
What this covers
This is a university-style lecture by Jeffrey Kaplan, the second in a philosophy of language course, working through Gottlob Frege's 1892 paper. The running example is pop-cultural: the viral clip in which Ellen already knows who Jay-Z is, yet learns something when a man reveals he is him. Kaplan uses it to set up the problem for John Stuart Mill, whose view that a proper name means only its bearer cannot separate "Shawn Carter is Jay-Z" from "Shawn Carter is Shawn Carter." What Ellen learns, he argues, is an empirical fact about the world, not a fact about what the name means.
The middle of the lecture builds Frege's answer through several illustrations. Kaplan pairs the Jay-Z case with the morning star and evening star, both names for Venus, and with Frege's own geometric case of two lines meeting at one point under different descriptions. A house seen from its stone-columned front and from its plastic-sided back stands in for two modes of presentation of one object. The telescope analogy separates the moon itself, the image inside the telescope, and the observer's retinal image, which marks the line between sense and private conception. Sense, in this account, is public and shareable, so it cannot be a person's mental imagery.
The later sections extend the framework beyond names. It covers definite descriptions and empty names, which have a sense but no referent, with "the celestial body most distant from the Earth" as the example. It then moves to whole sentences, where the sense is the thought expressed and the truth value is the reference. The case for that last claim rests on substitution: swapping co-referring terms such as "Jay-Z" or HOV preserves truth value and respects compositionality, while a false predicate turns the sentence false whichever name is used. Kaplan calls the paper the most important in the history of the philosophy of language.
Frege's 1892 'On Sense and Reference' solves the puzzle of how identity statements can be informative by distinguishing two levels of linguistic meaning: sense (the mode of presentation of an object) and reference (the object itself), allowing terms like 'Shawn Carter' and 'Jay-Z' to refer to the same person while presenting different modes of presentation.
- Mill's theory that a name's meaning is only the object it denotes cannot explain why 'Shawn Carter is Jay-Z' is informative while 'Shawn Carter is Shawn Carter' is not
- The sense-reference distinction allows for co-referring terms with different senses, preserving compositionality while explaining cognitive value in identity statements
- The truth value of a declarative sentence is its reference because truth value is the only property that remains invariant when substituting co-referring terms
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Linguistic terms must have two levels of meaning: sense and reference. The sense is the mode of presentation (how the referent is characterized or described), while the reference is the actual object that the term denotes.
“Frager realizes that linguistic terms words have to have two levels of meaning they each have to have a sense and a reference”
Sense of a term is public and can be shared between different people, unlike conception (private mental imagery), which is why sense cannot be identified with private mental content if we want to explain how different people can mean the same thing by a term.
“it's important that the sense of a term is public different people can mean the same thing by a term and so they have to be able to share the sense and for that reason the sense of a term the mode of presentation contained in the name blah blah blah all of that that's not the same as some private mental thing some conception or image in your mind it can't be that because that thing in your mind is private no one else can see your conception”
The truth value of a declarative sentence (whether it is true or false) is the reference of that sentence, because truth value is the only property that remains invariant under substitution of co-referring terms and satisfies the compositionality constraint.
“the next question is well what's the reference what is the reference of a declarative sentence like like this or like this sha Carter is Rich Jay-Z is Rich we know what these names refer to they refer to the guy what do the whole sentences refer to and once again when figuring this out frga is constrained by compositionality whatever this thing the reference is it's going to have to somehow be built up out of the references of all the individual parts and this gives Fraga an argument for why the reference of a declarative sentence like this is that sentence's truth value”
The woman Ellen in the viral video already knows the linguistic meaning of the name 'Jay-Z' and who it refers to, but still learns something when the man reveals he is Jay-Z; what she learns is an empirical fact about the world (that this particular person is the rapper), not a linguistic fact about the meaning of the name.
“the woman her name is Ellen she already knows the meaning of the name Jay-Z so it's not like what happens is that the guy tells her oh there's this name Jay-Z and the name refers to me... she's familiar with the name she knows the meaning of Jay-Z but she still learns something at the end of the video when he tells her that he is Jay-Z”
John Stuart Mill's 1881 theory of proper names claims that the meaning of a name is nothing more than the object it denotes (the referent), making it impossible to explain why 'Shawn Carter is Jay-Z' can be informative while 'Shawn Carter is Shawn Carter' cannot be.
“there was this other theory of names published in 1881 by John Stewart Mill and according to Mills Theory the meaning of a proper name like Shawn Carter or Jay-Z the meaning of a name like that is nothing more than the object named”
The morning star and evening star example illustrates the same puzzle as the Shawn Carter/Jay-Z example: both names refer to Venus, but someone can know the meaning of both names and still learn something new by discovering that they refer to the same object.
“if you look at the Sunrise Just Before Sunrise right near where the sun is about to rise you can see a very bright star sometimes and the name of that star is the morning star... just after Sunset right near where the sun just set sometimes you can see this other bright star and that star is called the evening star... at some point someone discovered that these two stars were the exact same thing and they're not even Stars it turns out they are the planet Venus”
Frege's geometric example with a triangle: the point of intersection of lines A and B and the point of intersection of lines B and C are the same single point, but they have different names with different modes of presentation; this statement is informative and contains true knowledge because these two names present the same point differently.
“let a b c be the lines connecting the vertices of a triangle with the midpoints of the opposite sides... all three of these lines intersect they cross each other or meet at the very same point in the middle the point of intersection of A and B is then the same as the point of intersection of B and C so there's just one point here in the middle of this diagram but fra mentions at least two different ways of describing that exact same point”
Empty names are meaningful names that have a sense but no reference—they have a mode of presentation but don't refer to any object in the world; the phrase 'the celestial body most distant from the Earth' is a meaningful expression with sense but doubtful reference.
“there are what are today commonly called empty names these are names that are meaningful but they don't refer to anything it may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well-formed expression representing a proper name always has a sense this just means that if a name is Meaningful it has a sense but this is not to say that to the sense there also corresponds a reference”
In the telescope analogy, the moon itself represents the reference, the optical image projected onto the interior glass represents the sense, and the retinal image in the observer's eye represents the conception or experience—illustrating how reference, sense, and conception are related but distinct.
“somebody observes the moon through a telescope I compare the moon itself to the reference it is the object of the observation mediated by the real image image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope and by the retinal image of the Observer the former I compare to the sense the latter to the conception or experience”
Gottlob Frege's 1892 paper 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' ('On Sense and Reference') is the most important paper in the history of the philosophy of language because it introduces the foundational distinction that linguistic terms have both sense (mode of presentation) and reference (the object denoted), solving the puzzle of informative identity statements.
“this guy dolab Fraga published this paper Uber Zin un on sense and reference in 1892 and it is the most important paper in the history of the philosophy of language”
When you substitute a true sentence component (e.g., a name) with a false predicate in an identity statement like 'Shawn Carter is enshrined in the Country Music Hall of Fame', the resulting sentence becomes false, just as it would with any co-referring term like 'Jay-Z' or 'HOV'
“if instead of saying sha Carter is Rich this sentence said sha Carter is enshrined in the Country Music Hall of Fame well then three would be false but then the same sentence where you swap in Jay-Z that would also be false hve would also be false any sentence that is false of Shawn Carter is also false of Jay-Z is also false of hve swapping out these names with different senses but the same reference changes the thought or proposition but never changes the truth value”
Using a house analogy: a house viewed from the front (with fancy stonework and columns) and viewed from the back (with plastic siding) provides two different modes of presentation of the same object, just as 'Shawn Carter' (the kid from Brooklyn) and 'Jay-Z' (the mogul) are two different modes of presentation of the same person.
“imagine one of these ugly houses and in the front of the house there's like fancy stonework or bricks or columns or something like that but in the back of the house it's just plastic siding so you can imagine a case where you've seen this house from the front that's one way of viewing the house one literal angle or perspective from which you can view the house you might also Al see the house from the back that's a different perspective a different mode of presentation of the house”