
Bonus: The World of Trump 2.0 | Foreign Affairs Interview
What this covers
This bonus episode of The Foreign Affairs Interview was recorded on November 6, 2024, the day after the election. Editor Dan Kurtz-Phelan talks with Daniel Drezner of Tufts and Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute (the transcript renders her name as Corey Shaikh and Corey Shaki). They use the first term as a guide to the second. Much of the conversation turns on Adults in the Room: Mattis and McMaster pushed back on Trump's impulses before, and Drezner argues that this time such figures will be absent or will be devoted to him.
The middle of the discussion covers specific theaters. On Ukraine, Drezner sees no sign that Vladimir Putin will concede anything, since he has already formally annexed the territory he holds. Schake argues the Biden administration's own timidity belongs in any account of who is responsible if Ukraine is abandoned, which is contested. On Iran, the speakers weigh a renewed maximum-pressure policy. Drezner warns it could speed up a nuclear weapon if it offers no off-ramp, and Schake notes that European help with sanctions faded after the JCPOA withdrawal. They also ask whether Trump's hostility to Iran will conflict with warming toward Putin, given the Coalition of the Sanctioned. The Abraham Accords are credited as the first term's main foreign policy success.
The episode also covers economics and institutions. Drezner points out that Trump's coercive bargaining mostly failed in his first term, outside Mexico. He expects tariffs, retaliation and inflation to cycle upward again, and he treats export controls on China as a bipartisan new normal that China will eventually work around. Schake says Trump underrates the pull of US security guarantees while pressing allies on burden-sharing, a complaint that dates to Eisenhower. The last stretch turns to domestic power: the Insurrection Act and Posse Comitatus, what the military owes in the face of illegal orders, and the risk that politicizing the civil service lasts beyond one term.
A second Trump administration will impose a high chaos premium on US foreign policy through unpredictable leadership, erosion of alliance networks, transactional diplomacy replacing credible commitments, and potential militarization of domestic policy, with particular risks in Ukraine, the Middle East, Asia, and institutional governance.
- Trump's 'madman theory' of bargaining and unpredictability makes it difficult for allies and adversaries to plan strategically, while his preference for transactional relationships over institutional alliances weakens US strategic position
- The absence of institutional restraints ('no more adults in the room') combined with personnel loyal only to Trump enables more radical execution of long-held impulses on tariffs, immigration, and military use
- Risk of permanent institutional damage through politicization of the military, intelligence services, and civil service via Schedule F, potentially compromising the foreign policy establishment for years
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The United States' principal adversaries are more constrained by its network of alliances than by its military might, and failure to adequately invest in relationships with allies will allow the alliance network to deteriorate and allow competing networks to emerge.
“as capable as the US military is the United States principal adversaries are more constrained by its network of alliances than by its military might and you go on to note that failure to adequately invest in relationships with allies will allow quote a long- tended Garden to become choked with weeds which would result and the emergence of other competing networks”
European participation was crucial to making sanctions on Iran effective and driving Iran to negotiate the nuclear limits in the JCPOA, and when the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA, Europeans stopped wanting to help constrain Iran, which will be a significant problem for a Trump administration seeking to take a hard line on Iran.
“what really made the sanctions effort that drove Iran into negotiating the nuclear limits was European participation right and when we withdrew from the jcpoa Europeans stopped wanting to be helpful to us on constraining the problem and I think that's likely to be a sign significant problem for a trump Administration which is going to want to take a very hard line on Iran but it's difficult to see how to make that effective since Russia and China aren't going to help they're Iranian allies these days and Europeans are likely to be freaked out by a trump Administration generally”
Technology and export controls on China have become a central feature of US foreign policy, with the control of technology flows to China now considered part of 'national security' broadly defined, and this represents a new normal in American foreign policy that will continue under Trump and likely under any president.
“the centrality of Technology some of that has been about export controls which have gone beyond what we ever imagined we certainly talk about export controls more in these kinds of conversations than we ever did before... Economic Security is now you know part and parcel of what you know US foreign policy makers are going to be thinking about”
Trump is a huge fan of 'madman theory' when it comes to bargaining, believing that if he rants, raves, and threatens economic consequences like tariffs, his bargaining partners will think he is crazy enough to follow through and will offer concessions to avoid escalation.
“Trump is a huge fan of the madman Theory when it comes to bargaining he really does believe that if he Rants and Raves and threatens to you know unleash fire and fury or the economic equivalent of fire and fury in the form of tariffs that he wants his other bargaining Partners to think that he's crazy enough to do it in the hopes that he can then get concessions of some kind”
The American military has no responsibility to obey immoral orders but does have a responsibility to refuse illegal orders, and military personnel cannot individually determine whether presidential policy is appropriate.
“it is a common fallacy that the American Military has no responsibility to obey immoral orders the American Military has a responsibility to refuse to obey illegal orders but we do not want a military where every major or Lance corporal is determining for themselves whether the president's policy is appropriate”
A second Trump administration will impose an enormously high chaos premium for president Trump as commander-in-chief and chief diplomat, making it very difficult for adversaries to anticipate US reactions and for allies to align their policies effectively with the United States.
“we will pay an enormously High chaos premium for president Trump as commanderin-chief and as Chief Diplomat and that makes it very difficult for adversaries to anticipate our reactions which can be destabilizing and it makes it very difficult for allies to align their policies effectively with our own”
Trump announced cooperation with Vladimir Putin for a cyber unit after a summit meeting and then reversed the announcement by tweet within six hours, illustrating his unpredictability and lack of understanding of diplomatic processes.
“my personal favorite during the first term was when he announced the cooperation with Vladimir Putin for the Cyber unit after a summit meeting that he I think managed to reverse by tweet within six hours of the announcement which of course you know was just sort of perfect”
Trump is pursuing a harder bargain on burden-sharing from European allies, which is not unreasonable given that the US has complained about European burden-sharing since Eisenhower's presidency, especially in the last 20 years.
“president Trump is telling people is that you know he's just driving a harder bargain on burdens sharing with Europeans and by the way he's not wrong right since Dwight Eisenhower was President we have been complaining about burden sharing and Europeans have done too little to address especially in the last 20 years”
If Trump takes a maximum pressure approach on Iran without realistic demands or off-ramps, it is likely to accelerate Iran's development of a nuclear weapon rather than constrain it.
“indeed if anything what it might do accelerate their development of a nuclear weapon”
The Abraham Accords, which Trump administration negotiated, were the main foreign policy success of the first term, bringing Gulf states to acknowledge shared security concerns with Israel, though at the cost of support for an independent Palestine.
“second thing I think he did well was the Abraham reports which I think were the main foreign policy success bought obviously at the cost of support for an independent Palestine but getting the states of the gulf and Beyond to acknowledge that they and Israel had common security concerns and the basis for deepening cooperation I think was an important thing”
Trump could invoke the Insurrection Act to get around the 1878 Posse Comitatus restriction on the use of the American Military for law enforcement purposes
“I do think there are real causes for worry about the president wanting to invoke the Insurrection act so to get around the 1878 restriction on the use of the American Military for law enforcement purposes”
Joe Biden kept most of Trump's tariffs in place, particularly with respect to China, and Kamala Harris shifted ever rightward during the campaign, showing continuity rather than difference between the Trump and Biden administrations on trade policy.
“B Biden kept most not all but most of Trump's tariffs in place particularly respect to China and On the Border K haris shifted ever rightward during the campaign so in some ways the victory that Trump won isn't just for himself it's also for those policy ideas”
Trump's track record during his first term with coercive bargaining was actually really bad: outside of Mexico he basically didn't get anything he wanted in terms of NAFTA renegotiation, didn't get much in terms of the Korea Free Trade Agreement renegotiation, and didn't get major concessions from either.
“we actually know how this went during the first term and the answer was not well Trump's track record when it came to coercive bargaining is actually really bad outside of Mexico he basically didn't get anything he wanted in terms of the renegotiation of NAFTA he didn't get much in terms of the renegotiation of the chorus the US South Korea treaty he didn't get a ton of concessions from either”
The bedrock of US foreign policy since the end of World War II has been the notion of credible commitments—that the US has signed treaties and agreements and will back them up, and that the power of deterrence is that you never actually have to fight because credible threats prevent conflict.
“the Bedrock of US foreign policy since the end of the second world war has been the notion of credible commitments it's the idea of we have signed treaties we have signed agreements and by doing so we are going to back them up and therefore the power of deterrence is we never actually have to do anything hopefully like in other words if deterrence works you never actually have to go to war”
The Biden Administration was timid in the risks it was willing to run to help Ukraine succeed, which Shaki argues should be considered in assessing responsibility for potential Ukraine abandonment under Trump.
“the current president had more than two and a half years to be able to assist Ukraine and the timidity with which we were willing to run risks in order to help Ukraine succeed I think also Bears some consideration”
If Trump follows through with tariffs as threatened, the European Union is already building a list of retaliatory measures, China is expected to retaliate, and the result would be an ever-increasing cycle of trade restrictions similar to what happened in 2019 which triggered an industrial recession, with inflation expected in this round when combined with tax cuts and labor supply reductions through deportation.
“we're in we're going to be in a very bad place I mean if he goes forward we've seen the European Union already start to build up its list of what it wants to do in response China I assume would retaliate as well there might be countries like let's say South Korea that decide they'd rather be on the inside of the security umbrella and it would be worth it to make concessions but by and large I think you would just see ever increasing amounts of trade restrictions the last time we had this it triggered an industrial recession in 2019 in this case I would expect it to trigger uh you know relatively healthy bout of inflation when you combine what he wants to do on tax cuts what he wants to do in terms of reducing the labor Supply through deportation and through tariffs”
So far there is no evidence that Vladimir Putin is willing to make any meaningful concessions on Ukraine—he has legally annexed the territories he has conquered, and unless Ukraine recognizes this, there is no point in talking about negotiation.
“the question is will Vladimir Putin actually be willing to make any meaningful concessions and so far the evidence is is that he does not I mean he's legally annexed the territories that he's conquered unless Ukraine recognizes that there's no point in talking about negotiation”
The difference in a second Trump term is that there will be no more 'adults in the room' or the adults will be slavishly devoted to Donald Trump's vision, unlike the first term when figures like Mattis and McMaster pushed back against Trump's impulses.
“the difference this time around is going to be there are no more adults in the room or the adults in the room will be slavishly devoted to Donald Trump's Vision”
Donald Trump has driven a fundamental sea change in how policymakers inside the Beltway think about trade and migration, with both policy areas shifting way to the populist right, regardless of whether Trump won or lost the 2024 election.
“you could argue Donald Trump really did have a sea change in the way that policy makers inside the Beltway thought particularly about trade and migration they have both shifted way to the populist right on this”
Trump will seek to create a Sunni Coalition that continues to put pressure on Iran, and the real open question is whether a rapprochement with Putin will complicate this strategy because of the 'coalition of the sanctioned' (Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China) and whether Trump's Iran animus conflicts with his desire to improve relations with Putin.
“you know you'll see efforts to try to create a sort of Sunni Coalition that continues to put the screws on Iran I honestly think the real open question here is If there really is a r pront with Putin to what extent does that affect what I like to call the Coalition of the sanctioned which is Russia Iran North Korea and China because Trump's enity for Iran is pretty real and particularly those of his advisers if there is one country that gets Mike Pompeo very exercised it's Iran and so the question becomes if he pushes on Iran to what extent does that create difficulties in terms of of trying to build a relationship with Putin”
Restoring credibility on Iran through military threats might affect Iranian choices, though Shaikh is skeptical of this because the Iranian leadership is increasingly entrenched, relies on the IRGC (Revolutionary Guards) for power, and the IRGC controls the economy.
“it's possible that restoring credibility more broadly might affect Iranian choices but I'm skeptical of that I think the Iranian leadership is ever more entrenched ever more reliant on the Iranian guards right the irgc for remaining in power and they're in control of the economy and so it's hard for me to see what short of either destroying the program or having the kind of credibility that Iran thinks you could get much done”
Trump dramatically undervalues the magnetism of US security guarantees and culture and overestimates how much he can demand of allies, particularly in burden-sharing
“the president dramatically undervalues the magnetism of the United States security guarantees and culture and he overestimates just how much you can demand of allies”
The biggest foreign policy opportunity the United States has been missing is consolidation of North America as a labor platform and energy platform, but this opportunity will certainly continue to be missed in a Trump administration due to his mass deportation and hardline immigration policies.
“the biggest foreign policy opportunity the United States has been missing is consolidation of North America as a labor platform as an energy platform in all sorts of ways and and I think we are certain to continue missing that opportunity in a trump Administration”
A pathological trend in US foreign policy is the reluctance of any Congress in a polarized era to ratify a president's foreign policy accomplishments if they are from the opposition party.
“this is increasing pathology by the way I would add of US foreign policy which is the reluctance of any Congress in a polarized era to ratify a president's foreign policy accomplishments if it's from the opposition party”
China will eventually indigenize its production and develop workarounds to US export controls, making these restrictions generate short-term gains but uncertain long-term viability.
“there's going to be a point after which these export controls don't matter as much um China eventually is going to indigenize its production and to some extent it's found workarounds R around some of the export controls and so um this is a policy that I think generates short-term gains for the United States and over the longterm I'm not sure how viable it's G to be”
The Trump administration's increased defense spending for the first two years was overdue, with Congress adding $27 billion to the president's first budget and $48 billion to the second one, and is poised to add between $21 and $43 billion to a third budget.
“first they increased defense spending for the first two years of the administration and that was overdue and is once again overdue you know on a bipartisan basis the Congress added $27 billion to the president's first budget $48 billion to the second one and are poised to add between 21 and $43 billion to the third one”
The problem with Iran policy across the last four administrations is that they are unwilling to carry out their declaratory policy that they will destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure if Iran doesn't concede Western demands, which undermines credibility.
“I think the problem with Iran policy across the last four administrations at least is that the administrations are actually unwilling to carry out their declaratory policy that they will destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure if Iran doesn't concede Western demands”
Attempts to push the military into inappropriate roles could damage the American public's relationship with its military in lasting ways.
“this could get messy in lots of ways that would do lasting damage to the American public's relationship with its military”
If Xi Jinping had to choose between Trump and Harris based on China's strategic interests, both represented poison: Harris was predictable (which is problematic) while Trump was much less predictable but more willing to let US alliances in Asia degrade.
“the my favorite phrase about the the Chinese perspective on the election was that it was choosing between two bowls of poison and with Harris representing a situation where she's predictable but the problem would have been that one of the things she wanted to do was build alliances out there Trump obviously much less predictable which is a problem but on the other hand far more willing to let the alliances in the area degrade”
Trump could be persuaded that the terms he set out—Ukraine willing to negotiate and Russia willing to negotiate—are conditions for his support, and if Russia won't come to a deal he will arm Ukraine even more than the Biden administration did, which supporters of Ukraine should try to hold him to.
“it does seem to me possible that President Trump could be persuaded that the terms he set out which is Ukraine's got to be willing to negotiate but Russia's got to be willing to negotiate and if Russia won't come to a deal that he will arm Ukraine even more than the Biden administration had those of us who believe in Ukraine's cause of restoring its internationally recognized territory um ought to try and hold the incoming president to that”
Pressure on Iran coupled with Israel's ongoing wars puts enormous strain on the government of Jordan, and the United States is underestimating how much Jordan could totter and potentially fall.
“the pressure on Iran coupled with Israel's ongoing Wars put enormous strain on the government of Jordan and I think we are underestimating just how much Jordan could totter and potentially fall so I think we're not worried enough about Jordan”
Israel's destruction of Hezbollah (Israel's proxy proxy in the region) might be consequential in pushing the Iranians back and puncturing their sense of having effective strategic depth through proxies, which could affect Iran's strategic calculus.
“one possible turn of the Kaleidoscope is that Israel's Wars have punctured the sense of Iran having an effective strategic depth through the use of its proxies I mean the ease of destruction of Hezbollah in particular I think might be consequential in brushing the Iranians back”
If tariffs go through, Trump is unlikely to mind, but he might back down if given a sufficiently shiny concession like a glowing orb or sweet investment deal
“in the sense that I don't think if the tariffs go through he's necessarily gonna mind but he might back down if he is given a sufficiently shiny concession”
Biden's approval numbers collapsed when Afghanistan fell, and if Trump cuts off Ukraine, the resulting humanitarian disaster will resemble Afghanistan or Vietnam but 'with white people,' which may not play well domestically in the US.
“remember Joe Biden's numbers started going into negative territory when Afghanistan fell if Trump Cuts Ukraine off you're going to see a version of Afghanistan or Vietnam but with white people and that I'm not sure is going to play very well in the United States”
The Middle East is the region that most missed Trump during the Biden administration, particularly because Trump's approach takes a harder line on Iran and, in the case of Israel, a harder line on Palestinians.
“actually the region that Coro IDs which is important is the Middle East and you can argue was the Middle East that actually most missed Trump for a variety of reasons they wanted to see a us that took a harder line on Iran and in the case of Israel a harder line on uh the Palestinians”
During his prior term, Trump tried hard to marginalize the chain of command by reaching past senior officers into the rank and file, and pardoned people convicted by courts martial to create personal loyalty with the military, which is a dangerous authoritarian tendency.
“in his prior term tried very hard to marginalize the chain of command and by reaching past them into the rank and file and by pardoning people convicted by courts martial for example to create a personal sort of torian loyalty with the military and that's a dangerous thing a dangerous authoritarian tendency that the president has”
The Trump administration plans to bypass the FBI in background checks and outsource to the private sector, which is a way of not really doing background checks at all, and potentially very compromised people could end up in positions of power, making them easy prey for countries like Russia and China.
“there are reports that the Trump Administration is just going to bypass the FBI completely in terms of doing background checks that they might outs soer to the private sector which is a polite way of saying they're not really going to do them at all and so you're G to have some potentially very compromised people um in positions of power and this is easy prey for countries like Russia and China”
If Trump is reelected, his America First foreign policy will have been validated and the result will be an America snarling into decline and a new order that excludes the United States, though there is cause for some hope because American culture is so brilliant and sometimes brutally in motion that standard models fail to apply.
“if Trump is reelected his America First foreign policy will have been validated and the result will be in America snarling into Decline and a new order that excludes the United States are we in the snarling into decline era of American foreign policy now I do absolutely worry about it I am however taking solace in the reflection of the Great American poet Robert Pinsky who wrote in 2002 in a beautiful book about poetry and democracy that American culture as I have experienced it is so brilliantly and sometimes brutally in motion that standard models for it fail to apply so I am taking Stace in the fact that the United States is so crazy risk tolerant and dynamic that we may find a way to thread this needle”
The first Trump Administration was 'a total mess' on process because Trump didn't expect to win, there was a very haphazard transition, and Trump hired people like Jim Mattis, H.R. McMaster, and John Kelly who were 'adults in the room' that often pushed back against Trump's foreign policy impulses.
“on process the first Trump Administration was just a total mess in no small part because Trump didn't expect to win when he did win it was a very halfhazard transition process and as you well know there was a lot of loose talk about when the people that he hired particularly in the area of foreign policy were viewed as the so-called adults in the room think Jim Mattis or HR McMaster or John Kelly or I suppose in a weird way Rex Tillerson at least at the outset and the result was was that these were people that frankly were very often pushing against what were Trump's foreign policy impulses”
Trump's substantive foreign policy priorities include trade and foreign economic policy, where Trump opposes any barrier to inward flows—whether immigrants, imports, or (with exception of foreign direct investment) anything else he dislikes.
“on trade and foreign Economic Policy which is basically there is no barrier to inward flows that Donald Trump doesn't like so whether it's immigrants coming in or Imports coming in or what have you with the exception of foreign director investment Donald Trump thinks it's bad”
Personnel is policy in a Trump administration even more than for most presidents because key agency heads and national security leaders can shape policy in areas where Trump doesn't engage in detail.
“Personnel is policy in a trump administration because of the extent to which key agency heads and ntion Security leaders are able to shape some of the policy issues where Trump is not getting into detail”
In the first Trump term, while Trump ratcheted up tariffs and economic pressure on China, he simultaneously sent constant signals that he wanted a grand bargain with Xi Jinping and was willing to trade away geopolitical interests in exchange for China buying more US goods.
“if there's been a pattern for how Trump has dealt with XI Jin ping during his first term it was simultaneously the ratcheting up of tariffs and other forms of economic pressure on China and at the same time Trump constantly sending signals that he wanted some kind of grand bargain and that he was willing to basically trade away everything except you know China buying more us Goods”
Xi Jinping can recognize a desperate interlocutor when he sees one, and Trump's eagerness for a Phase 2 deal is unlikely to result in significant concessions from China.
“I also am not terribly persuaded that xiin ping is going to go for it for a variety of reasons among other things he he can recognize a desperate interlocutor when he sees one”
Trump's foreign policy team will be split between people who legitimately believe China is the greatest threat and people who believe the trade deficit is the biggest threat, creating persistent internal tensions.
“Trump's foreign policy team is going to be like sprinkled between people who legitimately believe that China is the greatest threat and people who believe that the trade deficit is the biggest threat and so that is an area where I think you are going to see persistent tensions within the administration in terms of what to do”
Trump clearly believes in a much more transactional foreign policy, and there are foreign policy actors in the rest of the world that are perfectly happy to have that kind of relationship with the United States, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Serbia, Russia, and potentially China—countries that conduct foreign policy through mutual back-scratching enriching elites rather than based on institutions.
“what is interesting about Trump is that he clearly believes in a much more transactional foreign policy and there are foreign policy actors in the rest of the world that are perfectly happy to have that kind of relationship with the United States whether it's Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates or let's say Serbia or even Russia and China potentially these are countries that often when they conduct their foreign policy are engaging in mutual backs scratching that are not based on institutions but based on enriching Elites and that is Donald Trump's wheel house”
A Trump administration is more likely than a Harris administration would have been to increase US defense spending and defense industrial production in a way that might affect Chinese strategic calculations about the costs of challenging the US.
“I do think a trump Administration is more likely than a Harris Administration would have been or than a Biden Administration was to increase us defense spending and defense industrial production in a way that might affect Chinese judgments”
The last three months of the Trump administration (after losing in 2020) when he fired people like Mark Esper and Bill Barr and executed a radical series of last-minute foreign policy steps—withdrawing US forces from Germany, Somalia, and Afghanistan—are the best indicator of what to expect in a second Trump term.
“I think the the best Hallmark for what we'd expect to see for Trump's second term was actually what happened after he lost in 2020 the sort of last three months the transition as it were to Biden where he got rid of a lot of people that he disagreed with folks like Mark esper for example or Bill bar for that matter attorney general and really did try to execute a very radical sort of lastminute series of steps in terms of foreign policy withdrawing US forces from Germany from Somalia from Afghanistan and so so forth”
Trump is not an isolationist; he is a mercantilist who wants to bomb different countries, and the countries he wants to bomb are primarily in Latin America, which he has been forthright about, wanting to use military force against coyotes, criminal gangs, and fentanyl shipments.
“Trump is not an isolationist he's a mercantilist who wants to bomb different countries um and the countries he wants to bomb are all in Latin America um he has been very forthright about this about using military force to deal with either coyotes or criminal gangs or fenal shipments”
Corruption is an underestimated risk of a second Trump term, exemplified by Jared Kushner receiving $2 billion in investment from Saudi Arabia after leaving the White House, and Rick Grenell's real estate deals in the Balkans, suggesting Trump appointees may have private sector interests they will want to see addressed.
“I think we've underestimated I mean even within the first term you know Jared Kushner was worked in the white house and then after leaving the White House mysteriously got2 billion do worth of investment from Saudi Arabia and no one has explored that relationship Rick grenell is involved in a variety of real estate deals in the Balkans along with Kushner it would not surprise me if some of the people that wind up getting appointed have private sector interests that they will want to see addressed”
Trump thinks about tariffs the way the father in 'My Big Fat Greek Wedding' thought about Windex—as a cure-all solution—and has talked about tariffs replacing taxes as the primary income source, punishing countries diversifying away from the dollar, getting better trade deals, and creating incentives for domestic production, even though tariffs cannot accomplish all of these things simultaneously.
“Donald Trump thinks about tariffs the way the father in My Big Fat Greek Wedding thought about Windex which is to say he thinks it will cure everything he's talked about tariffs replacing taxes as the primary source of income he's talked about using tariffs to punish people if they diversify away from the dollar he's also talked about tariffs as a tool for you know getting better trade deals while simultaneously also using tariffs as a way to create incentives for domestic production and inward foreign direct investment now I'm not sure tariffs are great at any of those things but one of the things I'm quite certain of is they can't do all of those things”
Trump has threatened to fire 'woke generals' and if he fires the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs, this will create consternation in Congress and the defense department.
“president Trump has threatened to fire uh all the woke generals on one and so um if he for example fires the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service Chiefs um that will create quite some consternation um probably with Congress as well as with the defense department”
European countries on the central front confronting Russian aggression—including Poland, Hungary, possibly Finland, and the Baltic states—are likely to make compromises to keep the United States engaged and willing to support them, signaling they will align more closely with Trump.
“I think we're likely to see a beauty contest among Europeans Poland Hungary possibly even Finland the Baltic states the countries that are on the central front confronting Russian aggression are likely to make compromises to keep the United States engaged and willing”
During a second Trump term, it would not be surprising to see at least one or two military strikes in Mexico or Central America against criminal gangs and drug networks, presented as getting tough on criminal activity.
“by the way this is also an area where it's not just Trump saying this it's most of the GOP also saying this so you know would not surprise me if during a second term you see at least one or two military strikes either in Mexico or in Central America as a way of showing that he's getting tough with these criminal gangs”
American allies in Asia, particularly India and countries unhappy with the Biden administration, were more comfortable with a Trump administration and complained that Biden said he would show up for Asia but didn't physically show up, and they felt he was unduly provocative without building political or economic basis for Asia-wide allied cooperation.
“there are a lot of American friends and allies who were unhappy with the Biden Administration I mean India Prime Minister Modi is quite contented with President Trump's reelection many American Allies in Asia were more comfortable with a trump Administration and have been complaining Biden said he would show up for Asia and he didn't physically show up moreover they feel like he's been unduly provocative without building either the political or the economic basis for Asia wide Allied cooperation”
There is a real danger that the Trump Administration will abandon Ukraine, with Trump and his advisers plus Republican Speaker Mike Johnson all hostile to continued aid, and congressional Republicans unlikely to serve as a counterweight to the White House.
“I really worry that we will abandon Ukraine in the Trump Administration and it's not just president Trump and the people around him who will bear responsibility for that the Speaker of the House Mike Johnson has said he has no appetite for more Aid to Ukraine so you are unlikely to have republicans in Congress as a counterweight to the White House”
Trump's approach to Israel policy will be permissive regarding annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, settling of new Palestinian territory, and using Israel as a proxy against Iran, with Trump's main concern being public relations rather than enforcing international law or humanitarian limits.
“I think the change in terms of dealing with Israel is going to be if there is pressure from Trump it's pressure in a different direction Biden you know to the extent that you know he tried to restrain Netanyahu not that he succeeded all that much was you know basically trying to enforce the laws of war and try to push us for a ceasefire in Gaza as well as Tamp down conflicts with Hezbollah and with Iran I think Trump wants to see them accelerated he will have no problem with Israel annexing the West Bank he will have no problem with Israel annexing partisans of Gaza or creating new settlements there the only thing he will be concerned about there is literally the public relations of it”
The reaction of Mexico and other countries in the region to Trump's mass deportations is likely to be poisonous to any positive agenda for regional cooperation.
“I do think the reaction not just of Mexico but of other countries in the region of mass deportations is likely to be poisonous to any positive agenda we or they would want to have”
The Mexico relationship will also get complicated because of the domestic policy crises and democratic backsliding occurring in Mexico itself.
“also think the Mexico relationship is going to get more complicated anyway because of the policy sees the Democratic backsliding going on in Mexico itself”
Schedule F, a key plank of Project 2025, would allow Trump to fire civil service employees in Cabinet departments that are deemed sufficiently important, and Drezner has no doubt Trump will institute Schedule F when inaugurated on January 20th, creating a purge of foreign policy professionals across multiple agencies.
“recall that again this happened during the end of Trump's first term the creation of schedule f um which was a list of employees Civil Service employees and various Cabinet departments that were deemed sufficiently important that they could actually be fired as political appointees um this was a key plank of sort of project 202 25 that was put forward uh and orchestrated by the Heritage Foundation I have no doubt that Trump is going to Institute schedule F when he is inaugurated on January 20th so the word Purge is is a little strong but I think you're going to see a purging of a whole variety of you know foreign policy professionals ranging from state to treasury to the intelligence Community to the Department of energy and so forth that is going to fundamentally weaken the US foreign policy apparatus”
It would be difficult to sell Trump on why the US should care about the Philippines or other marginal security partners, though Australia would have an easier time because it is buying US submarines and AUKUS is a Biden achievement Trump may want to distance himself from.
“I think it would be a very hard sell to president Trump why we should care about the Philippines or more marginal security partners Australia probably has the easiest sell because they're buying a bunch of American submarines but that would be weighted against Aus being a major diplomatic achievement of the Biden Administration which may just touch off a disinterest in a trump White House”
Trump's hostility to Ukraine dates back to his first impeachment, which will play a significant role in how Trump thinks about this issue, and Trump felt compelled to meet with Vladimir Zelenskyy when he came to visit Kamala Harris, which suggests Trump thinks such meetings matter.
“there is no denying that you know Trump and to a larger extent his manga Coalition there is a russophiles and obviously Trump's hostility to Ukraine dates back to his first impeachment and you know don't underestimate the role that will play in terms of how Trump thinks about this that said it's also worth noting that Trump felt compelled to meet with valdimir zalinsky when he came to visit KLA Harris and the fact that he even thought that that meeting was important is in and of itself interesting”
The Biden administration failed to institutionalize US foreign policy accomplishments, as there is no multilateral regime on export controls and most Biden-era groupings are executive agreements that can be revoked by the next president, including likely withdrawal from the Paris climate accords.
“there is no multilateral regime to deal with export controls on China while it has created intern groupings these are almost entirely executive agreements that can be revoked by the next president which Trump may or may not do depending on the grouping we're obviously going to pull out of the Paris climate change Accords for example”
The problem of politicization and misuse of government institutions is not limited to the military but extends to the entire foreign policy establishment, including the State Department, Treasury, intelligence community, and Department of Energy.
“the problem is not limited to the military it extends to the entire forign policy establishment”
Robert Lighthizer, Trump's first-term US trade representative, will undoubtedly return in a second Trump term, likely going to Treasury or heading the National Economic Council, and is a huge booster of tariffs and protectionism as a way of getting more managed trade deals.
“one of the Personnel we haven't mentioned that is undoubtedly going to return in a second Trump term is Robert lighthiser who was Trump's first term us trade representative wouldn't surprise me if he goes to treasury or heads the National Economic Council this time and ligh ER is also a huge booster of the idea of tariffs and other forms of protectionism as a way of getting more managed trade deals”
Trump will likely start with military force against the Houthis in order to open up Red Sea shipping again, though there is no viable strategy for how that could work.
“it wouldn't surprise me if you see Trump starting off though with the use of military force potentially against the houthis because he'll want to see Red Sea shipping open up again I don't know if there's any actual viable strategy where that happens but you know that's never stopped Trump before”
Many people around Trump view continued US support for Ukraine as a bad investment and would like to cut US losses and focus resources on China.
“there are a lot of people around him who clearly see this as a bad investment for the United States and would like to you know kind of cut our losses and focus on China”
Potential Trump second-term appointees like Robert O'Brien at National Security Council, Mike Pompeo as Secretary of Defense, and Bill Hagerty as Secretary of State are within normal bounds of American foreign policy, operating within 'the 30 yard lines' rather than far ideological extremes.
“Robert O'Brien back at the nation Security Council or Mike Pompeo former Secretary of State being Secretary of Defense Senator Bill Hagerty becoming Secretary of State obviously that's all just gossip at this point but those are all people who are you know if not within the 40 yard lines of American foreign policy within the 30 yard lines”