
"What China Will Be Like As A Great Power" : Martin Jacques Keynote (32nd Annual Camden Conference)
What this covers
This is a keynote by Martin Jacques at the 32nd Camden Conference in Maine, followed by audience questions. Jacques asks what kind of great power China will be, and he answers mostly from its history and political culture. He sets out a governance model built on the state as guardian of society, a patriarchal idea of the ruler as good father, and a meritocratic tradition he dates back 1,500 to 1,600 years. He also traces a "stay-at-home" universalism, in which China saw itself as the Middle Kingdom with no need to evangelize, against a European universalism that spread outward into colonialism. The same logic is applied to one country, two systems, which he reads as a Confucian approach set against German "one nation, one system" unification.
The middle of the talk deals with China's economic and political direction. Jacques gives the arc of China's share of global GDP, from about 1 percent in 1980 to a projected one-third by 2030–35, a return to its 1820 position. He contrasts Deng Xiaoping's low-profile caution with Xi Jinping's aim of shaping globalization, and he describes Belt and Road as a 50-year project to remake Eurasia, with Malaysia's debt worries as a complicating case. He argues that the US–China contest is about innovation, not trade, and that China's decades of incremental innovation were wrongly dismissed as copying. He also argues that protectionism is the wrong American response.
Jacques is also critical of China. He names Xinjiang and Tibet as its biggest failure since 1949, attributing it to a defensive turn in the Confucian tradition. He treats the hukou system, which leaves migrant workers without services in the cities, and rural–urban and coastal–interior inequality as underestimated problems. In the Q&A, a questioner challenges his claim that over 90 percent of people identify as Han, pointing to minorities in Yunnan, Xinjiang and Tibet. Jacques also says the Nixon–Mao era of relations has ended, that China spends less on its military than its size would suggest, and that Britain's Brexit difficulties show how hard it is for Western societies to accept the end of dominance.
Martin Jacques argues that China is a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, fundamentally different from the West in its historical traditions and approach to global power, requiring the West to abandon assumptions of universal modernity and learn to coexist with China as a peer competitor rather than attempting to contain its rise.
- China's 2,000-year civilizational inheritance predates its adoption of nation-state status by 120-130 years, making it operate on principles of 'one civilization, many systems' rather than centralized nation-state governance
- China's historical foreign policy emphasized cultural power through the tribute system rather than military conquest, contrasting sharply with Western colonial expansion and military dominance
- The West's reflexive belief in universal modernity and single path to development is unsustainable and prevents understanding of China's legitimate alternative governance model
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Under Xi Jinping, there has been a shift in Chinese foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping's idea of moving carefully, quietly, and hiding one's capabilities and leadership, to something much more outgoing and expansive, moving to the idea that China is not just a recipient and player in globalization but also a maker and shaper of globalization.
“under Xi Jinping there's been a shift in Chinese foreign policy which I think we're all aware of which is moving from the dong shoppings idea of moving carefully quietly hiding or capability hiding your leadership to something which is much more outgoing and expensive moving to the idea that China was not just a recipient of globalization a player in globalization but was also a maker and shaper of globalization”
China is an extremely diverse country with many different ethnic and racial minorities, yet the most extraordinary feature is that over a very long historical period, over 90% of the population have come to regard themselves as Han Chinese through a process of sinicization over centuries, not through oppression, though this openness depends on confidence—when defensive, the Confucian tradition becomes exclusionary.
“China is an extremely diverse country extremely diverse many many different ethnic and racial minorities but the most extraordinary feature of China is the way in which over a very very long historical period the great majority well over 90% of the population by general agreement have come to regard themselves as Han so the Heinie's you know of course ultimately race as his news about there's a cultural question not a physical question but the now that and they embrace many many different different people so many minorities would now regard themselves to be hat and that's not through oppression that is to through the process of you know cinah cessation if you like over a very very long historical period and I think Confucian that you know the Confucian tradition was what had two sides to it one was very open to the difference and minorities where and that was when essentially the they were confident and at other times very defensive and exclusionary which was when they were on the back foot”
China's governance system achieves legitimacy not through democratic participation but through three factors: the state as guardian and embodiment of society, governance based on family/patriarchal principles (with the Emperor as good father), and meritocratic traditions dating back 1,500-1,600 years.
“the state is seen as the Guardian and the embodiment of society...the idea of governance in China is drawn powerfully from the notion of the family...the tradition of meritocracy the importance of meritocracy which could lease back to the tank the 1516 hundred years ago”
Growth of inequality in China is an underestimated problem, particularly the divide between rural and urban areas and between coastal regions and interior regions, resulting from Deng Xiaoping's spatial development strategy that prioritized coastal regions like Guangdong and Fujian provinces.
“the growth of inequality in China is an underestimated problem in my view...the divide between rural and urban the wrong coastal...the way Dunc shopping strategy was a sort of spatial strategy...let me develop the South the coastal regions which is you know Guangdong near Hong Kong Guangdong Province Fujian Province and then up the eastern coast Shanghai and so on so their living standards are much and their growth rates but they're not no longer the graters but their living standards are much higher than for example central China although central China being for example Sichuan province Georgian and so on and much greater than Western”
Belt and Road is a 50+-year strategic initiative aimed at transforming the Eurasian landmass (where 65 percent of the world's population lives) through large-scale infrastructure investment based on the model that proved successful in China's development, with 71 countries along the routes.
“Belt and Road...is a hugely ambitious project to transform transform the Eurasian landmass...the chinese thinking in relationship to belton wrote is look we how do we transform our country we transformed our country by economic growth based on very large scale very usually state large scale investment usually state investment and especially directed infrastructure...about 65 percent of the world's population lives in this in this in this land mass...71 countries are lying along the route”
The era in U.S.-China relations that began with Nixon and Mao in 1972 has come to an end because the United States has shifted its view of China from a weaker partner to a rival and strategic threat due to the fundamental shift in the balance of power between them.
“the era that started with Nixon Mao in 1972 has come to an end why is it come to an end because the United States has shifted its position not just Trump I think that more widely across American society why is it shifted its position because I think for a long time America saw China not as a rival to beyond a point to the United States it were it was a very very unequal relationship but we can all see that that balance has changed and now there's a feeling in America that China in some ways is a threat”
Migrant workers have done much of the heavy lifting for China's transformation but still cannot access education, hospitals, and services in destination cities due to the hukou (household registration) system that ties rights to hometown, and reforms have made little progress.
“migrant workers who be extremely important for China's transformation I mean they've done let's face it in labor terms a lot of the heavy lifting of it and they still are not they still can't you know if they're living in Shanghai they still can't get access to Shanghai education hospitals and so on so they then you know they're but they have because they're they're sitting there their household rights are from where hometown and so on and there have been they've been talking about as you know reforming the hukou system missile registration system but they haven't got very far with it”
Mao's major success was indigenizing Marxism in ways the Soviet Communist Party failed to do, by recognizing the peasantry rather than the working class as the revolutionary vanguard, contrary to traditional Marxist theory.
“one of the great successes of Mao was his ability to indigenous Marxism in a way that the Russian the Soviet Communist Party failed to do...the traditional Marxist position was that the working class is the leader of the socialist revolution is the vanguard class and all that kind of stuff now Maris position was the opposite to that MERIS position was that the peasantry in China would be the mainstay of the revolution and of course that is exactly what happened”
China has developed an extraordinary infrastructure of expressways, railways, and especially the world's largest high-speed rail network, which created connectivity across China that drew the country together and allowed market development.
“China does have for it a developing country and it's strong reinforced structure of expressways of Railways and they're not a larger high-speed rail network than the rest the world put together China have really made you on infrastructure in a big way and I think this has been so important to development in China because it's created a connect connectivity across China which has drawn the country together and allowed the market to develop”
China's biggest historical failure since 1949 has been in its treatment of Xinjiang and Tibet, where a defensive Confucian mentality has prevented proper recognition of cultural and religious rights.
“since 1949 they're been to the in my view the biggest failure of the Chinese government has been in relationship to shinjang and Tibet where the this old defensive mentality they're all Confucian defensive mentality has been had the upper hand and therefore a lack of proper recognition of cultural rights of religious rights of the practice of those has been very clear”
Ethnic minorities in southern China (e.g., Yunnan Province) and in Xinjiang and Tibet do not feel Han identity and feel sadness about their culture being suppressed, contradicting simplified claims about 90% identifying as Han.
“travelling in Xinjiang and in Tibet and in minority areas in southern China in Yunnan Province for example those minorities don't feel Han and they feel sad that their culture is being suppressed”
Malaysia's Mahathir, despite being historically pro-China, became critical of Belt and Road because the previous government under Najib took excessive loans from China and committed to major projects like the East Coast Rail Line, putting Malaysia into substantial debt; Mahathir has suspended or not yet canceled these projects to address the debt burden.
“Malaysia classy example Malaysia historically has been quite close to China Matthew I know who I do know is very Pro China but he's been very critical of China in this context why because the previous government of Najib undertook these big commitments voting got lots of loans in China and and put themselves and put the country in a lot of debt and no no no ji was particularly corrupt finger and and now Matt is cancelled or not yet canceled but suspended some of the key projects like the east rail route”
China represented approximately 1 percent of global GDP in 1980 and had risen to 15-17 percent by 2015-2016, with projections suggesting it will account for one-third of global GDP by 2030-2035, which matches China's proportion of global GDP in 1820.
“China represented about one percent of global GDP in 1980...as of 2015 it's already represented fifteen percent of global GDP and I think the figure now is something by 16 or 16 or 17 percent of global GDP...based on GDP measured in terms of primary purchasing power...in 2030 or 2035...China would account for a third of global GDP which by the way is what China accounted for in 1820”
China's size and internal diversity mean it operates on basis of respect for difference, expressed as 'one civilization, many systems,' reflecting a long historical period where central control was impossible due to scale and the only way to maintain unity was to allow regional and cultural variation.
“China is an extremely diverse country...the only way that China could really operate and could hang together was if it was on the basis of a certain sort of respect for difference if you like or to put it another way one civilization many systems”
The great challenge for the United States in response to China's rise is how to live in a world where China is a peer competitor, determining what forms of cooperation and rivalry will exist, as framed by Graham Allison's 'Thucydides Trap,' rather than responding through military buildup or becoming more defensive.
“the great challenge for the United States will be how to live in a world where China is appear a peer competitor what are the forms of cooperation and what are the forms of rivalry this is the question raised in Sioux City's trap by Graham Allison you know how does the United States deal with this challenge other than putting up the barriers and threat in becoming you know becoming more military from zombies response this isn't going to work this cannot be in the future”
China's interpretation of universalism was 'stay-at-home universalism' based on seeing itself as the Middle Kingdom and highest form of civilization with no need to evangelize, whereas Europe's interpretation was evangelizing and externalized, leading to colonialism and explaining why the United States exists as a product of European civilization's overseas expansion.
“China's interpretation of universes and was entirely different China did not see it in terms of externalizing itself because the Chinese idea of their universalism was we are the Middle Kingdom we are the land under heaven we are the highest form of civilization so why leave China...the Chinese interpretation of its universalism was essentially a stay-at-home universalism whereas the European version was to go to go overseas to to go around the world that's why the United States is the United States because it was a product of that evangelizing mission”
Britain never accounted for more than 8.5 percent of global GDP at its peak, yet was able to control an empire covering one-fifth of the world's land and population, suggesting future Chinese economic dominance will be disproportionately greater than anything previously witnessed in modern times.
“Britain never accounted even at its highest point it accounted for about eight and a half percent of global GDP and never larger than that but was able to have an empire which was controlled v of the world and a fifth of the world's population...China's economic power is going to be as I mentioned disproportionate disproportionate compared with anything we've ever witnessed in modern times”
China views its most important strategic relationship as being with the developing world rather than the United States or European Union, stemming from its own recent experience as a poor country and its resource needs for industrial transformation.
“strategically speaking I don't think that is an accurate way of seeing how China views its relationship and its priorities in terms of the world I think that China's most important strategic priority and it's thinking is its relationship with the developing world...China of course in 1978 when dong shoppings reforms started was extremely poor and was poor than a lot of African countries in terms of per capita income”
China is not Russia and does not place a disproportionate emphasis on military expenditure relative to its economic capacity, because China's historical tradition does not regard military power with the same priority as the West or Russia, making Chinese military spending less concerning as an indicator of future confrontation.
“when with in terms of us-china relations we shouldn't exaggerate the importance of Chinese military expenditure China is not Russia the Soviet Union was believed in military competition and the arms race...I don't think China is like that takes me back to the earlier point about history and China not essentially regarding military power within the same with the same priority as is true in the West and certainly in the case of Russia”
The competitive relationship between China and the United States is fundamentally about innovation rather than trade, as the West long believed China was incapable of serious innovation and could only copy, but this was a profound misconception.
“the problem of the relationship between the competitive relationship between China and the United States is not fundamentally about trade it's fundamentally about innovation now there has been a very strong view in the West that China was not capable of serious innovation that China was good at copying good at imitating but when it came to creative change radical change China would not be able to succeed now I think this was a profound misconception”
It is a mistake for America to respond to China's rise with protectionism because protective barriers are defensive withdrawals that prevent American firms from competing in the increasingly competitive Chinese market, which is essential for learning and adaptation.
“China's rise economic rise is going to the formidable challenge and to the United States and the only way that I think America I think it's a mistake for America to react in a protectionist way to this...the danger of protectionism is that you withdraw it's a defensive response when in fact basically for example it's very very important that American firms are competing in China because China is becoming such a competitive ruthlessly competitive and dynamic economy so you have to be part of it to learn from it”
Western societies and particularly Britain have struggled to adapt to not being the dominant global power, as exemplified by Britain's difficulty in accepting post-imperial status and the Brexit debate as illustration of difficulty adjusting to a world without dominance.
“the great challenge for the United States will be how to live in a world where China is appear a peer competitor...I think the great challenge for the United States will be how to live in a world where China is appear a peer competitor...my country being Britain which is learning to live in a world which is not the same as we've lived in for a long time and we've found it very different in my country brexit debate is a fantastically good illustration of this we found it very difficult to move on”
Hong Kong's 'one country, two systems' arrangement reflects a Confucian/Chinese civilizational tradition very different from Western nation-state tradition, as evidenced by contrasting approaches such as German unification ('one nation, one system').
“dong shoppings idea was one country two systems' very different way of thinking to that of a nation-state drawn from the tradition of Chinese civilization a nation-state would never think like that I mean German unification it was one nation one system that's a tradition in the West that's where it comes from our history likewise the tradition of one country two systems' comes from a different civilization tradition”
West has been on back foot and behind the game with China, unwilling to believe in China's sustainability and now must face the reality of remarkable transformation, but fundamental Achilles heel is that the West does not understand China in profound way.
“the Achilles heel in the West has been that really we are we don't understand China in some profound way we don't understand China and the reason for this is that the Western that our paradigm is that we are universal”
The Confucian tradition has two faces: one open and inclusive toward minorities when the state is confident, and one defensive and exclusionary when the state is on the back foot, which may explain contemporary Xinjiang and Tibet policies.
“the Confucian tradition was what had two sides to it one was very open to the difference and minorities where and that was when essentially the they were confident and at other times very defensive and exclusionary which was when they were on the back foot”
China has been engaged in incremental innovation since 1978, not merely copying, and this continuous incremental innovation process across Chinese society during decades of 10% annual growth built up enormous innovative capacity and thinking, enabling China to compete in technological areas where it was not expected to emerge as a serious player.
“ever since 1978 it's true that in the early decades China was by and large taking existing technologies and applying them to the new circumstances in China but even that kind of approach is not simply copying it involves a process of incremental innovation not Parrott not radical innovation but it's nonetheless innovation and I think across Chinese society when it was growing at 10% a year or now 7% a year this led to an enormous buildup of innovative capacity of innovative thinking”
Between the mid-14th and mid-19th centuries (500-year period), China fought only one major war with another country (Vietnam, resulting in defeat), whereas Britain and France fought 142 major wars against each other in the same period.
“in the 500 years between from the mid 14th century to the mid 19th century China only fought one major war with another country which was Vietnam which they got a bloody nose and eventually were defeated...there are only two major wars actually in that whole family repeat the period between major nations countries in Asia compared with say a hundred and forty-two wars just between Britain and France”
Xinjiang faces serious terrorist problem that partly justifies increased security measures, though it is unclear whether terrorism causes the repression or whether repression causes the resentment that fuels terrorism.
“shinjang is more difficult problem because shinjang is is you know bordering on the other of the other Central Asian Republics there there is a serious terrorist problem I know I was in a room Qi about four years ago now which is the capital of Xinjiang province and he did remind me of my visits to Belfast and Londonderry during the Troubles because there were you know there were sort of semi armed patrols and vehicles and so on all overseas and so it was clear that there was a serious terrorist problem although one wonders whether that feeling is also caused by the repression”
According to Danny Quah's econometric mapping of global economic center movement, the center was off the African coast in 1980, is now above the Arabian Peninsula, and is projected to be on the Sino-Indian border by 2050, and the transformation of the Eurasian landmass through Belt and Road will accelerate this shift in the global economy's center.
“this map here is my Danny quoi it was LSE learn at school of economics and he tries to understand trying to work out for very complex econometrics where the center of the global economy is is and he estimated that in 1980 it was a yellow spots just off the African coast and he's and he's seen it moving and now he thinks it's just above the Arabian Peninsula there is it now the center of the global economy and it he he predicts it'll be by 2050 on the sino-indian border...the transformation of the Eurasian landmass as a result of belt alone can only accelerate accelerate an underline that kind of development”
China has run into serious problems with Belt and Road in several countries (Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan) primarily because Chinese companies and state-owned enterprises have extended loans at favorable interest rates (~2%) but with terms that create unsustainable debt burdens for receiving countries, reflecting excessive commitments driven by commercial greed and lack of political awareness.
“China's run into some serious problems in different countries with belton Road notably Myanmar Sri Lanka motives Malaysia...criticisms in Pakistan...the biggest criticism of China...is that in extending loans to these countries usually very very very good interest rates around about 2% do these countries have taken on debt burdens which will see them in big trouble...you know this is a vast program so some some Chinese companies some state-owned companies...they rush into it...the Chinese banks...take on commitments which are excessive under the circumstances”
Gender equality in China shows contradictory patterns: women constitute formidable numbers in universities and professions like journalism, but the Communist Party leadership remains almost entirely male.
“if you look at many professions and so on in China they're very unequal very gender gender gender equality is is very powerful but if you look but I think there is a I mean and there are there's going to be I think a lot of conflict gender conflict in China...if you go now in journalism for example it's a I the very large number of women journalists and in fact I mean I don't know the statistics for it but this is based on my own you know my own bit circumstantial evidence there's been a big change and if you look at the composition of students for example I mean teacher China Xinhua food on universities and so on...there's a you know there's a formidable proportion of women amongst them so I think that there is change but if you go to the party if you look at the you know if you look at a picture of at the Congress you know it's almost male only”
During the Troubles in Northern Ireland, Catholic minority populations faced inferior economic and social circumstances compared to Protestant majorities, leading to desire for unification with Ireland and creating conditions for IRA activity and terrorism.
“what happened in Northern Ireland was that the Catholic minority population basically was had inferior circumstances to the majority Protestant population it wasn't just about religion that shorthand will use the religious terms and they and and there was a long journey unsurprisingly for unification right with you know with Irish Republic and and and hence the IRA and the terras acts and so on”
Loss of minority customs and languages is partly due to natural processes of industrialization, modernization, and commercialization that occur globally, not just political repression specific to China.
“what happens with industrialization and modernization is customs do get lost you know it's not a question of political repression it's a question of the way in which commercialization for example of people's lives and so on leads to the loss of certain forms of customs and identities and that is being tuned that's not just true of China that's happened rapidly across the West”
The United States' share of global GDP peaked at just under 29 percent in the 1950s and has declined to below 20 percent by the time of this speech, constituting significant relative decline despite absolute increases in American living standards.
“the United States...its highest-ever proportion was not surprisingly during the Second World War but even in the 1950s American proportion of global GDP was just under 29 percent something like that and now it's well below 20 percent but now that is that is a very significant decline”
Belt and Road will likely produce a transformation in governance across the Eurasian region with new regional entities being created to replace or supplement the nation-state structure, representing a revolution in governance that parallels increases in importance of the Chinese renminbi currency and Chinese legal/organizational concepts in the region.
“don't underestimate the kind of transformation in governance that is likely to come from Belton Road...there aren't really regional strong regional organizations...I think what we're going to see is a transformation in the idea of the nation-state new regional entities being created...a revolution in governance across the region...the increasing importance of the Chinese renminbi as a currency...increasing importance of Chinese ideas about how these kind of projects should be organized...courts are being established one in Xi'an and we're in change”
China is fundamentally a civilization-state rather than a nation-state, with a 2,000-year civilizational inheritance that predates its adoption of nation-state status by only 120-130 years (beginning in the late 19th century when China faced external pressure).
“it was only at the end of the 19th century when China got into being big trouble and what became very divided and occupied in parts that China finally conceded that it should be a nation-state...that's what 120 hundred and thirty years ago something like that that's a sliver of time when you consider a 2000 odd year history of China so to understand China we've got to understand it in my view primarily not as a nation-state primarily as a civilization state”
Western belief in a single universal modernity that all countries will eventually adopt is no longer sustainable because numerous developing countries with different historical and cultural roots have developed alternative paths that are not converging toward Western models.
“our paradigm is that we are universal that everyone should be one day will be is required to be like us that there's only one modernity in the world it's a modernity now frankly this is no longer a sustainable position it hasn't been a sustainable vision for a while but it's absolutely not sustainable any longer in the world because we see not only the transformation of China but so many developing countries which do not come from the same historical political cultural roots as the West”
Approximately 71 countries lie along the route of Belt and Road, with enthusiasm from many countries for the project because they perceive the possibilities of how their circumstances could be transformed; however, the two key countries that did not sign up are Japan and India, and they were not represented at the major Belt and Road summit in Beijing two years ago.
“they've a lot of money a great deal of infant money has already been invested and there's been a lot of enthusiasm his or to from not all the countries in the Eurasian landmass but I think there's 71 countries are lying along the route of Italy...the two key countries that have not signed up for it and Japan and India and they were not represented at the big summit two years ago in Beijing but many many countries were at very high levels”
American presence and involvement in Belt and Road projects is important for being a player in determining rules, regulations, and project selection, and without U.S. involvement China will dominate these decisions.
“the United States attitude as it was on the Asian infrastructure investment bank was should not get involved not not join in and so on...if it's not involved then then it's not a player in terms of the rules the regulations the the projects and so on”
U.S. alternative to Belt and Road will be too weak in terms of funding because China is throwing enormous amounts of money at the initiative and America is not in a position to match that funding in the foreseeable future.
“the alternative program will just be too weak in terms of its funding I mean China's throwing a lot of money at it and I don't think America is in a position to do that at the moment or in the force for the foreseeable future”
The Chinese will likely renegotiate Belt and Road agreements under pressure, and while Belt and Road problems are a warning to China, the initiative will not collapse because China cannot let it collapse; in the longer run, Belt and Road will likely be successful, though on what scale and timeframe is uncertain (the project is framed as 50+ years).
“I think what's going to happen is the Chinese will read ago she ate all these agreements where they under a lot of pressure there and this will I don't think it'll bring belt and wrote down I don't think the Chinese will let that happen I don't think they can let it happen but it is a warning to them but in the longer run what do I think I think that belt and road basically is going to be successful and what scale I don't know remember we're talking about a very long term project I mean I don't think we do at 10 years or 20 years we've talked about 50 years or more than that”
Over the last 10 years, development has revealed Africa as increasingly important to global affairs, with African growth rates now very strong, significantly boosted by China's demand for African raw materials which has raised commodity prices.
“I think African growth rates of the last 10 years probably the biggest single reason why African growth rates are now very strong in some countries is because of this relationship with China...becoming a serious source of demand for for African raw materials from those countries that produce a lot has boosted the prices”
The Western belief that the Chinese governing system is unsustainable and illegitimate was wrong, as demonstrated by evidence from Pew Global Attitudes surveys showing high satisfaction with Chinese governance.
“we think of governance in countries as essentially about universal suffrage multi-party system and China doesn't have that and for that reason we've long believed in the West that the Chinese system as we know it today is unsustainable is illegitimate but it's not I don't think if you look at the work that's been done on Chinese governance if you look at the Pew Global Attitudes surveys and so on about the set that levels of satisfaction amounts of Chinese with Chinese governance that's a really sustainable position it's clear that the Chinese governing system different though it hugely different though it is from our own in the West enjoys a great deal of support and legitimacy”
It is impossible for the United States to stop the rise of China unless through nuclear war, as this is a fundamental historical transformation comparable to the rise of Europe and decline of China in the 17th-18th centuries.
“I would say first that it is impossible for the United States to stop the rise of China unless we're talking about a nuclear war but then we're all dead anyway Mirai zuv China is one of these great quite unusual historical moments of a fundamental transformation taking place in the world I mean the rise of Europe and the decline of China in the 17th and 18th century was also one of these great change historical trends historical periods the United States cannot stop the rise of China this is this is impossible”
Despite inequality and corruption problems, China has demonstrated ability to address serious problems when they become critical, as evidenced by the corruption crackdown, though inequality has not received similar policy attention.
“there have been they've been talking about as you know reforming the hukou system missile registration system but they haven't got very far with it so I think though those kind of I mean you know you could you could add to one of the good things about the Chinese is that when they face a serious problem they do do something about it so corruption for example corruption was a really serious problem in China and they did and I think that they've had they made a singular dent on this problem inequality I don't think they've really done very much at all of it”
The Chinese Communist Party has demonstrated ability to change and move with the times by abandoning much of its old ideological positions, which is a critical test of any political party's viability.
“if you're how does it you know is a party whatever the party is whether it's communist or you know your parties or whatever is it able to change is it able to move with the times this is the great question I think facing political parties and the Chinese Communist Party that we're going to be your objective about this has clearly changed enormously hugely it's abandoned a lot of its old ideological positions”
Western perspectives on China's decline vs. Western decline are asymmetric: many Westerners enjoy good living standards despite relative decline of the West's global share, while Chinese improvements are real but accompanied by continued Communist Party control, tightened bureaucracy, and other challenges to growth sustainability.
“life is still pretty good for many people throughout Europe and for a large proportion of the population in the US and life is still quite in fact very difficult I would say as a reporter we get to see these things for most people in China and notwithstanding the many many many millions of people who've been risen out of who've been lifted out of poverty in China the Communist Party continues to tighten the screws and a lot of that bureaucracy and other things in dangers China's economic rise”
Majority public opinion in Africa shows 60-65 percent of Africans holding favorable attitudes toward China according to Pew Global Attitudes surveys, despite criticisms of China's relationships with various countries.
“if you look at public opinion for example in Africa according to Pew and so on China the majority attitude 60 65 percent of Africans have over quite well have what's called a favorable attitude towards China”
China is extremely poor in natural resources compared with other East Asian countries like Japan and Korea, which is a major structural constraint on its economic development.
“China like other East Asian countries Japan Korea is very poor in Natural Resources”