
The Offshore Global Dollar System | Jeff Snider
What this covers
This is a two-hour conversation in which Jeff Snider lays out his account of the eurodollar system for host Joeri Schasfoort, with Yuris Hosford also taking part. It starts with history. Snider says no monetary system has ever been fully constrained, because people invent workarounds, and he points to the ledger money Europeans devised during the bullion famine after the Black Death. He treats the eurodollar as the modern version of that pattern: a decentralized, bank-centered ledger that began in London in the mid-1950s. In his telling, it arose as an informal answer to Triffin's Paradox and the limits of Bretton Woods, and had taken over the reserve currency role well before the formal break with gold in 1971.
The middle of the conversation goes into mechanics. Snider covers maturity transformation and why frozen wholesale funding markets become crises, then repo), which he traces to the 1910s and 1920s. He describes how securities lending and repo chains let one bond be reused many times, so that collateral acts like a second currency. Counterparties care about the liquidity of collateral because they must be able to sell it if a borrower defaults. Hosford's account of being paid in dollars by sponsors around the world serves as a practical example of vehicle-currency use.
The contested material comes after that. Snider calls 2008 a global dollar shortage rather than a subprime crisis, and says banks' lasting risk aversion explains weak credit, the fall in labor force participation, and low interest rates, which he reads as a sign of scarcity rather than easy money. He argues that quantitative easing) did little, citing a study in which $600 billion of Treasury purchases cut ten-year yields by only 15 basis points. He also reads Greenspan's 2005 "conundrum" as a misjudgment of deflation risk, explains the 2020 dislocation through off-the-run Treasuries being refused as repo collateral, and ties Bitcoin's origins to post-2008 inelasticity. He admits that no unified textbook on the system exists.
Snider argues the eurodollar system, not central banks, is the true global reserve currency mechanism; understanding its bank-based credit creation, collateral dynamics, and elasticity constraints is essential to explaining monetary breakdowns, financial crises, and why conventional monetary policy tools fail.
- The eurodollar system operates as a decentralized, bank-centered ledger money system that intermediates global commerce and finance independent of central bank control
- Post-2008 banking risk aversion created a persistent credit contraction and monetary inelasticity that explains low growth, labor participation collapse, and the 2020 COVID dollar shortage
- Quantitative easing is ineffective because it responds to market-driven safe asset demand rather than creating it; collateral reuse and repo market dynamics matter far more than Fed asset purchases
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There has never been a completely constrained monetary system because humans always invent alternatives; even during the Great Bullion Famine after the Black Death, Europeans invented ledger money (writing debt on paper) to maintain commerce despite lack of physical silver.
“the very first Ledger system in history goes back to the 14th and 15th century when we had something called the Great bullion well we you and Europe had something called the Great bullion famine you know after the black death for various reasons there was a lack of silver coin throughout much of Europe and so in various you know various localities around Europe they started just writing it down on a piece of paper”
The eurodollar market originated in the mid-1950s as an offshore dollar-denominated banking system centered in London and other financial centers, predating the European common currency by many decades, and functions as a ledger-based system of bank liabilities rather than physical currency.
“at some point in the middle 1950s is sort of more formalized into a Marketplace centered in London some you know a lot of it in Switzerland as well as other places around the world where um we have this offshore currency Market you that began to transact in every way like a reserve currency except it wasn't it was except it wasn't US Dollars coming from the United States”
Repo is a collateralized short-term loan where one party exchanges cash for securities as collateral; it originated in the 1910s-1920s as a way to circumvent Fed rules against financing speculation and was formally structured as a 'repurchase agreement' despite being functionally identical to a secured loan.
“it's really just a collateralized loan it's not really it's a Clara loan and the only reason it's called the repurchase and thought of as a repurchase agreement because the Federal Reserve in the 19 teens with World War One the Fed was prevented from financing speculation so the FED decided Well We're not gonna we're not going to let commercial Banks use the discount window because that would be against the rules so instead we're going to pretend that we're going to buy a bond from the bank and then sell it back to the next day when really all that is is a collateralized loan”
Collateral became highly fungible in the eurodollar system through securities lending and repo chaining; a single bond can be borrowed, rehypothecated, and used as collateral multiple times through a chain of dealer and non-dealer financial institutions, creating a collateral multiplier effect.
“what's different now what the euro dollar took to The Next Step was in making collateral itself extremely fungible which means that um without getting too far down this rabbit hole which this is a whole other one um there are dealer Banks uh of this”
Monetary system participants used ledger money extensively by the early 20th century; physical hand-to-hand currency was not a huge part of commerce by the 1920s-1930s, so the common assumption that modern monetary systems are anomalous is incorrect—ledger money has deep historical roots.
“we move to a ledger money system not with the euro dollar in the middle 1950s but really at the end of the 19th century into the 20th if you've ever written a check um maybe people your age or younger probably haven't but people my age probably remember writing a check if you're writing a check you're using a ledger money system so this private Ledger money system goes all the way back to the earliest 20th century where it really hand-to-hand currency was not a huge part of Commerce really by the 1920s into the 1930s”
Maturity transformation—borrowing short-term to fund longer-term loans—is a core function of international banking that necessarily creates funding mismatches; when short-term wholesale markets freeze, banks lose the ability to rollover their short-term funding and face immediate crises if they cannot access central bank liquidity facilities.
“there's always a maturity mismatch so again we'll go back to our first example where you know we have a company a corporation that exists in Europe that wants to transact with Malaysia we'll use Malaysia so they need dollars to do that where do they get those dollars from well the company in Europe contacts its local bank the local bank probably doesn't have dollars but it knows a dealer who does so it's it's going to lend this Corporation these dollars that it borrows in short-term markets it's going to lend them at longer longer term maturity transformation”
Yuri's personal experience receiving dollar payments from sponsors around the world—regardless of their home currency—is direct proof that the dollar functions as a vehicle currency through the eurodollar system; this practical example shows how reserve currency function works in reality rather than in theory.
“that's what a reserve currency is um a lot of people especially in the United States tend to think of a reserve currency as oh we get to price oil in US Dollars that's not it at all Reserve currency is as I said this uh what was used to be called a vehicle currency as you are living proof of that vehicle currency because you're transacting you're intermediating through an intermediate currency”
The development of electronic communication (telegraph, later computers) reduced incentives to move physical currency, accelerating the shift to ledger-based systems and making efficient settlement possible at the speed of information rather than the speed of physical transport.
“it goes hand in hand with um Communications Technology Innovation the more that we can reliably communicate at vast speeds and process information which means computers and computers talking to each other the more transactions that we can we can process and settle faster and faster and faster as long as we're using this Ledger money system”
Repo market counterparties only care about the liquidity characteristics of collateral they receive because if the borrower defaults, they must be able to quickly sell the collateral to recover their cash.
“when it comes to Collateral repo the repo counterparty only cares about the liquidity characteristics of the cloud they're accepting I've lent you cash you've given me a security the only thing I care about is if you default tomorrow on that cache I have to be able to sell your security right”
Low interest rates are not evidence of monetary stimulus or loose money; instead, they indicate high demand for safe liquid instruments, which signals money and liquidity are in short supply; persistently low rates throughout the post-2008 period indicate persistent deflationary conditions and credit scarcity, not abundant money.
“when rates are low that means money is tight not loose it's not stimulus bond yields when the demand for safe liquid instruments is through the roof that means safety and liquidity are being prioritized because money and liquidity are in short supply what we saw in Japan in the 90s what we saw in the United States during the Great Depression Europe too interest rates go low and they stay low because this lack of money lack of credit creation produces a high level of demand for safe liquid instruments”
Cryptocurrency emergence, particularly Bitcoin's development after 2008, was not primarily about protecting wealth from dollar debasement but rather represented an attempt to create alternative money systems in response to eurodollar system inelasticity post-2008.
“it's not really about you know we need to store value to protect ourselves from the dollar that's about to be destroyed as you said you're it's creating more useful medium of exchange exchanges because the euro dollar system has been inelastic ever since 2007 because the pendulum swung in the absolute opposite direction where we had unconstrained money creation before 2007. now we have the banking system that almost refuses to create money”
After August 1971 and the end of the Bretton Woods gold standard, the eurodollar system had already assumed all the functions of the reserve currency system, making the formal end of gold backing a mere legal ratification of a transition that had already occurred.
“by the time we got to August of 1971 the euro dollar had already taken over all of the roles from Bretton Woods long before that I mean you had the two-tier Gold Exchange you had the London Gold pulled all the way back in 1961 so Bretton Woods had come apart as the euro dollar came of age”
The problem of finding equilibrium between monetary constraint and elasticity is fundamentally human and recurring: societies always swing between over-constraint and over-elasticity rather than achieving sustainable balance.
“that's that's really the issue we've never been able to solve this boom bust cycle which is really there's something innately human about it because as I said there's there's always the desire to create more money for whatever purposes and then we always convince ourselves that as we're doing more and more risky things without created money that nothing can possibly go wrong”
A completely unconstrained monetary system historically leads to confirmation bias and recency bias in banking behavior: once money creation causes no immediate problems, banks continue creating more money, eventually focusing on creating money for its own sake rather than for legitimate intermediation, leading to asset bubbles and systemic crises.
“once you allow uh you get confirmation bias you got recency bias to creep in the bank system okay will create a little bit more money and then we'll recreate a little bit more money nothing bad has happened so Lord create a little bit more money and then a little bit more money before you know it the entire focus of the system goes off of intermediating global global financial needs into just let's create money to create money let's create money so that we can create our own customers”
Elasticity in the eurodollar system refers to the ability of the monetary system to match the supply of money and credit with dynamic demand from a growing global economy, allowing expansion when legitimate demand for trade and investment financing rises while contracting when conditions deteriorate.
“when you say elasticity what do you mean with that exactly because demand for money and supply of money are Dynamic right this is the age-old problem in any monetary system how do you most efficiently match the supply of money with the demand for it and that gets into a whole bunch of sticky conversations right what is legitimate demand how much is speculative demand and things like that but either way we live in a dynamic World especially in this globalized economy of the latter half of the 20th century into the 21st century where you have to have this Reserve currency available for this growing globalized economy so you have to have enough money to meet the needs of all of the places around the world that need the reserve currency in order to grow their you know grow their prosperous societies so elasticity is this system being able to meet the monetary as well as credit needs of this growing uh globalized economy”
A fundamental distinction exists between understanding how something works technically and understanding why it matters macroeconomically; many people can describe money supply mechanics but cannot explain how these mechanics impact actual economic outcomes like employment, investment, and growth.
“hey Jeff and okay so I think you know this this is the the technical description right which is extremely important as economists to understand but one thing that does come to my mind is why does this all matter because it could also be like that you know fintech they use uh digital technology or uh right or maybe they're moving to a decentralized ledger like as an economist I could ask just to play The Devil's Advocate a little bit who cares right like how they do it technically uh who cares why does this matter for and I think I'm especially curious about for macroeconomists”
No comprehensive textbook or unified theory currently exists that explains the complete eurodollar system; understanding requires reverse-engineering through market signals, observing effects of monetary system stress, and synthesizing information from disparate academic sources.
“there's not like you can read a textbook there's no book out there that you can go to and flip through and say I understand the euro dollar system it's really digging through this primary source material and trying to put all these pieces together um IU that's why I use the analogy my logo is a black hole because this euro dollar system we can't observe what's going on in the banking system because they don't want us to observe it to begin with but it's unregulated it's on monitored and so we have to try to reverse engineer what's going on in the monetary system by how all of these things are affected by it”
The 2008 financial crisis was primarily a global dollar shortage caused by banks' recognition of risks in the eurodollar system and subsequent unwillingness to continue intermediating, not a subprime mortgage crisis; the crisis triggered persistent banking risk aversion that has constrained credit creation for 15 years.
“it was a global dollar shortage that was caused by the Banks operating the system realizing that there really were lots of risks involved in all this money creation and lack of intermediation and so once the horses are out of the barn you can't put this thing back together again so the banks no longer want to take the risks required to create money and credit that the globe needs”
Bretton Woods was designed by officials who did not foresee a globalized economy and the massive elasticity requirements it would create; the eurodollar system emerged in the 1950s as an informal, decentralized solution to Triffin's Paradox—the recognition that the gold standard could not simultaneously provide adequate global liquidity and maintain gold convertibility.
“you go back to the late Bretton Woods era something called triffin's Paradox where Robert triffin realized that the the real problem with Bretton Woods was that John Maynard Keynes talked about it with bancorps at the Bretton Woods conference Harry Dexter white to a certain extent but either way the designers of the Bretton Woods system really didn't foresee a globalized economy and the amount of money and elasticity that would be required for this globalization to take place where the euro dollar came in in the late in the middle 1950s was sort of a backdoor uh backdoor a way to solve what was called triffin's Paradox because it could respond it could be it could be elastic based on the actual needs of the system as it developed”
Governments historically have a monopoly on money, but this has never been true in practice; private money has existed throughout history, and the eurodollar is the modern incarnation of this long-standing pattern where private actors create money when official systems become too constrained.
“we're taught that governments have a monopoly on money when that's never really been true in fact there's all sorts of all kinds of forms of private money all throughout the all throughout the ages”
Labor force participation collapsed after 2008 and has not recovered because of lack of money and credit available for business investment and hiring, not because workers are lazy or drug-addicted; this is a symptom of deflationary monetary conditions, consistent with the pattern from Japan in the 1990s and the Great Depression.
“the labor market problems that we're seeing are consistent with the lack of money and deflation as we've seen time and time again this is why we look at the post-crisis era in the United States or Europe or really anywhere around the world including China Asia Emerging Markets you see the lack of Labor participation which is a symptom of deflationary Japan in the 1990s the Great Depression”
Quantitative easing studies, including those produced by central banks themselves, show negligible effects on interest rates; one major study found 600 billion in Treasury purchases reduced 10-year yields by only 15 basis points, which is 'a rounding error' and not statistically significant.
“there was a recent one from last year um I think a professor from University of California the widely cited study that showed that 600 billion in U.S treasury purchases in the United States is equivalent to 15 basis points on the 10-year treasury yield that's no effect that's nothing”
Alan Greenspan's 2005 'conundrum' was not actually a conundrum but evidence of his theoretical error: he raised short-term rates and expected long-term rates to follow, but they fell instead because market participants correctly identified deflation risk while Greenspan focused on inflation risk.
“what he was thinking is if I raise the short-term rate which was at the time just nothing more than the fact fund's Target again this perception is really simple and easy all they had was a Fed funds Target and yet that was supposed to control everything the short term the Greenspan is thinking I raised the FED funds Target by one percent for example why wouldn't the 10-year treasury yield also go up by one percent”
Foreign reserve managers hold primarily off-the-run treasuries, which lack deep liquidity; when many tried to sell off-the-run treasuries simultaneously, repo dealers rejected them as collateral due to poor liquidity, forcing dealers to warehouse the securities without repo funding, causing massive price dislocations.
“most Reserve managers have are off the Run treasure off the Run treasuries are treasuries that have been issued in the past there's not really a liquid Market available to them if you want to sell an off the Run treasury you can find a dealer that'll likely sell the treasury for you at a decent price but there isn't a really liquid Market when we talk about the treasury market being deep in liquid what we're really talking about are on the Run treasury”
Central banks should be genuine stewards of the monetary system by understanding it, monitoring it, and influencing it appropriately; instead, they are currently detached from actual monetary mechanics and their policy tools are largely ineffective because they operate in the wrong market segments.
“what the FED needs to do is more of what yori's talking about with these people he follows it needs to go back to its roots it needs to understand the monetary system which is its job see that's the part that really bothers me the most is the fed's job all along and what they told the public was that they were the monetary stewards when that was not the case they had no idea what's going on in the monetary system so to fix this problem and I would prefer the FED not do this but I can understand people want a public utility that is supposed to be that's supposed to operate Like Walter badgett said in the old old sense of a central bank so they need to go back to their Roots if we're going to have a central bank let's have it actually be a central bank that understands the monetary system actually monitors it and and we're able can affect some useful helpful influence over it”
Bill Dudley's 2008 statement that the four-week Treasury bill rate being well below the Fed Funds target was 'no big deal' when collateral was clearly in shortage demonstrates that even senior Fed officials didn't understand the collateral system mechanics.
“there's a quote from 2008 Bill Dudley who talked about the you could see that there was a collateral shortage in the in the weeks before Lehman failed because again the four-week treasury bill rate was well below the Federal fund's target and Bill Dudley said nah this this is no big deal everything's fine when everything wasn't fine”
The Fed buys bonds that the market is already fleeing toward in response to deflationary shock, not adding a buyer to an otherwise unwilling market; therefore QE does not lower rates but rather piggybacks on market-driven rate declines that are already underway, making the Fed's role reactive rather than causal.
“they're not adding an extra buyer to a market that doesn't have them they're adding to a market that is buying more and more treasuries anyway which is why you find very little effect from quantitative easing on interest rates because interest rates are already falling before the FED starts buying them”
In the midst of a deflationary shock like March 2020, uncertainty about future risks causes dollar providers and lenders to drastically reduce funding availability, with uncertainty itself being the primary driver of monetary contraction rather than changes in official policy.
“as a dollar provider you would quite naturally say I'm going to yank all my funding Mecha all my funding transactions and everything back as I possibly can because I don't know what the risks are and there's nothing more nothing that kills dollar providing more than uncertainty because you put that into any kind of quantitative Model A high level of uncertainty generates a ton of expected losses so uncertainty kills monetary resources faster than anything”
Looking at bank balance sheets worldwide shows they have contracted over the last 15 years despite the Fed's balance sheet expanding, indicating monetary contraction in the real system of money creation.
“people have the wrong idea about what the monetary system has been doing for the last 15 years they see the fed's balance sheet explode and think there's too much money in the world they don't look at the bank balance sheets around the world and see they've contracted over the last 15 years and really the fed's QE is a response to that monetary contraction”
Central banks fundamentally misunderstand the repo market and collateral system; they are only now catching up to understanding issues that were understood in the 1970s, while the system has evolved much further with derivatives and other instruments making collateral dynamics even more complex.
“the repo Mark that's not a new development the repo Market was became a huge important innovation of money market funds in the development of wholesale markets repo was a huge part of the system by the 1980s into the 1990s in fact if you wanna if you really want to if you've forced me to describe the 2008 crisis in a single word I would say collateral it was repo it was a collateral shortage so that's already 15 years ago and here we have policy makers just now starting to catch up on the fact that hey there's a safe asset shortage and they still have don't realize the full range of implications of it”
Central banks have repeatedly deployed quantitative easing despite its documented failure in Japan; six QE programs in the US, multiple programs in Europe and Japan (26+), indicate either misunderstanding or desperation—in a scientific discipline, repeated failure would prompt reconsideration of the approach itself.
“they never should have done QE in 2008 2009 to begin with because they already knew it didn't work in Japan they knew it didn't work in Japan and they also knew why it didn't work in Japan why did they do QE anyway because they didn't know what else to do which was the real reason why they did it in Japan in the first place so they realized everything that went wrong in Japan and said if we get in that situation maybe we'll do it better but they didn't do it any better they did the same exact stuff that had that happened in Japan and they got the same results as the Japanese and what do they do in response to that we'll do more QE they just keep doing one QE after another after another after another the qes Never End I mean Japan's on their 26th qqe has been ongoing for almost a decade in the United States how many qes have we done we're up to six”
Bond yields behave independently of central bank policy; the Federal Reserve influences the front end of the yield curve (short-term rates) but not the back end (long-term rates), which are determined by market expectations about future growth and inflation that operate independently of Fed actions.
“bond yields and behave independently which just explains why we have an inverted yield curve right now essentially say they behave independently what does that mean essentially we're taught to believe that the Federal Reserve or whatever Central Bank controls the front end of the yield curve and that's true to a certain extent yes High degree of influence at the front end of the yield curve”
Banks, when operating under risk-averse conditions after the 2008 crisis, transformed their internal processes to require lawyers, risk committees, and multiple layers of management approval for lending decisions, whereas pre-2007 banks would approve exotic transactions with minimal oversight if they made money.
“if you had some crazy idea to service a customer before 2007 you almost didn't need management approval you go to your you know you work on whatever exotic desk at whatever Bank you just go to your manager and say I'm going to make the bank and the customer money they'd say go ahead and do it nowadays you got to go through lawyers got to go through risk committees you got to go through layers of management that didn't exist before banks have become risk averse for good reason”
The Federal Reserve operates as a 'Market of Last Resort' rather than a traditional 'Lender of Last Resort' in the Walter Bagehot sense; it comes in after crises to clean up market dysfunction rather than preventing dysfunction by providing liquidity before stress occurs.
“the FED they admit this they they say the Federal Reserve is not a Central Bank in the old Walter budget model of lender of Last Resort they're now the what they call Market of Last Resort which is entirely different what you're saying is there's a huge problem that happens and then at the end of it we try to clean it up”
Negative swap spreads in financial markets have persisted despite theories predicting they should not exist, indicating that bonds are functioning as a preferred collateral medium beyond the predictions of formal economic models.
“so especially in the last 15 years you see that interest rates are not dependent on that front rate that's where you inverted yield curves come from it's where negative swap spreads come from”
The Fed's March 2023 quantitative easing and treasury purchases did not solve the March 2020 crisis; instead, the Treasury Department issuing more treasury bills (on-the-run collateral) was more effective because it provided collateral that dealers could actually use in repo markets to solve the collateral shortage.
“the buying of the treasuries didn't fix anything because when the FED announced QE which was March 15th it was on a Sunday night if you remember we had all sorts of massive illiquidity the next day in the rest of the week”
The biggest misconception about post-2008 policy is that quantitative easing solved the problem; central bankers and mainstream observers believe QE fixed the world, but reality is the opposite: the eurodollar system is broken and QE is a reactive response to banking system contraction, not a solution to it.
“I think that's one of the biggest misconceptions that people have in this real it's understandable why that is because everything you see on TV all you hear from Central bankers and politicians is that QE fixed the world um we had a financial problem in 2007 2008 with too many subprime mortgages Ben Bernanke came in with QE and everything's fine again and everybody has largely believed that's the case and really the most of the critics of the FED fall on the other side where they think the FED has done too much they printed way too much money and that's where you know uh the cryptocurrency The Craze the bubbles and cryptocurrencies can't come from when in fact the truth is the exact opposite”
Central banks replacing treasuries with bank reserves through QE is actively harmful because treasuries are useful collateral in repo and derivatives markets (with rehypothecation and reuse), while bank reserves are 'useless and inert'; QE removes collateral from the system and gives back reserves, worsening collateral shortages.
“they're taking a safe asset that's usable as collateral and repo and derivatives that's necessary in collateral repo and derivatives and giving them a useless bank reserve and it's actually harmful they're actually causing a bigger problem”
The yield curve is currently inverted by nearly 200 basis points in the eurodollar futures market (tracking 3-month Libor), signaling market expectations for future interest rate declines and suggesting central banks will eventually have to return to zero rates and more quantitative easing.
“I look at the euro dollar Futures curve which is obviously tied to three months Libor so that's a bet on your short-term rates are going it's inverted almost 200 basis points which is that's basically saying the yield curve is looking at probabilities where interest rates we're gonna in the next couple years it wouldn't be at all surprising if we're at zero percent interest rates and more qes”
The eurodollar system functions as the de facto global reserve currency, not primarily through pricing commodities in dollars, but by serving as a vehicle currency that allows parties in different jurisdictions to transact in a common medium, enabling international investment, trade, and capital flows without requiring bilateral currency exchange.
“it's not just a market for US dollars in London it is the functional means by which all the all the all the necessary requirements of a global Reserve currency are done”
The eurodollar system expanded massively because removing the need for physical currency settlement and reliance on Federal Reserve reserves gave banks 'essentially free reign' to create increasingly complex transactions, enabling exponential growth in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the offshore dollar market.
“once you've removed your remove the need to transact in physical hand-to-hand cash cash or even Bank Reserves from the Federal Reserve you've given Banks essentially free reign to come up with all different kinds of transactions because that's what it really is”