
Central Bankers Have Difficult Road to Walk, Says Summers
What this covers
This is a ten-minute Bloomberg Television conversation in which David Westin interviews Larry Summers and Roger Ferguson, then head of TIAA, about what central bankers face in the coming decade. Summers supplies the diagnosis: the private sector generates much less underlying energy than it used to, and growth has been sustained only by rising debt-to-GDP ratios and extraordinary monetary policy. Ferguson largely agrees but spends more time on policy design and on what investors should do about it.
The range is wider than the central argument. Summers offers a causal story of longer lifespans, high-saving households, and ever-cheaper capital goods pushing money into existing assets and producing asset price inflation without real investment. He also claims that without government debt accumulation the neutral real interest rate would have fallen 4-7 points rather than 2-3. He compares the condition to Japan and calls it a "monetary black hole," though Ferguson cites Japan to argue that how stimulus is deployed matters more than its size. The moderator brings in Janet Yellen's agreement with the structural thesis and the question of whether Trump's roughly $1.5 trillion of mostly tax-cut stimulus worked.
The most contested material concerns what comes next. Summers argues that a typical 5-point rate cut is unavailable with rates below 2%, and that quantitative easing) is unlikely to add another 3 points. He treats Ben Bernanke's AEA argument that monetary policy can handle the next crisis as a possible "last hurrah for central bankers." He proposes semi-automatic fiscal stabilizers, while Ferguson doubts legislatures will give up discretion. Ferguson says the last recovery leaned too heavily on central banks, that the next response must be both fiscal and monetary, and that policymakers should "let it rip." The closing minutes turn to investing, urging differentiation across asset classes and between the US and emerging markets.
Summers and Ferguson argue that secular stagnation—a structural decline in private sector economic energy—requires fundamental shifts from monetary policy dominance to coordinated fiscal-monetary responses, including automatic stabilizers, because traditional monetary tools are exhausted.
- Despite unprecedented monetary stimulus (low rates, QE, credit growth), growth and inflation have remained subdued, suggesting underlying demand deficiency rather than temporary shock
- The neutral real interest rate has been artificially propped up by government debt accumulation; without it, rates would have fallen 4-7 percentage points, indicating deep structural weakness
- Central banks have limited ammunition for the next recession (rates already near zero, QE effectiveness questionable), making automatic fiscal stabilizers and direct spending necessary complements
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People living longer, money flowing to savers with high savings rates, and capital goods becoming cheaper (as exemplified by a smartphone costing $500 with 100x the computing power of the entire Apollo project) collectively cause money to slosh into existing assets rather than productive investment, leading to asset price inflation without real economic growth.
“there's a fundamental structural challenge around the fact that people are living longer more the money is going to people who have high savings rates and at the same time as you see with my cell phone that costs five hundred dollars it has a hundred times as much computing power as the whole Apollo project capital goods are getting cheaper and cheaper and so the money sloshes into existing assets leading to asset price inflation but with limited economic energy”
The issue is not primarily the magnitude of fiscal stimulus, but rather how that stimulus is deployed; Japan's example proves this, as massive fiscal stimulus has not prevented Japan from experiencing two decades of very slow growth and borderline deflation.
“how the fiscal stimulus is used is really important case example is Japan huge amount of fiscal stimulus yet they still have been they are well into their second decade of very very slow growth and borderline dis inflation or deflation”
If governments had not run up national debt globally, the neutral real interest rate would have declined by 4-7 percentage points rather than the observed 2-3 percentage points, revealing a much deeper structural challenge in the economy than official rates suggest.
“people say that the so-called to the we neutral in restraint has declined by two or three percentage points what I've been able to show in some recent research is that if we hadn't been running up the national debt globally that probably that real not neutral interest rate would have declined by four or five or six or seven even percentage points”
Secular stagnation suggests much more profound trade-offs between rapid economic growth and financial stability and fiscal prudence than previously thought, raising complex questions for macroeconomic policy.
“secular stagnation isn't good news it suggests much more profound trade-offs between rapid economic growth and financial stability and fiscal prudence than we thought we had and raises all kinds of questions for macroeconomic policy going forward”
Fiscal stimulus, not just monetary policy, must be a core component of counter-cyclical policy, and in particular direct government spending on items like infrastructure (which is decaying in developed countries) is appropriate and necessary.
“I think we're gonna have to rely on putting money in people's pockets on direct government spending I think that's okay in a country where public investment infrastructure are decaying so bad so badly but I think that's where we're gonna have to look for our counter cyclical energy”
The central question for macroeconomic policy is whether conventional monetary policy and quantitative easing will be sufficient tools in the next recession, which both current and former central bankers are worried about.
“when you look at the debate that's going on the question is is that enough and will that be sufficient the next time around and I think that's really a question that we former and current central bankers are worried about”
Automatic fiscal stabilizers are unlikely to be politically feasible, as it is very difficult to get Congress or legislatures to voluntarily relinquish control over fiscal tools by pre-committing to automatic rules rather than maintaining discretionary authority.
“my theory and I think Larry wouldn't disagree is they're probably not realistic it's gonna be very hard to get any legislature to get our Congress to say we are now going to take our hands off the fiscal tools and let it work in some automatic fashion that's that's not the way politics work”
Former Fed chair Janet Yellen agreed with Larry Summers' secular stagnation thesis that structural factors had been boosting desired saving and depressing desired investment in most developed countries before the financial crisis, causing real rates of interest to trend down.
“this week former Fed chair Janet Yellen agreed with Larry I agree with Larry's secular stagnation thesis that well before the financial crisis structural factors had been boosting desired saving and depressing desired investment in most developed countries causing real rates of interest to trend down”
One key factor that has kept interest rates low is that inflation has been persistently below expectations, allowing central banks to remain highly accommodative and continue driving rates down without hitting their inflation target.
“what we haven't talked very much about is one of the things that's kept rates so low as inflation and so inflation for a variety of reasons has been a no-show which is allowed central banks to continue to be you know very very accommodative and to drive down interest rates”
Despite bigger deficits, lower interest rates, more credit growth, and higher asset prices than expected since 2013, actual economic growth and inflation have remained lower than expected, demonstrating that unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus has failed to generate commensurate real economic energy.
“what's happened relative to the time when I put forth that secular stagnation hypothesis in 2013 is we've had bigger deficits than people thought we've had lower interest rates than people expected we've had more credit growth and higher asset prices than people expected so the accelerators been on the floor but the car hasn't gone very fast we've had lower growth and lower inflation than people expected”
The underlying energy that the private sector generates is much less than it used to be, and we have only been able to stimulate growth by running up debt-to-GDP ratios and deploying extraordinary monetary policies at low interest rates, raising questions about sustainability.
“what that suggests is that the underlying energy that the private sector generates is much less than it used to be that we've been able to give some energy but only by having rising debt to GDP ratios only by having quite extraordinary monetary policies and low interest rates and there's a question how long that lasts and there's also a question of what the long-run side effects of that are”
The condition of secular stagnation is analogous to Japan's predicament or could even be called a 'monetary black hole'—a trap where monetary policy becomes increasingly impotent despite repeated efforts.
“it's a little bit like the plight of Japan or some you might even call it a monetary black hole”
Summers, along with others, raised the concept of semi-automatic stabilizers at the AEA (American Economic Association) conference in San Diego as a realistic alternative to relying solely on monetary policy for counter-cyclical support.
“Laurie this is something was the topic of discussion out the AEA that conference that you attended in San Diego one of the things that you raised I believe others have raised as well are something called semi automatic stabilizers basically as I understand an automatic fiscal injection when certain things turn south is that a realistic alternative”
Rather than relying on Congress to organize itself to enact counter-cyclical policies each time a recession occurs, governments should implement semi-automatic fiscal stabilizers—rules that lock in predetermined changes in spending, state assistance, unemployment benefits, infrastructure investments, or temporary tax credits based on economic conditions.
“what Olivia blonde chard and I were talking about when we discussed semi automatic stabilizers was the idea that a lot rather than relying on Congress to organize itself to act each time there's an economic downturn we should do more with rules that would lock in changes in spending perhaps greater assistance to States perhaps more assistance for people who are unemployed perhaps working off a backlog of infrastructure investments perhaps giving temporary tax credits for those who spend”
The last recovery was excessively dependent on central bank stimulus, and in the US while some fiscal stimulus occurred, retrospective analysis suggests it should have been larger and sustained longer, while in Europe the problem was that central banks were asked to do too much without fiscal support.
“the journalists consensus and I share it is that the last recovery depended much too heavily on central banks even here in the US while we had some fiscal stimulus in hindsight a lot of folks think maybe should have done more and kept it going certainly if one looks in Europe clearly the you know we'd say central banks are asked to do too much”
President Trump's 1.5 trillion dollar fiscal stimulus, consisting largely of tax cuts, did not solve slow growth, suggesting that the composition and design of fiscal stimulus matters—tax cuts may be less effective than direct spending or infrastructure investment.
“President Trump had a huge fiscal stimulus right 1.5 trillion dollars only that in tax cuts and that doesn't seem to fix the problem”
Central banks have kept growth running but essentially ran up the credit card—they succeeded in maintaining nominal growth through credit expansion but did not address the underlying structural problem of declining private sector energy.
“basically I think Hitler is saying we've kept it growing but basically running up the credit card”
In recession, central banks typically cut interest rates by approximately 5 percentage points, but current interest rates are below 2%, making it impossible to achieve another 5 percentage point cut, and quantitative easing is unlikely to be worth another 3 percentage points of effective rate reduction, leaving the next recession without adequate monetary ammunition.
“given that in recessions we usually cut interest rates by five percentage points and interest rates today or below two percent and I just don't believe that quantitative easing and that stuff is worth anything like another three percentage points”
Policy response to the next recession will need to be both monetary and fiscal (not either/or); monetary policy will need to continue aggressive accommodation while fiscal policy must be more quick, aggressive, and better-designed than it was during the last recovery.
“we have to be careful about making and either/or this is gonna be both an whenever there's another recession monetary policy is going to have to continue to be aggressive I hope stopping before negative rate which we saw in Europe and we will have to have learned the lesson from the last time around which is fiscal policy is gonna have to come in more quickly more aggressively”
During the last recovery, the US was more hamstrung in fiscal policy than policymakers would have preferred, suggesting that in the next recession, policymakers must be willing to 'let it rip' on fiscal policy to fully deploy this tool.
“the last time we confronted this in the u.s. I think we're a little bit more hamstrung in fiscal policy than we wanted to be and so we're gonna have to have a better sense of without being overly dramatic we're gonna have to let it rip sort of people and fiscal policy because indeed monetary policy would do it it can but Larry's right there's a limit how much further can go”
Ben Bernanke, in a recent speech at the AEA conference, presented what some view as the 'last hurrah for central bankers' by arguing that monetary policy will be able to solve the next crisis, an argument Summers considers unlikely.
“Ben Bernanke gave a speech out there which I think was a kind of last hurrah for the central bankers he argued that monetary policy will be able to do it the next time I think that's pretty unlikely”
Central bankers face a difficult political position: they cannot claim to be out of ammunition without undermining confidence and policy effectiveness, yet they must warn fiscal policymakers to prepare more aggressive fiscal responses for the next downturn.
“central bankers have a very difficult road to walk because on the one end they don't want to say they're out of gas and they can't solve the problem on the other hand they better be giving some warning if they want fiscal policy to be ready next time”
The key investment question for navigating secular stagnation is whether the picture of low inflation and low rates will change, and if so, whether different asset classes will benefit or suffer, requiring investors to differentiate carefully across sectors and geographies rather than taking broad bets.
“the way you play it is first is that picture going to change are interest rates going to start picking up anytime soon they have to worry about secondly as I said before you know what are the asset classes are going to benefit or not benefit and so you're gonna have to be thinking you know much more cleverly about you know how you differentiate”
The globality of secular stagnation is not uniform; investors must evaluate whether the US remains the most attractive market or whether different emerging markets present better opportunities.
“is this a this has been a global phenomenon is the u.s. still the best place to be or should we be looking at different emerging markets how should we think about it”
Central banks deployed both conventional tools (interest rate cuts) and unconventional tools (quantitative easing, balance sheet expansion, forward guidance) to combat the crisis and support recovery.
“They responded by doing a couple of things one is using their regular tools ie called interest rates and then two using some unusual tools some new tools qualitative easing for sure Billy emphasized their balance sheets going in and buying a variety of fixed income securities and then they you know polished up the use of for guidance”
This is a time to move from broad, general macroeconomic analysis down to much more focused and particular investment theories and opportunities.
“I think this is the time where you move from the broad general down to a much more now a much more focused much more particular theory”