
Warren Buffett: Why we don't invest in Nike stock 👟 Charlie Munger: We will never buy Nike stock 🏀
What this covers
This is a nine-minute excerpt from a Berkshire Hathaway shareholder Q&A, in which Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger field questions that begin with shoes and drift into sports equipment, sports teams, and how to judge a business. The opening question asks why Berkshire likes global brand leaders such as Coke and Gillette but stays out of Nike and Reebok. Buffett answers that he doesn't understand their competitive advantage over a 10 or 20 year span as well as he understands Berkshire's own shoe businesses. He says he is not expressing a negative view, only that he hasn't done the work. A follow-up praises Phil Knight as a terrific operator, but Buffett declines to say anything about the stock.
The conversation then widens. Buffett says sports equipment as a category has generally been unprofitable, and he cites golf gear, footballs, helmets, and baseball gloves, along with Berkshire's own experience with Spalding and Russell. He rules out buying a sports team and jokes that if either partner did, it would be time to discuss successors. A tangent on liability argues that a helmet or airport-security company is better owned by someone of modest means than by a wealthy corporation, because only the latter is worth suing.
The most quotable stretch concerns method. Buffett prefers to "multiply by three rather than by pi" and argues that thousand-page reports and PhD analysts do not reveal what a business will look like in a decade or more. Munger calls hiring credentialed experts to solve intrinsically hard problems one of the most dangerous ideas a person can have, and adds that he fears three things in construction: an architect, a contractor, and a hill. Buffett also dismisses seller-prepared projections, using Mark Twain's line about a mine and the barber who asks whether you need a haircut. He recalls a thick book of projections he would have paid $2 million not to read.
Buffett argues that successful investing requires understanding business fundamentals deeply, avoiding unnecessary complexity, and staying within one's circle of competence—a discipline that rejects both overconfident hiring and seller-provided projections.
- Businesses that are hard to understand (like Nike and Reebok) should be avoided even if they appear strong, because durable competitive advantage cannot be assessed without deep comprehension
- Simple, ordinary businesses yield exceptional returns when executed well; complex businesses with PhD-led analysis often fail to generate insight about their 10-15 year prospects
- Seller projections are inherently unreliable and should be ignored; buyers must develop independent views of the future or not buy at all
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A helmet company should ideally be owned by someone with minimal net worth ($1-2 million) with significant debt, rather than by a wealthy corporation like Berkshire, because poor owners will not be attractive litigation targets while wealthy corporations will be sued aggressively whenever helmets fail.
“the last thing B should do is own a helmet company that uh a helmet company should be owned by some guy that owes about a million dollars and doesn't have a dime to his name because uh you know he is not going to be a Target uh and we would be the ultimate Target”
The primary goal of business analysis and investing is to avoid being wrong about long-term business trajectories, not to be precisely right; avoiding dangerous errors is more valuable than achieving optimal predictions.
“the big thing to do is avoid being wrong that uh there's some things that are so intrinsically dangerous”
Some businesses are intrinsically harder to understand than others; Buffett and Charlie Munger deliberately avoid difficult problems and prefer to 'multiply by three rather than by pi' because simple businesses are easier to analyze and their competitive advantages more durable.
“some businesses are a lot easier to understand than others and Charlie and I don't like difficult problems I mean we we uh if something is is hard to figure you know I mean we we'd rather multiply by three than by pi I mean it's just easier for us”
Keeping business decisions simple means you don't have to hire out your thinking; exceptional results can be achieved through ordinary, simple execution rather than through exceptional complexity.
“don't have to hire out your thinking if you keep it simple you don't have to do we've said this before but you don't have to do exceptional things to get exceptional results”
Many people mistakenly believe that jumping over a high bar (taking exceptional actions) will yield more value than stepping over a low bar (taking simple actions), but in the investment world this is completely untrue.
“some people think that if you jump over a 7ot bar that the ribbon they pin on you is going to be worth more money than if you step over a one- foot bar and it just isn't true in the investment world at uh at all”
Berkshire Hathaway owns businesses like Brown & Texture whose competitive position and long-term durability Buffett understands deeply, whereas he does not understand Nike's and Reebok's competitive positions as well despite their status as global brand leaders in shoes.
“I just I don't understand that the I don't understand their competitive position and the likelihood of permanence of their competitive position over a 10 or 20 year period as well as I think I understand the the position of brown and dexture”
Berkshire has determined that airport security guard companies should be owned by individuals with minimal net worth (less than $100,000) without significant assets, because such owners escape litigation targeting and predatory claim behavior.
“a guard company at airports again should be owned by somebody who's net worth uh does not get out to two figures uh so so that that you won't see much of us in the sports arena”
Berkshire was previously offered the opportunity to buy an entire security guard business providing guards at airports, but declined because a wealthy corporation owning an airport security company would be a permanent litigation target—unlike a modestly-capitalized owner who would not be worth suing.
“we would be the ultimate Target that's the reason we used to but we'd had no interest in and we got offered the chance to buy the whole place and the idea of owning a business that provided guards at airports you know when anything went WR you know you're going to say it was the guard's fault and here's this super rich Corporation around there that is a perfect Target”
Complex businesses with thousand-page reports and PhD analysts working on them do not actually produce understanding of what the business will look like in 10-15 years; complexity defeats comprehension regardless of credential density.
“if you get into some complicated business you can get a report that's a thousand Pages thick and you got phds working on it but it doesn't mean anything you know what you've got as a report but you don't it you won't understand that business uh what what it's going to look like in 10 or 15 years”
It is naive and without utility for a business buyer to consider projections put together by the seller, agent, or their representatives, because the seller has financial incentive to misrepresent and the buyer should rely on independent analysis or not acquire the business at all.
“I I I do not understand why why any buyer of a business looks at a bunch of projections put together by a seller or or or agent or his agent I mean it you can almost say that it's it's uh it's naive to think that that has any utility whatsoever we just are not interested if we don't have some idea ourselves of what we think the future is to sit there and listen to some other guy who's trying to sell us the business or get a commission on it tell us what the future is going to be it it like I say it's very naive”
The phrase 'don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut' directly applies to projections provided by sellers of businesses, because sellers have built-in financial incentive to recommend the sale just as barbers have built-in incentive to sell haircuts.
“we had a line in the report one time don't ask the barber whether you need a haircut and uh it's quite applicable to projections of uh by sellers of businesses”
Hiring someone with the appropriate credentials or labels to solve a difficult problem is one of the most dangerous ideas a human being can have, because some problems are intrinsically difficult and no amount of credentials can overcome that difficulty.
“that is such an obvious point and yet so many people think if they just hire somebody with the appropriate labels they can do something very difficult that is one of the most dangerous ideas a human being can have uh all kinds of things just intrinsically create problems”
Mark Twain's characterization of mines as 'a hole in the ground owned by a liar' exemplifies Buffett's view that business projections are inherently unreliable because they are designed by interested parties (promoters, sellers, agents) with financial incentives to misrepresent.
“another of my heroes is Mark Twain who looked at the promoters of his day and he he said a mine is a hole in the ground owned by a liar and that's the way I've come to look at projections”
Berkshire became $3 billion better off in pre-tax value through an unnamed simple product and distribution system that required no specialized knowledge beyond what hundreds of thousands or millions of people already possessed—they simply did not act on it.
“we're $3 billion pre-tax better off than we were a few years ago because of it there's nothing that I know about that product or its distribution system it's finances or anything that really hundreds of thousands or millions of people aren't capable of they don't already know they just just don't do anything about it”
Munger has learned to fear three things in new building projects: an architect, a contractor, and a hill—because each introduces inherent complexity that credentials and hiring cannot resolve.
“I was dealing with a problem and I said this thing it's a new building I said this thing has three things I've learned to fear an architect a contractor and a hill and and if you go at life like that I think you at least make fewer mistakes”
Sports equipment manufacturing as a business category has generally not been profitable, despite Nike's exceptional overall operational success; Berkshire owns Spalding and Russell, which exemplify the generally poor economics of the sports equipment business.
“sports equipment has generally not been a very good business all you know obviously Nike's done incredibly well in its overall operation but but we own Spalding uh we own Russell and you know spaling has been around a long long time”
Buffett was once offered $2 million worth of business projections compiled in a very thick book when considering acquiring a company; he and his partner would have paid $2 million not to look at them, indicating that seller projections have negative informational value.
“I can remember war and I were offered $2 million worth of projections once in the course of buying a business and the book was this thick and for nothing and and if we were given it for nothing and we wouldn't open it you we we'd almost pay too million not to look at it”
Buffett would not be interested in buying a professional sports team, and if either he or Charlie Munger acquired one, it would signal that Berkshire should begin discussing succession planning.
“the answer to your question about buying a sports team is no uh uh in fact if if Charlie and I if you read that either one of us is buying a sports team it may be time to talk about successors”
Specific sports equipment categories including golf equipment, footballs, helmets, baseball gloves, and baseballs have historically not been particularly profitable businesses, despite the longevity and prestige of some (like A.G. Spalding's historical role in baseball globalization).
“the people that have made golf equipment golf equipment footballs helmets particularly uh baseball gloves baseballs it's not been a particularly uh profitable business and certain aspects of it like helmets”
Buffett owns a quarter stake in a major minor league baseball team, but this ownership does not meaningfully contribute to his wealth ranking on the Forbes 400.
“I own a quarter of a major minor league team but it's not responsible for my position on the Forbes 400”
Buffett will not pursue significant sports team or sports equipment acquisitions, and Charlie Munger reportedly likes such acquisitions even less than Buffett does.
“um Charlie are you looking at the Clippers or now I'm worried that he is no whatever Warren thinks about sports teams ownership I like it less okay Andrew”
Phil Knight is a terrific operator and a competitor who has substantial personal wealth invested in Nike, but Buffett declines to express publicly his views on Nike as an investment or on Knight's stewardship.
“I think Phil Knight is a terrific operator I think and and he's a he's a he's a competitor he's got a lot of money in Nike but as in terms of what we think of the stock you know we we keep all of those vied to ourselves pretty much”