
Dollar Milkshake Wrecking Ball | Brent Johnson & Michael Kao
What this covers
This is the audio from a Twitter Spaces event hosted by Demetri Kofinas, built around Brent Johnson, author of the Dollar Milkshake theory, and Michael Kao, who coined the "wrecking ball" metaphor. Michael Nicoletos and Michael Howell join later. The conversation starts from the dollar's run to 20-year highs despite years of Fed QE, and asks why that happened and what it does to the rest of the world. Johnson argues that the monetary stimulus of the past 10-15 years has benefited the US disproportionately. He also points to the eurodollar market, which is mostly debt between non-US parties and so gives everyone a reason to keep the dollar's position intact. Another speaker counters that Michael Cow's "accidental superpower" geography, including rivers, ocean buffers and farmland, makes the advantage structural. That speaker also holds that dollar network effects outclass Bitcoin.
Much of the middle is a tour of the damage abroad. Nicoletos explains why European inflation is mostly a supply shock, with gas prices rising from about 10 to 200 euros, so that ECB) tightening risks demand destruction without fixing prices. He describes Italy's bond problem, the fiscal gap between Germany and everyone else, and emerging-market borrowers squeezed by dollar debt. He also compares central bank balance sheets to GDP, arguing the Fed has monetized less than the BOJ or ECB.
The more contested ground is geopolitical and historical. Howell sees China's swap lines and digital currency as a long-run attempt at redenomination, treats oil routes and Russia as a naval-vulnerability story, and traces dollar hegemony to British lending suspended during World War 1 rather than to Bretton Woods. Johnson holds that reserve currency status is about power, not economics, so the US would keep its exorbitant privilege whatever it cost. The host's own view is more sweeping: nationalism historically beats liberalism, and the liberal order is an anomaly that fades as US hegemony does. Howell also raises the wealth skew produced by yield curve control and QE, and whether societies will tolerate it.
The dollar's dominance as global reserve currency is primarily endogenous to the system architecture rather than dependent on US economic performance; structural factors ensure the dollar falls last in any crisis, making de-dollarization attempts futile until the entire Bretton Woods framework is redesigned.
- System design ensures persistent demand for dollars across global trade and finance; 70-80% of dollar strength stems from architecture, not US exceptionalism
- Eurodollar debt and network effects create lock-in; alternatives lack sufficient liquidity and trust to displace the dollar in near term
- Rising dollar creates self-reinforcing doom loop as capital flees weaker currencies, particularly pressuring commodity-dependent and emerging-market economies
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Inflation in the US is driven primarily by demand-side factors (tight labor market) alongside supply shocks (energy), while inflation in Europe and other commodity-importing regions is driven predominantly by supply shocks; this difference means monetary policy is effective for US inflation but cannot solve European stagflation without collapsing demand.
“for the US there's a demand side inflation which is you know uh the labor market is very tight so there's a lot of demand but there's also a supply side issue which is the energy crisis...when we go to Europe for example or we go to Japan or we go to UK and commodities are priced in dollars and you get a supply shock like the one we got it means that the inflation you get in the rest of the countries is more supply-sided because the economy the labor market is not that tight so the demand side is not that tight and the supply side has just got a shock which is a supply shock so monetary policy is really effective when inflation is uh uh is coming from the demand side when it's coming from the supply side you face a serious issue which the monetary policy can't really fix unless it crashes demand”
Despite years of aggressive Fed money printing and QE between 2020-2022, the dollar reached 20-year highs, suggesting that Fed tools to weaken the dollar are insufficient against structural demand for dollars embedded in the system architecture.
“look at everything they did between 20 2020 and 2022. I mean they threw everything at it and yet here we are at the 20-year high right”
The US has unrivaled geographical advantages including river networks, oceanic buffers, and arable land per capita 15 times that of China, making it an 'accidental superpower' whose structural advantages persist independent of policy cycles.
“to borrow Peter zahan's uh phrase he called in 2014 he wrote a book called The Accidental superpower he calls the United States The Accidental superpower because despite all of our uh I guess you could argue you know bad policy choices on the world stage you know ephemeral presidential cycles that lead to inconsistent policies from one Administration to another we've we've become an accidental superpower by Dent of our unrivaled geographical advantages”
Nationalism trumps liberalism every single time historically; the liberal international order is an anomaly that requires hegemonic power (US) to sustain it; as that power wanes, national interests will reassert and the international system will revert to nationalist competition.
“nationalism trumps liberalism every single time so Michael Howell why don't you jump in here as I mentioned”
Europe's central bank (ECB) cannot effectively combat supply-side inflation through monetary tightening without causing severe demand destruction and unemployment, creating a political trap where rate hikes harm growth without solving the inflation problem.
“ECB cannot stop inflation they can only crush the economy and if they crush the economy yes inflation would come down but again as we pointed out earlier energy and food are inelastic Goods you need to move around you need to eat you need to hit your house your home”
The eurodollar market (dollars held and transacted outside the US) is larger than the domestic US dollar market and consists primarily of debt owed between non-US actors, creating a strong incentive to maintain dollar dominance because defaulting on this debt would be self-destructive.
“there's a euro dollar market out there which is dollars that exist outside the United States um that's probably bigger or actually it is bigger the euro dollar market is bigger than the domestic U.S dollar market and so then a lot of people will say well why don't the rest of the world just default on all of these loans that they have and then just there won't be any demand left for the dollar well the problem with doing that is that they would not be defaulting on the United States it's not the United States that lent the euro dollar market all this money I mean they lent them some of it but the fact is is that the euro dollar market lent other people in the euro dollar market all this euro dollar debt”
Europe premature green energy transition (committing to 2025-2027 decarbonization without infrastructure) created dependency on Russian natural gas as a transitional fuel, leaving Europe vulnerable when Russia was sanctioned, replicating the problem of de-dollarization initiatives that are 'too little too late'.
“Europe became so dependent on Russia and that's why Europe is here right now...one of the big causes that Europe is in such a mess is because it decided to become green before being ready to be green so they decided that by 2025 like you know 2025 or 27 they would Europe would be green and they thought that natural gas is green and they would turn into solar and wind and they would be fine but they they they brought the they thought this would happen much faster without even putting a plan in place and they got so fixated with this idea”
The Fed balance sheet represents only 35% of GDP, while the BOJ is 120-128%, ECB is 81%, and BoE is 39%; the US has monetized less debt relative to economy size than other developed central banks, making claims about Fed money printing excessive comparatively misleading.
“the boj is around 120 128 of Japan's GDP the the Eurozone is 81 of the Eurozone GDP the bank of England is 39 and the FED is 35 so if you you if you you are the biggest economy in the world everyone wants your currency everyone trades in your currency and your fed has only 35 percent only well only the relative word in this discussion you understand and everyone and you have only 35 is owned by your fed actually you've not monetized so much debt versus other people well versus other central banks”
The digital dollar and swap lines that China has established with 36 countries represent China's long-term strategy to eventually redenominate its trade in yuan overnight, attempting to displace the dollar in Asian trade and beyond.
“China has done in the last few years is to set up swap lines around the region I think there are 36 swap lines with other countries uh with their currencies into Yuan now the only reason that that will be done or is being done is that China basically intends at some stage overnight to redenominate trade it's trade in Yuan and basically try and kick the dollar out of its trade”
European natural gas prices rose from approximately 10 euros per unit in November 2020 to 200 euros in 2022 (equivalent to oil at $500/barrel), an unprecedented spike creating severe stagflation for energy importers.
“in November of 2020 natural gas was in Europe was around 10 euros per I don't know what the the metric is exactly and now it's at 200. so you understand that the cost uh being at 200 is the equivalent of oil being around 500 dollars”
Global Reserve currencies are fundamentally about power and enforcing will on the global stage, not about economics; the US would not surrender the dollar's exorbitant privilege even if economic costs existed because it provides geopolitical leverage.
“global Reserve currencies are not about economics I mean they sort of are but they're really about power they're really about enforcing your will and the rest of the globe and I know people don't like to hear that but if you really get down to the real politic of it that's the way it is”
China's oil supply vulnerability is critical; if China imports from the Middle East via sea routes through Southeast Asia, those convoys are vulnerable to naval interdiction; Russia provides a land-based alternative less vulnerable to blockade, explaining geopolitical tensions.
“China needs to import a huge amount of oil it can get that oil from the Gulf which it's doing now or I can get it from Russia which is not doing but it will do but in an ideal world for China in the future the problem with getting Middle Eastern oil or gold foil for China is that there's a long serial route back to China where the Chinese tankers are vulnerable to any attack so in any military conflict the supply chain that China would run that would run a gauntlet uh basically through southeast Asia it would be very very vulnerable there will be nothing able to protect the Chinese convoys”
Asset market inflation created through yield curve control and QE creates huge wealth and income skew in society, disadvantaging wage earners while benefiting asset holders, but this skew appears to be politically tolerable compared to the alternative of restructuring.
“what that does is it creates a huge skew uh in society uh it disadvantages a huge amount of people um but you know for the moment that's the world we're living in and I don't really see there as any alternative”
The average investor or analyst misunderstands the primacy of politics over economics in determining reserve currency status, leading to poor macro forecasts and risky portfolios.
“most macro investors and commentators in macro when it comes to where markets are situated within the political system itself situated within the National Security Paradigm... doesn't exist for a lot of folks”
China is intentionally strengthening the yuan despite its export-driven economy being weakened and competing currencies in Asia devaluing, indicating serious worry about importing commodity inflation rather than maximizing export competitiveness.
“last week we saw the pboc intervene to actually strengthen the Yuan which had been weakening precipitously throughout the year and that I think is a tell on just how worried China is on inflation because when you think about China's economy it's an export-driven economy right and they are very dependent on their current account Surplus so one would think that if their economy is on the back foot...all of their neighboring countries have devalued currencies that they would uh jump at the opportunity to allow the remingbi or the Yuan to to weaken but instead they did the opposite”
Oil is a demand-inelastic operating expense (opex) commodity in the short term, different from capex commodities like copper or cement, making it impossible to reduce oil demand significantly without economic collapse, intensifying the structural inflation problem.
“I call oil and Opex commodity you compare and contrast that to capex Commodities like for instance copper cement Etc that are more based upon you know economic growth oil is an up you know operating expense right so it is definitely demand inelastic in the short term”
Different European countries have very different fiscal capacity; Germany can borrow 200 billion for stimulus while other countries cannot, creating 'every man for himself' dynamic that undermines the EU's collective response to the crisis.
“Germany decided to to launch a stimulus of 200 billion for itself now you Germany can do that not all countries in Europe can do the same so suddenly everyone's for themselves”
The US dollar has network effects superior to Bitcoin and crypto alternatives; despite years of Bitcoin advocacy as the solution to dollar hegemony, adoption remains trivial compared to dollar usage in global trade.
“you want to know what has the ultimate Network effects it's the US dollar system and so um when you talk about alternatives to the dollar um you know yes there's there's some oil trade being conducted in uh between you know the Yuan and Russia directly”
Emerging market corporations and governments borrow in dollars instead of local currency because dollar interest rates are lower and the market is more liquid; as the dollar strengthens and US rates rise, these actors face a double whammy of higher FX costs and higher interest rates.
“having been an Emerging Market uh fan manager I've seen what the emerging markets do and what do they do they borrow in dollars why do they borrow in dollars because interest rates in their local currency are so expensive so they they go to the US dollar which is a liquid Market it has lower rates and they can borrow these rates so these happen on a global scale and as a dollar strengthens this means that all these countries and all these corporations in these countries need to repay these dollars the more expensive fx3 and they need to pay a higher interest rate because interest rates are going up so they have a double whammy”
Britain's relative naval dominance was eclipsed by the US within 20 years (1897-1920s), suggesting currency hegemony can also shift rapidly; the UK went from having the world's dominant currency (sterling) to the US dollar rising in 20 years, particularly during and after World War 1.
“in 1897 uh in the UK it was Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee and to celebrate the Diamond Jubilee they had a a sale past of the British Fleet uh where she was allegedly watching and uh you know giving the salute that Fleet took eight hours to pass by the queen um you know it was it showed the power the military power that the UK had in 1897 and that involved a fleet where no ships from Asia or India were included it was purely uh the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets so that basically showed the the if you like the military premise of the UK within 20 years stunning have been eclipsed by the US dollar okay”
During World War 1, Britain suspended all overseas lending by UK banks, creating a vacuum that US banks filled by developing a trade credit market; this was the beginning of dollar hegemony, not FDR or Bretton Woods.
“what happened in World War one is that Britain basically suspended all lend all overseas lending uh by UK Banks uh U.S banks muscled in uh they developed a trade credit market and that was the beginnings of of dollar hegemony the dollar went from nowhere to being the major Reserve currency in foreign exchange reserves of major countries by 19 by 1921”
Bear steepening (where longer-dated yields rise even as short rates are hiked) is possible during stagflation, contrary to decades of recent experience with bull steepening (where curve steepens during easing); the Fed is explicitly targeting positive real rates across the entire curve.
“so a bear steepening means that longer rates go higher even as the FED is hiking the front end compare and contrast that to a bull steepening where the yield curve steepens when the FED is easing the front end right so the the knee-jerk response you know Guided by you know Decades of easy money is that the yield curve only steepens through bull steepening but I have news for you because during periods of stagflation Bears steep bear steepening as possible”
When Italy faces 9% inflation but ECB caps bond yields at 5%, investors lose 4% in real terms, creating a problem of finding marginal bond buyers; eventually the ECB must buy all the debt, at which point northern European countries (Germany, Netherlands) will demand an end to 'burden-sharing'.
“in Italy inflation is around nine percent when you cap the bond yields and they haven't given a specific number but let's say they kept the bone yields at five percent it means that the investor who buys the Italian bond is willing to lose four percent in real terms...who will be the marginal Bond buyer for Italy...at some point when they realize that inflation is not coming down they'll say oh no five percent is not that good so who's going to be the marginal buyer so ECB will be forced to start buying more and more and more”
The dollar milkshake framework describes how repeated monetary stimulus across the globe over the last 10-15 years benefits the US disproportionately because the US dollar has structural advantages no competing currency possesses, allowing the US to capture capital flows while other nations experience liquidity deprivation.
“the solution has been to borrow more money Kick the Can down the road print money for lack of a better way of saying it...the whole world has quote unquote mixed this milkshake but for a number of reasons based on the design of the system uh whether it's fair or not fair whether it's moral or immoral the simple fact is is that the US dollar has several advantages that none of the currencies none of its competing currencies do”
The Fed faces a structural incentive misalignment with other central banks; unlike the past when the Fed could be a 'plunge protection team' for the world, the presence of structural inflation creates an 'every man for himself' dynamic where the Fed is not necessarily aligned with BoJ, ECB, or PBOC.
“it used to be that you know if if everybody uh were aligned cyclically economically uh then the FED can be the plunge Protection Team for the rest of the world right um but as last week's Bank of England uh intervention and the guilt Market showed there there are things about the current situation that make uh make the macro setup very very unstable because there are differing incentives...our fed is not necessarily aligned with the other central banks of the world and and will Nest don't count on the on the our fed to go back to QE just because the bank of England has to do so or that the bank of Japan has to do so”
The US will serve as a relative safe port in the coming storm not because the US is treated well, but because it is treated best relative to other currencies and destinations—a comparative rather than absolute advantage framework.
“the US will be seen as a relative um a safe port in in the coming storm”
Demographics may constrain China's challenge to the dollar; Peter Zeihan projects China's population could be cut in half by 2050, which would reduce China's labor force and economic power relative to the US, limiting its ability to challenge dollar hegemony.
“except the big the big wrinkle here is demographics because if you believe Peter zahan's demographics and it's hard to argue the math by 2050 he thinks the Chinese population could be half of what it is today”
At some point, northern European countries (Germany, Netherlands) and southern countries (Italy, Spain) will face an irreconcilable political conflict over burden-sharing and fiscal transfers, threatening the euro and EU's survival.
“there will be a political issue going forward which we don't know how it will be resolved uh so I think Europe is in a very tough spot and things are likely to get worse before they get any better because ECB is going to raise rates they cannot do anything uh regarding demand so they'll have to crush the economy in order to reduce demand and again but crushing the economy will not reduce demand for these Goods so much because there are inelastic and necessary goods for everyone so I think this thing was going to get much worse before it gets any better for Europe at least”
Yield curve control is returning as the policy tool of choice after the Bank of England intervention in September 2022; the Fed previously used yield curve control from 1942-1951, and modern research by the St. Louis Fed shows it was successful then.
“the alacrity with which they moved suggested that yield curve control is coming back and yield cure control is something that we've seen in Japan we've seen in Australia uh the US did it between 1942 and 1951 pretty successfully uh generally um interestingly I looked uh today at previous fomc statements about yield curve control and to my great surprise I discovered that uh lail Brainard and Janet Yellen when she was chair there were big Advocates of yield curve control”
The US fiscal situation is deteriorating faster than commonly recognized; US interest payment coverage (entitlement spending + military minus taxes) is currently 80%, meaning a 20% shortfall; in 5 years, if debt grows, this could fall to 25% coverage, making the US position unsustainable.
“looking at the debt coverage of the of the UK fiscal situation looking at let's say entitlement spending plus military expenditure relative to tax and then looking at that Surplus against interest payments interest was covered before the budget in the UK uh 1.8 times so it was 180 coverage...where is America now right now America is 80 So currently entitlement spending plus military subtract taxes does not cover the interest bill on U.S debt there's a 20 shortfall which means the US has to borrow in five years time that 80 goes to 25”
The world economy is weakening rapidly; FedEx's recent guidance suggests world trade will decline ~30%, which is consistent with a global recession scenario.
“look at the what FedEx announced 10 days ago if you extrapolate FedEx's announcement it's telling you pretty much that World Trade is going to be down 30 percent um that that's what it's consistent with so the Outlook is not Is Not Great”
Market has chosen dollar primacy through Bretton Woods 1 architecture by selecting it for superior liquidity, bond market depth, and capital availability, not through coercive imposition; the market continues to choose dollars over alternatives.
“the market has chosen uh to keep the dollar Primacy it's not as if there's there's behind closed doors that you know the overlords uh are still trying to keep prop the dollar up and against the Market's Wishes the market has chosen the dollar system because of its unrivaled liquidity adoption underlying depth of bond Market liquidity which is another key importance and all of that in turn stems from geopolitical advantages”
The US dollar is the least dirty shirt in a laundry basket of competing currencies; despite US monetary and fiscal mismanagement, other central banks have done the same or worse, so relative advantage persists.
“I called I called the US dollar the least uh the least dirty shirt right amongst the bunch and and then we can also talk about I know that uh we can also talk about some of the geopolitical factors”
The system design ensures the US dollar will fall last before other currencies; the only way the dollar falls first is if the Fed, Treasury, and US government collectively agree to deliberately devalue it overnight, which is unlikely.
“the basic design of the system basically ensures that the US dollar will fall last now the only way that the U.S dollar is going to fall first before these other currencies is If the Fed or the treasury or the US government in general all got together and agreed that overnight we are going to devalue it just unilaterally right in which case the dollar Falls versus all the other currencies I don't think we're anywhere close to that happening”
The alternative to perpetual debt growth is austerity or deliberate demand destruction; a business cycle must eventually occur where spending is reduced to match income, despite policy-maker preferences.
“the alternative is and and I and I think that the um there's no better way to or there's no better excuse to try to put in to sort of dampen the oscillations and that in that mental model then nine percent or ten percent inflation sooner or later you have to acknowledge that there is something called a business cycle and that austerity actually may may have to come to pass and and National balance sheets need to be shrunken one way or the other”
A paper by Michael Dooley and co-authors titled 'US Sanctions Reinforce the Dollar's Dominance' published by the NBER argues that the ability to impose sanctions is actually a feature, not a bug, of running a global reserve currency system.
“a paper I I mentioned written by Michael Dooley and a couple of other authors is titled U.S sanctions reinforce the Dollar's dominance and that's I think nber it's published on the mbr's website the National Bureau of economic research”
Investors should focus on liquidity risk and counterparty risk in the near term; liquidity crises can cause rapid systemic damage even if solvency is not in question, and counterparty risk deserves a premium as governments and banks become fragile.
“the two things that will play will be the most important things in the next couple of months and years is liquidity risk people need to focus more on liquidity risks because when there is no liquidity a lot of things go bad so you need to focus on that and the second thing that a lot of investors will need to start paying attention to which they haven't been for a long time is counterparty risk which everyone thinks that their counterparty is safe but through acids with no counterparty risk I think we'll in the next few years will deserve a premium”
The US 25% of global GDP but 87% of global trade; the fact that the economy is open and liquid enough to handle this volume is a sign of strength, not weakness, because it demonstrates the trust in and demand for dollar-denominated transactions.
“the US is 25 of global GDP but it's 87 of global trade...everyone's settling in dollars there have been some uh exercises in some attempts to uh to to to to trade in other currencies but this is a very small amount in terms of percentage versus the total amount traded you see that everyone wants the dollar”
The transition from unipolarity to multi-polarity is occurring while new systems have not yet formed, meaning we are in a period of undoing existing institutions without yet having alternatives; this gap creates instability and favors the incumbent dollar system.
“I also want to say this kind of highlights something that we talked about earlier which is the move from unipolarity to a new system that has not come into being yet it's not formed we're in this period of undoing and then creating something new”
China cannot realistically replace the dollar as global reserve currency in the near term because it would need to open its capital account and allow free float of the yuan, but its M2-to-FX-reserves ratio of 8% means capital would flee immediately if liberalized, breaching the historical 25% threshold where currency pegs break.
“if China were to open up its capital account if you look at and I mentioned this I've had this discussion with Michael Cowell previously if you look at uh M2 versus its FX reserves in China you will see that the ratio is about eight percent so if it were the the Chinese tigers the Asian tigers in uh 87 the pegs broke when that number breached 25 so now imagine with an eight percent M22 FX reserves and China and China opening its capital account everyone with one will convert their money and leave”
National security considerations, not liberal economic ideology, will become the primary organizing principle in the post-unipolar world; whether the EU survives depends on the US commitment to NATO security guarantees rather than economic integration benefits.
“when Michael N was talking one of the things that came to mind for me is something I've talked about on the show quite a bit on numerous occasions which is that the European Union itself came into being in response to security concerns a desire to tie the Germans into a European economy it was the European coal and Steel Community and I wonder whether or not the right framework to think about whether or not the Euro and the European Union survives in the face of the challenges that we see today is one that puts economics first or one that puts National Security first because I tend to think that so long as the United States continues to lead and is able to sustain its role as the leader of this Alliance in NATO and in Asia the European Union will stay together”
Brent Johnson's position is not advocacy for the current system but acknowledgment of how it actually functions; making a thesis politically unpopular does not mean the thesis is incorrect, and investors should separate their desires for how the world should be from how it actually is.
“advocating for something is completely different than acknowledging something I am not an advocate for the system I just acknowledge that I exist and I'm doing my best to kind of help everybody kind of see what's happening now whether it actually plays out this way I don't know uh but so far a lot of the things seem to be uh firing and so if you have big bets against the dollar I would encourage you just to at least think where you could potentially be wrong I know I always think always how I can potentially be wrong”
The 2008 financial crisis transferred bank debt to government debt; now the government is experiencing the same strains (currency weakness, fiscal deterioration) that banks experienced, suggesting the problem is structural and moving up the liability stack rather than being solved.
“in 2008 all the debt from the banks went to the government and now the government we're seeing the government experiencing issues which are seen in their currencies so I think people need to be very careful”
One key distinction is between the 'use of a currency' (how widely it's traded) and the 'level of a currency' (exchange rate); the dollar may be near peak level but is nowhere near peak use, which is what sustains dollar dominance long-term.
“I happen to think that we're somewhere near the peak in the dollar at the moment but I don't think we're near the peak in the use of the dollar and I think that's the thing that is is really sustained”
The Eurozone is probably in its most fragile state since inception because the euro was created to be a challenger to the dollar's reserve currency status but has failed; structural misalignment in inflation types across countries prevents unified monetary policy.
“the Euro was created and when it was created it was supposed to be to become a Challenger for the US dollar Global Reserve currency so 20 years have gone by and this hasn't happened and as we speak the euro is probably in its most fragile state since Inception”
The Fed's strategy in 2022 was to tighten monetary policy (reduce balance sheet, raise rates) to strengthen the dollar and fight inflation; the strategy in 2023 is likely to reverse—loosening balance sheet and cutting rates—to weaken the dollar and stimulate, based on economic weakness and political pressure.
“my simple take on what policy was this year was that U.S policy was pretty much about getting the FED balance sheet down and getting the US dollar up I think policy in 23 is going to be about getting the balance sheet up and the US dollar down and I think because the reason for that is the fed is going to break something and I think things are breaking fast”
The Bretton Woods system has never fundamentally changed; we remain in Bretton Woods 1 architecture, which is principally about free flow of trade and capital with the dollar as centerpiece, IMF and World Bank as enforcers, and US military as backstop—not about fixed exchange rates as commonly thought.
“Bretton Woods one actually we've never left Bretton Woods one and if you look at Bretton Woods one what was it really about it wasn't really about fixed exchange rates that was if you like an accident that came out of the uh the Bretton Woods agreement what Bretton Woods won was principally about was creating a system where you could get the free flow of trade and ultimately Capital where the dollar was the centerpiece of that of those arrangements where the IMF and the World Bank pleased um you know errant countries and where the U.S military essentially backstopped the system”
The US dollar's strength is 70-80% endogenous to system architecture and global Reserve currency design, with the remaining portion attributable to exogenous factors like US hegemonic power and structural advantages, rather than purely US economic performance.
“I can't put a percentage on it but I would say it not all of it but you know 70 or 80 percent of it I think has to do with the structure of the system itself and then I would put another big portion on the U.S you know as the global hegemon putting pressure on everyone else to keep the system as it is”
A complete debt restructuring in a sovereign context is analogous to a corporate bankruptcy and post-reorg equity; if debt becomes unpayable, it must be converted to equity claims backed by national assets, natural resources, and income-generating capacity.
“what is the Sovereign analog to a corporate restructuring what is the Sovereign analog to a post-reg equity where debt gets canceled right if if debt gets so large that the that the uh debtor can no longer afford the interest payments right there's something called a bankruptcy process that cancels the debt and the debt gets restructured into post-reorg Equity right”
Until the entire monetary system is redesigned and all debts are wiped off the table, the structural factors favoring dollar dominance will continue to assert themselves and the world will end up back at dollar strength even after temporary periods of weakness.
“until the system is completely redesigned we will end up right back where we are today now I don't know if it will take six months to end up back where we're at or if it will take six years to end up back where we're at but until the system is reset and tell all the debts are wiped off the table the system basically designed the system design basically ensures we end up back where we are”
Policy-makers will continue to kick the can down the road through yield curve control, asset purchases, or other tools rather than allow deflation or restructuring; this extends the timeline to eventual system reset but doesn't change the endpoint.
“policymakers are going to do is Kick the Can down the road and you know is that a 10-year Road a 20 year old a 30 year old I don't know but I think it's you know it's in most of our lifetimes I think it's going to keep kicking the can down the road”
If the Fed pivots back to QE, oil prices will spike dramatically because the structural supply deficit will reassert itself, causing the dollar to fall and inflation to resurface, recreating the boom-bust cycle without solving the underlying problem.
“if there is a real pivot oil will Moon and we will be right back to where we started”
OPEC+ announcing potential production cuts of up to 1 million barrels per day accelerates the structural supply-demand singularity point in oil, creating the 'synchronous wallop' rather than the asynchronous tag-team of core and energy inflation.
“if OPEC plus actually cuts and enters The Fray then instead of this sort of asynchronous tag team effect you have a synchronous Wallop that pushes the FED pivot even further out”
There is debate over whether a 'Bretton Woods 3' based on commodities or other system redesigns could emerge, but Howell and the panel are skeptical that fundamental redesigns will occur without complete system collapse.
“we're not only we haven't got a Bretton Woods 2 we're not going to get a Bretton Woods three uh based on Commodities whatever people may say it's basically about the the role of the dollar”
Multiple bouts of QE could occur before the dollar falls significantly; the unwind may take 3-6 years per cycle rather than 3-6 months, with multiple cycles potentially playing out over a decade before system reset becomes necessary.
“the dollar might fall from here it's had a heck of a run and I've never said it can go up in a straight line forever I think this could actually play out over several several years we could have one two three more bouts of QE before this is all said and done there's nothing that says this all has to play out in the next three to six months it could easily take another three to six years”
Brent Johnson has been early but consistent with the dollar strength thesis; he has maintained the thesis even when markets moved against him and returns were negative, showing conviction despite pressure to change views.
“he's been early but he's been there and he never changed his View and this is you know really admirable even though it wasn't working his thesis wasn't working for him for a few years but he kept on saying that this would happen and having been there I can say this is a very tough to keep your position and not change your mind even though if markets are going against you”