What this covers

This is a 17-minute talk by Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, with questions from an interviewer (the description names Sergei Guriev of Sciences Po as host). It sketches how a postwar social democratic settlement gave way to the neoliberal period, and how the 2008 crisis then opened the way for right-wing populism. Wolf traces deindustrialization and the weakening of organized labor, which had been a political force behind FDR and the British Labour government. He also points to financialization as one cause of the crisis itself.

Wolf complicates the neoliberal story. Part of the industrial decline, he says, came from skill-biased technical change, which shifted demand toward skilled workers and set off a huge expansion of university education. University-educated professionals under 50 now outnumber the working class, which changes the political base. Only about 10% of the labor force in America and Germany works in industry. He backs the stagnation claim with GDP per head figures: by 2021 the UK was more than 25% below its pre-crisis trend and America close to 20%, while Germany stayed near trend.

The more contested claims come later. Wolf argues the crisis discredited Reagan-Thatcher market optimism by forcing total state mobilization, so the right, having lost the economic argument, was left with cultural war. He compares this to the Great Depression. He defines right-wing populism as the politics of resentment and rage, and sees no politically relevant far left. The discussion then turns to the risk of a populist cycle, with Argentina as the example, and to why the center left struggles to offer anything transformative. Wolf says China makes a return to the 1950s-60s consensus impossible. The interviewer raises the pandemic response as a sign of democratic learning, along with Brexit, a free press, and the threat Donald Trump poses to peaceful rotation of leaders. Wolf closes with a warning that America may already be in a cold civil war.

Sharpest takeaway

The speaker argues that Western economic stagnation following the 2008 financial crisis, combined with deindustrialization and rising inequality, created conditions for right-wing populism by destroying faith in market-based economics and leaving millions feeling economically abandoned, with cultural backlash representing the only political avenue available after the economic debate was lost.

  • Post-crisis GDP per capita in UK is 25% below pre-crisis trend, in US nearly 20%, creating widespread economic despair despite official recovery narratives
  • Deindustrialization struck organized labor—the political base of the social democratic settlement—shifting demand toward skilled workers and hollowing out working-class communities
  • The financial crisis discredited traditional conservative and Republican free-market ideology by requiring massive state intervention, eliminating the right's core economic argument and forcing pivot to cultural grievance politics

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0.84

Deindustrialization in the neoliberal period struck at the heart of the social democratic settlement because organized labor had been a very important political force in creating it, particularly backing FDR powerfully and the British labour government.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“deindustrialization struck at the heart of the social democratic settlement because organized labor had been a very important political force in in creating it. It was They were part of the back backing of, for example, FDR very powerfully and also here the labor government”

0.80

The financial crisis was a dramatically clear economic failure visible to everybody because there was a massive financial panic, the economy tanked, and the entire resources of the state were explicitly committed to preventing another Great Depression, which made visible to ordinary people that the system had failed and required total state mobilization.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“Most of the time, economic failure is very difficult to perceive. It's very remote, how your fate is connected with the broader picture. It's all very difficult to understand unless it's your profession to follow it. But, a financial crisis is obvious to everybody and what happened was one, there was a massive financial crisis, there was a panic, the economy tanked the and in order to prevent another great depression and I was involved in these discussions, basically the entire resources of the state every state were put by them behind the financial system and everybody could see that.”

0.79

A significant part of deindustrialization was not the result of neoliberalism but rather profound structural economic changes, primarily skill-biased technical change that shifted demand toward skilled workers, prompting a massive expansion of university education that transformed those cohorts into a larger social force than the working class.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“a significant part of that was not the result of neoliberalism. It was the result of profound structural economic changes, of which the two most important were skill-biased technical change to use a technical term, a massive shift in the demand for labor towards relatively skilled people, which was responded to with increasing their supply by one I think is one of the most significant social revolutions in history, which is the enormous expansion of the number of people who go to university”

0.78

Ordinary people don't understand the origins of economic shocks and don't spend time analyzing them; they simply feel the consequences (inflation, energy costs, reduced real incomes) and reasonably conclude things aren't working for them.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“ordinary people, they they don't spend their time looking at at the origin of economic shocks and all the rest of it. They don't feel, it seems to me, pretty clearly that anything has been fixed. On the contrary”

0.75

The financial crisis discredited traditional Republican and conservative views about markets and the state because it required explicit state commitment to rescue the financial system with no alternative if Great Depression was to be prevented, which destroyed the Reagan-Thatcher optimism about how market economies work and enabled right-wing populism to seize control of the right.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“There was an explicit commitment that had in my view no alternative. We can discuss that. I have plenty of friends who thought we should have the great depression again because it would teach them a lesson. I'm not vastly in favor of that sort of approach to economic policy, but anyway that discredited a huge chunk of the elite and above all it above all I think and crucially it discredited traditional what I would call traditional Republican views of the market in the state and and traditional conservative views.”

0.73

Skill-biased technical change created massive shift in demand for labor toward relatively skilled people, which was responded to with a significant expansion of the number of people attending university—one of the most significant social revolutions in history—that transformed the role of university-educated cohorts in society.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“skill-biased technical change to use a technical term, a massive shift in the demand for labor towards relatively skilled people, which was responded to with increasing their supply by one I think is one of the most significant social revolutions in history, which is the enormous expansion of the number of people who go to university, and their role in society has correspondingly been transformed.”

0.71

Once the right lost the economic debate, the only war that could happen from the right's point of view was a cultural war, and this mirrors the pattern of the Great Depression, which ended up in one of the great cultural wars of all time with the rise of Nazism.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“I think all this had profound social consequences that played into what was in a sense the only war that could happen from the the right's point of view once you lost the economic debate in this way, which is a cultural war. And when I'm feeling really grim and depressed, I point out that the Great Depression ended up in one of the great cultural wars of all time, which was the rise of Nazism.”

0.69

Increased reliance on credit growth and the expansion of the financial sector with its increasing dominance over the productive sector—called financialization—had many consequences for how corporations and the global economy worked, and was one of the causes leading to the financial crisis.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“the other thing that happened in that period, of course, was an increased reliance on credit growth and the growth of the financial sector, and its increasing dominance over the productive sector, uh sometimes called financialization, which is something I whose implications I didn't fully understand till about 15-20 years ago. And that had many consequences, the way corporations worked, that's obvious, the way uh the global economy worked. But, one of the consequences is one of those incredibly visible failures of the market system, namely a colossal financial crisis.”

0.69

People felt economic stress and anger not fully compensated despite government spending, because they came out of COVID expecting improvement but were hit by post-COVID inflation shock, war-driven energy consequences, and persistent costs of living crisis, making them feel this world isn't going well for them.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“they don't feel, it seems to me, pretty clearly that anything has been fixed. On the contrary, we've come out of COVID, and that we thought everything would be much better, and instead we got hit by uh the post-COVID inflation shock, the war, the consequences of that for energy guys, a lot of money was spent by government to help them, but it didn't fully compensate them for their losses. So, people quite reasonably still feel this world isn't going very well for me.”

0.69

China's transformation of the world means that trying to restore a 1950s-60s style social democratic consensus is impossible, requiring instead a restoration of social democratic politics adapted to completely different modern circumstances.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“China is not going to disappear, and China has transformed the world. A just a reality. And the world of the '50s and '60s... it's pretty obvious we can't for whole roads. But one of them is because China is not going to go away. We have a completely a different context.”

0.68

Democracy is a system where we actually learn lessons and sometimes change behavior, which is crucial for breaking the populist cycle and moving toward optimistic, confident societies where people feel they are together.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (appears to be interviewer)

“democracy is the political system where we actually uh learn lessons and sometimes change behavior”

0.68

A peaceful rotation of leaders is the first thing needed for democracy to function, and Trump's disagreement with this principle, evident in January 6th violence, represents a threat to this core democratic requirement.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (interviewer)

“the first thing we need to have is a peaceful rotation of leaders, which Donald Trump apparently disagrees with you. And one person got killed in January 6th, 2021.”

0.68

A free press serves the function of informing people that problematic policies like Brexit were self-inflicted rather than caused by foreigners, enabling voters to correct course.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unknown Speaker (interviewer)

“That's why we have free press to inform people that Brexit is not a good idea and it was brought on ourselves. Yeah, yeah, our own voters.”

0.68

Economic transformation created a class of university-educated professionals that is now larger than the working class in Western societies (particularly under age 50), fundamentally changing social composition and political base.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“there are now more of them, in my view, in our society, certainly under 50, than there is of the working class. This is a really big deal, I think.”

0.68

The center left (Democrats or Labour Party) are doing some sensible things but lack the capacity to do anything sufficiently transformative or don't think they can get power on that basis, creating a risk of a populist cycle where governments alternate between populists making a mess of things and centrist governments trying unsuccessfully to fix them, as seen in Argentina.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“the center left, say the Democrats or the Labour Party here, are doing some sensible things, they don't have the capacity to do anything sufficiently transformative or they don't think they can get power on that basis. So, my worry is that this is all my optimistic worry is we get into what I think of from my studies of Latin America as the populist cycle. That is to say, you get populist governments, they could be of left or the right, they make a mess of things, you get a government in that tries to fix these things, it doesn't really work quickly enough and radically enough, the underlying economy is too weak, it's not developing in a way that satisfies most people, they then go back to the next populist and the thing never gets resolved.”

0.66

The neoliberal period combined failed pro-market economic ideology with attacks on trade unions and profound deindustrialization, hollowing out the organizational and political bases that had sustained welfare states.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“In the neoliberal period, not only of course would there attacks on trade unions, but even more importantly there was a profound deindustrialization.”

0.65

In Western countries like America and Germany, only about 10% of the labor force works in industry and it is going to go on down, representing a movement away from the industrial era that has political consequences not just social ones.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“in our society, in America, only about 10% of the labor force works in industry, and it's going to go on down. In Germany, it's somewhat higher, but it's also falling very rapidly. We are moving away from the industrial era, and that has political consequences, not just social ones.”

0.64

Much better regulation and taxation of global corporations has been achieved through mechanisms like OECD BEPS and minimal corporate tax agreements, representing major progress in corporate regulation compared to previous periods.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (appears to be interviewer/questioner)

“you mentioned the big corporations that probably got too much money abusing their market power in the labor market benefiting from lack of organized labor. And now we have much better regulation and taxation of global corporations. Not perfect, but there is a major progress in minimal corporate tax, OECD, BEPS, and so on.”

0.62

Right-wing populist politics is fundamentally the politics of resentment and rage, different from far left politics which is not politically relevant anywhere currently.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“if you conceive uh as I do right-wing populist politics as basically the politics of resentment and rage, um I won't discuss the far left at the moment because it doesn't seem to be politically relevant uh anywhere.”

0.61

By 2021, UK GDP per head was more than 25% lower than it would have been if pre-financial crisis trends had continued, and in America it was close to 20% lower, while Germany was the only major Western country where GDP per head remained fairly close to the pre-crisis trend.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“if you look at just a very simple measure. I got income inequality and social mobility or take a very simple measure which is what happened to G where is GDP per head in I think it's 2021. it was the last year I had, uh in the major Western countries relative to where it would have been if the pre-crisis trends had continued. And the results are much more startling, I think. So, in the UK, the GDP per head is now more than 25% lower than it would have been if the pre-crisis trend had continued. No wonder we feel poor. And in America, it's better, but it's still close to 20%. In fact, the only major Western country where it's fairly close to the pre-crisis trend is Germany.”

0.60

In Western countries, particularly the US, average incomes per head grew more slowly in the period after the neoliberal shift than before, and inequality rose significantly with a particular characteristic of declining income position for people in the middle of the distribution.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“By and large, productivity growth slowed over that period. So, average incomes per head in Western countries there are exceptions, but it's particularly important in the US was slower than before. Inequality rose and significantly and this had a particular characteristic of a decline of the position relative income position of people in the middle of the distribution.”

0.56

The state had no alternative to explicit commitment and massive resource mobilization to prevent another Great Depression after the 2008 financial crisis, despite some arguing it should have let a depression happen to teach a lesson.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Why the Right swapped economics for culture wars | Martin W… [ux8euGFCiis]

“There was an explicit commitment that had in my view no alternative. We can discuss that. I have plenty of friends who thought we should have the great depression again because it would teach them a lesson. I'm not vastly in favor of that sort of approach to economic policy”

0.54

During the pandemic recession, governments spent much more on helping people left behind compared to post-financial crisis austerity, and populists did not use the pandemic recession for political gain to the same extent, suggesting democratic learning from past mistakes.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (appears to be different speaker/interviewer)

“if you think about the lessons we learned from that, which did contribute to Brexit, during the pandemics, we already spent much more for people left behind. And populists did not use the pandemic recession for their own benefit.”

0.52

America could have a civil war and may already be experiencing a cold civil war, representing a serious risk to democratic institutions.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (main speaker)

“I think America could have a civil war. Yeah. And yeah, you may say that it's going on in a sense. It's it's a cold civil war, which is going on.”

0.45

The majority of British voters now agree from polling that Brexit was not a bright idea, suggesting people no longer blame foreigners for problems and recognize internal fault, which is real political progress and a sign democratic learning is possible.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (main speaker returning)

“it seems from the polls that at the very least the majority now agree that wasn't a bright idea. And that makes me feel well may doesn't mean we're going to reverse it cuz I don't think we are, but it does mean that we don't think any right now a lot of people think that if we've got a lot of problems at least it's partly our fault, not foreigners. And that's a big That's a big That's progress.”