What this covers

This CSIS and Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions event accompanies a Big Data China feature reviewing the literature on how industrial policy has fared in China. Ilaria Mazzocco moderates a panel of Lee Branstetter, Panle Jia Barwick, Chloe Papazian of the OECD, and Gerard DiPippo of Bloomberg Economics. The conversation keeps returning to what counts as success. Researchers measure it through market share, industry revenue, patenting and other variables, and the verdict can flip depending on the choice. DiPippo frames the goals as overlapping circles of productivity, market dominance and resilience, and notes that efficiency and resilience often pull in opposite directions. He adds that economists, Washington and Beijing do not share an objective.

The middle of the discussion rests on concrete cases. Barwick walks through Chinese shipbuilding, where entry subsidies to every firm drew in rent-seekers and waste until policy shifted toward investment subsidies that favored efficient, long-horizon firms. She also covers the auto sector, where partnering with foreign firms explained under 10 percent of domestic partners' quality gains. In EV batteries, a supplier white list shifted gains from foreign rivals to Chinese firms, but also cost Chinese downstream producers and consumers. She argues that EV subsidies across countries can be complementary through learning-by-doing in batteries.

The panel also takes up measurement and the limits of state capacity. Papazian stresses mapping the full ecosystem of measures, including opaque below-market energy and land, and the role of state enterprises and procurement. Branstetter says picking future inventors is much harder than picking copiers, and warns against concentrating US basic science funding in fashionable fields. Another panelist emphasizes how much foreign technology, investment and market access contributed to China's industrial gains.

Sharpest takeaway

Industrial policy effectiveness depends critically on design, implementation, and measurement metrics; while productivity gains are often limited, policies can succeed at other objectives like market share and innovation, but the global costs and trade tensions they generate must be fully accounted for in policy evaluation.

  • Research shows firms receiving industrial policy support tend to be less productive than unsupported peers, but metrics vary—some policies succeed at market share while failing at productivity
  • Policy design and implementation timing matter enormously; identical policy instruments produce vastly different outcomes depending on targeting, incentives, and cyclicality
  • Industrial policies generate significant spillover costs including retaliation, capital flight, and disruption to global trade systems that offset narrower sectoral gains

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0.81

In electric vehicles, all countries' subsidies (US, China, Europe) for EV purchases act as global complements because subsidies increase EV demand, which increases demand for batteries, which accelerates learning-by-doing in battery production, which lowers EV prices globally, which further stimulates EV purchases—creating positive spillovers rather than zero-sum competition.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Panjia Barwick

“we look at several policies one is that all countries subsidized electric vehicles purchases you know during this period and and then a key feature very different from the other traditional Industries is there's very significant learning by doing in EV battery production so we all know that in the cost of BB battery production dropped by 90% from 2020 to 2020 and then so China did uh like other countries subsidies turned out to be Global compliments the US subsidies benefit all other regions similarly as the Chinese subsidies and and European subsidies this is because when the farm subsidize that EV purchase it will increase demand for electric vehicle battery which then accelerate learning by doing at the battery sector which then lower the EV prices in the future then further stimulate pressures um”

0.80

The policy community often discusses industrial policy success in terms of outcomes like global trade flows or market share, but academic research reveals that scholars measure success through a much larger variety of metrics including market share, industry revenue, innovation measures like patenting, and other variables, and depending on which metric is used, conclusions about effectiveness can be drastically different.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Ryan Fedson

“in the policy community often times we we see certain outcomes of industrial policy and those are often discussed uh maybe it's global trade flows uh maybe to some degree it's market share uh but I found that the academic research really looked at a really large uh variety of ways that you can measure the success of industrial policy everything from market share industry Revenue um measures of innovation like you know the total amount of patenting uh you know all sorts of different uh measures”

0.80

Industrial policy goals can be visualized as a three-way venn diagram with productivity in one circle, market share or market dominance in the middle, and resilience or self-reliance in another circle, and efficiency and resilience are often opposites: very tight just-in-time supply chains are efficient but fragile, while resilient supply chains are less efficient.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Gerard Depo

“you could you could imagine priorities or goals as being sort of like a like a a three-way vend diagram right so on the one hand you wind have productivity and that definitely is thing that matters in the long run from an economic perspective in the middle maybe overlapping you would have something like market share or market dominance and on the other side you might have resilience or self self-reliance right those things are these two self-reliance and productivity could very well be the opposite or another way of putting it is um efficiency and resiliency are often the Opposites right so if you have very tight just in time Supply chains they could be very efficient low cost but there's not a lot of resiliency there”

0.80

The fundamental question in industrial policy assessment is 'what is the objective here,' and while economists would certainly agree it should be productivity, this is definitely not the consensus in DC nor in Beijing, making dialogue between economists and policymakers problematic.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Gerard Depo

“I think we have to sort of start by asking what is the objective here I think economists would certainly agree it should be productiv but that is definitely not the consensus in DC nor is it in Beijing”

0.80

Government faces inherent conflicting objectives when implementing industrial policy: wanting to pick winners but also compensate losers, wanting disruptive innovation but also social stability, wanting dynamic innovation but also state control, and trying to do everything everywhere at once makes it harder to improve on market outcomes.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lee Brainard

“governments inevitably have conflicting objectives they want to pick winners but also compensate the losers they want disruptive innovation but also social stability they want Dynamic Innovation but also State control and trying to do everything everywhere all at once makes it harder to improve on Market outcomes”

0.80

All three types of subsidy instruments (grants, income tax concessions, below-market borrowings) should be included in empirical studies to avoid wrongly attributing outcomes caused by subsidies to other factors.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Chloe Papazian

“one important point we would like to make is that um governments including in China make use of the three types of instruments we quantify five to support industrial films this underscores that to the extent possible all free instruments grants income tax concessions and Below Market borrowings should be in our view included in empirical studies in order to avoid wrongly attributing outcome caused by subsidies to other factors”

0.80

To understand the impact of industrial subsidies in a given country or sector, one must first identify and quantify the broader ecosystem of measures because subsidies often persist in lack of transparency (e.g., below-market energy prices, below-market land prices) that OECD doesn't yet measure.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Chloe Papazian

“perhaps two very quick Point here is the fact that um to understand the impact of such industrial subsidies in a given country in a sector or across sectors you need to identify First and quantify first this ecosystem of measures and this might be difficult due to at times the persistent lack of transparency surrounding some subsidies measures including measures we do not cover yet at the oecd such as the provision of below market energy or the provision of bow Market land”

0.80

Identifying firms that can invent the technologies of tomorrow is much harder than identifying firms that can copy technologies of the present, as any venture capitalist will attest.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lee Brander

“identifying firms that can actually invent the Technologies of Tomorrow is much harder than identifying the firms that can copy the Technologies of the present just ask any venture capitalist”

0.80

Different measurement variables for industrial policy success (market share, industry revenue, patenting/innovation measures, etc.) can lead to very different conclusions about effectiveness, making it difficult to assess whether a given policy was successful.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Ryan Fedsion

“in the policy community often times we we see certain outcomes of industrial policy and those are often discussed uh maybe it's global trade flows uh maybe to some degree it's market share uh but I found that the academic research really looked at a really large uh variety of ways that you can measure the success of industrial policy everything from market share industry Revenue um measures of innovation like you know the total amount of patenting uh you know all sorts of different uh measures um and so that is one challenge with with the research is that um you can look at total amount of money spent in industrial policy but that doesn't really give you a sense of how effective um it's it's necessarily been um and so so that was something I I found particularly interesting Ian there really are a variety of ways to evaluate um the the question of Effectiveness and depending on which one of those uh variables you look at you could draw very different conclusions”

0.75

Policy design matters: having more discipline within the industrial policy system, more competition, and more market-based tools actually leads to better outcomes, and this pattern is visible even within China itself.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Elad Mokow

“not all industrial policies are the same right so policy design matters I spoke about this a little bit earlier uh of course you know having more uh you know the more discipline within the system uh more competition more market-based tools right actually uh leads to better outcomes and and you see this even within China”

0.75

Electric vehicle industrial policy effectiveness changed over time: a decade ago research showed less confidence in EV policy effectiveness with some papers suggesting possibility of failure, but policy design changed with a focus on consumers and EV attributes like battery quality and driving distance, and enabling conditions like foreign firm presence and global technology access made the policy more effective.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ryan Fedson

“electric vehicles is a similar one where it was interesting for me when we looked at some research that was done maybe a decade ago um there was a lot less uh confidence about the effectiveness of of of electric vehicle policy um and there you know in fact some some of the papers even even were suggesting that there were you know the possibility of failure but of course policy design changed there's a there was a focus on on consumers and what they wanted a focus on AP attributes of of electric vehicles themselves um the the the quality of batteries the distance of of electric vehicles um and so the policy became more effective”

0.75

China's white list EV battery supplier policy generated business-stealing away from rivals, creating distributional consequences: China benefited by $2 billion while foreign countries lost $4 billion; within China battery firms benefited at the expense of EV firms because input prices were initially more expensive, with 70% of gains to battery firms offset by losses to consumers and EV downstream firms.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“so this policy here the white list policy unlike the subsidies are essentially generated a big business dealing away from Rivals and we we also show um we show that China benefited from the white least policy by so this doesn't require the government to do anything it just essentially a shi away from foreign suppliers to domestic suppliers it benefit CH China by $2 billion doar at the cost of for foreign countries of $4 billion dollar but even within China the E the battery firms benefit at expense of EV Farms because the input is more expensive initially and the consumers so 70% of the gains to the EV firm battery firms actually are offset by the losses to Consumers and EV Supply EV down stream Farms”

0.75

In China's shipbuilding case, subsidies generated 10 times more trade volume than the subsidies themselves, and military production ships increased several-fold during the industrial policy period, though causality cannot be definitively established.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Polit Barwick

“Chinese subsidies generated a trade volume that's 10 times larger than the subsidies and so that you how do you quantify the welfare benefits from that we also show we don't really we can't argue Cal causality but we do show that military production ships also increased by several folds you know during this period when China Implement industrial policy”

0.75

In China's traditional auto sector from 2001 to 2014, the quid pro quo technology transfer policy required foreign firms to partner with domestic firms, and while the policy benefited domestic partners, this ownership affiliation contributed less than 10% of the quality improvement for the domestic partners, with the majority of quality improvement coming from the presence of foreign firms, growing talent of domestic managers and technicians, and growth of the domestic parts sector.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“the policy the quick protol was essentially put in place to incentivize technology transfer from foreign farms and to the domestic Partners well we have you know out look following the industry for you know quite some period of time we have discovered indeed the policy benefited the basic Partners however this ownership affiliation only contributed less than 10% of the quality improvement for the itic Partners so our view of this is while um this particular qu Pro call uh technology transfer policy is perhaps at work but uh the majority the the um most of the factors contributing to The Domestic Auto firms quality improvement is not this policy but rather the presence of foreign firms you know the growing Talent of domestic managers and technicians and more importantly the the growth of domestic part sector”

0.75

The US should not concentrate basic science funding in currently fashionable areas because the locus of technological opportunity can and does move, and we need to be prepared for that movement—a lesson from technology history.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“it's important that we invest in this but that we not put all of our eggs in the currently fashionable baskets we SP spread it around because what we learned from technology history is that the currently fashionable Cutting Edge areas were not always the places that Venture capitalists were investing in and they won't always be in the future the Locust of a technological opportunity can and does move”

0.75

Access to foreign technology, foreign direct investment, globalized value chains, technology transfer, and access to foreign markets have been important for China's industrial development, and sometimes the effectiveness of industrial policy is overstated while the role of these foreign sources is forgotten.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Elad Mokow

“access to foreign technology um has uh has been important right so I think we we think about China's um indigenous innovation uh and we sometimes forget the role of foreign direct investment of uh globalized value chains of um technology transfer um and and core technology diffusion in many ways and also the importance of having access to foreign markets”

0.75

In China's shipbuilding policy, early on entry subsidies to every firm were vastly wasteful and attracted rent-seeking and entry of inefficient firms, but later when the aggregate environment was less favorable, China's policy was quickly changed to shift support away from entry subsidies (which are wasteful) toward investment subsidies targeted at more efficient firms with long-run horizons, which improved policy effectiveness in terms of output, revenue, and welfare.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“in ship building the early on this plan subsidy to every every firm is vastly wasteful and attracts uh rent seeking and entry of inefficient farms and essentially later on went B up when the aggregate environment is not so favorable and then what uh China did to China's credit the policy was quickly changed um in response to some of the you know negative consequences and the government shift support toward uh Farms that are more efficient for example they use the essentially shifted to from away from entry subsidies which are wasteful to investment subsidies that are much more likely to be taken up by efficient Farms”

0.75

To understand the impact of industrial subsidies on a country, sector, or across sectors, one must first identify and quantify the full ecosystem of measures surrounding subsidies, which is difficult due to persistent lack of transparency in some subsidy measures including below-market energy provision and below-market land provision.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“to understand the impact of such industrial subsidies in a given country in a sector or across sectors you need to identify First and quantify first this ecosystem of measures and this might be difficult due to at times the persistent lack of transparency surrounding some subsidies measures including measures we do not cover yet at the oecd such as the provision of below market energy or the provision of bow Market land”

0.75

In shipbuilding, China's early policy of providing entry subsidies to every firm was vastly wasteful and attracted rent-seeking and inefficient firm entry; later, when the aggregate environment became less favorable, China changed the policy to provide investment subsidies instead, which were more likely to be taken up by efficient firms with long-term horizons, significantly improving policy effectiveness.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Panjia Barwick

“in ship building the early on this plan subsidy to every every firm is vastly wasteful and attracts uh rent seeking and entry of inefficient farms and essentially later on went B up when the aggregate environment is not so favorable and then what uh China did to China's credit the policy was quickly changed um in response to some of the you know negative consequences and the government shift support toward uh Farms that are more efficient for example they use the essentially shifted to from away from entry subsidies which are wasteful to investment subsidies that are much more likely to be taken up by efficient Farms”

0.75

Foreign technology access has been important for Chinese industrial policy success; the role of foreign direct investment, globalized value chains, technology transfer, and access to foreign markets has been underappreciated in discussions of China's indigenous innovation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Elad Mokito

“access to foreign technology um has uh has been important right so I think we we think about China's um indigenous innovation uh and we sometimes forget the role of foreign direct investment of uh globalized value chains of um technology transfer um and and core technology diffusion in many ways and also the importance of having access to foreign markets”

0.75

Efficiency and resiliency are often opposites; very tight just-in-time supply chains are efficient and low-cost but lack resiliency, while the narrative in DC about why industrial policy is needed focuses on resilience and redundancy (partly driven by COVID experience), not efficiency.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“you could imagine priorities or goals as being sort of like a like a a three-way vend diagram right so on the one hand you wind have productivity and that definitely is thing that matters in the long run from an economic perspective in the middle maybe overlapping you would have something like market share or market dominance and on the other side you might have resilience or self self-reliance right those things are these two self-reliance and productivity could very well be the opposite or another way of putting it is um efficiency and resiliency are often the Opposites right so if you have very tight just in time Supply chains they could be very efficient low cost but there's not a lot of resiliency there this is part of the narrative in DC about why we need to do Industrial policy because of what happened during Co”

0.75

State enterprises in China play a pivotal role in providing subsidies to other state or private enterprises or in favoring domestic companies through discriminatory public procurement.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“The second lesson is that state Enterprises notably in China play a pivotal role in for instance providing themselves subsidies to other state or private Enterprises or in favoring other domestic companies for example the discriminatory public procurement”

0.75

We must start by asking what is the objective of industrial policy; economists would agree productivity should be the goal, but this is definitely not the consensus in DC nor in Beijing.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“I think we have to sort of start by asking what is the objective here I think economists would certainly agree it should be productiv but that is definitely not the consensus in DC nor is it in Beijing”

0.75

Chinese industrial policy generates trade flows 10 times larger than the subsidies themselves and is correlated with increases in military production capacity, suggesting non-economic benefits that can't be quantified in standard welfare analysis.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“in our analysis we show that um there's a couple of Dimensions we can't really measure and model you know in the empirical analysis one is the benefit from trade indeed you know chinesee subsidies generated a trade volume that's 10 times larger than the subsidies and so that you how do you quantify the welfare benefits from that we also show we don't really we can't argue Cal causality but we do show that military production ships also increased by several folds you know during this period when China Implement industrial policy”

0.75

Most industrial policies are procyclical (applied when industry is at full capacity), which is wasteful because additional output is very costly, whereas countercyclical policies would utilize unutilized resources more efficiently.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“most of the policies are procyclical which are wasteful because when the industry is already at full capacity explaining more is very costly poundal policies on the other hand would essentially utilize the unutilized uh resources”

0.74

The currently fashionable cutting-edge technology areas are not always where venture capitalists and policymakers should invest, because the locus of technological opportunity moves over time; therefore, government science funding should be spread across many areas rather than concentrated in current fashion.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lee Branstetter

“we should not put all of our eggs in the currently fashionable baskets we SP spread it around because what we learned from technology history is that the currently fashionable Cutting Edge areas were not always the places that Venture capitalists were investing in and they won't always be in the future the Locust of a technological opportunity can and does move and we need to be prepared for that movement”

0.72

Japan's industrial policy mandarins in their heyday were no more successful than China's have been on average; Japan did not pick winners any better than China is doing today, with no more correlation between Japanese policy support and productivity than exists in China today.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Lee Brander

“Japan's industrial policy mandarins back in their Heyday were actually no more successful than China's have been on average Japan did not pick winners any better than China is doing today there was no more correlation between Japanese policy support and productivity than there is in China today”

0.71

Timing matters for industrial policy: most policies are procyclical (wasteful because applied when industry is at full capacity) while countercyclical policies would be more effective because they would utilize unutilized resources.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“timing is also very important here we show that um most of the policies are procyclical which are wasteful because when the industry is already at full capacity explaining more is very costly poundal policies on the other hand would essentially utilize the unutilized uh resources”

0.70

The strategic trade policy literature of the 1980s predicted that industrial policy could lead to a wave of inefficient entry that undermines the national benefits from industrial policy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lee Brander

“there's an old literature from the 1980s right the Strategic trade policy literature of the 19 1980s that actually anticipated this papers by authors like Horseman and Markus and eaten and Grossman some of whom are sadly no longer with us predicted that industrial policy could lead to a wave of inefficient entry that undermines the national benefits from industrial policy”

0.70

Industrial policy is motivated primarily by National Security concerns on both sides of the Pacific, not by productivity considerations; the outgoing Obama administration and now the Trump administration both frame industrial policy in National Security terms rather than economic terms.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“I think we're even we're having this discussion at least in the DC context because of National Security concerns I think that's what's spurring action on both sides of the Pacific and it's the primary motivation on the Chinese side and on the us side the chips Act is I've almost never heard it framed in terms of productivity even if that actually might be the right way to think about it”

0.70

EV policy discourse shifted dramatically from 2020 to 2023; earlier analysis (around 2020) described white elephant projects and wasteful provincial spending, but by 2023 China was selling over 8 million EVs annually (up from about 1.2 million in 2020), suggesting that linear extrapolation from past analysis produces misleading conclusions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“I would also caution against um being too linear in extrapolation so just take electric vehicles for example the discourse say three or four four years ago was largely about um companies like Neo or others like white elephant projects a lot of provinces having their own um you know government guidance funds wasting money and it wasn't going so well uh but then all of a sudden it it turned quite rapidly so looking at our BNF data on the terminal so in even in 2020 China domestically was selling about 1.2 million electric vehicles in its own Market by 2023 they was over 8 million and it it had been basically flat for 5 years and then it went vertical”

0.70

In electric vehicles, research a decade ago showed less confidence in policy effectiveness and suggested possibility of failure, but policy design changed with focus on consumer preferences and EV attributes (battery quality, range), and enabling conditions like presence of foreign firms and access to global technology made policy more effective.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Ryan Fedson

“for example we we featured uh research done by uh ponla who's on the uh panel and some of her her colleagues on ship building um in that case uh you know there was a a large amount of uh policy support there were multiple uh types of support everything from entry subsidies that that focused on getting firms to enter the market to investment subsidies um but uh you know a lot of that policy ended up being incredibly wasteful um and and I think in economic terms you might think of it as a failure right and that it wasn't a very effective policy there was a lot of waste at the same time you know China gained significant market share in that industry”

0.69

The United States should increase government funding of pre-commercial basic science through government agencies and university research, as this represents one of America's most successful investments in the future and has laid the groundwork for major industrial advances like those in AI.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“the United States should increase Government funding of pre-commercial basic science and of course you know as uh you know Elon Musk and others uh consider ways to cut trillions of dollars from the government budget I'm very worried that one of the things that will cut uh is expenditure that has been among America's most successful investments in the future right funding by the science agencies in university-based research that has actually laid the groundwork for major industrial advances like those in AI”

0.69

In OECD analysis collecting financial information on 480+ companies in 14 industrial sectors from 2005-2022, both OECD and non-OECD countries use subsidies in the form of grants, income tax concessions, and below-market borrowing, but China-based producers have been the largest recipients of subsidies across various industrial sectors throughout the period.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“we have now such information for uh more than 480 companies uh listed and long listed in 14 different industrial sector between 2005 and 2022 and this data collection efforts has enabled us to draw some key lessons on Industrial subsidies notably in China and I would list three of them so first both o and non nod countries use subsidies in the form of Grants income tax concessions and Below market borrowings yet what we have seen is that China based producers have been the largest recipient of subsidies across the various industrial sectors we cover throughout the period”

0.69

State enterprises in China play a pivotal role in providing subsidies to other state or private enterprises and in favoring other domestic companies through mechanisms like discriminatory public procurement.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“state Enterprises notably in China play a pivotal role in for instance providing themselves subsidies to other state or private Enterprises or in favoring other domestic companies for example the discriminatory public procurement”

0.69

China's semiconductor industrial policy, despite massive government spending, has not been an unvarnished success and has experienced significant setbacks including widespread corruption and failed projects associated with the Big Fund and other investments.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Ryan Fedson

“semiconductors um is one often discussed today was very interesting because of course a lot of industrial policy support in China but there's also a lot of industrial policy support around the world um and so even though China has thrown a lot of money at semiconductors and there have been um improvements particularly in um the less advanced technology nodes um it has not been an unvarnished um policy success and there have been significant setbacks uh such as widespread you know corruption or kind of failed projects associated with with the bin big fund and other other Investments”

0.69

Japan's industrial policy in its heyday was no more successful at picking winners than China's is today—there was no more correlation between Japanese policy support and productivity than exists in China today, according to the older literature on Japanese industrial policy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“Japan's industrial policy mandarins back in their Heyday were actually no more successful than China's have been on average Japan did not pick winners any better than China is doing today there was no more correlation between Japanese policy support and productivity than there is in China today”

0.69

US military and economic security in the long run may depend on the health and longevity of the Western Alliance, so anything that undermines those alliances and ties weakens the United States very substantially.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“I think our military and economic security in the long run may depend on the Health and Longevity of that Alliance and anything that future presidential administrations might do to undermine those ties and undermine those alliances weakens the United States very substantially in the competition that's underway”

0.69

To extend lessons from Japan or China to another country may not be easily replicable due to very different contexts, government structures, and institutional environments, making direct policy transfer risky.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“if you uh draw a lesson from what happened uh in Japan uh in some years ago or in China to today may not be easily replicated in another country due to a very different context a very different country a very different uh government”

0.69

Looking at ship building history spanning 150 years globally, every successful case examined was supported by government policy, while there have been failed attempts (US, Brazil) and cases that failed initially then succeeded (South Korea in 1960s then 1970s), indicating that government support is necessary but not sufficient for ship building success.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“I have looked at um the ship building industry going back 150 years worldwide and I think for every cases we examine every case We examined particular the successful case cases um they're all supported by government you know some kind of government policy there are also failed attempts so it doesn't mean that every and US tried and failed Brazil tried and failed and South Korea tried in the 60s and failed and then succeed in the 70s”

0.69

Subsidies often accompany other measures including trade barriers (import/export restrictions), market access restrictions (joint venture requirements), consumer subsidies with local content requirements, and weaker regulatory rules, creating complex ecosystems of complementary policies.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“other point about this ecosystem of measures and policies is that often measures accompany produc other measures accompany producer subsidies such as trade barriers including import restriction or export restriction Market access restriction including an obligation to form a joint venture with a local producers consumer subsidies with local content requirements or weaker regul regulatory rules so these various lessons we have learned shed line on the empirical challenges attached to measure whether industrial subsidies are a success or failure and what is the trade the global impact of such industrial subsidies”

0.69

The US military and economic security may depend on the health and longevity of the Western Alliance including East Asian industrial democracies; anything that undermines ties with these allied countries weakens the US substantially in competition with China.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Branstetter

“China May and perhaps will grow larger than the United States in absolute economic size but it's very hard for it me to imagine it growing larger than the entire Western Alliance especially if we Define the Western Alliance broadly to include the East Asian industrial democracies and other Advanced industrial Democratic countries I think our military and economic security in the long run may depend on the Health and Longevity of that Alliance and anything that future presidential administrations might do to undermine those ties and undermine those alliances weakens the United States very substantially”

0.69

Academic literature on industrial policy across countries shows that success is concentrated in East Asia (Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, China) while many other countries have experienced failures, and the determining factors include firm incentive structures and discipline mechanisms (exports competition, internal competition, or independent bureaucracy) to counterbalance state support which can lead to capture.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Elad Mokito

“you have the developmental States you you have a lot of failures a lot of the successes are f are concentrated in East Asia um Taiwan um Japan um South Korea um to a certain extent uh you know China itself and then many other countries have had failures and really you know there's various factors that determine that uh but the the incentive structure for firms and um uh and the the the the introduction of of of um discipline uh mechanisms for firms are really important right discipline can come through a variety of ways exports competition internally competition externally”

0.69

Firms and regional governments in China respond opportunistically to central government industrial policy initiatives in ways that undermine desired outcomes.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“firms and Regional governments can respond opportunistically to central government initiatives in ways that undermine desired outcomes”

0.69

Market failures like learning-by-doing (in semiconductors, EV batteries) and infant industries justify economic arguments for industrial policies, and these are legitimate considerations even if implementation is difficult.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Panjia Barwick

“there are cases economic arguments that actually justify or motivate industrial policies in particular when we have market failures or distortions and learning by doing is a good example I looked at several historical cases in the US steel industry in the 19 1900 early 1900s and and in know literature the one studying the literature when there infant Industries you know now we're looking at semiconductor industry there are economic arguments or electric vehicle battery production that uh there significant spillover generated by commercial activities that perhaps justify industrial policies”

0.69

Innovation policy and productivity policy can be much broader than industrial policy; fundamentals need to be gotten right, and some of the most successful industries achieved success not just from government support but also from companies getting fundamentals right and being genuinely innovative.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Elad Mokito

“I think it is uh sometimes frustrating that we talk so much about industrial policy these days and we forget that Innovation policy and productivities policy can be much broader right and that there's some fundamentals that you need to get right and actually that was one of the findings is that um looking also at China is that some of the industries that have done well it's not entirely clear that it's just uh government support right it may actually be very reneu companies it may be that they got the fundamentals right”

0.69

China is now thought to have a special position in shipbuilding from a national security perspective, raising concerns in Washington, and while shipbuilding cost-benefit analysis shows costs exceed benefits economically, people in Beijing likely think the cost was worth it for the strategic advantage it provides.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Elad Moko

“and yet um you know this does put China in sort of a special position in on a national security front right and in Washington it's certainly raised a lot of concerns right that that China has this this dominance over ship building so I think that does you know I'm sure there are people in in in Beijing who think the cost was well worth it uh because it's given china such a lead in what is a pretty strategic industry right”

0.69

The United States should increase government funding of pre-commercial basic science and university-based research, which has been among America's most successful investments in the future and laid groundwork for major industrial advances like those in AI.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“secondly I think the United States should increase Government funding of pre-commercial basic science and of course you know as uh you know Elon Musk and others uh consider ways to cut trillions of dollars from the government budget I'm very worried that one of the things that will cut uh is expenditure that has been among America's most successful investments in the future right funding by the science agencies in university-based research that has actually laid the groundwork for major industrial advances like those in AI”

0.68

The perception in DC that 'China always wins' whenever Beijing provides subsidies is not supported by academic research examining quantitative data; in fact, firms and industries receiving policy support tend to be relatively less productive than unsupported firms, and after receiving support become even less productive in relative terms.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“DC there's a sense that China always wins that if you know that that as long as Beijing provides subsidies um any industry decides to look at um will succeed”

0.68

The narrative in DC attributes supply chain disruptions during COVID to insufficient resilience and uses this to justify industrial policy, but an alternative interpretation is that Asian factories held up reasonably well and trade saved the US, suggesting resilience concerns may be overstated.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“this is part of the narrative in DC about why we need to do Industrial policy because of what happened during Co although I would argue that Asian factories held up pretty well uh and trade saved us but that's not the dominant narrative”

0.68

Industrial policy's cost needs to be fully accounted for, including indirect costs such as potential retaliation from other countries: if Chinese industrial policy leads Western countries to retaliate, that cost must be factored into policy evaluation, and since China is the world's largest exporter of manufactured goods it has more to lose from global trading system breakdown than any other country.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“if Chinese industrial policy leads Western countries to retaliate against China then that needs to be factored into the cost right and I don't want to make China solely responsible for the breakdown of the global trading system there's plenty of you know blame to go around but it certainly Bears part of the blame right and I can't think of any country that has more to lose from a breakdown in the global trading system than the world's largest exporter of manufactured goods”

0.68

The solution to US ship building capacity deficit is almost certainly industrial policy, because the US cannot rely on market mechanisms to rebuild a capital-intensive, slow-moving industry when competitors maintain state support.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“the solu to that is almost certainly industrial policy or you could say it doesn't matter”

0.68

Research by Branstetter and co-authors found that firms and industries receiving policy support tend to be relatively less productive than firms that don't receive support, and after receiving support they become even less productive in relative terms than before, with no statistical evidence that support leads to higher productivity or better innovative outputs even for Made in China 2025 policies.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Branstetter

“in my research I found that firms and industries receiving policy support and intervention as I measure it and as my uh co-authors measure it tend to be relatively less productive than firms that don't and after receiving this support the firms that are the recipient become if anything even less productive and relative terms than they were before receiving the support and even if we focus on subsidies ass associated with the made in China 2025 policy initiative we see no statistical evidence that the support leads to higher productivity or better Innovative outs uh”

0.68

In China's quid pro quo foreign joint venture policy in the auto sector (2001-2014), the policy benefited domestic partners in quality improvement, but this ownership affiliation contributed less than 10% of the quality improvement for domestic auto firms; the majority of quality improvement came from the presence of foreign firms, growing talent of domestic managers and technicians, and growth of the domestic parts sector.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Panjia Barwick

“we have discovered indeed the policy benefited the basic Partners however this ownership affiliation only contributed less than 10% of the quality improvement for the itic Partners so our view of this is while um this particular qu Pro call uh technology transfer policy is perhaps at work but uh the majority the the um most of the factors contributing to The Domestic Auto firms quality improvement is not this policy but rather the presence of foreign firms you know the growing Talent of domestic managers and technicians and more importantly the the growth of domestic part sector”

0.68

China's white list policy (2015-2019) for EV subsidies, which tied domestic EV subsidies to domestic battery suppliers, generated significant business diversion away from foreign rivals; Chinese battery suppliers caught up with and surpassed Japan and South Korea, with dominant Chinese suppliers accounting for over 60% of worldwide battery production by 2024.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Panjia Barwick

“China also implemented a white list policy which essentially ties the domestic EV subsidies to domestic battery suppliers in 2015 China became the largest ev Market but Chinese uh battery suppliers are lagging behind Japan South Korea see but we show crucially by the end of the policy the white list policy which is very similar in spirit to the US inflation reduction act the local count requirement China's Chinese battery suppliers have already caught up with Japan South Korea and um and essentially now become the leading battery suppliers by 2024 the dominant Chinese battery suppliers accounting for more than 60% of worldwide battery uh production”

0.68

The United States should vastly increase levels of high-skilled immigration as one of the most powerful advantages the US has in competition with China, since tens of thousands to millions of highly skilled entrepreneurial people would love to work in the US if given the opportunity.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“in the name of National Security the United States should vastly increase its levels of high-skilled immigration one of the most powerful advantages the United States has and any kind of competition with China or anyone else is our attractiveness as a place to do business to study to do research to invent the future there are tens of thousands hundreds of thousands millions of very highly skilled entrepreneurial people who would love to exercise their talent in the United States if we would just give them the opportunity to do so”

0.68

EV battery production costs dropped by 90 percent between 2010 and 2020, demonstrating significant learning-by-doing benefits in battery manufacturing.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Ponla Barwick

“we all know that in the cost of BB battery production dropped by 90% from 2020 to 2020”

0.68

Industrial policy costs need to be fully accounted for, including retaliatory responses from other countries that can harm a large exporter like China more than the export gains from the policy, and the US should factor in these costs when evaluating whether to respond with its own industrial policy.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“I think one of the ways that you know pan has really moved our understanding forward um is that you know she and her co-author sort of realized that it's very hard to directly measure all these subsidies and so instead they constructed this you know very sophisticated model of the ship building industry and they inferred the subsidies based on the observed behavior of shipyards in the model and it you know led to these conclusions right that you know once you total up the enormous cost expended promoting this sector they actually outweigh the benefits right now it's very hard to do this kind of analysis right you kind of have to do this industry by industry and sector by sector you kind of have to build a bespoke model in every context but I think it's really important to account for the costs and I would argue and I hope P would agree that in some ways we might need to even go beyond what ponla and her co-authors have done for inance if Chinese industrial policy leads Western countries to retaliate against China then that needs to be factored into the cost right and I don't want to make China solely responsible for the breakdown of the global trading system there's plenty of you know blame to go around but it certainly Bears part of the blame right and I can't think of any country that has more to lose from a breakdown in the global trading system than the world's largest exporter of manufactured goods”

0.66

Firms and regional governments respond opportunistically to central government industrial policy initiatives in ways that undermine desired outcomes, a pattern anticipated by 1980s strategic trade policy literature authors like Horseman, Markus, and Grossman.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lee Brainard

“firms and Regional governments can respond opportunistically to central government initiatives in ways that undermine desired outcomes again there's an old literature from the 1980s right the Strategic trade policy literature of the 19 1980s that actually anticipated this”

0.66

Long-run productivity growth is the key metric for assessing economic success, and short-run growth at the industry level is not a useful success metric if it doesn't contribute to long-run productivity gains.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Lee Branstetter

“I think it is useful for us to focus our thinking on the productivity of firms Industries and economies the key to National prosperity in the long run is for a nation to become more productive to generate the highest possible output with a given level of capital labor and materials inputs and I also want to emphasize the long run uh economic development is a marathon not a Sprint short run growth at the industry level is not necessarily a very useful metric of success if it doesn't contribute to Long Run productivity growth”

0.65

In solar panels, many Chinese companies operate at a loss with subsidies propping them up, which is clearly inefficient; however, China has become almost completely dominant in solar panel production, and Beijing appears willing to bear this efficiency cost to achieve dominance.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“there are also sectors like solar panels where we know from filings that a lot of Chinese solar panel companies are operating at a loss and subsidies are probably propping them up that is definitely not efficient however China is almost completely dominant in solar panel production and that seems to be a cost that that Beijing is willing to bear”

0.64

Productivity—generating the highest possible output with given capital, labor, and materials inputs—is the key to national prosperity in the long run, and short-run growth at the industry level is not a useful metric of success if it doesn't contribute to long-run productivity growth.

normativehigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Lee Brander

“the key to National prosperity in the long run is for a nation to become more productive to generate the highest possible output with a given level of capital labor and materials inputs and I also want to emphasize the long run uh economic development is a marathon not a Sprint short run growth at the industry level is not necessarily a very useful metric of success if it doesn't contribute to Long Run productivity growth”

0.64

Foreign direct investment inflows into China collapsed from an all-time high of $340 billion in 2021 to negative $5 billion in the first quarter of 2024, and foreign venture capital investment in Chinese startups has collapsed, representing huge costs that could partly be attributed to Chinese industrial policy and economic security concerns making China less attractive.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Brainard

“FDI inflows into China have collapsed from an all-time high of you know 340 some OD billion dollars in 2021 to neg5 billion in the first quarter of 2024 foreign venture capital investment in Chinese startups has collapsed foreign investors are pulling their money out right I mean these are huge costs to China to what extent could we attribute them to Chinese industrial policy certainly not the only Factor but it is a factor”

0.64

The US still maintains inefficient industrial policy tools like the Jones Act despite economic criticisms, showing that industrial policy persists for reasons beyond economics.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“at the end of the day we're still getting back to to the point where we are today which is the US is basically no commercial ship building capacity and even our naval ship building capacity is is far less than even our own current demands including to meet uh requests by by say Australia for subs and other things the solu to that is almost certainly industrial policy or you could say it doesn't matter right I think a a broader point is that when we talk about objectives we have to say what are the objectives and why should they be the objectives”

0.64

The US lost its residual shipbuilding capacity when the Reagan administration eliminated the cost differential subsidy, which was an inefficient industrial policy; however, the US still has the Jones Act which creates inefficiency but exists for protectionist reasons.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“in the US I think that the discourse is um digging into this a bit more that the US lost what was sort of left of its residual ship building capacity when the Reagan Administration got rid of its cost differential subsidy which is to say it ended a rather inefficient and expensive uh industrial policy nonetheless we still have things like the Jones act which I think is economically stupid but you know it it exists for for a reason whether you like it or not”

0.64

Semiconductors show many industrial policy successes with continued support despite improvements in less advanced technology nodes, but also significant setbacks including widespread corruption and failed projects like those from the big fund, indicating mixed results.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Ryan Fedson

“and then the final industry we looked at semiconductors um is one often discussed today was very interesting because of course a lot of industrial policy support in China but there's also a lot of industrial policy support around the world um and so even though China has thrown a lot of money at semiconductors and there have been um improvements particularly in um the less advanced technology nodes um it has not been an unvarnished um policy success and there have been significant setbacks uh such as widespread you know corruption or kind of failed projects associated with with the bin big fund and other other Investments”

0.63

Both sides are preparing for the contingency of war; China's emphasis on self-reliance from the third plenum, the US Chips Act, and industrial policy initiatives are motivated by this underlying military contingency planning.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“I would say more quietly or maybe not so quietly preparing for the contingency that they might go to war and I think that is really the underlying motivation for the self-reliance efforts that we're clearly the the Paramount Target in the third plenum in China and I think it's a motivation at least behind the chips act”

0.63

China has collected detailed financial firm-level subsidies data across 14 industrial sectors from 2005 to 2022, covering over 480 companies; Chinese producers have been the largest recipients of subsidies across these sectors.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Chloe Papazian

“we have now such information for uh more than 480 companies uh listed and long listed in 14 different industrial sector between 2005 and 2022 and this data collection efforts has enabled us to draw some key lessons on Industrial subsidies notably in China and I would list three of them so first both o and non nod countries use subsidies in the form of Grants income tax concessions and Below market borrowings yet what we have seen is that China based producers have been the largest recipient of subsidies across the various industrial sectors we cover throughout the period”

0.62

The United States needs to invest much more strongly, aggressively, and effectively in a social safety net for workers and families cushioning them against disruption from trade and innovation, with solutions including wage insurance, expanded Earned Income Tax Credit, and intelligently designed child tax credits, rather than relying on industrial policy.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“the United States needs to invest much more strongly and aggressively and effectively and a safety net that cushions our workers and families against the disruption that trade and Innovation inevitably generate and economists have come up with a lot of ideas over the decades wage insurance a vastly expanded Earned Income Tax Credit an intelligently designed child tax credit there's no shortage of good ideas that could be implemented that could pretty coste effectively cushion that Minority of workers upon whom the burden of disruption inevitably rests”

0.62

The United States should vastly increase high-skilled immigration as a National Security priority, as this is one of the most powerful advantages the US has in competition with China, and turning away hundreds of thousands to millions of highly skilled entrepreneurial people represents one of the most amazing own goals in the history of international competition.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“in the name of National Security the United States should vastly increase its levels of high-skilled immigration one of the most powerful advantages the United States has and any kind of competition with China or anyone else is our attractiveness as a place to do business to study to do research to invent the future”

0.62

The fact that the United States turns away highly skilled, productive, innovative individuals from other countries is probably one of the most amazing own goals in the history of international competition.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“the fact that we turn away so many of these outstanding highly productive Innovative individuals um is probably one of the most amazing own goals in the history of international competition”

0.61

There are economic arguments that can justify or motivate industrial policies, particularly when market failures or distortions exist and significant spillovers occur, such as learning-by-doing in infant industries; historical examples include US steel industry in early 1900s, semiconductor industry, and EV battery production.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“there are cases economic arguments that actually justify or motivate industrial policies in particular when we have market failures or distortions and learning by doing is a good example I looked at several historical cases in the US steel industry in the 19 1900 early 1900s and and in know literature the one studying the literature when there infant Industries you know now we're looking at semiconductor industry there are economic arguments or electric vehicle battery production that uh there significant spillover generated by commercial activities that perhaps justify industrial policies”

0.61

Identifying firms that can actually invent the technologies of tomorrow is much harder than identifying firms that can copy the technologies of the present, as any venture capitalist would confirm.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brander

“identifying firms that can actually invent the Technologies of Tomorrow is much harder than identifying the firms that can copy the Technologies of the present just ask any venture capitalist”

0.61

China faces a fundamental productivity challenge because its labor force will shrink by 200 million workers in the coming decades (larger than the entire current US labor force) and capital investment faces diminishing returns; therefore, China must become more efficient to generate growth and living standard convergence with developed nations.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Branstetter

“becoming more productive is really China's key challenge in the coming decades its labor force is no longer growing drinking by as many as 200 million workers in the coming decades which is more than the entire current labor force of the United States capital investment is running into diminishing returns in Industry after industry in order for living standards to grow and converge to those of first world Nations under these conditions China has to become more efficient and effective at generating the most possible output given it shrinking labor inputs”

0.57

The US has essentially no commercial shipbuilding capacity currently, and even naval shipbuilding capacity is less than current US demands including requests from Australia for submarines; this capacity gap creates National Security vulnerabilities.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“at the end of the day we're still getting back to to the point where we are today which is the US is basically no commercial ship building capacity and even our naval ship building capacity is is far less than even our own current demands including to meet uh requests by by say Australia for subs and other things”

0.57

The dominant narrative in Washington is that China's industrial policy always succeeds and the US must either emulate it or prevent a Chinese tech takeover, but this narrative is contradicted by academic research examining quantitative data.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Elad Mokito

“DC there's a sense that China always wins that if you know that that as long as Beijing provides subsidies um any industry decides to look at um will succeed”

0.57

The US should not follow China down an industrial policy path because it does not contribute to macro-level productivity growth; instead, the US should increase high-skilled immigration, increase government funding of pre-commercial basic science, seek to integrate US firms and workers into global supply chains with allies, and invest in worker safety nets to cushion disruption from trade and innovation.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Branstetter

“I certainly don't think that we should follow China down an industrial policy rabbit hole that's not contributing to macr productivity growth at the aggregate level”

0.57

Industrial policy is not the path forward for the United States, and if anything good might come out of a turning of administrations it might be a turning away from policy initiatives that are unlikely to generate outcomes commens with their costs.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Brander

“I don't think that industrial policy is the path forward um and if anything good might come out of a turning of administrations um it might be a turning away from policy initiatives that I'm quite concerned um are not going to generate outcomes and contributions to aggregate productivity that are commens with their costs”

0.57

In the global electric vehicle sector from 2013-2020, all countries—US, China, and Europe—subsidize EV purchases, and these subsidies turned out to be global compliments rather than substitutes: when one country subsidizes EV purchases, it increases demand for batteries, which accelerates learning-by-doing in battery production, which lowers EV prices globally, further stimulating demand everywhere.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“so in our analysis we showed we look at several policies one is that all countries subsidized electric vehicles purchases you know during this period and and then a key feature very different from the other traditional Industries is there's very significant learning by doing in EV battery production so we all know that in the cost of BB battery production dropped by 90% from 2020 to 2020 and then so China did uh like other countries subsidies turned out to be Global compliments the US subsidies benefit all other regions similarly as the Chinese subsidies and and European subsidies this is because when the farm subsidize that EV purchase it will increase demand for electric vehicle battery which then accelerate learning by doing at the battery sector which then lower the EV prices in the future then further stimulate pressures”

0.56

The discourse on China's electric vehicle sector shifted dramatically over 3-4 years: it had discussed white elephant projects and wasted provincial government guidance funds with ineffective results, but then suddenly EV sales went vertical—from flat for 5 years to 1.2 million domestically in 2020 jumping to over 8 million by 2023—suggesting that linear extrapolation from past analysis can be misleading.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Gerard Depo

“the discourse say three or four four years ago was largely about um companies like Neo or others like white elephant projects a lot of provinces having their own um you know government guidance funds wasting money and it wasn't going so well uh but then all of a sudden it turned quite rapidly so looking at our BNF data on the terminal so in even in 2020 China domestically was selling about 1.2 million electric vehicles in its own Market by 2023 they was over 8 million and it it had been basically flat for 5 years and then it went vertical”

0.56

China's aggregate rate of total factor productivity growth has substantially declined in recent years, and the rate at which China is converging to the productivity frontier represented by the United States and other advanced countries has declined sharply, which does not augur well for future success regardless of industrial policy effectiveness.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Brainard

“China's aggregate rate of total Factor productivity growth has substantially declined in recent years and the rate at which China is converging to the productivity Frontier represented by the United States and other First World countries has declined sharply in recent years”

0.56

FDI inflows into China have collapsed from $340 billion at all-time high in 2021 to negative $5 billion in first quarter of 2024; foreign venture capital investment in Chinese startups has collapsed; foreign investors are pulling their money out.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Branstetter

“FDI inflows into China have collapsed from an all-time high of you know 340 some OD billion dollars in 2021 to neg5 billion in the first quarter of 2024 foreign venture capital investment in Chinese startups has collapsed foreign investors are pulling their money out right I mean these are huge costs to China”

0.55

The United States should aggressively seek to integrate US firms and workers into Global supply chains that include allies and partners, because while China may grow larger in absolute economic size, it is hard to imagine it growing larger than the entire Western Alliance especially if defined broadly to include East Asian industrial democracies and other advanced industrial democracies.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Lee Brainard

“aggressively seek to integrate us firms and workers into Global Supply chains that include our allies and partners China May and perhaps will grow larger than the United States in absolute economic size but it's very hard for it me to imagine it growing larger than the entire Western Alliance especially if we Define the Western Alliance broadly to include the East Asian industrial democracies and other Advanced industrial Democratic countries”

0.52

Policymakers in DC are motivated primarily by National Security concerns rather than productivity when pursuing industrial policy, which is why the chips act is accepted across administrations for national security reasons but the incoming Trump administration is more skeptical of EVs due to anti-climate views, even though both policies could theoretically improve productivity.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Gerard Depo

“I think we're even we're having this discussion at least in the DC context because of National Security concerns I think that's what's spurring action on both sides of the Pacific and it's the primary motivation on the Chinese side and on the us side the chips Act is I've almost never heard it framed in terms of productivity even if that actually might be the right way to think about it”

0.46

While Barwick has studied industrial policy extensively, she is not a proponent of it but also not opposed to it; there are ways to do it effectively if implementation is careful regarding policy design, timing, targeting, and punishment/reward structures.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Ponla Barwick

“the second I also want to argue I actually personally I don't I'm not a you know Pro proponent of industrial policy I'm not also not a you know saying we can't do it I think there's a way to do it and it's not you know that's what I said in the beginning it's so complex that even the same policy if you do it differently if you implement it differently either the timing and the targeting the punishment in the reward and Punishment can make a big difference”

0.45

Barwick is not a proponent of industrial policy but also not opposed to it, arguing instead that how industrial policy is implemented—timing, targeting, punishment and reward mechanisms—can make enormous differences in effectiveness, and this implementation quality is as important as policy design itself.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Ponla Barwick

“I'm not a a you know Pro proponent of industrial policy I'm not also not a you know saying we can't do it I think there's a way to do it and it's not you know that's what I said in the beginning it's so complex that even the same policy if you do it differently if you implement it differently either the timing and the targeting the punishment in the reward and Punishment can make a big difference”

0.45

Industrial policy is not the path forward for the US, and if anything good might come from a change of administration it might be a turning away from policy initiatives that will not generate outcomes and productivity contributions commensurate with their costs.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Lee Brander

“I don't think that industrial policy is the path forward um and if anything good might come out of a turning of administrations um it might be a turning away from policy initiatives that I'm quite concerned um are not going to generate outcomes and contributions to aggregate productivity that are commens with their costs”