
Global Macro Podcast #009 | feat. Lyn Alden
What this covers
This episode of the Top Traders Unplugged global macro series is a conversation between Lynn Alden, an engineer-turned-investment strategist, and the show's hosts, including Rob. It is built on historical analogy. Alden works through three earlier episodes: the 1920s, when private debt hit record highs while federal debt stayed low; the 1930s, when the money supply (broad money)) fell by about a third and official deflation reached 10 percent; and the 1940s. She then lines these up against 2008, when private debt slightly exceeded its 1929 level and was largely moved onto the federal balance sheet, with federal debt rising from 65 percent to over 100 percent of GDP.
The middle of the discussion is about how governments have escaped debt burdens. Alden describes the 1930s dollar devaluation from roughly 1/20th to 1/35th of an ounce of gold, and the 1940s use of yield curve control to hold Treasury yields at or below 2.5 percent while inflation sometimes reached double digits. She treats both as "soft" debt jubilees that moved purchasing power from creditors to the state, and sets them in a longer tradition of forgiveness going back to Mesopotamia. The hosts add a point about pensions: asset-liability matching rules lock them into bonds with negative real returns.
The conversation also covers why the 2010s were disinflationary despite quantitative easing (QE)). Alden argues the money mostly recapitalized banks, whose cash share of assets rose from about 3 percent before 2008 to 15 percent, while deleveraging, technology and offshoring held prices down. She argues that 2020s fiscal transfers reach the real economy more directly. Other threads include the US trade deficit and dollar reserve status, the reshoring of supply chains, and military dependence on Chinese components. The hosts raise the contested Strauss-Howe "fourth turning" and the risk of war. The episode closes on portfolio hedges, covering gold's inverse relationship with real rates, commodities and silver, and Bitcoin.
Lynn Alden argues that we are at the convergence of two long-term cycles—the end of a multi-decade debt cycle and the straining of the dollar-centric global monetary system—which will likely produce significant currency devaluation and inflation in the 2020s, requiring portfolio hedges in commodities, precious metals, and select scarce assets.
- US debt-to-GDP has reached historical highs similar to the 1920s pre-Depression, with both private and public debt now at ~350% combined, requiring a major deleveraging or currency devaluation cycle
- The post-WWII dollar-reserve system has enabled massive US trade deficits that eroded manufacturing capacity; as globalization peaks and reverses, supply chain reshoring will be inflationary
- Central banks will likely engineer moderate inflation (3-6% official, higher real) and yield curve control rather than sharp deflation, inflating away debt like in the 1940s
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Banks entering the 2008 financial crisis had only about 3 percent cash as a percentage of assets due to deregulation and low capital requirements; the Fed's QE brought this up to 8 percent after the first round, 15 percent by the end of QE3 in 2014, then it declined to 7 percent by September 2019 (when the repo crisis hit), and has since been restored to 15 percent.
“back in the in the 2010s a lot of this qe that they did mostly went to recapitalize the banking system so banks went into that crisis with about three percent cash as a percentage of assets right because we we had deregulated the financial system so we had very low cash levels so part of the way that they got out of that crisis was the federal reserve created a bunch of dollars and they bought assets from those banks so they after the first round of qe banks were brought up to about eight percent cash levels as a percentage of assets and by the time that qe3 ended around 2014 banks had 15 cash as a percentage of assets and they slowly worked that down over several years they got down to about seven percent that's when we had the repo crisis last year in september”
The Federal Reserve managed to reduce federal debt as a percentage of GDP in the 1940s not by decreasing nominal debt but by locking the yield curve below inflation rates, effectively inflating away much of the debt through negative real returns on treasuries.
“and that's actually how they managed to reduce their federal debt as a percentage of gdp because even though they never actually decreased the nominal amount of debt they locked the yield curve below inflation rate and they kind of inflated away a lot a lot of that debt”
In the 1940s, despite treasury yields locked below 2.5 percent, inflation in some years went into double digits, creating a staggered inflationary environment where anyone holding treasuries lost purchasing power in real terms because nominal returns of 25-30 percent over the decade failed to keep pace with CPI inflation.
“but inflation at some years went into double digits for a period of time we had a pretty kind of staggered inflationary environment so anyone who invested in treasuries over that that decade they made money in nominal terms right because they got about two two and a half percent a year so by the end of the decade they got a little over 25 percent but their purchasing power in real terms diminished because it failed to keep up with cpi inflation”
Many pensions and large investors are locked into bond allocations by regulatory frameworks (asset-liability matching), meaning they cannot simply flee bonds even if they wanted to, forcing them to hold negative real return instruments.
“i think some of them probably would like to flee from the bonds but they cannot they're they're not allowed to do it the asset liability management frameworks don't permit them to do it regulatory boundaries don't permit them to do it right and they've given out guarantees that they can no longer meet”
The Great Financial Crisis of 2008 involved a massive buildup of private debt that reached levels slightly larger than 1929, followed by a deleveraging event where much of that debt was transferred from the private sector to the federal level, with federal debt rising from 65 percent to over 100 percent of GDP.
“if we look fast forward all the way to the great financial crisis right we had a similar event to the 1929 period where we had a massive buildup taking decades to do in the private sector so we reached total debt levels that were even slightly bigger than back in 1929. and so we had this huge deleveraging event where we had you know a lot of people lose their homes we had some banks go under and then a lot of that debt was kind of moved up to the federal level so the federal government went into that crisis with about 65 debt to gdp but by the end of that crisis we were up to over 100 percent of debt to gdp”
During the 1940s, the federal government ran massive deficits reaching 20-30 percent of GDP for World War II, federal debt rose above 100 percent of GDP, and the Federal Reserve engaged in yield curve control by purchasing as many treasuries as needed to keep yields at 2.5 percent or less throughout the entire decade.
“by the 1940s the private debt bubble was mostly worked off but then of course we entered the world war ii period we had massive deficits of federal deficits as a percentage of gdp they have to you know 20 30 and so we had this huge fiscal spend we had a really strong rise in federal debt up to over 100 of gdp”
During the 1920s, private debt as a percentage of GDP reached all-time highs while federal debt remained low, and the ensuing Great Depression involved a massive deleveraging where banks failed, the broad money supply fell by about one-third, and official deflation reached 10 percent.
“if we go back starting with 1920s we had a really big credit cycle build up a huge accumulation of credit for a couple decades there and it really kind of culminated in the 19 late 1920s when we had of course the famous uh market crash in the beginning of the great depression and during that period private debt as a percentage of gdp reached all-time highs federal debt was still pretty low in the u.s because we had a more lean government back then so we had to be still pretty low federal debt but private debt had reached extraordinarily high levels”
In response to 1930s deflation, the US devalued the dollar from approximately 1/20th of an ounce of gold to 1/35th of an ounce of gold, then printed money, ran infrastructure programs, and increased federal debt to reflate the economy and reduce private debt as a percentage of GDP.
“the way that they kind of got out of that was that they devalued their currency significantly so they d-pegged the dollar from worth about 1 20th of an ounce of gold to about 1 35th of an ounce of gold and then they printed a ton of money they did a ton of infrastructure programs they increased federal debt so we had this big expansion of the monetary base and a big increase in federal debt and then eventually we worked down the private debt but not really in nominal terms mostly in real terms so they basically devalue the dollar so much that they reduce the the private debt as a percentage of gdp”
The 1930s involved a large deflationary period followed by some reflation, but inflation did not remain persistently high; the net effect was relatively balanced, making it not a period of sustained high inflation.
“so the 1930s even though so we had we started with a really big deflationary shock and then we had this inflationary response to it and it mostly balanced out it was not a period of high inflation right it was just a big deflationary period and then some degree of reflation”
In the 1920s-1930s, when major sovereigns reduced their gold pegs, they did so in a coordinated way where all major currencies (dollar, yen, franc, pound) depreciated against gold by varying amounts, with Switzerland depreciating the least and France and Japan depreciating the most, creating a relatively coordinated currency devaluation rather than one country acting alone.
“if you look back in the 1920s and 30s when all the major sovereigns reduced their gold pegs that's generally what we saw back then is instead of just one country reducing their currency we saw all the majors reducing it so the dollar the yen the swiss franc the pound uh they all reduced their currencies by varying amounts to gold switzerland reduced it one of the least whereas like france and japan reduced it more so it was still somewhat of a relative game but they all diminished their currency significantly”
In inflationary environments, scarce assets (gold, silver, commodities) have historically performed well, and Lynn expects them to do so in the 2020s, though she notes exceptions like the 1940s when gold was pegged to the dollar so it did not appreciate nominally, though silver and other commodities still rose significantly.
“we know from the past that inflationary environments scarce assets do pretty well so that's gold silver commodities now in the 1940s you had an exception because gold was pegged to the dollar so gold in nominal terms did not really appreciate in the dollar but we had silver go up pretty significantly we had other commodities go up and of course in the 1970s when they were all de-pegged we had a very strong commodity cycle”
Gold historically tends to trade inversely correlated with real interest rates, and periods when precious metals performed poorly were when real interest rates increased (like Paul Volcker's inflation-killing rate hikes creating high real yields), making opportunity cost unfavorable to owning non-yielding precious metals.
“for example gold historically tends to trade very inversely correlated to real interest rates so a lot of those really bad periods for gold was because it reached very high valuations and then real interest rates went up you know when paul volcker raised interest rates and killed inflation we had a very long period where treasuries and bank accounts provided you with a much higher return than inflation so that was opportunity cost to owning something that is scarce but doesn't provide a yield”
Yield curve control and currency depegging have been used historically (1940s and 1970s) to achieve soft debt jubilees where the government did not default but the real purchasing power transferred from creditors to the government via inflation exceeding bond yields.
“so for example the dollar has gone from 120th amount to gold to what is it today almost 1 1 800. so we've had a very significant devaluation of these currencies so it's almost like we have a mini debt jubilee every couple decades with a big inflationary cycle so i think that julies are something to look out for in this 2020s period but i think a lot of them could take the form of currency devaluations so that you basically do a soft debt jubilee rather than a nominal one so if you look in say the 1940s or 1970s anyone holding treasuries basically provided the us government with a debt jubilee because it didn't default right but it lost purchasing power so generally in the case of both the 1940s and the 1970s anyone who bought treasures at the beginning of the decade lost about a third of their purchasing power by the end of the decade because those treasury yields underperformed inflation”
Historically, debt jubilees and debt forgiveness have been common going back thousands of years to ancient Greece and Mesopotamia, and in modern times have taken the form of currency devaluation rather than outright nominal forgiveness.
“historically debt jubilees have been common in many places in the world so going back to greece and the whole mesopotamia literally thousands of years of debt jubilee history now in more modern times it's often taken the form of currency devaluation uh as opposed to outright debt jubilee”
Interest rates have been declining for roughly four decades, which has enabled private and public debt to build up progressively as a percentage of GDP because lower rates allow more leverage to be sustainable.
“especially as interest rates have declined for about four decades now they're able to build up more and more leverage as a percentage of gdp”
The US military has raised concerns that critical military components are sourced from China, creating a national security vulnerability analogous to relying on an adversary's supply chains during the Cold War.
“and we've had the u.s military been raising concerns for a while now where they have components that are made in china so that's it's not imagine like if we were during the cold war and we had russia making some of our components it's not it's not a situation you want to be in”
We are currently bumping into the high point of two very long-term cycles: the long-term debt cycle in the US where leverage has compounded over decades despite periodic deleveraging, and the current global dollar-centric monetary framework that the world has outgrown.
“i kind of view us as bumping into the high point of two very long term cycles so one cycle is the long term debt cycle in the us so in addition to the normal five to ten year business cycle where credit builds up and then it gets deleveraged and then it builds up again that tends to compound over the long term right so even though it deleverages each time it never really deleverages back down to the place it started at”
Historically, approximately every 50 to 100 years a much larger deleveraging event occurs—a phase shift—which is what we are approaching now, with the last such event occurring in the 1920s-1930s-1940s period.
“so historically every you know 50 to 100 years you kind of get to a point where you have a much larger deleveraging event and a much larger phase shift in that so there have been some investors that cover that a lot like ray dalio but there's a lot of basically evidence that we're kind of ever since the great financial crisis and then still in that period now we're kind of bumping into that high water mark of how much debt you can possibly have in the global economy the last time we ran into this was back in the 1920s 1930s 1940s”
Federal Reserve currency creation and QE in the 2010s primarily went to bank balance sheets as treasuries and mortgage-backed securities, whereas 2020s fiscal stimulus goes more directly into the real economy through consumption and business spending, making it more inflationary.
“that's where most of the qe winded up it went into treasuries and went into mortgage-backed securities and it all just kind of went on to bank balance sheets for the most part whereas now what we're seeing is because physical deficits are so large and there's so much you know they did 1200 checks to people they did 600 a week and extra federal unemployment for four months there going through the end of july we're probably going to see more rounds of fiscal”
After the 2008 financial crisis, the US entered a disinflationary environment for several years because although quantitative easing implemented inflationary monetary policy, this was offset by massive deleveraging especially in the consumer market, and the money largely went to recapitalize banks rather than enter the real economy.
“and then for several years we've had a very disinflationary environment because even though we've had kind of inflationary policy response in the form of qe a lot of that just went to recapitalize banks and we had it was offset by a lot of that deleveraging especially in the consumer market”
One key difference from the 1930s-40s is demographics: the current US and global population is slower-growing and more aged, which all else being equal makes it harder to achieve the high inflation levels seen in the 1940s.
“one is uh that we have a very different demographic situation now so we have a slower growing and more aged population so all else being equal it can be harder to get those higher inflation levels that we saw in the 1940s”
A big reason the 2020s will likely see higher inflation than the 2010s is that post-2008 QE mostly went to recapitalize the banking system and went onto bank balance sheets as treasury and mortgage-backed securities, whereas now 2020s fiscal stimulus is being injected more directly into the economy through business loans, grants, and helicopter money to consumers.
“a big reason for that is because back in the in the 2010s a lot of this qe that they did mostly went to recapitalize the banking system...whereas now what we're seeing is because physical deficits are so large and there's so much you know they did 1200 checks to people they did 600 a week and extra federal unemployment for four months...instead of a lot of these qe winding up in asset prices and winding up in the financial system a lot of is getting injected more into the economy in the form of business loans that turn into grants and helicopter money to consumers”
Despite high monetary base inflation (5-8% per year broad money growth), inflation in the 2010s did not manifest in most consumer prices because of offsetting deflationary forces: technology and offshoring drove down prices for electronics, devices, and televisions; commodities remained cheap from prior exploration and excess supply.
“we've had pretty high monetary base inflation but it hasn't really translated into a ton of prices because some of those prices were offset by technology and offshoring so things like televisions phones and any sort of devices in general have gone down commodities have been in a pretty cheap decade because we had a ton of exploration in the past decade and we've kind of had this period of excess supply”
The US has run very large trade deficits over the past 50 years to maintain dollar reserve status and facilitate global trade in dollars, requiring it to export supply chains offshore, which has resulted in a very negative net international investment position and decreased ability to manufacture.
“over the past 50 years that the system has been in place the u.s has basically had to run very large trade deficits and has basically had to export its supply chains to facilitate global trade in dollars and to maintain the global reserve status for the dollar but now the globe is kind of handed a peak stage of globalization and seems to be pulling back and so much accumulated trade deficits has resulted in the us having a very negative net international investment position and has really decreased its ability to manufacture things”
Strauss-Howe fourth turnings often end in war, and the convergence of economic debt cycles with a fourth turning suggests elevated geopolitical and conflict risk in the current period.
“and often these cycles they actually end in war i don't think there are many examples where it didn't end in a big conflict so you take that into to your uh perspective when you look at the world and certainly thing is there best to consider and i think hal's work's been great because you know his his uh fourth turnings tend to coincide with the kind of the popping of these long-term debt cycles so i don't just i don't think that's a coincidence right”
Despite nuclear-armed states (US, China, Russia) reducing the likelihood of full-scale hot war because of mutually assured destruction, geopolitical competition continues in forms of cold war, proxy wars, and regional conflicts (India-China, potential Middle East conflicts), creating supply chain risks even without major wars.
“one deterrent is that many of these countries are nuclear powers so the whole cold war never really ended in a hot war it just kind of burned itself out so i think we're certainly entering a period where the us and china are more in a cold war situation and whether or not that translates into hot wars in the middle east or proxy wars like that that could be kind of kind of considered proxy war or if we have more india and china skirmishes both of those are nuclear powers so it's certainly a ton of risk there if we see hot war among these countries”
Healthcare, education, and services in general have experienced pretty high inflation throughout the 2010s because they cannot be easily outsourced or offshored, creating structural inflation even in a generally disinflationary environment.
“so things like healthcare education services in general things you can't outsource we've had pretty high inflation and if you look at say the money supply right so over the past decade the money supply broad money supply in the u.s has increased by about seven percent per year on average”
Even in favorable fundamental environments for precious metals, significant corrections can occur when prices bump into previous highs due to psychological resistance, requiring a trend-following approach to reduce risk of being caught on the wrong side of major downtrends.
“so i do think it's certainly possible we could have some resistance like when we started to bump into previous highs that could be a big psychological thing to try to get through so i do think we could have pretty significant corrections along the way but i do think a trend following approach can reduce risk of of kind of being on the wrong side of a really major downtrend”
The main tail risk to Bitcoin is government banning rather than central bank digital currency competition, because a Fed coin would not be inherently scarce (the Fed controls the protocol and can create unlimited supply) whereas Bitcoin is decentralized and its scarcity is algorithmically enforced.
“so there are some tail risks from governments trying to ban it so i don't consider something like a fed coin to be a real threat to it because even a central bank cryptocurrency even though it could have similar traits it wouldn't be scarce right they control the protocol so they can create all sorts of extra currency whereas bitcoin is decentralized and inherently scarce and that's part of what makes it unique”
The bond market is larger than the Federal Reserve and if bond vigilantes become coordinated and lose confidence in Fed policy, the Fed will be unable to control yields or sustain yield curve control, creating uncontrollable inflation or currency crisis.
“well our behavior will succeed in generating inflation because we think differently about the world or supply jane's break and it's kind of like different behavior of people in the economies and then the thing that has happened so many times before happens again which is inflation and that's the solution quote unquote solution to the problem rather than a default yeah so i by base case is that we're going to see higher inflation in the 2020s now exactly how high will depend on a lot of variables so just like how the 1940s are more inflationary than the 1930s i think we're going to see a high probability that the 2020s are more inflationary than the 2010s and a big reason for that is because back in the in the 2010s a lot of this qe that they did mostly went to recapitalize the banking system so banks went into that crisis with about three percent cash as a percentage of assets right because we we had deregulated the financial system so we had very low cash levels so part of the way that they got out of that crisis was the federal reserve created a bunch of dollars and they bought assets from those banks so they after the first round of qe banks were brought up to about eight percent cash levels as a percentage of assets and by the time that qe3 ended around 2014 banks had 15 cash as a percentage of assets and they slowly worked that down over several years they got down to about seven percent that's when we had the repo crisis last year in september and ever since then we've they've been treading water in in this most recent qe that was brought up to 15 cash again by the fed now back then that's where most of the qe winded up it went into treasuries and went into mortgage-backed securities and it all just kind of went on to bank balance sheets for the most part whereas now what we're seeing is because physical deficits are so large and there's so much you know they did 1200 checks to people they did 600 a week and extra federal unemployment for four months there going through the end of july we're probably going to see more rounds of fiscal we already have kind of a agreement between both the president and the democrats and and the senate that they're going to do some sort of fiscal this year most likely again they just don't know what shape that's going to take yet and then probably in the years ahead we're going to see some infrastructure because it's going to take a long time to get kind of out of this unemployment mass so a big difference that can actually have them quote unquote succeed in causing inflation is that instead of a lot of these qe winding up in asset prices and winding up in the financial system a lot of is getting injected more into the economy in the form of business loans that turn into grants and helicopter money to consumers [20:01] extra unemployment benefits that sort of thing so as we have a massive run-up in deficits and the money supply and as they lock treasury yields you know wherever they want them to be by buying as many treasuries as needed we could start to see a more inflationary environment and currency devaluation compared to harder assets like say precious metals yeah i mean wouldn't you say i mean i i may be completely wrong here but in order to get rid of all that debt shouldn't they aim or won't they aim for [20:32] you know what we're going for 20 inflation we'll just you know make this it's like a pain right let's let's get over with it uh have it quick and short two three four years real super high inflation and then we start again i think the challenge with that is that because fee and currency is entirely a kind of a confidence game it's all faith-based in you know the stability of that currency so we have situations now where they're doing qe but they don't want to call it debt monetization for example even though in many countries now most of the [21:04] sovereign bond issuance is being you know accumulated by the central bank so but they don't want to refer to it as debt monetization uh so they prefer to kind of uh i think in their perfect world they want us to be somewhat gradual right so they their inflation the fed's inflation target is two percent right and that that inflation target uses a bunch of statistics to kind of understate real inflation and they've also talked about having that they're fine with symmetric inflation so instead of two percent being a ceiling it's more like because we went under that that target for several years they're happy [21:36] to go above that target for several years now i think in their view above that target means like say three percent so if we look at it and say okay so they want three percent inflation but that three percent still it would understate what actually inflation is at that time so it might be up to four five six percent for for the cost of goods or higher i think that's their ideal world is to kind of have yields at one or two percent uh and then inflation at you know three percent or higher now if you have kind of a sharp spike in [22:06] inflation it kind of depends how long that lasts so if i think in their mind they also wouldn't mind to be like oops inflation had a big spike to eight percent this year but we got it back down and conveniently we inflated away some of that debt so you could have mid single digit kind of sustained inflation with an occasional spike especially in a yield curve control environment where they don't they don't raise rates to stop inflation but that could quickly get out of control if the global investors lose confidence in the currencies and bonds so just the [22:37] way that the whole system structured i don't think they want a really sharp inflation i think they and they're they want to kind of taper but that's always harder to do in practice than in theory yeah maybe just as a as a quick comment we were talking to jim bianco also on this series and he said something quite interesting right because so far it seems like you know the central banks have been pretty much in control to a large extent but what he did say was that the bond markets are way bigger than the fed but at the moment they're [23:09] not speaking with the same voice so when the bond vigilantes as he called them starts to really get in tune there's just no way that the fed will be able to control that and also to your point about inflation yeah and to your point more it's about okay well let's take three years of 20 inflation well it kind of assumes that you can control that but i just don't think you can i mean at some point you lose control and that's probably not something they want to to risk i guess it's a question of um like lynn [23:40] was saying it's all a relative game all the other countries all the other major currencies may be doing it at the same time in which case it isn't that painful if only one country is doing it if only you say the u.s were running 20 inflation but none of the other countries would well that's a big problem for the us but if everybody is in a super high inflationary environment then because of this relative game in terms of currencies maybe it's something that you can get through i mean you know i don't know the thing about you know two percent inflation to me is kind of like yeah compound that [24:11] for 10 years you're getting i don't know 25 or something like that does that really solve the problem if we have 25 less debt 10 years from now i think that solves the problem in any shape or form if you don't want to default if you really want to get rid of the debt and don't leave it as a burden to generations to come it really needs to get way way way down and you don't do that with two percent yeah that's my base cases that we're gonna see higher than two percent inflation over the next decade but how high i think is going to kind of [24:42] you know i think if it gets much higher than that we're going to see kind of these big volatile periods where you could have spikes of inflation and then decreases in inflation if you look back in the 1920s and 30s when all the major sovereigns reduced their gold pegs that's generally what we saw back then is instead of just one country reducing their currency we saw all the majors reducing it so the dollar the yen the swiss franc the pound uh they all reduced their currencies by varying amounts to gold switzerland reduced it one of the least [25:12] whereas like france and japan reduced it more so it was still somewhat of a relative game but they all diminished their currency significantly so i do think we're going to see pretty significant currency devaluation by the time that 2030 comes around let's call it now that can take a couple different forms right so we could have for example a very large devaluation versus commodities and other hard assets whereas everyday prices might not change a ton they might only go up three four or five [25:44] percent a year for a couple years or we could see a more kind of 1970s environment where you have pretty high everyday inflation and i think that's going to depend on a lot of different variables it's going to depend on supply chain it's going to depend on policy response could depend on election outcomes all sorts of things where it's very hard to say like okay we're going to have eight percent inflation five years from now right that's that's a very it's more like looking at the direction and the trends and then kind of going from there and saying you know every year we kind of reevaluate okay what are they doing now what's happening in this situation uh so [26:16] my base case is is much higher than two percent inflation in this decade but i don't have really a ceiling for where we might get to no and it's not like we don't have inflation right now we may not have official inflation but if i look at my health care costs every year they go up uh quite a lot and uh and you're getting all the nails i know i know and my kids are as well but still it is kind of a little bit deceptive when we talk about one or two percent deflation inflation and also the way europe calculates inflation doesn't take into account shelter so there's no [26:46] housing costs in the number either so it's a little bit um of a jungle let me i just want to circle back to some of the things you mentioned i mean you mentioned ray dalio so just wanted to ask you a little bit about um i mean he i think he's come out recently to say that he thinks we will get into a depression actually he does obviously want to clarify what he means by depression but minus 10 gdp etcetera etcetera he thinks we're there if you know or will be there so that's one [27:17] thing and the other thing is of course you mentioned these that long-term debt cycles where he's also done a lot of work on this and and of course we have other cycles in general you talk about the business cycle but we have also wall cycles right and even though we say right now well okay we don't maybe envisage a world war or something large we have people like neuro roubini who definitely believes that we're going to be you know the u.s is going to be in a hot war with iran before the election we have north korea south korea that”
Unlike the 1940s which involved a hot war (WWII), the current environment involves a cold war and economic decoupling with China, though there remains significant geopolitical risk with India-China border tensions, China-Taiwan tensions, and potential for proxy wars or regional conflicts.
“we don't at the current time hopefully have a war a hot war so we have more of a kind of a cold war a little bit sort of a decoupling economic decoupling”
Over the past decade, the broad money supply in the US has increased by about 5-6 percent per year on average, which has recently accelerated to 7-8 percent per year due to a 25 percent increase in the money supply in just the past six months (early 2020).
“if you look at say the money supply right so over the past decade the money supply broad money supply in the u.s has increased by about seven percent per year on average now if we were having this conversation last year i would have said it was five or six percent but because we had a massive 25 increase in the money supply just in the past six months that ten-year rate has already increased to seven or eight percent”
Most retail and institutional investors (60-40 portfolios, pension funds) still have minimal exposure to precious metals, Bitcoin, or commodities, while enthusiasm remains mostly in niche and early-adopter crowds, suggesting there is significant room for asset allocation shifts once broader recognition occurs.
“so you know anything i list now there could be something totally else so i would not have guessed for example a pandemic in 2020. i had been writing about how you know with high debt levels were very exposed to some sort of shock but i could not have predicted the actual shock would have been a global pandemic coming out of china for example so that's always kind of that just unexpected thing so i think if we look at how much enthusiasm there is for precious metals or bitcoin and stuff a lot of that still tends to be pretty niche right so many uh pensions big money portfolios institutional portfolios common investors with 60 40 portfolios there's not a lot of interest in in that space there's not a lot of interest in precious metals or commodities or bitcoin we have some of these kind of early people saying like looking really long term out and starting to highlight these things and we have people that are more concerned about the financial system wanting to buy these things and we have kind of uh trend followers starting to get into things like gold but we don't have for example the robin hood crowd flooding into gold stocks i wouldn't be surprised to see that happen years down the line after their earlier trend followers already got in so they they benefit from that we don't for example have a lot of retail enthusiasm about precious metals bitcoin things like that we have it's more niche”
The Strauss-Howe generational theory predicts fourth turnings that often end in large conflict, and the current period is aligned with such a fourth turning that was predicted roughly 30 years ago and has been 'spot on' in its accuracy so far.
“and of course we have other cycles in general you talk about the business cycle but we have also wall cycles right and even though we say right now well okay we don't maybe envisage a world war or something large we have people like neuro roubini who definitely believes that we're going to be you know the u.s is going to be in a hot war with iran before the election we have north korea south korea that seems to be hotting up we have taiwan and china you mentioned india and china i mean it's not like there isn't the potential for war and then on top of that we have this other cycle that we've talked about on this podcast which of course is is kind of a demographic cycle based on the work from neil howe and bill strauss in terms of the generational turnings and we are in a fourth turning according to their work and obviously they wrote it 30 years ago and it's been spot on”
Housing costs, both for purchase and rental, have increased significantly and cannot be offshored, making real estate both an asset whose value may appreciate and a cost category that creates sustained inflation pressure.
“but the other thing that's gone up in value is housing and as an asset but also the kind of cost of housing which is another one of these things you can't offshore you can't go and live in china um you have to live in in new york or or near london in my case or or you know in switzerland and germany the other guys”
In an environment with low or negative real yields (current and forecast 2020s), precious metals and commodities are likely to perform well because the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets decreases when bonds provide negative real returns.
“so in that sort of high real yield environment generally precious metals and to some extent other commodities don't do very well whereas in an environment with low or negative yield yields which is currently where we're in and what i think we're going to be in for much of the 2020s i do think gold is likely to do well”
The Federal Reserve's inflation target of 2 percent uses statistics that understate real inflation, and their recent shift to 'symmetric inflation' means they are comfortable with inflation running above 2 percent for several years to make up for undershooting in prior years, which in the Fed's internal view likely means 3 percent official inflation, translating to 4-6 percent or higher for actual cost of goods.
“their inflation the fed's inflation target is two percent right and that that inflation target uses a bunch of statistics to kind of understate real inflation and they've also talked about having that they're fine with symmetric inflation so instead of two percent being a ceiling it's more like because we went under that that target for several years they're happy to go above that target for several years now i think in their view above that target means like say three percent so if we look at it and say okay so they want three percent inflation but that three percent still it would understate what actually inflation is at that time so it might be up to four five six percent for for the cost of goods or higher”
Official inflation statistics in the US and especially Europe understate real inflation because they use flawed methodology (like hedonics in the US) and exclude shelter costs (housing) in European calculations, making the true inflation rate higher than reported.
“it is kind of a little bit deceptive when we talk about one or two percent deflation inflation and also the way europe calculates inflation doesn't take into account shelter so there's no housing costs in the number either so it's a little bit um of a jungle”
We are witnessing a parallel to the 1940s where we have worked off the private debt bubble and are now grappling with sovereign debt bubbles in both the US and elsewhere in the world.
“so it's it's kind of mimicking in my opinion a lot like the 1940s where we see we've already kind of worked off a private debt bubble and now we're kind of working with uh sovereign debt bubbles both in the u.s and elsewhere in the world”
The US has a more diversified economy than in the 1940s, which means supply shortages may not be as concentrated, though current globally-distributed supply chains mean that certain critical shortages (like masks during COVID) can still occur and create vulnerabilities similar to WWII.
“but we also have a more diversified economy we have uh slower demographics and one thing that can make somewhat of a comparison to world war ii is that back then we had supply shortages right so we had a lot of materials used for the war one thing we're finding ourselves in now is that because of our globally diversified supply chains we already have some shortages so like we did we had a shortage of masks for example at a critical time when we needed masks”
If countries try to reshore supply chains away from cheaper labor markets to increase resilience and reduce geopolitical vulnerability, this reshoring effort can be inflationary because it moves production from lower-cost to higher-cost locations.
“it's not a situation you want to be in and actually during the recent china and india conflict right so they've had some border squabbles...it's kind of really interesting situation where if they're trying to resource supply chains and try to avoid having those supply chains in cheaper places in the world that can be inflationary if they try to bring some of the supply chains home which can be higher cost but can be more resilient”
Central banks do not explicitly call current QE 'debt monetization' even though in many countries most sovereign bond issuance is currently being accumulated by the central bank, because fiat currency stability depends entirely on confidence in that currency, and openly admitting to debt monetization would undermine confidence.
“we have situations now where they're doing qe but they don't want to call it debt monetization for example even though in many countries now most of the sovereign bond issuance is being you know accumulated by the central bank so but they don't want to refer to it as debt monetization uh so they prefer to kind of uh i think in their perfect world they want us to be somewhat gradual right so they their inflation the fed's inflation target is two percent right and that that inflation target uses a bunch of statistics to kind of understate real inflation and they've also talked about having that they're fine with symmetric inflation so instead of two percent being a ceiling it's more like because we went under that that target for several years they're happy to go above that target for several years now i think in their view above that target means like say three percent so if we look at it and say okay so they want three percent inflation but that three percent still it would understate what actually inflation is at that time so it might be up to four five six percent for for the cost of goods or higher i think that's their ideal world is to kind of have yields at one or two percent uh and then inflation at you know three percent or higher”
Countries will seek to localize and reshore their supply chains not because of hot war but because of cold war competition, as having critical supplies (medicines, masks, military components) sourced from a geopolitical adversary creates unacceptable strategic vulnerability, even if actual shooting war is unlikely.
“so even if it's not a hot war if it's a cold war you still don't want most of your medicines made in your cold war antagonist so those restoring of supply chains can be quite inflationary because as you pointed out we've had very uneven inflation”
If supply chains are reshored and commodity supplies tighten, the deflationary effects of technology and offshoring that masked monetary inflation in the 2010s will reverse, putting an inflation floor under previously cheap categories while services inflation continues, creating a more broadly inflationary 2020s.
“so if we start to kind of enter a period of higher commodity prices and a period of reshorting some of the supply chains that kind of puts a bottom in how much deflation we can get in those areas we could have inflation in those areas while we also have high inflation in some of those services areas so that's why i think the 2020s in addition to the amount of money printing that's happening is that we have a reshoring effect and i think together that could be pretty inflationary”
Lynn is now broadly bullish on commodity producers in the 2020s, including copper and other metals used in renewable energy (solar panels, electric vehicles, electrical grid upgrades) and battery metals, because global exploration has been insufficient and we have not had adequate new capacity additions.
“so going forward now i'm more broadly bullish for the long term on commodities including copper producers all the different kind of metals that are useful for solar panels electric vehicles electrical grid because people often talk about renewable energy which is a shift essentially from oil to metals because electric vehicles solar panels electrical grid they all use more copper silver nickel battery metals all these different kind of commodities and we have not had a lot of expiration so i like to combine the present in the past when looking at how these play out”
Real estate as an inflation hedge is more nuanced: expensive urban real estate (like a Manhattan penthouse) is unlikely to appreciate as an inflation hedge if people migrate out of cities, whereas suburban or reasonably priced real estate financed with a very long-term fixed-rate mortgage can be a good inflation hedge for investors who can obtain favorable long-term financing.
“i think real estate is more hit or miss so we could have you know city real estate is very expensive whereas in the u.s for example a lot of suburban real estate is still pretty reasonably priced so for investors that can get a very low long-term fixed rate mortgage on a decent home i think that could be a decent hedge against inflation whereas like a really expensive penthouse in manhattan for example is unlikely to maybe have that kind of hedge especially if people want to kind of move out of cities a little bit”
Pensions and large institutional funds are increasingly forced to use leverage to meet their return targets (7% real return assumptions) in an environment where bond yields are below inflation, creating systemic risk if they blow up, which would require government bailout and further currency devaluation.
“so there are cases where a sophisticated strategy could use a certain amount of leverage appropriately but levering up purely because you feel you have to is a way to blow up your portfolio so we're kind of seeing that at the pension level now so i do think it's a significant risk for any of these kind of institutions that have obligations they have to meet a lot of them have seven percent rate of return targets right and so i think we're likely to see pension failures and or government bailouts of some of these programs but that can lead to further currency evaluation if you're basically printing money to build a pension that's right right”
Key tail risks and shocks that most investors are not focusing on include: currency devaluation risk where treasuries deliver significantly negative real returns over the next decade, supply shortages in non-energy commodities (especially metals) due to weak prior exploration, and pension system failures or government bailouts requiring currency devaluation.
“so my view is that some of the big shocks out there are basically around currency evaluation so i don't think a lot of people expect that treasuries might provide a significant negative real return over the next decade i don't think that's that's on a lot of people's radar even though it's it's on the radar of some sophisticated investors and some niche investors i don't think that's something that the average 60 40 portfolio or pension system is necessarily considering or if they're considering it they're allocating a small percentage against that possibility rather than fleeing bonds for example and then in addition because we've had such weak expiration in commodities particularly non-energy commodities like especially the metals i do think there's a significant risk of supply shortages in certain metals by the end of this decade so that could be copper that could be some of the other ones and even energy you talked before about some of the tail risks if you see more military action in the world those supply chains for oil can be disrupted”
The Fed's ideal scenario is to maintain yields at 1-2 percent while inflation runs at 3 percent or higher, allowing them to inflate away debt without sharp inflation spikes that could trigger loss of confidence in the currency.
“i think that's their ideal world is to kind of have yields at one or two percent uh and then inflation at you know three percent or higher now if you have kind of a sharp spike in inflation it kind of depends how long that lasts so if i think in their mind they also wouldn't mind to be like oops inflation had a big spike to eight percent this year but we got it back down and conveniently we inflated away some of that debt so you could have mid single digit kind of sustained inflation with an occasional spike especially in a yield curve control environment where they don't they don't raise rates to stop inflation but that could quickly get out of control if the global investors lose confidence in the currencies and bonds”
A critical structural difference from the 1940s is that currently both federal and private debt are at very high levels simultaneously, whereas in the 1930s-40s they worked them off sequentially—private debt bubble in the 1930s, then federal debt bubble in the 1940s, separated by a decade.
“another thing though that's different is that this time we have a federal very high federal debt and very high private debt at the same time so back then we had kind of one after the other first we had a private debt bubble then we had a federal debt bubble so they worked them off kind of separately a decade apart whereas in this time we had a partial deleveraging 10 years ago particularly in the housing the consumer segment but we did not have a de-leveraging really in the corporate sector and then of course we've had an increase in the in the federal sector so at the current time overall public and private debt to gdp is very high if you combine all sources of debt something like 350 of gdp”
As of 2020, the US currently has corporate debt buildup, federal debt at 106 percent of GDP, and COVID-driven deficits that are approximately as large as those in World War II—roughly 20-30 percent of GDP—with the year not yet finished and further stimulus still being discussed.
“but as we went into this crisis we had corporate debt build up again we have federal debt at 106 percent of gdp and now with covet happening in the economic shutdown we have deficits that are as large as they were roughly in world war ii so we're running 20 30 deficits because you know we're already at like 20 deficit and the year's not over yet they're still talking about more fiscal so we don't know what the final number is going to be”
Globalization has peaked and is pulling back, causing accumulated US trade deficits to result in negative net international investment position and decreased manufacturing capacity, which now constrains the dollar-centric monetary system.
“but now the globe is kind of handed a peak stage of globalization and seems to be pulling back and so much accumulated trade deficits has resulted in the us having a very negative net international investment position and has really decreased its ability to manufacture things and we've really kind of bumped into that over the past several years”
The COVID-19 pandemic and government economic shutdowns represent the largest economic shock since World War II and have created the largest global deficits since WWII, functioning as a 'war event' that accelerated the transition into the long-term debt cycle resolution period.
“we've had kind of experiment to see how these different countries handle the pandemic and how seriously they take it so we already kind of have our that's in some ways it's more of our war event right because we have the biggest economic shock since world war ii essentially in the biggest deficits globally since world war ii”
Lynn's base case is that we will see pretty significant currency devaluation by 2030, which could take different forms: either large devaluation versus commodities and hard assets with only 3-5% annual everyday price increases, or a 1970s-style environment with high everyday inflation, depending on supply chain and policy outcomes.
“so i do think we're going to see pretty significant currency devaluation by the time that 2030 comes around let's call it now that can take a couple different forms right so we could have for example a very large devaluation versus commodities and other hard assets whereas everyday prices might not change a ton they might only go up three four or five percent a year for a couple years or we could see a more kind of 1970s environment where you have pretty high everyday inflation”
Bitcoin has become established as a digital speculative store of value due to strengthening network effects, decline in altcoins' market share relative to Bitcoin, platform adoption (Robinhood, Square, PayPal), and having a well-designed protocol with halving events and difficulty adjustments, though it remains more volatile than gold and should be allocated to differently.
“i think bitcoin uniquely has become kind of established as uh sort of a digital speculative store value for many people and it has a very kind of a well-designed protocol so my view is since april 2020 i have been bullish on bitcoin and i i consider it a more volatile speculative asset so i wouldn't allocate to it as much as i would say gold”
Lynn's personal view on Bitcoin allocation since early 2020 is that it seems odd not to have approximately 1 percent of portfolio in Bitcoin because the market cap is currently 100-200 billion (fluctuating) while gold's market cap is approximately 10 trillion, making Bitcoin a smaller-cap speculative store of value that could reach 1 trillion dollar market cap without seeming utterly shocking.
“ever since my view in early 2020 of becoming more firmly bullish it seems odd to me not to have say one percent in bitcoin because the market cap right now is fluctuates between one and one and two hundred billion but gold's market cap is like ten trillion based on estimates for how much gold above ground gold exists in the world and what its current price is it's like roughly eight nine ten trillion bitcoin is still a small market cap it's still a very low investor allocation to bitcoin gold is like a large cap store value bitcoin is a smaller cap speculative store of value so it's not hard to see bitcoin eventually hitting a one trillion dollar market cap and it's not my i'm not saying it will i'm saying i wouldn't be utterly shocked if one day it did”
Large deficits will persist for several years into the future despite economic recovery because the tax base has been damaged by joblessness and the government will need to continue stimulus to keep people afloat, preventing a quick return to deficit normalization.
“this isn't going to go away in a year or two even if even as things start to recover the amount of joblessness means that the tax base is damaged the amount of stimulus that they have to do to kind of keep people afloat is is higher so we're going to see deficits that are very large for several years”
There is likely to be agreement between the US administration and Senate Democrats to pursue additional fiscal stimulus in 2020, though the exact shape remains uncertain, and infrastructure spending will likely occur over subsequent years as unemployment recovery takes time.
“they did 600 a week and extra federal unemployment for four months there going through the end of july we're probably going to see more rounds of fiscal we already have kind of a agreement between both the president and the democrats and and the senate that they're going to do some sort of fiscal this year most likely again they just don't know what shape that's going to take yet and then probably in the years ahead we're going to see some infrastructure because it's going to take a long time to get kind of out of this unemployment mass”
A key difference between the 1940s and today is that back then, interest rates were about 2.5 percent while federal debt-to-GDP was lower, whereas today interest rates are about 70 basis points (0.7%) with higher debt-to-GDP, but the burden of interest payments—calculated as interest rates times debt-to-GDP—comes out approximately equal when compared using that proxy.
“i think um the 1940s like us 10 years was you you actually gave us a fee they're about two and a half percent um and now we're we're about 70 basis points so we're somewhere below that and actually i did a kind of quick back of the envelope calculation and then i multiplied the interest rates in 1930 by the the federal government of gdp ratio and then i did the same calculation today and that's kind of a very vague proxy for sort of the debt burden on the federal government as in terms of interest payments and that came out scarily almost exactly the same number”
Lynn's base case is that we will see higher inflation in the 2020s than in the 2010s, with the 2020s probably being more inflationary than the 2010s in the same way the 1940s were more inflationary than the 1930s.
“so i by base case is that we're going to see higher inflation in the 2020s now exactly how high will depend on a lot of variables so just like how the 1940s are more inflationary than the 1930s i think we're going to see a high probability that the 2020s are more inflationary than the 2010s”
Lynn expects gold to reach probably at least $3,000 by the end of the decade and possibly double from there, based on models comparing gold to the money supply and other metrics, though she does not give a specific ceiling due to unpredictability of sentiment and momentum trading.
“well where do you think could it go not a specific price target but i do expect to see probably over 3 000 by the end of the decade and that's kind of a lower end target so it really kind of depends because i don't i don't uh predict sentiment right so i kind of i have a couple models that compare gold to the money supply and other metrics so i do think we're going to see notably higher gold throughout the next 10 years so i would expect to see probably a doubling or probably at least 3 000 in dollar terms but there are kind of tail scenarios that could seem much higher than that especially if momentum people get into it or if we have a more significant more rapid currency devaluation”
Simply achieving 2 percent inflation for 10 years, which would compound to about 22 percent cumulative, does not solve the debt problem; meaningful debt reduction requires much higher sustained inflation over the 2020s to materially reduce the debt burden on future generations.
“the thing about you know two percent inflation to me is kind of like yeah compound that for 10 years you're getting i don't know 25 or something like that does that really solve the problem if we have 25 less debt 10 years from now i think that solves the problem in any shape or form if you don't want to default if you really want to get rid of the debt and don't leave it as a burden to generations to come it really needs to get way way way down and you don't do that with two percent”
Exactly how high inflation will go in the 2020s is hard to predict because it depends on multiple variables including supply chain developments, policy responses, and election outcomes, so Lynn does not provide a specific ceiling but rather emphasizes directional trends to monitor annually.
“i think that's going to depend on a lot of different variables it's going to depend on supply chain it's going to depend on policy response could depend on election outcomes all sorts of things where it's very hard to say like okay we're going to have eight percent inflation five years from now right that's that's a very it's more like looking at the direction and the trends and then kind of going from there and saying you know every year we kind of reevaluate okay what are they doing now what's happening in this situation uh so my base case is is much higher than two percent inflation in this decade but i don't have really a ceiling for where we might get to”
Lynn's approach to precious metals and commodities combines looking at what assets historically did well in inflationary periods with acknowledging that specific metals or assets may be exceptions to general rules, requiring constant monitoring of whether an asset is acting as expected.
“i think the same sort of things will do well but it's always useful to pay attention to what's going on on that specific metal is is that metal kind of an exception to the role or can we consider it uh part of something that's going to do well”
Lynn turned bullish on gold in late 2018 because the growth cycle had peaked even though GDP continued to grow, gold was cheap, and it had positive trend signals, marking the beginning of her multi-year bullish positioning on precious metals.
“so specifically around late 2018 i turned bullish on gold because we saw the growth the top of the growth cycle so even though gdp continued to grow in 2019 we had a much slower period of growth and so we also had gold was pretty cheap and had some positive trend signals so i i turned bullish on gold then”
COVID and the resulting economic shock proved more severe than Lynn's early 2019 forecast anticipated (with oil prices going negative), but it has not changed her long-term bullish commodity outlook, only the timing of when the commodity bull market would begin.
“and so of course we had coveted come along and that we had a bigger drop than i i would have guessed that it wouldn't have expected negative oil prices you know back in 2019 so going forward now i'm more broadly bullish for the long term on commodities”
Lynn was cautious on commodity producers until very recently because while she is bullish on commodities long-term, her analysis showed the business cycle was slowing in 2019, making a near-term correction likely before the long-term bull case plays out.
“and then commodity producers i've been more hesitant on until very recently so i've been sticking to some of the most conservative commodity producers because even though i considered that we're probably looking forward to inflation in the coming decade i also was my analysis was showing that we're probably at the towards the end of a business cycle so as things were slowing down in 2019 i was saying okay we have to kind of separate durations here so i'm bullish on commodities long term but i'm worried that we're going to get a a drop in the near term”
Throughout the 2010s-2020 cycle, gold and silver have experienced dips and rallies but have maintained a long-term bullish trend that Lynn expects to continue throughout the 2020s, though with likely significant corrections along the way.
“and throughout this cycle we've had we've had dips and and and rallies along the way but i continue to see this as part of a long-term trend that gold silver are going to do very well in the 2020s even though they'll have they'll have big corrections along the way most likely”
Ray Dalio has recently argued that the US will enter a depression, which he defines as a GDP decline of minus 10 percent or similar magnitude, and he has done extensive work on long-term debt cycles similar to what Lynn describes.
“i mean he i think he's come out recently to say that he thinks we will get into a depression actually he does obviously want to clarify what he means by depression but minus 10 gdp etcetera etcetera he thinks we're there if you know or will be there so that's one thing and the other thing is of course you mentioned these that long-term debt cycles where he's also done a lot of work on this”
The 1930s and 1940s comparison works well because the timeline aligns: 1929 marks the private debt peak, 2008 marks the equivalent modern peak roughly 80 years later; 1940 begins the sovereign debt phase, and roughly 2020 begins the equivalent modern phase.
“the fact that the dates work so well from uh you know 1929 being a bit like 2008 and we're sort of 10 years on from that in the same way that the 1940s was 10 years on from yeah from 1929”
Combined federal and private debt in the current economy totals approximately 350 percent of GDP when all sources of debt are added together.
“overall public and private debt to gdp is very high if you combine all sources of debt something like 350 of gdp”
The Federal Reserve has been maintaining banks at 15 percent cash levels since the most recent QE began, following the September 2019 repo crisis, by continuing quantitative easing operations.
“ever since then we've they've been treading water in in this most recent qe that was brought up to 15 cash again by the fed”