
From David Duke to Donald Trump: The Rise of ‘Middle-Finger Politics’
What this covers
This conversation pairs Ezra Klein with the writer John Gans (the speaker label spells it Gans, though the publisher's description spells the name Ganz). It treats Trump as one instance of a recurring American type rather than an anomaly. The route runs through the early 1990s. A 1992 Larry King clip has Trump predicting that David Duke and Pat Buchanan would draw votes because of the country's anger. Duke's 1991 Louisiana run is a central case: he took 55% of the white vote while running against a Republican establishment that had mobilized to stop him. His platform differed little from mainstream conservatism, except that he made the racial subtext explicit. Buchanan appears as the proto-Trump, polite and skilled with the media, who used mainstream outlets against the establishment.
The middle of the discussion is theoretical. Murray Rothbard's 1992 essay on right-wing populism supplies the idea of a popular short circuit, a demagogue who bypasses mediating institutions. Rothbard read Joe McCarthy's crudeness as a success of form rather than a flaw. Gans and Klein also discuss slipperiness, the pairing of an explicit message with a coded one, and they dispute whether style and content can be separated at all. Other threads include the relational character of transgression, the way populists escalate when ignored and amplify when answered, and the argument that fact-checking misses an appeal that is affective rather than cognitive.
The conversation then moves to the material and political context: de-industrialization in rural and exurban America, birtherism as Trump's entry into politics, and Buchanan's lament that millions feel like strangers in their own land. It also covers evangelical support shifting from instrumental in 2016 to messianic by 2024, and voters backing Trump at higher rates after January 6. Toward the end the two take up populism's trouble with governing, conservative elites who expect to control a leader they depend on, and the historical contingency that makes Trump's future open rather than fixed. They also discuss whether the underlying demand can be reduced, given that defeating one figure does not drain it.
Gans argues that Trump's political success flows from channeling a perennial right-wing populist reservoir of demand that has long existed in American politics, animated by racial and cultural anxiety, and that his unique synthesis of entertainment, business imagery, and direct anti-establishment rhetoric finally activated what prior figures like Duke and Buchanan could not.
- Right-wing populist demand is a constant reservoir in American politics, not a new phenomenon; it recurs across eras and countries when conditions allow it to surface
- Trump uniquely synthesized entertainment skill, business credibility, and unambiguous anti-establishment posture in ways that prior figures (Duke, Buchanan) lacked, making him more effective at channeling the reservoir
- The appeal is fundamentally about form (middle-finger politics, charisma, the 'gangster' archetype) rather than consistent policy content, and Trump understood this better than the Republican establishment
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Donald Trump, appearing on Larry King in 1992, predicted that both David Duke and Pat Buchanan would 'get a lot of votes' because there was 'a tremendous amount of hostility in the United States, anger' and that 'if you have these two guys running or even one of them running I think George Bush could be in big trouble,' demonstrating that Trump recognized the political potency of populist anger in real time.
“there's a tremendous amount of hostility in the United States anger it's anger I mean that's an anger vote that's people are angry about what's happened people are angry about the jobs if David Duke runs David Duke is going to get a lot of votes whether that be good or bad David Duke is going to get a lot of votes uh Pat Buchanan who really has many of the same theories except it's in a better package Pat Buchanan uh is going to take a lot of votes away from George Bush so if you have these two guys running or even one of them running I think George Bush could be in big trouble”
Despite his positioning as an extremist, Buchanan maintained media respectability partly by being charming, polite, and good at producing media content (sound bites, panel appearances), and in doing so demonstrated a template that Trump would perfect: the ability to use mainstream media institutions against the establishment those institutions normally defend.
“he also understood something about the media the others didn't about the ability to use the fact that it didn't like people like him but somehow needed people like him at the same time”
Duke effectively reframed his Neo-Nazi and KKK past by adopting a born-again Christian identity, using religious conversion as a strategy to apologize for 'intolerant' statements while simultaneously pivoting to defending 'white working class' against discrimination and affirmative action, demonstrating a consistent strategy of rhetorical slipperiness.
“there was a moment in the debate in that governor's race where he's asked if he repudiates his Neo-Nazi past and you can hear him make that turn as a newfound Christian a born again are you here willing now to apologize to the people the minorities of this state whom you have so desperately insulted Sir Mr Duke you have 30 seconds 30 seconds of course I apologize for things that I've said that have been intolerant and improper...but you don't make up for p discrimination by putting new discrimination on people with these affirmative action programs”
Murray Rothbard, a libertarian economist and fringe right-wing theorist, wrote an influential 1992 essay called 'Right-Wing Populism' analyzing Duke's loss, arguing that right-wing populism required a 'popular short circuit'—a charismatic demagogue who could bypass mediating institutions and plug directly into alienated populations to excite and rouse them.
“Murray rothbard for most of his career was a little bit of a fringe figure on the right...he was a Libertarian...he was a little bit homeless uh politically for a lot of his life and and he Associated himself with the old right...he saw in Duke a kind of Return of that and a way to unseat the conservative and Republican establishment”
The appeal of Trump's transgression is partly relational—it depends on generating outrage and reaction from opponents; without an audience responding to the transgression, the shock value dissipates, similar to how a child telling a naughty joke finds it funny because of the parent's reaction, not the word itself.
“part of what makes him funny is how outraged he makes them oh for sure that the energy is actually Unleashed in the interaction it is I have a little kid yeah what is the first joke little kids tell it is some kind of complete nonsensical setup and then the joke is poop right the absolute ER joke is a little bit of shock value oh for sure right like can you believe I just said that can you believe we're saying that together yeah...a much more kind of elevated level a lot of the energy it seems to me in a trump rally when I watch them is this can you believe we're doing it together and then the response right if there was never a response if my kid didn't think I would ever have a response to him saying naughty words it wouldn't be funny right”
The Evangelical Christian voter relationship to Trump shifted between 2016 and 2024: in 2016, it was instrumental (they supported him for court appointments), but by 2024, it became messianic (he is understood as chosen by God as their defender), representing a fundamental change in the nature of his political appeal.
“in 2016 the relationship was instrumental he said he would put our judges on the court yes and 2024 it's no longer instrumental right at least not among Evangelical Christians as a as a kind of community it's become a deep like he is chosen by God as our Defender sort of thing”
McCarthy-era demagogy was understood by Rothbard not as a failure of form but as a success of form; crude, populist, demagogic means were the point—not a problem to be fixed—because they were effective at reaching and mobilizing alienated populations in ways respectable conservative discourse could not.
“so many conservatives and Centrist liberals or right-leaning liberals looked at McCarthy and said well we don't like communism and we're worried about this and you know we're cold Warriors and but we but he's so crude he's so demagogic if it was only put nicer and Roth says no you don't get it the form the means that he used this populist attack on the establish is exactly the point that's what was effective about it he scared the living [ __ ] out of them and that's what I like about it and it was exciting and fun for people”
Media literacy and fact-checking are insufficient responses to populism because the appeal is not primarily cognitive but affective and emotional; voters respond to the joyousness, sense of transgression, and feeling of being part of an in-group rather than to rational arguments about policy or truth.
“the form does seem as or more important than the content and in fact the the content seems very malleable and one of Trump's characteristics as a political figure is the malleability of his content how much it will change even rally to Rally or even within a single rally but that the energy is actually about this sort of middlefinger politics is I think a much more honest sense of it”
Populist politicians employ a double strategy: if they are reacted to, they amplify; if they are not reacted to, they escalate and test how far they can go, creating a dynamic where the opponent faces a dilemma of either reacting (which emboldens them) or not reacting (which allows further escalation).
“this is what happens with the way populist politicians campaign though which makes it hard to say oh just don't react they do two things they have a a very effective little tactic which is well if they get reacted to they play off that and if they don't get reacted to they take it a little farther and see what happens”
Duke's platform was not substantially different from mainstream conservative Republicans—he opposed welfare, was concerned about crime, and opposed affirmative action—but made the racial subtext explicit rather than implicit, and his crowds understood this racial meaning and responded with excitement.
“Duke's message strangely enough was not all that different from conservative Republicans at the time he was against welfare he was concerned about crime he was against affirmative action he was a little bit more explicit about the racial subtext it was for other Republicans for him it was more text and his crowds plainly understood that and were very excited by it”
Barack Obama's presidency was a galvanizing event for right-wing populism: Trump's entry into politics was via birtherism—the claim that Obama was not really a citizen—which indexes the core of Trump's politics: the narrowing of American citizenship to exclude certain racialized populations while accepting others.
“there's no Donald Trump without Barack Obama of course...how did Trump get started politics right birtherism what is birtherism Obama's not really a citizen...the core of Donald Trump's entire politics from then until now is certain people and this is why some people respond to it is certain people are not really CI American citizens”
Trump's claim about being 'greedy' for himself and then being 'greedy for you' reflects and appeals to a populist conception of economics: the belief that the economy is a zero-sum contest of connected insiders, and that what voters need is someone who understands the corruption and will work it on their behalf, rather than technocratic experts managing the system.
“here this line I love from 2016 where he says I've been greedy my whole life and now I'm going to be greedy for you right and there is a sense of him as a guy who knows how to work the back rooms and if you believe the whole thing is corrupt then what you need is a guy who understands the corruption working on your behalf”
Fascist movements in the 1930s are often narrated as inevitable in retrospect, but historical contingency meant things could have gone otherwise at multiple points; similarly, Trump's future is not predetermined, but his coalition could collapse or be defeated if conditions shift and he faces the right political challenge.
“it's important to remember I think fascist propaganda about the 30s and so it's like it makes these movements look inevitable like the force of History right like they're just moving and there's that it was impossible for them to to stop and they had so much powery on them and that gives us a kind of cartoonish picture of them in point of fact there were many contingent points along the line where things could have gone otherwise and their political support could have collapsed all of a sudden and they got lucky just as easily as things taking power it is you know Fortune goes the other way”
Populist movements of this type (right-wing populism) have no clear playbook for governance; they are effective at opposition and at exciting constituencies, but their anti-establishment orientation makes coalition-building difficult and actual governance a significant challenge, partly because the energy of the movement is defined against institution-building.
“I think that that's a contradiction that's sort of hard to square and makes populism hard it's an effective political strategy or rhetoric but as a system of government sometimes obviously has problems”
David Duke, despite being a former grand wizard of the KKK and Neo-Nazi, performed well in Louisiana politics by running explicitly against the Republican establishment, winning 55% of the white vote in the 1991 gubernatorial race despite a massive coordinated campaign by the Republican National Committee, Ronald Reagan, and the business community to stop him.
“David Duke was a grand wizard of the K Cooks Clan he was a Neo-Nazi and despite his sorted past he did quite well especially among white voters he ran explicitly against the leadership of the Republican party and beat them...Reagan who was immensely popular in Louisiana...ran radio ads against him...there was a huge concerted effort by Republicans...and he said these people are Outsiders telling you people how to vote I am a populist I represent the Forgotten white man”
The fundamental problem for reducing right-wing populist appeal is the existence of an underlying 'reservoir' of demand that is addressed by figures like Trump; addressing this requires material change (jobs, economic security, sense of societal direction) and political response (leadership that feels responsive), not just defeating the current figure.
“what about the reservoir itself I mean one of the things that I find scarious about Trump and is the way he has infected the broader Republican party particularly now that he he's been back on the scene...this creates this question of how do you reduce the demand for something like him which I'm not sure it's the same question as how you beat him my obvious Instinct of this as a kind of Social Democrat New Deal Democrat kind of guy is that we need to I know the economy appears to be doing well I I strongly believe that there are structural issues that need to be answered about how Americans leave behind a better life for their children how jobs feel more secure cure how the country feels productive and heading in a certain direction”
Republicans and conservative elites have learned to work with Trump by accepting that while his statements may be outrageous, he remains politically valuable; this replicates a pattern from 20th-century authoritarian movements where conservatives backed problematic leaders expecting to control them, then found themselves dependent on the leader's continued support.
“there's been some indications from comments of people on Wall Street that said you know because of what happened last time Trump wins Trump doesn't win it's not such a big deal we can really work with this guy”
Right-wing populism strategically employs 'slipperiness'—a rhetorical technique where speakers communicate one message explicitly while simultaneously sending an implicit, coded message to audiences who understand what is 'really' being said, creating excitement through transgression and the sense of saying the unsayable.
“there is an essential quality of slipperiness to these guys there's always this question of on what level are they talking what is the message that they are saying explicitly and what are the what is the message that they are communicating to the people who know that the thing they really believe is a thing you're not really allowed to say”
The form and content of right-wing populism are fused; they cannot be separated such that you could take Trump's positions (immigration restriction, economic nationalism, skepticism of institutions) and put them in a 'normal' candidate and expect similar results, because the theatrical, transgressive style is not incidental but essential to the appeal.
“I think that there is no separating form and content as you said that the figure has to represent the middle finger in order to be effective and get the constituency behind them”
De-industrialization and economic insecurity, particularly in rural and exurban America, created the material conditions for Trump's appeal; these regions have experienced ongoing depression visible in physical decay and ruins, missed by economic statistics, creating a sense of societal collapse that Trump addressed more directly than predecessors through phrases like 'crippled America.'
“the other thing that ripens and I think is that de-industrialization took place there's a lot of insecurity people don't have the sense of the same kinds of jobs middle class jobs that they could hope for they see rural communities especially really collapsing and falling apart...if you go into a lot of rural exurban areas there's a there's a I would argue like kind of an ongoing depression which is missed by economic statistics”
Pat Buchanan was a proto-Trump figure in the 1990s: a former Nixon administration official and conservative commentator who, after observing David Duke's success, launched a 1992 presidential campaign explicitly targeting the Forgotten American and attacking the political establishment, foreign entanglements, and what he framed as cultural degradation.
“papyan was among a number of people on the right who looked at David Duke's candidacy and found it very interesting and saw something hopeful there...the evidence of that is that he wrote it he said basically Republicans ought to look at David Duke is doing and kind of appropriate some of his program”
Buchanan framed white Christian cultural displacement as a core threat, writing that 'Millions have begun to feel like strangers in their own land' due to popular culture 'saturated with raw sex,' disappearing holidays, 'old Heroes degraded,' art and artifacts removed from museums replaced by 'the depressing the ugly the abstract the anti-American,' and moral codes being 'overthrown.'
“Millions have begun to feel like strangers in their own land they recoil from a popular culture that is saturated with raw sex and Trum its hedonistic values they see old holidays disappear and old Heroes degraded they see the art and artifacts of a glorious past removed from their museums and replaced by the depressing the ugly the abstract the anti-American they watch as books they cherished disappear from the schools they attended to be replaced by authors and titles that they've never heard of the moral code that they were raised to live by has been overthrown the culture they grew up with is dying inside the country they grew up in”
Trump was underestimated before January 6, but after January 6, the question changed: knowing what he did attempting to overturn elections and incite a mob, Americans voted for him at higher rates, contradicting the assumption that seeing evidence of danger would reduce his support.
“I do think it's a way that Trump was underestimated yeah worked better before January 6 and after if the question in 2016 was for a lot of liberals like how can people like this guy...the question in 2024 for a lot of them is you've all seen what he's capable of you saw January 6...and yet if you look at polling yeah Trump is polling better than he ever has in terms of his matchups with the Democrat right there's never a period in any previous election where Trump LED”
Trump's appeal is not limited to economically left-behind voters; he won voters with family incomes of $100,000+, including many wealthy supporters, but his strongest support comes from people who feel left out of the intersection of the economy and culture—particularly small-business owners in exurban areas who maintain a different relationship to mass culture than urban educated professionals.
“it's not true that everybody voting for Donald Trump is left out of the economy in 2020 he won voters with family incomes of 100,000 or more and there are a lot of really really rich people voting for Donald Trump it is also true that many of the people who vote for him are feeling left out of the economy they're certainly feeling left out of this intersection of the economy and the culture one way I think income doesn't capture everything here is look you don't have a lot of poor graduate students voting for Donald Trump and you do have a lot of people who say run local car dealerships”
Fascism in the 20th century, while serious and dangerous, also had absurd and ridiculous dimensions; treating fascism as profound and world-historical can actually grant it more coherence and inevitability than it possessed, while dismissing it as ridiculous misses the genuine danger it posed.
“the critics who say that talking about fascism takes Trump too seriously or correct it involves too much Hocus Pocus it cloaks him in a certain dark Grandeur...the phoniness the bombast and the Ridiculousness was a part of the original thing too there's always been a deeply moronic side to Fascism fascism is perhaps most fundamentally a [ __ ] putting on world historical errors morons trying to make history”
Viewing Trump purely as a 'crook' or 'con man' or 'idiot' misses something essential about his appeal and dangerousness; treating him as a genuine authoritarian figure with historical precedents provides better predictive power about what he might attempt and how movements around him might develop.
“I would say this I think that the record of thinking of trump as a fascist or would be fascist has a better predictive power than saying that he's not so everyone said this guy you know he's such an idiot he's so weak you know he doesn't really have the political skills...he definitely doesn't have the organization he doesn't have an SS or an sa or the black shirts behind him...okay true but the people said well what would a fascist dictator do...he would try to use their malicious to make some kind of extra legal attack on on Power and try and stay in office right well he did that”
Media structure changes between the time Rothbard wrote (1950s) and Trump's rise are crucial: Rothbard thought populism required circumventing institutional media, but modern cable news and social media are actually MORE amenable to populist short-circuits because they're based on ratings, competition, and showmanship rather than editorial control.
“back when rothbard wrote that essay he was talking about newspapers and he thought already you know he talks about how McCarthy was using TV I think it's different forms of media are more amenable to this quote unquote short circuit because they're not you know they have less editorial control essentially and they're based on ratings and competition in ratings and competition yeah they build on the on the need for you know commercial advantage and that's based on Showmanship and theatricality”
Pat Buchanan is a genuine extremist and likely an anti-semite; William F. Buckley devoted a lengthy essay to analyzing whether Buchanan was anti-semitic, and Buchanan's career has been marked by consistent articulation of white Christian nationalist themes disguised as conservatism.
“buan is a genuine extremist I think it is fair to say I mean William F Buckley the the editor of National Review at some point does his huge long essay trying to decide if Pat Buchanan is an anti-semite so there that”
Trump's 'bloodbath' comment about automotive tariffs, while taken out of context to suggest political violence, was actually about economic consequences of outsourcing; however, the comment is simultaneously tone-deaf given his role in January 6, where real blood was nearly shed, and his opening of rallies with insurrectionist performers.
“if you're being fair he's saying this sort of as an inter like a very weird way to make a point about how badly America's going to be broadly ripped off right and there is this way in which he gets pulled out of context and then that looks to his supporters like like the media is against him right and on the other hand that is a crazy way to describe that”
In his 2002 book 'The Death of the West,' Pat Buchanan articulated white demographic decline anxiety, arguing that in 1960 only 16 million Americans did not trace ancestry to Europe, but by his writing 80 million did not, and globally people of European ancestry declined from 1/4 of world population in 1960 to 16% in 2000 and would be 1/10th by 2050, describing this as 'statistics of a Vanishing race.'
“in 1960 only 16 million Americans did not Trace their ancestors to Europe today the number is 80 million no nation has ever undergone so rapid and radical a transformation...in 1960 people of European ancestry were 1/4 of the world's population in 2000 they 16 in 2050 they will be 110th these are the statistics of of a Vanishing race”
Attempts to create 'mini-Trump' figures (DeSantis, Vivek Ramaswamy) have largely failed because Trump is not easily replicated; he is a genuine synthesis of multiple rare qualities (business fame, media skills, entertainment ability, outsider status, charisma) that happen to combine in him but are difficult to reproduce in other figures.
“I hope I do believe in the United States especially everyone who's tried to become a mini Trump hasn't really been able to do it the Sis's campaign phasal ramas Swami didn't really go anywhere I think honestly and I hate to say this because it's something he would say it's really he's pretty special guy”
Trump's appeal includes a genuine business acumen and reputation as someone who 'builds real things in the real world'—Trump Tower, his buildings with his name on them—which distinguishes him from prior populist figures and represents actual economic success, even if subsequent Trump administrations (2017-2020) largely coasted on the Obama recovery.
“Trump turned money into branding and power and cultural centrality represented for years in America what success literally meant he was the big money guy he was a big money guy he had The Apprentice he has Celebrity Apprentice but he also has these buildings I mean you can walk around New York today and like look at these gigantic buildings with his name on them he built real things in the real in the real world”
Rothbard's core insight was that right-wing populism rests on the belief that 'we live in a status country and a status world dominated by a ruling Elite consisting of a coalition of big government big business and various influential special interest groups,' and that this elite coalition—not left-right ideology—is the enemy that must be defeated.
“rothbard says right at the beginning that the David Duke is only defeated by quote a massive campaign of Hysteria of fear and hate orchestrated by all wings of the ruling Elite from official right to left and he goes on to say that quote the basic right-wing populist Insight is that we live in a status country and a status World dominated by a ruling Elite consisting of a coalition of big government big business and various influential special interest groups”
Many voters are not well-informed about January 6, don't understand it in the way elite critics do, or don't care about it; this isn't a matter of lacking education but of different priorities and relationships to politics, making empirical awareness insufficient to shift support.
“a lot of people just don't really understand that stuff and don't give a [ __ ] well what do you mean I don't understand it because it's not like you need a lot of like you don't need a postgrad degree to understand a mob at the capital I don't know I I think that the amount of people who are aware of what happened is probably smaller than you think it is the amount of people who conceptualize it in the way that we do that it was a sincere attempt to overthrow democracy in America is not as big as we think it is”
Trump's understanding of political risk and establishment vulnerability is fundamentally sound—he recognizes that there is no affection needed between disparate interests for them to achieve 'unity of interest,' and that institutions will tolerate him as long as he's useful or necessary to their goals, even if he's explicitly attacking those institutions.
“there does not need to be a affection for there to be a Unity of Interest”
Trump has become more organized and more dangerous in his second rise than in his first, with a larger number of people willing to do his bidding and potentially a more effective administration structure, even if he still does not have 'vast armies of uniform men at his disposal' like traditional fascist movements.
“I still don't think that he has quite I think there are more people who are willing to do his bidding and would be part of a you know Trump Administration be more effective he doesn't have vast armies of uniform men at his disposal to intimidate voters and that sort of thing still but yeah he's a little bit more organized than canny”
Trump's archetype combines elements of gangster mythology and wise-guy masculinity that resonate with audiences; his New York accent, alleged business acumen, willingness to cut corners, and refusal to be intimidated convey a certain cunning and effectiveness that makes him entertaining and appealing beyond conventional political dimensions.
“he is a little bit of a gangster so I think the archetype of gangsters from movies which we've as being you know they're bad but they're good they're kind of fun they know how to get things done there there's no [ __ ] with them you know we have this very affectionate almost picture of gangsters in American culture and he's a gangster in a certain way he's a little bit of a mobster”
The insult comic operates differently from the ironist: right-wing humor is based on the direct insult (exemplified by O'Reilly's 'you're not a real American' messaging), while left-wing humor relies on irony; Trump, as an insult comic, is entertaining precisely through direct, aggressive comedy while liberal politicians like Obama operate through irony, giving Trump a tactical advantage in emotional resonance.
“the attack on the right is that you're not a real American right that's what Bill O'Reilly was always about right the attack on the left is you're dumb right the left's humor is irony yes and the rights humor is the insult comic right Trump is fundamentally an insult comic like Barack Obama actually is quite funny but he's an ironist right”
Trump is paradoxically a 'family values' candidate not because of his personal behavior (divorces, remarriages, apparent distance from children) but because he represents a new model of family values suited to contemporary America: a 'big daddy' who provides for an extended, blended family despite not necessarily liking all members, embodying the reality of modern family structures rather than traditional patriarchy.
“I think Trump is a family values candidate and I think that a lot of liberals will look at him and say well he's he's such a horrible father...how could they be so hypocritical...Trump's family looks like a lot of American families there's divorces there's lots of extra kids he might not like his ex-wife very much he might not even really like the kids that much and he still is able somehow to provide for them and look like a big strong guy...this his big daddy he's the head of the clan”