What this covers

This is a single-guest interview on the On the Margin podcast. Host Mike Ippolito talks with Michael Howell of Crossborder Capital about his book Capital Wars. The conversation moves from a diagnosis of the post-2000 financial system to Europe, the dollar, and the US–China contest. Howell's central lens is global liquidity. He treats markets as a refinancing mechanism more than a way of funding new investment. In his figures, roughly $350 trillion of debt with a five-year average maturity means about $70 trillion must be rolled over each year, against only about $10 trillion of externally financed new capital spending. That arithmetic leads him to argue that access to funding matters more than the level of interest rates. He calls this claim contested.

The middle of the discussion is about Europe, which Howell frames as a possible canary in the coal mine. He traces the energy crisis to decisions made decades ago: France chose nuclear power, Germany chose Russian gas, and Britain's room for manoeuvre was curtailed after Suez in 1956. On the euro, he argues that fixed exchange rates without fiscal transfers push richer northern members and poorer southern ones further apart. The European Central Bank (ECB)) has been absorbing southern debt, and its withdrawal risks fragmentation of the bond market. He sees only two exits: money printing or a euro devaluation of 20% or more.

The final third covers the dollar and China. Howell argues that Bretton Woods endures because of US naval power, the Treasury market as the central safe asset, and the Federal Reserve's swap lines, which he likens to the Fed opening foreign branches. He lists three prongs of China's push to internationalise the yuan: trade settlement, open bond markets, and a digital yuan. He also says China is constrained by its dependence on sea lanes it cannot police, and that US regulators are slowing American digital currency efforts. The episode closes with a view of current liquidity conditions, including the Fed's 2019 quantitative tightening misstep and the liquidity-driven rebound after the March 2020 crash.

Sharpest takeaway

Central banks' decision to slash interest rates 15-20 years ago in response to misdiagnosed cost deflation from China's WTO entry triggered a debt spiral that made modern financial systems increasingly fragile and dependent on continuous liquidity provision, with the US dollar and Federal Reserve remaining central to global stability despite emerging challenges from China and structural eurozone problems.

  • Cost deflation from Chinese competition was mistaken for monetary deflation, prompting rate cuts that encouraged debt accumulation rather than addressing real productivity gains
  • The modern financial system is fundamentally about refinancing $350 trillion in debt (70 trillion annually) rather than capital formation, making liquidity access critical to prevent cascading defaults
  • Despite predictions of dollar decline, Bretton Woods remains intact with US military, treasury system, and now Fed swap lines preserving American monetary dominance, though China's belt-and-road and digital yuan initiatives pose medium-to-long-term challenges

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0.75

The Federal Reserve has established swap lines with foreign central banks around the world, which effectively function as the Fed opening foreign branches to provide dollars globally, representing an extension of US monetary system control internationally.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“take a look at the swap lines that the federal reserve has put in place around the world for friends to borrow uh dollars these swap lines are like you know the fed opening a foreign branch uh you know offshore overseas to actually provide dollars to the global financial system”

0.75

The European energy crisis stems from structural decisions made decades ago: France chose nuclear power, Germany chose Russian gas pipelines (starting in the 1960s with subsequent expansion), and the UK's power was constrained after the 1956 Suez Crisis, leaving Europe vulnerable to Russian energy leverage.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the energy crisis in europe basically goes right back to the 1950s and it goes back to uh what was what in uh in britain we think of as what was called the suis crisis when britain france and israel uh basically invaded egypt and took back control of the suez canal okay the suez canal had basically been nationalized by the egyptians under nasa”

0.75

The eurozone banking crisis from 2010-2012 destroyed confidence in the euro as a reserve currency, causing Asian central banks to shift from holding euro reserves back to dollars, permanently undermining the euro's challenge to dollar hegemony.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“although up to about 2010 many uh asian economies had large euro deposits in their reserves the eurozone banking crisis from 2010 to 2012 uh opened their eyes to the instability and fragility of the eurozone system and people have swung back to dollars uh you know ever since then so the dollar is still the dominant asset in uh in foreign exchange reserves”

0.74

Creating a functioning reserve currency requires several institutional preconditions including a robust banking system, the ability to create credit, and willingness to serve as a lender of last resort internationally—capabilities that would be difficult for alternative currency systems to replicate.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Michael Howell

“there are a number of things that come with operating a reserve currency and one is a banking system an ability to create credit uh and a lot of the points that you raise are absolutely valid will the child if the chinese were in control would they be lender of the last resort to another country internationally what would they demand for that from that etc so it's a there's a lot of interesting questions that are posed in that particular instance”

0.74

China's geopolitical position is fundamentally constrained because it cannot police global shipping lanes to the Middle East via the Indian Ocean, making it dependent on US-controlled sea routes for energy imports, and thus unable to achieve independent great power status.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Michael Howell

“world trade is dependent on the us uh you know if the chinese try and do it try and go it alone uh how are the chinese going to get their oil from the middle east back to china that's a long sea route who's going to police that do the chinese navy have the ability to do that uh there is risk of you know if china falls out with taiwan or with japan ultimately the japanese or the taiwanese have got the ability to significantly disrupt chinese energy imports”

0.73

Modern financial markets are fundamentally refinancing mechanisms rather than capital formation engines, because global debt of approximately $350 trillion with an average maturity of 5 years requires roughly $70 trillion in annual refinancing, which dwarfs the ~$10 trillion in externally financed new capital spending (one-fifth of the $100 trillion global economy).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“financial markets as we see them are basically refinancing mechanisms for the huge amount of debt that exists on balance sheets whether it be the consumer sector the corporate sector or the government sectors everyone has basically been uh you know is uh is now debt ridden uh the debt has become a drug uh that everyone's using and the fact is that debt needs to be refinanced so if you look at the world economy there is something like 350 trillion dollars of debt outstanding that debt has an average maturity of about five years which simple math tells you that about 70 trillion on average has to be refinanced or rolled over every year”

0.72

The eurozone's fixed exchange rate system (without flexible exchange rates or fiscal transfers) creates a dynamic where richer regions (Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Denmark) grow wealthier while poorer regions (Italy, Greece, Spain) grow poorer over time, mirroring the US and UK pattern under fixed currency systems.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Michael Howell

“every fixed exchange rate system in history has one clear trait and that is true whether it's the us dollar system in the us in the united states or the british pound in the uk what happens is that in a fixed exchange rate system the rich or the rich regions of an economy get richer more wealthy and the poor regions get poorer uh over time so look at how that happens in the us the rich states are always getting richer and the poor states particularly in the southern states of the us are getting poorer right so how is that alleviated same problem in the uk the rich areas like the southeast get richer and the poorer fringes like scotland ireland wales get poorer okay”

0.71

China's strategy for currency internationalization consists of three components: (1) redenominating international trade in yuan, (2) opening bond markets to foreign capital to create a liquid yuan asset market, and (3) developing a digital yuan for peer-to-peer transfers globally.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the first of those uh which hasn't happened yet but is probably not that far away is to redenominate international trade in yuan now if china is the world's biggest exporter and importer that's not such a difficult task for it to do it would just at the stroke of a pen say we're going to have these goods now invoiced in yuan okay will they do that almost certainly because they have already set up i believe the number is 36 swap lines around the region where uh foreign governments or foreign central banks can swap their currency into yuan if they need you on the only reason for those swap lines is for that for those transactions the second thing they do is they open up the bond market to foreign capital and that's what they've done quite successfully and with chinese bonds having quite high yields that has proven attractive although you know one has to admit uh in this year there's been an outflow of capital from china because people have been spooked by what's been going on the kovid crisis but longer term trends there's been certainly a move of bond money into china and the third thing is setting up a digital yuan uh which can compete and allow peer-to-peer transfer uh of a yuan uh in in terms of you know the world economy it's a trusted framework”

0.69

China's entry into the World Trade Organization approximately 20 years ago caused a cost downward shock by flooding global markets with very cheap Chinese goods, which created deflationary pressure on prices in the West.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“when these problems began what we saw was china entering the world trade organization and china basically you know right almost writing its own rules here and china was allowed to compete um and it effectively flooded the world uh markets with very very cheap chinese goods okay now there are benefits there let's not get that wrong but the fact is that that had an impact on price levels in the west and it caused a cost downward cost shock”

0.69

The US Treasury market is the center of both the US and global financial systems because treasuries are the primary safe asset, making illiquidity in the treasury market an existential threat to global financial stability.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the treasury market is absolutely the center of not just the u.s financial system but the global financial system because treasuries are the the sort of the main safe asset in the system and if you've got problems illiquidity in the treasury market then the whole system is ultimately threatened”

0.69

China has stated an explicit policy goal of displacing the US dollar, particularly in the Asian region and more broadly, as articulated by a People's Liberation Army general and spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“china has a policy of stated policy i put a very juicy quote in my book capital wars uh from the people's liberation army one of the generals there who's often a spokesman for the chinese communist party who very explicitly says it's the aim of chinese policy to displace the dollar uh within certainly within the asian region and then more broadly”

0.69

China faces significant near-term economic challenges but takes a long-term strategic view, meaning that while China is not yet a credible challenger to US dominance, it is steadily building the capabilities and relationships needed for a longer-term challenge.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“china is coming make no mistake but it's not there yet and china faces a lot of problems near term in terms of of its economy uh these things are clear but you know china takes a long-term view and we've got to remember that”

0.69

The March 2020 COVID stock market crash was followed by abundant Federal Reserve liquidity injections that pushed the market back up, demonstrating the Fed's power to stabilize through liquidity.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“there was an absolute uh you know crash in prices that it took the federal reserves uh in a very abundant supply of uh liquidity or re-injections of liquidity uh to actually push the market back up again and the fed was very successful uh actually in truth in all three occasions the federal reserve bailed the system out”

0.68

The decision of central banks to slash interest rates 15-20 years ago was the fundamental cause of the debt spiral that led to financial crises, not legitimate economic needs, because those rate cuts encouraged widespread debt accumulation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“it was the decision of central banks to slash interest rates originally 15 20 years ago that was really the problem and that caused debt to begin to spiral out of control”

0.68

Central banks mistook cost deflation from China's WTO entry for monetary deflation and therefore implemented loose monetary policy, when they should have recognized cost deflation as benign and potentially beneficial because it reflects productivity gains and efficiency improvements.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the central banks mistook that for a monetary deflation and they said whoa bad so what we've got to do is we've got to try and stop this monetary deflation and so what they did is they relaxed policy okay they cut interest rates they expanded their balance sheets”

0.68

Interest rates are not the primary driver of financial stability in a debt-dominated economy; instead, whether debt can be refinanced (access to liquidity) is the critical factor, because default or inability to roll debt creates systemic cascades.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“if you're doing a roll of debt uh what matters is not really so much the rate of interest clearly that's important but it's not crucial what matters is whether you get the role or not uh if you don't get the role and you're a corporate you default uh if you don't get the role the role and you're a mortgagee you're homeless so these are the things which really focus attention”

0.68

Financial systems become more fragile and crisis-prone as they become more sophisticated and complex, as evidenced by the Western financial system's greater vulnerability to crises compared to China's simpler but tightly-controlled banking system.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“much of the media decries china for having a very uh or particularly vulnerable financial system the paradoxes that maybe the financial system of the west is actually more prone to crisis china's financial system actually is very simple uh it's not particularly sophisticated and it's being overseen and run very tightly by the people's bank of china now it's very difficult to compare those financial systems one is nascent the chinese one and one is highly sophisticated but the more sophisticated the financial system becomes in the west the potentially the more fragile it is”

0.68

The Federal Reserve's policy error in 2019 was conducting quantitative tightening (QT) that reduced its balance sheet and bank reserves below minimum thresholds, which caused money market liquidity stress and forced the Fed to reverse course.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the error that the fed had made in 2019 was that they basically had they were doing a tightening a a mini qt at the time and they were basically reducing the size of their balance sheet and consequently money market liquidity and by corollary banks reserves were then getting below minimum thresholds and that was a that was a problem”

0.68

When investors perceive liquidity risk, liquidity becomes non-fungible and hoarded rather than flowing through the system, causing asset prices to crater as fire sales occur.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“people tend to or investors tend to panic uh and they tend to hoard liquidity and liquidity far from being fungible becomes non-fungible people hoard it it doesn't flow through the system and you get just a a cratering of of uh financial asset prices”

0.68

The Federal Reserve's balance sheet expanded to approximately 9 times its pre-2008 size following the global financial crisis, and the Fed's presence in markets has dramatically increased relative to shadow banks, making the Fed the dominant player in the financial system.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the fed balance sheet is now significantly bigger than it was in 2007 i mean we're talking of you know nine times bigger in many ways”

0.68

Southern eurozone countries facing asset price depression and declining wealth must increase fiscal spending to maintain living standards, forcing them to take on more debt, creating a vicious cycle of rising debt burdens with no mechanism for relief.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“if you're in one of the southern states like italy what you've got to do is the only way that you alleviate these problems is you start to spend more fiscally but you've got to take on more debt so the debt burden of the italians within the european system is growing the whole time”

0.68

During the COVID crisis, the ECB's bond purchases provided liquidity to absorb the extra debt issued by southern eurozone countries, enabling fiscal spending; now that the ECB is pulling back post-COVID, there is a risk of eurozone bond market fragmentation as investors flee southern debt for safe German bunds.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“during the covid crisis it was probably easier to manage because the ecb was in there buying this debt so they could provide the extra liquidity to basically hoover up uh a lot of the extra debt that was being that was being sold now you've got the e the ecb pulling back because the kovid crisis is over let's say you've got a problem italy's got more de a bigger debt burden someone's got to buy that debt and there is the risk of fragmentation in the eurozone bond markets for the simple reason that everybody wants uh the the good quality debt the bund the german bund uh you know despite germany's you know structural problems over energy it's still you know um you know the the more attractive of the european economies whereas italy italian debt is stunning yields are starting to move out”

0.68

The eurozone can resolve fragmentation through two mechanisms: either ECB money printing (which is politically difficult given inflation concerns) or a substantial euro devaluation (20%+ depreciation), with no realistic third option.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“there is a great reluctance to commit the ecb to this money printing if they don't print money you'll get fragmentation in the eurozone the only resolution the only realistic resolution as far as i can see is for the euro to decline in value substantially and we're talking about you know 20 down or something right uh so just minor problems that europe is facing”

0.68

Bretton Woods consisted of four key pillars: (1) US dollar at the center of the system, (2) US military/navy policing of global trade routes, (3) IMF and World Bank oversight of country discipline, and (4) fixed currency exchange rates—with the first three being most essential, not the fixed rates.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“what bretton woods uh is or was okay and there are a number of facets for bretton woods i mean one was that the us dollar was at the center of the system okay um the second thing was that basically uh the u.s military uh stroke navy uh basically policed the system insofar as that you know the the monetary system was all about uh expanding trade or having cross-border trade and ultimately cross-border capital moving between different uh different nations worldwide but somebody had to police the shipping lanes and to make sure that trade that trade wasn't compromised by whatever uh military force or terrorism or whatever the us basically played an important role in that behind the scenes with the u.s navy or the u.s military presence there so the whole world trading system really depends on on america in that regard and then the third thing is when he came to the discipline of individual countries you then have the imf and the world uh the world bank which were which would go in and they would both audit countries uh they would make sure that the uh their uh their finances were integral uh etc”

0.68

The euro was originally constructed as a deliberate French challenge to US dollar hegemony to claim a share of 'exorbitant privilege' (the ability to purchase real resources internationally with paper currency), but it has proven unsuccessful in achieving this goal.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the euro uh was originally uh constructed to challenge the us dollar uh and it was uh uh you know it was it was basically there as uh it came from the french initiatives to try and try and say that you know the the us had a very unfair advantage uh with the dollar and therefore europe needed to get its share of what was called senior edge which is the ability to essentially buy resources with paper”

0.68

The US is disadvantaged in the global digital currency competition because the SEC is hampering the rollout of digital currency models in the international arena, while China is free to export its architecture without regulatory constraints.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the problem that we identify is that the us which is in many ways has been the leader in digital technology digital currencies uh and international transfer is being sort of hampered uh paradoxically by the sec in the us in terms of rolling out some of these models in the international arena”

0.68

The real importance of Fed policy pivot will be Fed balance sheet expansion, not rate cuts, because balance sheet growth directly increases liquidity in the system whereas rate cuts are merely signaling.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“it may not be sudden and it may not be it may not involve a significant drop in interest rates but it may mean that the fed balance sheet begins to grow again and that's what's important in my view of the world”

0.68

Beyond 2023, the structural trajectory of the world economy depends on central bank liquidity provision because debt burdens are unsustainably high and can only be managed through continuous balance sheet expansion, making the current system inherently inflationary.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“beyond that i think it depends very much on your view my view is that uh it's not do it's not different this time we're still in this we're still in the same cycle and i think central banks will uh have to play a bigger and bigger role anyway so they've got to expand their balance sheet so i've got to expand liquidity if you expand liquidity asset markets go up and equities are beneficiaries so unfortunately unfortunately whichever way you look at it that's the world we're in okay uh and the only way we get out of that is to get rid of our huge debt burdens and that's not going to be easy you need higher interest rates for longer for that”

0.68

Rising equity prices despite rate increases are 'odd' and suggest that the decline in term premium (risk premium on treasuries) reflects either liquidity shortage, structural shortage of safe assets, or recession expectations—all negative for equities—rather than supportive conditions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“what you've seen is term premier falls significantly the question that policy makers and investors should be asking is why is the term premier on the us 10-year treasury at all-time lows right now that's either because of number one a shortage of liquidity number two structural shortage of safe asset treasuries in the world or number three there's a huge recession coming any one of those three is not good news for equity markets”

0.68

The concept of 'global liquidity' refers to the cross-border flows of capital and money that enable financial markets to function, and monitoring these flows is more important for understanding financial stability than monitoring interest rates or traditional economic indicators.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“capital flows were really the instrumental driver of both financial markets and ultimately the world economy i think a lot of us are kind of looking at this paradox right of a larger financial system right especially in especially in the west as compared to these in say china um and saying well look we we have a lot more liquidity in the system”

0.68

Liquidity is fungible and moves to wherever it can generate returns, meaning that liquidity used to refinance debt in one market can spill over into other markets and inflate asset prices elsewhere, creating wealth effects and inequality.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“there's another cost to this which is liquidity is fungible so if you're using liquidity to roll debt over the liquidity stays in the system and it can move off elsewhere and cause asset prices elsewhere in the system to rise so then what you start to see a significant wealth effects so those people that own assets are then getting significant gains from the effect of this increased liquidity it's uh you know a cost or let's say it's a cost in inverted commerce a benefit for some but it basically polarizes society”

0.68

Three players now control global liquidity: the Federal Reserve (number one), the People's Bank of China (number two), and offshore dollar/eurodollar markets (number three, diminished from historical importance).

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“if you come back to what is really important in terms of understanding these liquidity flows globally it's actually three players now it's the federal reserve in number one place it's the people's bank of china in number two place and it's if you like the offshore dollar markets the old euro dollar markets would still play a role which have probably been pushed down to number three but the fed is very much in the in the center of things”

0.65

The Lehman Brothers failure in 2008 created a systemic cascade because of the high degree of interconnectivity between Lehman and other financial actors, demonstrating how defaults in a tightly-networked system propagate contagion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“we saw that very much in the case of uh lehman in 2008 when the failure of lehman sort of cascaded through the system because there were lots of interconnectivity uh between lehman and many other actors in the in the system”

0.64

The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) committed at their June 2023 meeting to creating a rival currency to the US dollar, though it's unclear whether this is a genuine alternative or merely a Chinese yuan in different packaging.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Michael Howell

“the thing about ray dalio's approach if you if you look at what happened at the brics conference uh in june of this year so the brics are looking at brazil china india russia south africa throwing their saudi arabia those countries committed themselves to creating a rival currency to the us dollar at the last brics meeting now whether this is a genuine attempt at a rival currency or it's essentially a chinese yuan in sheep's clothing i don't know”

0.64

Germany is facing the highest inflation rate in 70 years (over 10%) due to energy costs, making monetary expansion by the ECB politically and economically difficult as it would worsen inflation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Michael Howell

“to say that germany uh with an inflation print of over 10 okay has got the highest inflation rate for i think it's 70 years this is important this is important stuff”

0.63

Bretton Woods I is still intact; there is no Bretton Woods II or III; the dollar remains central to the global system despite predictions 20+ years ago that US GDP share decline would cause dollar decline.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Michael Howell

“if you if you look to where we are now i don't think there's a bretton woods two i don't think it's a bretton woods three i think there's a bretton woods one i think it's still there okay the dollar still central to the system economists for as long as i can remember have been saying that was going to see the demise of the dollar in the international monetary system because they equate that to the diminishing share of u.s gdp in the world economy so that was the sort of consensus view back you know certainly 20 years or more ago that the dollar would decline uh along with parrot pursue with the us economy but that clearly hasn't happened it's gone the other way the us dollar has become more and more and more important in the world uh not less”

0.63

Salomon Brothers was the preeminent global fixed income trader and the world's biggest fixed income house, dominant in forex and treasury securities, with experience that shaped understanding of how capital flows drive markets.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the concept that uh basically grew up well probably now 30 years ago when i was working at salomon brothers the us investment bank uh salon brothers for those people that don't know was the preeminent trader worldwide it was the world's biggest fixed income house uh it was dominant in forex and uh and treasury securities it was the market in treasuries in in many countries particularly the us”

0.61

Quantitative easing and regulation have reduced the capacity of shadow banks to grow while forcing traditional banks to hold more safe assets, shifting the source of liquidity provision from private shadow banking to government institutions (Fed and Treasury).

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“you're also looking at regulation uh that has forced uh that has basically capped the ability of of shadow banks to grow and has forced traditional banks to hold more uh safe assets uh banks and insurance companies the basel three rules have been changed uh generally banking regulations improved significantly”

0.59

China's People's Bank will likely expand liquidity in 2023 to support economic growth and fulfill political promises made by Xi Jinping for his re-election, creating synchronized global liquidity expansion by the Fed and PBOC in 2023.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Michael Howell

“china and china's people's bank will probably be expanding liquidity in 2023 to pay for some of the promises that undoubtedly xi jinping has made to get re-elected so uh that i think is coming this is just a political cycle in china”

0.57

China is hooked on the dollar currently and finds it very difficult to get off; China re-exports dollars when it should be exporting yuan, making it dependent on the dollar system despite wanting to displace it.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Michael Howell

“the problem that china's got is that china is hooked on the dollar right now and it's very difficult to try to get off but it needs to china essentially re-exports dollars right now when it should be exporting yuan”

0.50

The Federal Reserve will likely pivot monetary policy sometime in 2023, probably moving to hold rates rather than raising further, because a recession will become clear by January 2024 and the Fed cannot maintain rate increases during a recession.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Michael Howell

“the fed will at some stage pivot that pivot may well be uh just going on to hold i think that's realistic i find it very difficult to think that the us fed can raise interest rates in the midst of a recession and that recession will be clear by january of next year it may even be clear in the next two months but it's certainly coming um and that's uh that's one's got to be realistic about that so i would suggest that sometime in 2023 there will be a turn in u.s monetary policy”

0.43

Over the next 6-12 months, investors should avoid exposure to equities and cryptocurrency because the Federal Reserve is in a tightening cycle and liquidity conditions are deteriorating, despite short-term stock market rallies driven by rate-cut expectations.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Michael Howell

“so my view is for the next six months keep out stay away same with crypto keep out stay away the fed will at some stage pivot that pivot may well be uh just going on to hold i think that's realistic”

0.29

The host attributes Austria to the wealthy northern European tier alongside Germany, Netherlands, Denmark; in the eurozone divergence pattern, Austria prospers with the north.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Michael Howell

“the rich north germany netherlands uh etc denmark probably austria get richer”