions threw it into chaos, with the current situation feeling similar to the 1970s.
“I think it feels a little like the 70s to me. Trump actually feels a little like Nixon to me”
Venture capitalists like Vinod Khosla believe computers and robots will become free labor, fundamentally transforming economic arrangements.
“Venod Kosla the venture capitalist he believes that computer will be free labor will be free on the back of robots”
Some venture capitalists (like Vinod Khosla) believe computers will become free labor through robots, making labor costs minimal; if true, this would support deflationary technology hypothesis but raises adjustment speed concerns.
“some people like you know Venod Kosla the venture capitalist he believes that computer will be free labor will be free on the back of robots”
Rogoff forecasts the US will impose tariffs on Europe on the order of at least 10-20% within a year, with Europe retaliating and substantial noise back-and-forth resulting.
“I'm guessing the US will have tariffs for example on Europe uh on on the uh on the order of uh uh I don't know at least 10 you know 15% 20%. And Europe will have retaliated and there'll have been a lot of noise back and forth.”
Forecasting inflation precisely is impossible given political uncertainty (Trump's mood, Putin's actions, unknown shocks), but Rogoff is willing to say inflation is unlikely in near term and to describe the mechanism rather than give precise numbers.
“So, sort of trying to make a smooth prediction like I think inflation in 2026 is going to be 5%. I I don't know what side of bed Donald Trump's going to wake up up on.”