What this covers

Edmund Phelps and Russ Roberts conduct a wide-ranging conversation about labor markets, unemployment, and the intellectual history of macroeconomics over the past century. Phelps, a Nobel laureate, traces how his early work in the 1960s attempted to provide microfoundations for Keynesian theory while introducing imperfect information and realistic expectations about the future. The discussion weaves together his major contributions—the role of wage-setting above market-clearing levels to reduce shirking and turnover, the persistent presence of involuntary unemployment even in equilibrium, and the critique of rational expectations models that assume agents possess knowledge they could not possibly have.

The conversation covers distinct intellectual territory. Phelps situates his work against the Austrian School, Keynes, and the Lucas-Sargent-Prescott rational-expectations tradition, arguing that modern macroeconomics must abandon the fiction of perfect foresight and instead embrace Knightian uncertainty and dispersed knowledge. He contends that aggregate-demand-only frameworks miss crucial structural forces—sector-specific shocks, real exchange rates, financial-sector evolution—that shift the natural rate of unemployment itself. The conversation also turns philosophical, defending entrepreneurial capitalism not on grounds of wealth creation but on the human satisfactions of dynamic, challenging work: engagement, novelty, intellectual growth. Toward the end, Phelps reflects on how macroeconomics advances not steadily but as a "roller coaster" of competing models and reappraisals, and on the responsibility of economists to avoid empty slogans and contribute genuine theoretical insight to policy debates.

Sharpest takeaway

Phelps argues that modern macroeconomics must abandon the assumption of perfect foresight/rational expectations and embrace Knightian uncertainty, imperfect dispersed knowledge, and structural (non-aggregate) forces, which together explain involuntary unemployment and the failure of simple Keynesian models.

  • Firms rationally set wages above market-clearing to reduce shirking and turnover, generating equilibrium involuntary unemployment
  • Agents lack knowledge of both the future and the present, so they can be collectively fooled and pushed out of equilibrium
  • Aggregate-demand-only models miss structural shocks (e.g., exchange rates, sector-specific collapses like construction) that move the natural rate itself

The claims · ranked26 claims · weighted by value

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0.87

The justification for entrepreneurial capitalism should rest not on wealth accumulation (since wealthy comfortable European economies lack American dynamism yet are rich) but on the 'good life'—the excitement, engagement, adventure, novelty, intellectual development and personal growth that challenging, dynamic work provides, drawing on Aristotle, Hume, Bergson, William James, and Dewey.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Edmund Phelps

“I thought that it was important to celebrate the excitement the engagement the adventure that this system offered and I thought this was a new way of defending capitalism”

0.86

Companies have a self-interest in setting wages above the market-clearing level—to reduce quit rates, deter shirking and theft, give employees something to lose, and economize on turnover costs—and this incentive produces involuntary unemployment as a feature of equilibrium itself.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Edmund Phelps

“companies have an incentive to set their wages above the market clearing level for their own self-interests”

0.86

Phelps's 1960s work was not anti-Keynesian but an attempt to provide microfoundations for Keynesian economics—showing how a demand increase could elevate output and employment for a prolonged period rather than just momentarily—yet it implied that monetary authorities cannot permanently sustain elevated employment by pouring in money, because people eventually anticipate the resulting wage and price increases.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Edmund Phelps

“I was trying to provide a micro economic foundation for the basic ideas of Keynesian economics”

0.81

Uncertainty is not only about the future but about the present: in a modern economy knowledge is dispersed geographically and across the minds of millions of people, so everyone is 'in the dark a little bit all the time' about what is happening right now, unlike a medieval economy where you knew everyone you traded with.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Edmund Phelps

“it's dispersed among geographically and and physically among the minds of the people and your well everybody's in the dark a little bit all the time”

0.78

There are no simply 'good' and 'bad' models; the macroeconomist must carry a large repertory of models (Austrian, Keynesian, Marshallian, Lucas-Sargent-Prescott, and one's own) because no single model can handle macroeconomics—unlike microeconomics where the Marshallian model alone might suffice for a whole career studying the price of peas.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Edmund Phelps

“I never saw a model I didn't like I don't believe in good models and bad models”

0.78

Because outside observers lack perfect knowledge of why demand fell, comparative-statics thought experiments are deeply problematic: there is always 'one more step in the argument we leave out,' since something must have changed and that underlying cause—rarely truly random—shapes the result and limits our ability to predict.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Russ Roberts

“since we as the outside observers don't know why we don't have perfect knowledge we don't know why Demyan fell it's really hard to do comparative statics”

0.77

Samuelson's formalization of economic theory clarified and broadened it but abstracted away from the distinctive features of the modern economy—endemic uncertainty, ambiguity, diversity of beliefs, and dispersed specialized knowledge—and therefore could not endogenize phenomena like innovation waves, business swings, and disequilibria.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“it abstract it from the distinctive character of the modern economy the endemic uncertainty ambiguity diversity of beliefs specialization of knowledge and problem-solving as a result it could not capture or endogenous the observable phenomena that are endemic to the modern economy”

0.77

American Keynesianism differed profoundly from Keynes himself because Americans removed the uncertainty and lack of knowledge from his theory—replacing his subjective 'marginal efficiency of capital' with something more tractable—making the math easier and more beautiful but losing what was essential in Keynes.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“the American Keynesianism which which differed profoundly from Keynes because the Americans took the uncertainty out it's a lack of knowledge out”

0.75

By the end of the 1980s the world no longer looked Keynesian: European unemployment of ~15% in the mid-1980s persisted without the deflation or disinflation the Keynes-Phillips model predicted, demonstrating that the Phillips curve forecast (falling/slower-rising money wages at high unemployment) failed and that a structuralist explanation was needed.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“there had been a tremendous depression in Europe with unemployment rates of like 15 percent in the middle of the 1980s and and and they just hung that way they hung up there and there was no deflation or disinflation”

0.73

If firms do not realize that competing firms are also raising wages, they can all be collectively fooled: wages will be set lower than they would be with full information, employment will be lower than otherwise, and when information eventually reveals the error, wages and prices will accelerate, producing clear inflation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“if each firm doesn't realize that the others are raising their wages too then they can they can all get fooled”

0.73

The macroeconomically interesting form of unemployment arises not from individual frictional job search in a stochastic equilibrium, but from macro shocks (e.g., an obscure monetary development, or a housing/construction collapse) that are not quickly identified and catch an entire industry with the wrong expectations—wrong probability distributions in their minds.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“I'm interested in the story in which something happens to cause the whole industry to be off to be to have to get it wrong”

0.73

Real (non-monetary) variables—wealth, real interest rates, and real exchange rates—impact the natural rate of unemployment itself; in particular a real exchange-rate depreciation acts like a tariff that better protects domestic firms, letting them raise markups so prices rise relative to wages, leaving the new equilibrium with employment lower than before rather than restored.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“things like wealth real interest rates and real exchange rates variables that you would have had in a non monetary model not any money at all those variables are very those they impact on the natural unemployment rate itself”

0.71

Unsold inventory in a grocery store or unsold cars on a dealer lot are not signs of disequilibrium requiring price cuts; they are precautionary stocks held because future demand is stochastic and disappointing a customer is costly—an equilibrium phenomenon rather than market failure.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“inventories are there because future demand is uncertain disappointing a customer is really to be avoided and so we don't expect those markets to clear in the textbook way”

0.71

Every big crisis arrives out of the blue and each one differs in important ways from the others as the world changes; the present slump differs more from ordinary postwar recessions than from the 1930s Depression, and is shaped by an enormously evolved financial sector and a globalized economy where the US now produces only about a quarter rather than nearly half of world output—so everything must be rethought rather than analyzed with past models.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“each one is in important ways quite different than the others the world has changed quite a bit”

0.71

An economy with built-in dynamism is desirable not only for the good life but because it produces high employment, which yields broad social benefits: people taking care of themselves rather than being a public burden, and children growing up with parents who are role models pursuing careers and personal development.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“it's good for employment and high employment is good you want people out there taking care of themselves earning their own way in life not being a burden on the public trough”

0.68

When Phelps began modeling unemployment in 1966 he deliberately refused to impute to people perfect foresight or knowledge of the future consequences of their decisions, choosing a more realistic 'modernist' approach in the tradition of Knight, Hayek, and Keynes who treated the future as essentially uncertain.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“I simply wasn't willing to impute to people a knowledge of of the consequences of their present decisions for the future”

0.68

When the housing market collapses and construction workers become unemployed, even if price and wage adjustment eventually restores aggregate activity, it takes a long time for displaced workers to be reallocated—'round pegs to find round holes'—because shocks are sector-specific and the structure of demand matters, not just aggregates.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“it's going to take a while for round pegs to find round holes and square pegs to find square holes”

0.63

Macroeconomics has progressed not as a steady accumulation but as a roller coaster of discovery, reappraisal, and fights—yet there is genuine cumulative knowledge because the field now possesses a far richer repertory of models and has decisively rejected some ideas, notably rational expectations, which Phelps regards as a known casualty.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Edmund Phelps

“it's been a macroeconomics has been a roller coaster of of discovery and reappraisal and fight”

0.63

Contrary to Robert Reich's claim that most Americans hate their jobs, survey data on job satisfaction show that the large majority of US workers report being highly or fairly satisfied, because people value being 'in the thick of things,' challenged, and involved in aspirational companies.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Edmund Phelps

“if you look at data on job satisfaction and you look at people's responses to weather there they are really quite satisfied with their jobs or are fairly satisfied by far United States by far the majority are highly satisfied or fairly satisfied”

0.57

Dynamism and engagement 'trickle down' culturally: in a highly entrepreneurial, venturesome society even waitresses and waiters show more hustle and take more interest in performing well, because aspiration becomes the prevailing culture worth retaining and celebrating.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“in a highly entrepreneurial highly venturesome society even the waitresses and the waiters show more hustle and I'm more interested in performing well”

0.52

Much of what economists do is ex post storytelling rather than prediction, but economists tell better economic stories than economic historians—who understand history but not economics as well—and society needs economists gifted with theoretical insight and imagination involved in policy, or it will be the poorer for it.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Edmund Phelps

“I think economists tell better stories and economic historians do”

0.49

Many public intellectuals identified as economists are using empty slogans (e.g., 'Keynesian' meaning different things week to week—a proactive stance, or merely a preference for a big public sector) and doing real harm to the quality of economic discourse; some may not even have read Keynes's General Theory.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Edmund Phelps

“I think a lot of these public intellectuals are doing a lot of harm to the quality of the discourse”

0.44

Keynes's most important insight was not his macroeconomic theory but his analysis in 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace' of the Treaty of Versailles; had those insights been taken seriously the world would be considerably better off.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“his most important insight of course wasn't listened to which was economic consequences of the peace”

0.26

There has never been a society in human history like the present-day United States in which so large a proportion of people can use their creativity in exuberant, psychologically satisfying ways—though it remains only a fraction of the entire workforce.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Russ Roberts

“there's never been a time where creative people could use their creativity in extraordinarily exuberant and satisfying ways”

0.26

Friedman's strength and weakness was that he oversimplified a lot.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Edmund Phelps

“he oversimplified in lots of ways that I didn't like his strength and his weakness was that he over simplified a lot”

0.18

Robert Lucas is a very smart, deep, thoughtful theorist, but Phelps did not learn a great deal from him.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Edmund Phelps

“Robert Lucas is a very smart man and a very deep and thoughtful theorist and I didn't learn too great deal from him”